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Abstract 
In the inter-war years, the Australian War Memoria l was one of the nation's premier 
cu ltural institutions, its displays addressing Australia's fundamental nation-building 
experience up until that time. the First World War. However, these displays have not 
before been fore-grounded in interrretations of the insti tution in this period. The study 
that follows seeks to make inter alia a contribution compensating for this lacuna in 
our knowledge. offering a new understanding of the Memorial obtained through a 
fresh methodology. It also adds to our understanding of the Anzac Legend and 
Australian commemoration in the inter-war years. as well as Australian nationalism. 
Envisioned and guided by Australian Official War Correspondent and 
Historian C.E.W. Bean, the Memorial's inter-war displays ( 1922-35) offered a heroic 
vision of the Australi an war experience, with a narrative of test, ordeal and triumph at 
their heart. Integrated into this was an interpretation of why the Australians had come 
through victoriously. focussed on perceived martial vi11ues such as courage, 
detem1ination, feroc ity and nobil ity. In addition, proof was offered that Australian 
soldiers had been superior to thei r opponents. At the same time, the Memorial dealt 
sensitively and honestly with defeat, death and the wounded, although these subjects 
were treated so as to play down their hoiTor and emphasise Austral ian triumph over 
them. Further. the displays were govemed by a strict real ism of presentation which 
operated through a process 1 have named "naturalisation" to insist that both mil itary 
fact and moral assertion were equall y true. I have labelled the Memorial 's version of 
the Australian overseas war experience the "national" interpretation of it. 
It is argued that the influence of what I label "martial" nationalism was the key 
to these displays, as it was the key to Australian commemoration more broadly. This 
was a major mode of nationalist thinking in Europe before 1914, expressed in a 
complex of war memorials and triumphal writings that equated national identity with 
success on the battlefield. Certain educated Austra lians were seeking a nationa l 
history which could compete on this martial ground in the same pre-war period, and 
when the Australian troops performed creditabl y in 1915 and 1916, and vvith 
increasing effectiveness in 19 1 7 and 1918, martial nationalism was embraced, 
complete with its accompanying glorification of victory. 
A major aspect of Austral ian inter-war commemoration was the enunciation of 
an Austral ian national identity. Two major nationalist models were taken up, the 
martial, championed by educated Anglo-Australian elites, and what might be termed 
the "developmental," advocated by such moderate Leftist groups as the Australian 
Labor Pat1y. These were manifest in two "cultures," which have been labe lled the 
"monumental" and the "anti-monumental." The fonner recognised the horror of war, 
but concentrated upon the posit ive clements of the Australian war experience, 
building a major national tradition upon those elements. The latter could not see 
beyond the horror. The result of these varying visions of the war was that the 
monumental cu lture wished to publicly remember the war forever, "to keep green the 
memory of the AIF." whi le the anti-monumental argued that the war experience 
should be consigned to oblivion. The monumental culture was dominant; indeed, it is 
suggested that this was the predominant commemorative reaction in the immediate 
post-war years. The so-called Anzac Legend, a myth focussed upon the characteristics 
of the typica l Australian soldier (and by extension, the typical Austra lian citizen), 
which emerged from the war and which was regularly reheaTSed on commemorative 
occasions and in war literature, was strongly martial nationalist, being founded upon 
an assertion of Australian mil itary supretnacy. 
Through its war narrative, its interpretation of typical soldierly characteristics 
of Australians, and its proof of military supremacy, the Memorial made a significant 
and enduring contribution to the monumental culture and its ma1tial nationalist vision 
of the war. Its displays outlined the characteristics of a typical solider, and thus typical 
Australian male, thereby promoting the martial vision of Australian identity against 
competing visions. It held physical evidence for the many publ ic asse1tions made 
about Australian soldiers and their mil itary abi lities. Also, the Memorial embodied a 
strong masculinist ideology; men had defended the nation, its logic asse11ed, and this 
made their citizenship deeper and more imp01tant than women's. 
Finally, all memory of the war was imbued with political connotations. and 
throughout its inter-war life the Memorial was associated with the lead ing figures of 
conservatism in Austral ia, with Nationalist politicians and returned officers on its 
controlling committee. Its messages about the war were in broad agreement with 
those of the dominant right-wing groups in the country, including the RSSILA, whose 
agents controlled vital commemorative days and whose non-political stance masked a 
clear conservatism. 
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I 
They gave their lives. For that public gift they received a 
praise which never ages and a tomb most glorious - not so 
much the tomb in which they lie, but that in which their fame 
survives, to be remembered for ever when occasion comes 
for word or deed. 
- Morto for the Australian War Memorial. adopted 1926. 
The Museum is rich with the individual genius of the 
Australian soldier. ... The true sign ificance of the greater part 
of the exhibits lies, not in their character as battlefield curios, 
but as emblems of those splend id qualities which made the 
Australian soldier - to quote the words of Marshal . Foch -
"the greatest individual fighter in the war." 1 
- Excerpt from Foreword to 1922 guide to the Australian War 
Memorial. 
In the aftermath of the First World War. many belligerent countries erected national 
war memorials as tributes to their war dead. Australia's memorial was unique, taking 
the form of a military, technology and social history museum, originally called the 
1 Australian War Museum. The Relics and Records of Auslraba 's Effort in the Defence of I he f:'mpire. 
19/.J-1918, (Melbourne: s .n., 1922), Foreword. 
Australian War Museum and later known as the Australian War Memorial ? The 
Memorial's inter-war exhibitions, to which this study is devoted, first opened in the 
Melbourne Exhibition Building on 24 Aptil 1922, following Federal Cabinet approval 
on 29 August 1917.3 The exhibition incorporated war materiel which the Australian 
Imperial Force (AIF) had taken from the Germans and Turks during the war, 
commonly referred to as "trophies," and objects used by the Force, known as "relics.'' 
The Victorian State Governor, George Mowbray, Earl of Stradbroke, presided over 
the opening, and Australia's foremost soldier, Lieutenant-General Sir John Monash, 
declared his wish that the museum become "a Mecca for all Australians."4 Conceived 
and guided by Austral ian Official War Corespondent and Historian, utopian 
nationalist and master propagandist C.E. W. Bean, the Memorial was designated as the 
Australian National War Memorial in 1923, following intensive lobbying by Bean and 
certain of his allies; legislation was passed to this effect in 1925. 5 
The Memorial's Melbourne exhibition ran from 1922 to early 1925, when the 
displays were moved to Sydney and housed in its Exhibition Building until 1935.6 
The Melboume exhibits were seen by 776,000 people, and those in Sydney by over 
2,000,000 (with the first mi llion viewing the exhibits in the first two years). 
Considering that during this period the population was growing from its 192 I census 
figure of 5,435,734 to that of 1933, 6,629,839, this was a considerable vote of 
z Hereafter referred to as the Memorial. I have chosen to use the term "Austral ian War Memorial" 
throughout the dissertat ion to refer to 1he institution at any time of its life, for the sake of simplicity and 
to reflect its supporters· attitude that it was the nation's memorial to its war dead, regardless of when 
that official designation came to it. 
3 Minutes. Australian War Museum Committee (hereafter A WMC). inaugural meeting. 26 June 19 18. 
AWM 170 1/1. 
~Age. 25 April 1922. p.8. Sir John Monash ( 1865-1931). b. West Melbourne, Victoria. d. lona. 
Victoria. Commanded 4'h Brigade at Ga ll ipoli. and 3'" Division on the Western Front from July 1916 
until May 19 18, scoring signal victories at Messines (June 1917) and Hamel (July 1918). Commanded 
Austral ian Corps from I June 1918 until the end of the war. Lionised after the war for his handl ing of 
the Australian Corps in the victorious offensive of summer and autumn 19 18. Bedc Nairn and Geoffrey 
Searle (general eds). Australian Dictionwy of Biography, 1·oi.IO. (Melbourne: Melbourne University 
Press, 1979). pp.226-9 (hereafter ADB) pp.543-9; P.A. Pederson. ·•General Sir John Monash: Corps 
command on the Western Front," in D M. Horner (ed.). The Commanders: Australian military 
leadersl11j1 in the tH enlieih centw:\', (Sydney: Allen and Unwin. 19~4) , pp.85- 125. . 
~ Charles Edwin Woodrow Bean ( 1879-1968), b. Bathurst. New South Wales (hereafter NSW), d. 
Sydney, NSW: journalist and historian. See ADB, vo/.7, pp.226-9. For more details on Bean, sec 
Chapter Three. The Memorial was legally created by An Act to Provide for the Establishment o( the 
Australian War Memorial and for Other Purposes. No. 18 of 1925, assented to 26 September 192S. 
6 A small collection was reta ined on display at the Memorial 's offices, which remained in Melbourne. 
2 
popularity; the attendance figures were above those for museums such as the 
Australian Museum in Sydney (whose 255,000 vis itors for 1925 were more than 
matched by the Memorial in its first three months). 7 The Memorial was a significant 
cultural institution in inter-war Australia, and the only one that was overtly and 
officially "national." 
The collection and display of trophies was at the heart of the Memorial in the 
1922-35 period. As a national war memorial , it was unique in two ways, both 
concern ing trophies. Fi rstl y, it was a military museum, displaying a large amount of 
equipment captured from the enemy in an attempt, its principal founding document 
stated, to create "the most prominent traditions" of the Australian nation.8 Secondly, 
the Memorial's first task, even before organising exhibitions, was to coordinate the 
provision of a large number of captured enemy field guns, mortars and machine guns 
to Australian municipalities, with a view to their being displayed in public areas.9 
The display of trophi es also occurred in Canada, the United States and New 
Zea land. but the des ignation of a mi litary museum as the national war memorial was a 
development unparalleled among belligerent countJies. 10 No other nation involved in 
the confl ict seemed as eager to display the destructive hardware of the war to its 
public, either during or after the war. In Britain, for instance, a collection of war 
materiel was referred to in 1927 as "the rusting dusty relics of destruction and poor 
pathetic reminders in cloth and metal and bloodstains of a host of broken lives." 11 In 
Australia. on the other hand, the Memorial's collection was variously described as 
"sacred," ''the most significant and stirring place in all Australia," and "a fitting 
7 See A WM 265 17/2/3 and Table SR 123-130: "Visitors ro Museums and Art Galleries. Australia 
1906-1927 ," Wray Vamplew ( ed), A mrralians: f-lisrorica/ Starislics, (Sydney: Fairfax, Syme and 
Weldon, 1987), p.391 : Table POL 185-193: "Population by Age Group. States, 1921 Census" and 
Table POL 194-202: "Population by Age Group, States, 1933 Census." Historical Sratisrics, p.36. 
~ See Chapter Three. 
9 Michael McKernan. Here is their Spirir: A histO(i' o.f 1he Aus fl'cilian War /1-femorial, (SI Lucia: 
University of Queensland Press in association with the Australian War Memorial, 199 1 ), pp.70-2; 
Mark Clayton, "To the Victor Belongs the Spoils: A history of the Australian war trophy collection' ' 
Parts 1-2: ''The Trophy Tradition." Part 3: '" One for every city,'" Sabrelache. 36.3 (July/ September 
1995), pp.ll -22: 36.4 (October/ December 1995). pp. l2-29; 37, 1 (January/ March 1996), pp.3-26: K.S. 
Inglis, assisted by Jan Brazier, Sacred Places: War memorials in 1he Ausrra/ian landscape, 
(Melbourne: Micgunyah Press at Melbourne University Press, 1998), pp.l 7S-9. 
10 See Clayton, ''To the Victor,'' Part 3, pp.5-6, 12. 
11 Quoted in Gaynor Kavanagh, Museums and the Firs! World War, (Leicester: Leicester University 
Press, 1994), p.ll6. 
3 
national memorial."12 Furthennore, the attempt by Sir Ma1tin Conway and others to 
have the Imperial War Museum adopted as the British National War Memorial was 
rejected in Cabinet, in August 191 7, with a certain revul sion. 13 Ultimately the Cabinet 
fe lt that making a museum the national war memorial "would be an unjustifiable 
I . I I . h '"' '' 14 extravagance now and a w 11te e ep 1ant tn t e JUture. 
Further compounding the d istincti veness of the Memorial were the messages 
attached to these trophies in its displays. The principal elements of these were 
expressed succinctly by the institution 's motto and the foreword to its first gu idebook. 
As the motto declared, the Memorial was dedicated to offering the Australian war 
dead "a praise that never ages." The foreword expl ained that this praise was deserved 
primarily because of the Australians' military supremacy, and expressed principally 
through displays depicting the Australian soldier as a great and victorious fighter. 
Military success would be the principal element of the fame of the dead enshrined 
foreve r in the "tomb most glorious." In addition , this fame based upon martial 
supremacy would be an unfa iling source of national inspiration in the future. 
Within the Memoria l's inter-war displays, victory was also offered as the 
ultimate justification for the cost of the war1 which was presented in a selective yet 
reali stic manner. Death, defeat and the wounded were all depicted within the displays, 
as part of a comprehensive " national " interpretation of the Australian overseas war 
experience which claimed positive results for the Australian nation in almost every 
facet of that experience, be it victorious, disas trous or bleak. The Memorial presented 
the naiTati ve of the Austral ian overseas war experience in a public war history of test, 
ordeal and triumph, arguing that the enormity of the ordeal made the triumph all the 
greater. At the same time, the dead symbolically conquered mortality through their 
depiction as victorious heroes sacrifi cing their lives for victory, and, in the 
Memorial ' s rhetotica l logic, provided as they did so an everlasting inspiration to the 
1 ~ See respectively Thomas Ley and Thomas White. two Nationalist parliamentarians who were not 
otherwise especially prominent in commemorati ve debates. Commonwealth of A ustra I ia, 
Parliumenrw~v Dehares (hereafter CPD). vol. l l9, 4 September 1928, p.316 and vol. 12 1, 22 August 
1929 p.261 : Melbourne Herald. 25 April 1924. quoted in McKernan, Here Is Their Spirir, p.75; and 
Senator George Pearce. Chairman of the A WMC, CPD. v. l 05. 22 August 1923. p.3265 . 
13 Sec Ka vanagh, Museums and rhe Firs! Wurld War, p.135 . Sir William Martin Conway ( 1856-
1937). b. Rochester, Kent. England, d. London. England. Director-general of the Imperial War 
Museum 1 917- .~7 . H.C.G. Matthew and Brian Harrison (eds). Oxford Dicrionan· o( Na tional 
. - . 
Biography (hereafter ODNB) . vol. I 3. (Oxford: Ox ford University Press, 2004), pp.58-60. 
IJ Kavanagh, Museums and the First World War, p.l 35. 
4 
nation they had g1ven their lives for. Death was transformed into glory, the men 
remembered not in eclipse but in apotheosis. It was through praise for military 
qualities. then, that the "fame" of the dead would primarily survive, and this provided 
a perpetual reward for the public gift of their lives. This objective was eventual ly 
materialised in 1950 in the stained glass windows of the Hall of Memory in Canbena, 
the Memorial's "c rowning feature" as Bean called it. 15 The qualities embodied in 
glass, asserted to be typical of Austral ian soldiers. are, firstly, the "personal qualities" 
of Resource, Candour, Devotion, Curios ity and independence, seen in the South 
Window; the West Window's "social qualities" Comradeship, Ancestry, Patriotism, 
Chivalry and Loyalty; and the "fighting qua lities" Coolness (in action, especially in 
crisis), Control (of self and others), Audacity, Endurance and Decision, depicted in 
the East Window. 16 The Memorial displayed these, and certain other martial virtues 
such as feroc ity. ruthlessness and a determination to prevail , throughout the inter-war 
years. 
The depiction of the men as victorious was conceived as a national public 
service, a nation-bui lding service des igned to strengthen emotional bonds within the 
Australian nation through common veneration of mighty warrior compatriots who had 
faced a terrible ordeal and triumphed. The Memorial promoted such nation-building 
in everything it did. This included the provision of a triumphal national war history 
and displays offering "proof' of Austral ian mi litary supremacy, while the Memorial's 
commitment to and caring affection for its nation were never more clearly seen than 
in the museum's treatment of elements of the war that were less triumphal - death, 
defeat and the wounded. All of these aspects of the Australian overseas war 
expe1ience- battles, military effectiveness, "splendid qualities," the "realities of war'' 
- were depicted within the comprehensive "national'' interpretation of the war. This 
dissertation is concerned with documenting, analysing and contextualising this 
"national" interpretation of the overseas war experience during the period 1922-35, in 
its roots, its objectives, its composition , and its political and social affiliations. Unlike 
previous studies. it places tbe Memorial's main rhetorical displays at the forefront of 
inquiry, as befits Austral ia's first truly ''national" rnuseum. 17 
I' 
· Press Release, 21 March 1928. A WM 38 3DRL 6673. ltcm 620. 
16 
www.awm.gov.au/encyclopedia/hall/stained.htm. 
5 
This introduction incorporates another four sections. The first outlines my 
reading of the contours of Australian public memories of the war, and how these 
related to the Memorial. It includes an examination of the issues which r feel are 
relevant, and which I address in the dissertation. The second section places Australian 
reactions to the war into the larger international context of what I feel was a process 
of fundamental change in commemorative style throughout Western nations. The 
third explores the extant li terature on the Memorial, which I critique and attempt to 
complement in this study. The fina l section offers outlines of the chapters to come. 
Theories of social remembering inform the d issertation throughout, for it IS 
concerned with ''public memories," themselves elements of a larger "collective 
memory." 1!J Nachman Ben-Yehuda, following pioneeri ng scholar Maurice Halbwachs, 
defines ''collective memory" as " memOJi es of a shared past that are preserved by 
members of a specific group who experience them." 19 I define "public memories" as 
those memories which are articul ated in public through a message-vehicle such as the 
spoken or written word, the arts, or any other physical means of communication. They 
17 By ··rhetorical" displays I mean severa l kinds of display. Fi rstly, they include those which deail wi th 
military actions, which I have labelled "campaign" displays because they were organised according to 
battle and presented chronologically. These include exhibits of objects. dioramas. and paintings and 
sculpture. Rhetorical displays also include the photographic collection. whose labels contained 
numerous stories re lating mil itary deeds. In contrast, "technical" exhibits explained how mi litary 
hardware operated. Some technical displays had subsidiary rhetorical clements. but in general they 
offered audiences a technica l military education. which was a subsidiary objective of the Memorial. 
Despite this being a subsidiary objective. the museum had a large number of display cases devoted to 
techn ical displays. close to fifty percent in Melbourne. 
tx For a recent survey of this literature, sec Barbara A. Misztal. Theories of Social Remembering, 
(Maidenhead: Open University Press. 2003). The principal sources I consu lted included Maurice 
Halbwachs, On Co//ecril·e !14ei1101J', Lewis Coscr (cd. and trans.). (London: Chicago University Press, 
1992): Jacques Lc Goff, The Medie1·al Imagination. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 1988): 
Kate Darian-Smith and Paula Hamilton, " Introduction," in Kate Darian-Smith and Paula Hamilton 
(cds). JlfemoJ~\" rllld HistOr}.- in Twentielh-Cen!UJ)" Austmliil. (Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 
1994 ), pp. l-6: Paula Hamilton. "The Knife Edge: Debates about memory and history," in Kate Darian-
Smith and Paula Hami lton (eds). Me1110I)" and HistOJ~1" in T11·entieth-Centw}'" Austmlia, (Melbourne: 
Oxford University Press. 1994). pp.9-32: Annette Hamilton, "Skeletons of Empire: Australian and the 
Burn1a-Thailand railway." in Kate Darian-Smith and Paula Hamil ton (eds), Memon• and Histon' in 
. . 
TH•emieth-Ce!IIUIT Auslrulia, pp.92- I 12: Edward Shils. Tmdirion. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
198 I): Michael Schudson. "The Present in the Past versus the Past in the Present.'' ConunwliC(Ifion, 1 1. 
19X9. pp. l 05- 113: Barry Schwartz, ''Social Change and Collective Memory: The democratisa tion of 
George Washington." American Sociological Re1·ieu·, 52.2 (April I 99 I), pp.221 -36: Michael Kammen, A 
Season o( Yourh: The American ReFolution and rhe Hisroricul Imagination, (New York: Knopf. 197X): 
George Lipsitz. Time Passages: Co//ecti1·e memorr and American popular wlture. (Minneapolis: 
Univers ily of Minnesota Press. 1990): Michael Kammcn, Myslic Chords o{Memorr: The lrans(ormarion 
of 1radirion in American eulture. (New York: Vintage Books, 1993): Carl J Friedrich and Zbignicw K 
Brzezinski. Totaliroriun Dictulorship und Aulocracy. 2nd edn, (New York: Praeger, 1961): Gilbert 
Morris Cuthbenson. Political Afylh u11d Epic, (M ichigan State University Press. 1975). 
19 Nachman Ben-Ychuda. The Masuda Myth: Collective memorF a11d mythmaking in Israel, (Madison: 
University of Wisconsin. 1995). p.272. 
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differ from "pri vate memories" in that they are articu lated in locations generally 
accepted to be public, such as the media, literature, art galleries, museums, parks, and 
public squares. They also differ in that they address groups wider than their 
articulators' friends and immediate family; they address groups such as the local 
district, the state or territory, and ultimatel y, the nation. Public memory is vital to the 
overall collective memory, for, as Austra lian memory theorist Kate Darian-Smith 
asserts, "in the public arena, museums, libraries and monuments possess the material 
culture that sustains and upholds collective memory.''2° Following the Birmingham 
Popular Memory Group (PMG), I refer to a single speech, painting, novel , or display 
as a ·'representat ion."21 "Display" includes objects, documents or paintings, and the 
labels which interpret them. 
II 
Australian reactions to the war were varied, including but by no means exclusive to 
grief. national ist responses to the war (inc01porating strong triumphal ism), "the 
politics of victory," rejection of war, and the sanctifica tion of the memory of the dead. 
Many responses were in direct emotional or political contrast to each other. For 
instance, those Australians who wished to reject war completely, a minority, were 
usually at odds with those who believed in ''triumphal" commemoration, that is, the 
public remembrance of victory. In add ition, memories of domestic A ustra I ian political 
developments during the war, particularly the question of reinforcement of the troops 
by conscription, cast a shadow over all public memories of the war, be they 
commemorative or literary. Other responses meshed together, as in the case of the 
widespread feeling that the memory of the dead was sacred in some way. Th is was 
magnified and focussed by the national cause, itself claimed by nationalist activists to 
possess spiritual aspects. Finally, some reactions which appear to have been 
contradictory found resol ution in the "national" interpretation of the war, which was 
common to most Austral ian mainstream commemorative representations. This was 
2Q Kate Darian-Smith, ''War Stories: Remembering the Australian home front during the Second World 
War,'' in Kate Darian-Smith and Paula Hamilton (eds). MemOI)' and Histu1:1· in Tw<!ntieth-Centw')' 
Ausrralia. (Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 1994), pp. l37-57, p. l40. 
21 Popular Memory Group, "'Public Memory: Theory, politics, method." in Richard Johnson, Gregor 
Mclennan, Bill Schwartz and David Sunon (cds). Making Hisrories.· Srudies in hisiOJy-ll'riring and 
politics, (M inneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. 1982), pp.205-52, p.207. 
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the case with triumphal ism and grief, in which the former was offered as consolation 
for the latter. The twin themes of victory and death were a consistent part of 
commemorati ve rhetoric throughout the inter-war years. Indeed, triumphal ism, sotTow 
and political attacks upon domestic enemies often existed cheek-by-jowl in early 
Australian post-war commemoration. These points are discussed in Chapter Two. 
The Australian post-war distribution of the spoils of victory has been little 
examined by scholars of either the Memorial in particular or Australian 
commemoration in general , but was a fundamenta l element of both. For instance, Ken 
Inglis covers the entire phenomenon in less than a page in his monograph on "war 
memorials in the Australian Jandscape."22 Michael McKernan affirms that the 
distribution was seen by many municipal public fi gures as al lowing "adequate 
recognition . . . [for] local achievement in the local area," by which he implies military 
achievement.23 McKeman devotes just over three pages to the distribution, but makes 
no direct j udgement, being content to describe the phenomenon. As he says, the 
distribution proved to be very popular, with a tota l of 3,497 towns accepting 
weapons.24 In many places, as Mark Clayton has shown, these guns arrived severa l 
years before any masonry memorial was constructed ~ for they were distributed rapidl y 
and free of chargeY They then served as war memorials, and many continued to do 
so even after masonry memorials had been constructed. Inglis s tates that the weapons 
distributed included, according to a 1929 Memorial press release, "500 hundred guns, 
400 trench mortars and 5,000 machine guns"26 As war memorials, they became the 
focus of commemorati ve ceremonies, initi ally alone in many areas and then, as Inglis 
puts it, "beside, or w ithin, or on top of, j ust about every kind of monument. 
Some ... were even made a central feature."27 Clayton insists that symbolising victory 
was the trophy's primary rhetorical function.2x 
,, . 
--I nglis. Sacred Places, pp. l78-9. 
'
3 McKernan, Here is their Spirir, p. 70. 
,. A total of 469 towns refused, with the vast majority of these having a population less than 500. 
Fo11y-six declined on the grounds that no suitable place to display a trophy existed. George Pearce, 
Senate debate on Australian War Memorial Bil l. 21 August 1925. CPD, Senate. vol.l l l, p.1643 . 
~~C layton , ''To the Victor," Part 3, pp. l8. 22 . 
~(, Press Release, November 1929, p.4. A WM 93 20/ 111 A. Numerals in original. See also Inglis, Sacred 
Places, pp.l?/5-9. 
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The striking contrast in reactions between the British Imperial metropolis and 
its self-consciously "British" co lony. after they had been through a comparable crisis, 
losing a large proportion of their young men in the war and experiencing considerable 
domestic conflict as welL was chiefly the result of nationalist influences in Australia. 
In contrast to established European nation-states such as Britain, France or Germany, 
Australia saw the creation of a new national mythology - "prominent national 
traditions" - during and after the war, one based upon the nation' s warfront 
experience. This endeavour complicated, and largely shaped, commemoration. In 
creating this mythology, incl uding but not exclusive to the myth now known as the 
"Anzac Legend," Austral ians adopted many of the trappings of a "martial 
nationalism" that had been the prevailing paradigm of nation-building in nineteenth-
century Europe. Martial nationalism was manifest in a corpus of images, ideas, 
practices, physical objects and monuments, from romantic descriptions of battles such 
as Waterloo and Agincourt to the Arc de Triomphe and the Berlin Victory Monument, 
whjch collecti vely argued that true national history was founded upon historically-
important military encounters. 
Many Austral ian national ists made free use of this martial cultural 
"vocabulary," adapting it to local circumstances as they saw fit in the decade or so 
after the Gallipoli campaign in I 9 I 5. For instance, instead of symbolising the triumph 
of the great leader, as trophy-monuments had often done in the pre-war era in Europe, 
trophies in Austra lia symbolised the victory of ordinary Australian soldiers. There 
was a demotic triumphal ism involved, in which the "glory of war," a concept of great 
antiquity traditionally associated with the aristocracy, was democratised. However, as 
Chapter I explores, this "democratisation of glory" was an ongoing Western cultural 
phenomenon by 1914, rather than an Australian invention.29 It had been pioneered by 
the French after the Revol ution, although there was still a great deal of classical-style 
triumpha\ism in the Republic, especially under Napoleon, who was fond of having 
himself depicted as Caesar. Australian post-war commemoration was essentia lly 
plebeian in its focus from the beginning. 
l
7 C layton, "To the Victor:'· Part 3, pp.3-22: Ingl is, Sacred Places, pp.l 78-9 . 
2R Clayton, "To the Victory," Part 3, p.22. 
29 The expression comes from Barbara Ehrenreich. Blood Rires: Origins and hist01:r of rhe tJassions of 
war, (London: Virago, 1998), pp 175-93. 
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Trophy-taking and display also illustrates the influence of a desire among 
some Australians to ''historicise" the Australian landscape, to obtain ''real" historical 
objects - that is, associated with the kinds of military events which martial 
nationalism insisted formed the bedrock of a "true" national history - and display 
them publicly. The display of trophies offered physical evidence that, following the 
performance of its soldiers during the war, Australia, too, had assumed a place among 
the "historical" nations, or as wartime Prime Minister William Morris (W.M.) Hughes 
often put it, had received "a ni che in the temple of the immortals."-'0 This national 
hubris was a widespread phenomenon in commemoration and literature, subordinating 
grief in many public representations on the war. 
For many, bereavement was the bedrock of commemoration, however, 
fuel ling a strong desire to publicly honour the lives of dead loved ones. Spontaneous 
acts of commemoration were occurring in Australia as early as Empire Day (24 May) 
1915, for instance.31 The question was never "should we remember them?," but rather 
"how should we remember them?" As thi s dissertati on explores, the answer to this 
question in some influential areas of Australian society was "as triumphant wan·iors ." 
Bereavement was very strong in Australia, but lamentation was not dominant 
m early post-war commemoration. There were several reasons for this. Firstly, the 
victory of 1918 itself was vital, for the overthrow of a Pruss ian regime that had been 
painted by Allied wat1ime propaganda as the greatest tlu·eat to freedom in the history 
of human ity was seen in Australia in the first post-war decade to have been a great 
30 See for example the Prime Minister's message to the na tion, Anzac Day 1922. Age, 26 April 1922. 
p. 7. William Morris Hughes ( 1862-1952), b. Pimlico. London. England. d. Lake Cargelligo. NSW. 
Austral ian Labor Party (herea fter ALP) Prime Mi nister 1915-1 6, National ist Prime Mini ster 1917-23. 
A leading proponent of peacetime compulsory mil itary service. he wa expelled from the ALP in 1916 
over conscription for overseas war service, ami formed the Nationalist Party with the Liberals in earl y 
19 1 7. A DB. ''ol. 9. pp.393-40 1. 
1 1 See Inglis. Sacred Places, p. l 06. This dissc1t ation examines mourning per se very little, fo r the 
Memorial spoke only of the war period. and within that period, only of the soldiers' experiences. 
Soldiers were depicted as remembering their dead mates. but were not shown in the state of grief. 
However. recent studies by Jay Winter, Ken Inglis, Joy Damousi and Tanya Luekins cast considerable 
light on mourning and grief in wartime and post-war Australia, and may be consulted for deta ils. See 
Jay Winter, Sires of i'vleml)l:r. Sire.1 o.f Mourning: The Creal War in European cul!ura/ hisiOJy, 
(Cambridge: Cambridge Uni versity Press. 1995). pp.29-53: Inglis. Sacred Places. pp.97-106; Joy 
Damousi, The Labour o(Loss: Mouming. llll:llllil)' and H·anime hereavemenl in AuSirolia. (Cambridge: 
Ca mbridge University Press, 1999), pp.9- l 02; Tanya Luck ins, The Gales of MemOl)': Auslralian 
peofJie 's experiences and memories of loss and !he Grear War, (Frernantle: Curtin University Books, 
2004). 
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event, saving the worl d from a terrible tyranny.32 The Austral ian role in the victory 
was, as a consequence, celebrated for itself. Secondly, the widespread use of narrative 
as a commemorative dev ice promoted remembrance of victory. Many tales were told 
publicly which climaxed with Austra lian armed forces, a conquering host of"paladins 
of the South," smashing the flower of the Prussian Guard and ending the war. "It is 
this," such activists cried, '"that we shou ld remember!" Victory narrati ves were 
another featu re of pre-war martial nationalism, and more generall y of traditional 
triumphal commemoration, being traceable to the Standard of Ur in Babylonia, c.2650 
BC. and probably beyond:13 Furthe r, pseudo-mythological and epic rhetorical modes, 
deliberately harking back to the past, were often used in these narratives, and thus 
Australians heard that their men had "stormed the impossible steep" at Gallipoli, 
"endured hell" at Pozieres, "liberated the Holy Land from the Infidels," and wrested 
''the mastery of the world" from the greatest standing army in Europe during 1918. 
The pol itics of victory was the third major factor promoti ng tri umphal 
commemoration, •vith many groups in Austra lia serving their own interests by 
sustaining and focuss ing the spontaneous outpourings of victorious joy seen in 19 18-
20.~4 The dominant Imperially-loyal Anglo-Australian power elites, such as the 
Nationalist government, the Anglican clergy, the mainstream press, the Retumed 
Sa ilors ' and Soldiers' Imperial League of Australia (the RSSILA), and the Universal 
Service League, had adopted uncond itional surrender of the enemy as their platform 
during the war, and had demanded that any sacrifice be made to ach ieve this. The 
victory, when finally it came, was grasped as validating their self-styled "National" 
position (the capitalisation being a del iberate attempt to rei terate the poi nt), and was 
used as justification for the huge cost of the war. In addition, to dwell too much on the 
cost of the war was politically dangerous for these same groups in the 1918-25 period, 
for it would associate a still-reign ing wart ime leadership with wholly negative images 
.\! James Morgan Read, A1roci1r Propaganda /914-1919. (New York: Arno, 1972). Bill Gammage 
argues that a considerable number of Australian soldiers bel ieved this. also. Bill Gammage, The Broken 
Years: Ausfl'ldian sofdiers in 1he Creal War , (Ringwood: Penguin, 1974), pp.221·5, 257-9. 
33 A Jan Borg. War Memorials: From antiqui~~· 1o !he present, (London: Cooper, 1991 ). pp 18·20. and on 
war narratives more generall y, pp.l8-50. The Standard is described in some detail by its discoverer in 
C. Leonard Woolley, Ur of Clwldes: A record of seven r ears o( excal'(lfion, 2nd edn, (London: Emest 
Benn, 1950), pp.8 1-7. 
·'
4 See John F. Williams, The Quaranlined Cui lUre: A uslralian reaCiions to A4odemism. /9!3-!93CJ, 
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995), pp. l 07-25. 
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and ideas. bringing their fitness to rule into question. Thus, the bereaved. a lthough 
acknowledged, received patriotic salves for their grief. while subjects such as 
muti lation and madness were avoided. Overall, the combination of popular elation 
and relief at the victory, the influence of martial nationalism, and local politics were 
the main factors which led to the subordination of grief to martial national traditions 
in the early post-war years. 
Memories of the war were contested in inter-war Australia. as were nation-
building processes more genera lly. De fucto alliances were formed around particular 
visions of the past. The Memorial was part of one such "commemorative complex," 
the dominant one control led by an overlapping, similar-minded group of right-leaning 
politicians, fom1er officers of the AIF, and the RSSILA, who, in the vast majority of 
cases. had also had control over aspects of the conduct of the war. They found allies 
and apologists in protestant clergy and the mainstream press, and their positive vision 
of the war experience received endorsement by the bulk of soldiers ' war literature. Let 
us call this loose alliance the "Digger-Nationalist complex," all of whose agencies 
embraced the "national' ' interpretation of the war as fundamenta l to their nature and 
their commemoration:'5 Dissenters existed , but were unable to find a s ignificant 
pub! ic audience. 36 Th us, by the end of the 1920s, the agencies of the Digger-
Nationalist complex had a vitiual monopoly on commemorative rhetoric, with other 
commemorative interpretations effectively si lenced. It is thus possible to refer to the 
Digger-Nationalist complex as "mainstream commemoration.'' 
The silencing of alternative positions was primarily due to the breadth of the 
acceptance of the "nati onal " interpretation of the war in Australian society. A 
majority of Australians. as evidenced by the 191 7 election, agreed with the contention 
that the war \Vas a "national'' matter, and remained loyal to the Imperial cause even if 
they opposed reinforcing the Australian troops with conscripts.37 "Mainstream" 
>
5 I borrow the term " Digger-Nationalist" from Fiona Nicoll, but the definition here is my own. See 
Fiono Nicoll. From Diggl!rs 1u Dmg Queens: COJ~/igura/ions o/'Aus/ralian na1ional identin·, (Sydney: 
Pluto. 2001 ). pp.99-l 00. 
'
6 S AI ' . Th 
· ee 1Sta 11· omson. Anzac Memories.· l.i1·ing ll'ith the legend. (Melbourne: Oxford University 
Press. 1994 ), pp. 118-56. 
17 At the 19 17 election for the House of Representati ves. the National ists won 53 seats to the ALP's 22. 
Table POL 24-28: "Austra lian House of Representatives Scats Won by Party, General Elections 1901-
1983." Historical S[(l[istics. p.395 , See also ian Turner, "19 14- 19," in F.K . Crowley (cd.), A New 
Hist01 :r oj'Aus[l'(i/ia , (Melbourne: Heinemann. 1974), pp.312-56. p.336. 
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Leftist groups, such as the Australian Labor Party (ALP), having adopted a nationalist 
understanding of the war from its outset, with Andrew Fisher's famous pledge of 
Australia's "last man and last shill ing," then faced serious limits upon any criticism of 
the war's conduct by their political enemies. the Nationalists, which they might wish 
to make, for they found it difficult to appear both " national" and "anti -war."38 Many 
s imply did not mention the war; Joseph Lyons, for example, when he was ALP 
Premier of Tasmania, remained silent on Anzac Day platforms as commemoration 
was not his party's province.39 Bui lding one's nation on war memories prescribes 
those memories to a considerable degree, and the "national" interpretat ion cha nne ll ed 
public remembrance of the war into avenues that were least dangerous (and indeed, 
most beneficial) politically to those who had conducted the war. 
The RSSILA, Nationalist politicians and protestant clergy saw themselves as 
the leaders of Australian society, and felt a responsibility to shape the nation in a 
"responsible'' manner. They thus cond ucted, as part of their commemorative rhetoric, 
a programme of "emotional" nation-building, that is, the inculcation into the widely-
scattered populace of a consciousness of communi ty, based on common public 
memories of the Austral ian overseas war experience.40 It was a project that sought to 
establish a specifically " national" consensus on the war experience, that is, a 
consensus in relation to what would then be part of the identity of anyone clami ng to 
be "Australian." The Memorial had an important role to play in this project, for its 
displays offered stories whose heroes were presented as ideal Austral ians. exhibit ing 
typical Australian moral virtues, attached to emotionally-powerful physical objects 
used or captured by those heroes. It was this project which brought the Memo1ial in 
closest contact with the rhetorical world of Austra lian pol itics, for politicians felt that 
national history was too important to leave to the historians, and provided their own 
versions. Chapter Two examines some of these political uses of the past in its 
exploration of Australian commemoration. The principal points of contact between 
3~ Fisher made this statement at Colac. Victoria, on 2 August 19 14. See Argus, 3 August 19 14. in Brian 
McKinlay, Documentary HisfOIJ' of rhe Australian Labour Mo1·ement 1850- JCJ75, (Melbourne: 
Drummond, 1979), p.56. See also Thomson, Anzac Memories, pp. 139-40. 
39 Inglis, Sacred Places, p.224; Joseph Aloysius Lyons ( 1879-1 939), b. Stanley, Tasmania. d. Sydney. 
NSW. ALP Premier of Tasmania, 1923-8. United Austral ia Party (hereafter UAP) Prime Minister 
1931-9. ADB. vol./0, pp.l84-9. 
40 I contrast "emotional" nationalism with the "i nstitutional" nation-building of creating High Court. 
Constitution, Parliament and so on. 
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the Memorial's rhetoric and that of politicians such as W.M. Hughes came when the 
latter used narrative dev ices, and in the Imperial loyalty ascribed to the Australian 
soldiers by both agencies. 
The Memorial had extremely lo ng labels, often quoted directly from books, 
wh ich gave it a distinctly literary quality. Indeed, the Memorial's rhetoric had much 
more in common with Austra lian wartime cOJTespondence and post-war literature than 
w ith the masonry memorial compl ex w ith which the institution is often somewhat 
erroneous ly compared. The Memorial certainly had many messages and objectives 
not seen in other national memorials, or in the State and local memorials in Australia. 
For instance, the Memorial 's unambiguous assertion that Australians were superior 
wan·iors was a very uncommon message for inscriptions or sculpture on local or State 
memorials, while the objective of the Memorial 's creators to provide mainstream 
entertainment to audiences was unique. If the designation " national war memorial" is 
considered for a moment as a recipe for a blend of ideas whose relative propo1tions 
could be altered, in the Memoria l during its 1922-35 incarnations in Melbourne and 
Sydney, the purely nationalist e lements were stronger than the purely memorial ones. 
Reciting nationalist tales of successful warriors was perceived to be more important, 
in the last ana lysis, than lamenting the cost. Lamentation was carried out to a much 
greater degree by another element of the Digger-Nationalist commemorative complex , 
the local memorials with the names of the men on them. Today, the Memorial's Roll 
of Honour, the pub! ic list of the names of the dead now seen on the walls of the 
cloisters in Canberra, serves a similar purpose. 
This tendency towards triumphal commemoration was perhaps not surprising 
for a '' literary" institution, for, as Robin Gers ter has shown, "the heroic theme" - by 
which he means primaril y heroic victory - was dominant in Australian war writing 
throughout the whole inter-war period.4 1 John Laird agrees with Gerster's assessment, 
arguing that "the all -pervading sentiments of bitterness, disenchantment, and 
pacifism, characteristic of a large number of war books published overseas during the 
1920s and 1930s are .. . noticeably absent from the writings ofmost A ustralian soldier-
authors."42 Rather, as Gerster demonstrates, the literature of Australian soldier-writers 
41 Gerster, Big-noting. pp. l- 171. 
~~ J.T. La ird, Other Banners: An anrholog1· o.f Australian lirerarure o.f the Firsr World War, (Canberra: 
The Austra licm War Memorial <md the Australian Government Printing Service, 197 1 ), p. l55. 
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>vas triumphal in the extreme, consisting in his opinion of national and personal "big-
noting"- "the giving of extravagant praise to oneself or the exaggeration of one's 
own performance. "4·' 
Another important difference between the Memorial and local memorials 
concerned control of the project. The Memorial was the product o f elites in Australian 
society to a much greater extent than were the local war memorials raised after the 
war.
44 There was considerably less consu ltati on with the general population, beyond 
requests for both donations and information for the Roll of Honour. The main two 
creators of the Memoria l were Bean and long-time Director John Treloar, ass isted by 
political all ies including Nev ille Howse, Thomas Glasgow and Henry Gullett, who 
had also been officers in the AIF, and Senator George Pearce, who had been wartime 
Mi nister for Defence.45 Bean was visionary, politician and propagandist, and guided 
43 G · s· · ' erster. 1g-nottng, p . .> • 
.w Inglis. Sacred Places. p.340. 
45 John Linton Treloa r ( 1894-1952). b. Port Melbourne. Victoria, d. Canberra. Australian Capital 
Territory (hereafter ACT). Enlisted in the I" Division. AI F. in August 19 14. anu served on Gall ipoli. 
Served briefly with I" Squadron Australian Flying Corps then as the cont'idcntial clerk to Colonel 
C.B.B. White. Chief-of-Staff. AI F. Appointed to lead Austral ian War Records Section (hereafter 
A W RS) in May 19 17 on the recommendation of C. E. W. Bean, organising the collection of objects and 
unit war diaries for the Memorial. Director of the Memorial 1920-52, except for when seconded to 
Empire Exhibi tion Committee from August 1923 to April 1925 and to Department of Information 
during the Second World War. ADB, vol. / 2. pp.256-7; McKernan. Here is Their Spirit, pp.86-8. Sir 
Neville Reginald Howse ( 1863-1930). b. Stogursey, England, d. London, England. Served as a 
surgeon in the New South Wales Medical Corps during the Boer War. wi nning Australia's i'irst 
Victoria Cross, although the country did not yet officially exist. on 24 July 1900. Was twice mayor of 
Orange, NSW, before the First World War. Served on Ga ll ipoli, taking personal charge of medical 
evacuat ion on 25 Apri l 1915. Served as commander of A IF medical services fro m November 19 15 
unti l the end of the war. Became Nationalist Member oft he House of Representative (hereafter MHR) 
for Calare. NSW. serving in cabinet fro m January 1925 until October 1929. Chairman of Australian 
War Memorial Board of Management 1928. ADB, vo/.9, pp.384-6; Lionel Wigmore and Bruce 
Harding, Thev Dared Mightily, 2"d edn rev. by Jeff' Williams and Anthony Staunton, (Canberra: 
Australian War Memorial. 1986). pp.21 -3 describes the action for which he was awarded the Victoria 
Cross. Sir Thomas William Glasgow ( 1876- 1955), b. Tiaro. Queensland. d. Brisbane, Queensland. 
Served in I" Queensland Mounted Infa ntry Regiment during the Boer War. Served on Gall ipoli, 
commanding 2"d LHR from August 1915. Commanded D'11 Brigade. AI F. on the Western Front from 
March 1916, being instrumental in the recapture of Vi llcrs-Brctonneux in April 19 1 R. Commanded I" 
Division. AI F. from June 1918 until the end of the war. Nationalist Senator for Queensland 191 9-31. 
Minister for Home and Territories (and cha irman of the Memorial' s Board of Management) 1926-7 
A DB. vo/10., pp.2 1-3. Sir Henry Somer Gullett ( 1878-1940). b. Toolarnba West, Victoria. d. 
Canberra, ACT. Official Correspondent 1915. Enlisted in AIF as a gunner in July 1916. Chosen by 
C. E. W. Bean to command Egypt sub-section of A WRS, commissioned August 19 17. Official 
Correspondent in Palestine from August 1918. First Director of the Memorial, 19 19-20. Wrote Volume 
Seven of Austral ian Official History of the War, 1923. Nationalist Member of the House of 
Representative (hereafter MHR) for Henly 1925-40. ADB. vol.9, pp.l36-9. Sir George f oster Pearce 
( 1870- 1952), b. Mt Barker, South Australia (hereafter SA), d. Melbourne, Victoria. Prominent in 
Western Australian labour movement in the 1890s. ALP Federal Senator 1901- 16. Nationalist Senator 
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every pan of the Memorial' s life. The idea itself was his, al though he later shared the 
"glory" with a group in a dugout on the Somme.46 He wrote guides that sold well -
over 100,000 - throughout the 1922-35 period, as well as many of the diorama labels, 
whi le the Official History a/Australia in the War ofl914-!8, which he edited and of 
which he wrote the six key volumes - covering the Gallipoli campaigns of 1915 and 
the Australians ' campaigns on the Western Front 1916-18 - provided the ultimate 
authority for the Memorial 's disp lays.47 His political influence kept an expensive 
project on the govenunent agenda. He also guided Treloar in the latter's drafti ng of 
the main display labels48 Treloar also built up institutional relationships with groups 
such as the RSSILA while Bean had personal relationships with a host of politicians 
and officers from his war work.49 Treloar's position was subordinate to Bean's 
19 J 7-3 I. UAP Senator 193 1-R. Early supporter of W.M. Hughes's scheme for peacetime conscription. 
Joined Hughes in leaving ALP and found ing Nationalist Party over conscription. Minister for Defence 
190X-9, 1910-13, 19 14-2 1. 1932-4. Minister for Home and Territories 192 1-6, 1934-7. Early and 
consistcm supporter of C. E. W. Bean and the Memorial. Chairman of A WMC 1921 -6. Board of 
Management 1934-7. ADB. \ 'Of. II , pp. l77-82. 
~,. C. E. W. Bean, "The Beginnings oft he Australian War Memorial," typescript, n.d (post- 1945). A WM 
38 3DRL 6673 . Item 6 19. Similarities to the British project fo r an Imperial War Museum (hereafter 
IWM) suggest it may not have been their idea at a ll - an interesting area for investigation. See 
Kavanagh, Museums and rhe Firs! World War, pp. 11 7-36. 
"
7 C. E. W. Bean, The STOIJ' of An:ac 1: From rhe our/weak of war ro rhe end of rhe first phase of the 
Callipoli campaign. May 4, 1915. Official History of Australia in the War of 19 14- 19Jg, vol. l , (St 
Lucia: University of Queenshmd Press in association with the Australian War Memorial, [ 192 1) 198 I); 
The S!OJ)' of An zoe 11: From 4 May. 1915. lo rhe e1·acuariun ofrhe Callipoli Peninsula, Official History 
of Austral ia in the War of 1914- I 918. vol.2, (St Lucia: University of Queensland Press in association 
with the Australian War Memorial, (1924) 1981); The Australian Imperial Force in France. 1916, 
Official History of Australia in the War of 19 14-1 918. vol.3, (St Lucia: University of Queensland Press 
in association with the Australian War Memorial, [ 1929] 19R2): The Australian Imperial Force in 
France. 1917. Official History of Austral ia in the War of 1914-1 918. vol.4, (St Lucia: University of 
Queensland Press in associat ion with the Austral ian War Memorial , ( 1934) 1982); The Ausrralian 
ln11ierial Force in France Duri11g rhe Main German Offensive. IYI8. Officia l History of Australia in 
the War of 19 14-19Jg, vol.5. (St Lucia: University of Queensland Press in associat ion with the 
Austral ian War Memorial. [ 1937] 1983); The Ausrrolian Imperial Force in France During rhe Allied 
Ot.fens il·e. 1918. Official History of Australia in the War of 1914-19 18. vol.6. (St Lucia: University of 
Queensland Press in association with the Austru lian War Memorial, fl942) 1983). 
~~ For instance, Treloar wrote somewhat officiously to Curator Lcs Bain that "your transcription of Dr 
Bean's <.! raft [or the Nonne Boschen diorama] appears to be correct." In the same Jetter he 
acknowledged that Bean provided the final word on the war's incidents, tel ling Bain "Dr Bean had 
obviously greatly improved the description and I suggest that you telephone Mr Bazley [Arthur Bazley. 
Bean 's assistant] and ask him to thank Dr Bean for having licked it into shape for me." Director, 
Australian War Memoria l, Melbourne (John Treloar). to Curator, Australian War Memorial, Sydney 
(Les Bain), 3 March I 932. A WM 93 13/ 1/37. 
~·1 For example. Treloar was careful to have letters of appreciation sent to the editor of the New South 
Wa les Returned Sa ilors' and Soldiers ' Imperial League of Austral ia (hereafter RSSI LA) branch journal 
RePei/le for an offer to publicise new exhibits in 1929 and to the branch secretary for his dispatch of a 
circular to all sub-branches urging members to visit the Memorial in I 934. In the first case the journal 
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throughout their working assoc iation, as evidenced by his many deferrals to Bean's 
opinion on matters of policy. 50 
From its inception. then, the Memorial was a thoroughly politicised institution. 
In add ition to these personal and institutional relationships, there was considerable 
overlap in personnel sitting in the Hughes and Bruce-Page ministries and meetings of 
the Memorial's governing counci l, the Australian War Museum Committee (A WMC) 
and its successor the Board of Management, wh ile several RSSlLA presidents became 
board members and the League was a consistent and enthusiastic supporter of the 
Memorial and proponent of the swift construction of its permanent home. 51 Politicians 
such as Glasgow and Pearce repeated Bean's words in their parliamentary speeches, 
and stories of heroism and sacrifice from the Memorial' s displays also found their 
way to the dispatch box. There was also considerable convergence of personnel 
between the A WMC, and Board, and the King and Empire Alliance, a leading 
carried an anicle written by Treloar himself. Director. Australian War Memoria l (John Treloar) to 
Editor, Reveille, 18 January 1929. A WM 265 17/2/3 and Director. Australian War Memorial (John 
Treloar) 10 Curator, Austral ian War Memorial, Sydney (J.S. Kirkland), I I October 1934. A WM 93 
20/ 1/6. 
~0 Bean addressed Treloar al ti mes in correspondence as "My Dear Treloar:· to which the latter replied 
" Dear Dr/Mr Bean" at all times. As for Bean 's inn uence, two exa mples indicate its scope and the level 
of detail involved. On 5 June 1926 Treloar wrote to Curator A. E. Scammell that they would proceed 
with the marking of place-names on a new model of Gallipoli "after agreement has been reached with 
Mr Bean rega rding the names to be shown." Director. Australian War MemoriaL Melbourne (John 
Treloar), to Curator, Australian War Memorial, Sydney (A. E. Scammell). 5 June 1926. A 7702 
749/0321004. A second example re lates to the purchase of a collection of photographs, which Sir Harry 
Chauvcl, chairman of the Memorial's finance comminee. was considering. Chauvcl was having trouble 
making up his mind, so Treloar wrote to Bean asking the historian •'to favour [Chauvel] with your 
views on the subject." John Treloar to C. E. W. Bean, 28 October 1935. A WM 38 3DRL 667:., Item 
778. Sir Henry Cha uvel ( 1865-1945). b. Tabulan. NSW, d. l'vle lboume. Victoria. Served in the I " 
Queensland Mounted In fantry during the Boer War. Commanded the I s• Light Horde Brigade and then 
the I" Division on Gall ipoli. followed by the Australian and New Zealand Mounted Division in 
Palestine from early 1916. Sir Edmund Allenby gave him command of the Desert Mounted Corps in 
June 1917. Conducted a number of important act ions. inc I uding Romani. a defensive victory, in 1916, 
and the capture of Beersheba in October 19 17. ADB. vo/.7, p.624-8: A.J . Hil L "General Sir Harry 
Chauvel: Australia's first corps commander," in D.l'vl. Horner (ed.), Thf! Commanders: Ausrralian 
mi/ita1y leadership in rhe rwentierh cenrw:v, (Sydney: Allen and Unwin. 1984), pp.60-84. 
51 For example, the League's Federal Capital Territory (hereafter FCT) Branch President. Roy Rowe, 
when appearing before the Public Works Committee. presented the Committee with favourable 
resolutions from the League's recent Federal Congress in support of the Memorial. Commonwealth of 
Australia, Parliamentwy Standing Commillee on Public Works Report Together u·irh Min utes oj 
Evidence Relating to the Proposed Australian War Memorial. Canberra (hereafter, Sranding 
Commillee on Public Works Reporr ), (Canberra: Government Printer. 1928). p.340. 
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Imperially-loyal, Anglo-Australian conservative group that was dedicated to the 
eradication of all forms of"disloyalty" to their own ideals.52 
III 
Austra l ian inter-war commemoration was located within a larger cu ltural 
development common to Western nations such as France, Britain and the USA. The 
inter-waJ years were a period of transfonnati on in war commemoration in these 
countries, with a system that had been elitist and focussed strongly on victory before 
19 14 being transformed towards the one seen after the Second World War, which was 
widely democratised and focussed on sacrifice. Both triumphalism and lamentations 
for the dead were thus seen in commemoration during the inter-war period, often 
expressed together. Triumphalism was very strong in its first few years, but receded 
rapidly in Europe. 
The main factors leading to this transformation were a growmg public 
awareness of the horrific rea lities of the war, which tended to mock triumphal or 
heroic pretensions, and the increasingly poor reputation of the victo ry won in 1918. 
Celebrations in that year. centred on a perceived destruction of Prussian militarism 
and victory of international morality and justice, appeared hollow by the late I 930s, 
when in the ri se of Hitler many saw a resurgence of " Prussianism."53 The 
triumphal ism of I 918, which saw the public display of enonnous numbers of trophies 
- mainl y field guns and howitzers captured from the defeated Germans - in the 
London Mall , gave way to soul-searching, pessimism and abhorrence ofwar.54 
The transfom1ation of war commemoration from "triumphal' ' to "sacrificial'' 
occurred at different speeds in different countries, and the initial degree of 
triumphalism in 19 18 also vari ed . Australia exhibited a greater degree of 
triumphalism than most other belligerents, and the feeling lasted longer there also. 
From the Australian point of view, the inter-war period can roughly be divided into 
., . 
· - C.M.H. Clark. A llisron· oj Australia. m/.6: ·-rhe Old Dead Tree and the )'oung Ti·ee Green.· · 1916-
35 with an l!pifogue, (t'vlclboume: Melbourne University Press. 1987). pp. l Sl -2. 
5
' For instance. Winston Churchill told the House of Commons in a speech tit led 'The Past and the 
Future .. on 21 September 1941 that .. the core of Gem1any is Prussia. There is the source of recurring 
pesti lence." Winston Churchill. Th e War Speeches of the Rr Hon. Winston S. Churchill. vof.3, compiled 
by Charles Eade. (London. Cassel l. 1952). pp.3-3 1. p.l 8. 
'
4 As Ma rk Clayton shows. many of these guns had been captured by Australians, and were sent back 
to Austral ia. Clayton, "To the Victor." Part 2. p.29. 
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the opti mistic years before about I 935, particularly before I 930, which saw a great 
deal of triumphal commemoration, and the final pessimistic years tracking the rise of 
Hitler and Japan up to the outbreak of war in I 939. 
The earl y post-war years were the most important to the Memorial, because its 
displays tended to reflect the commemorative mood of 1922, and once these were 
estab lished it was very difficult for them to be radically altered. Bean and Treloar 
wrote all the labels between them, and the staff was smal l. Thus the Memorial d id not 
change a great deaL while the rhetoric of commemorative clays, be it on the p latform, 
at the pulpit or in the newspaper, underwent considerable revision. The Memorial 
accurately ref1ected the Australian commemorative cli mate of 1922, but by 1935 there 
•vere great differences of emphasis , tone and method. Th us the Memorial's displays, 
which carried "the sp irit of 1 922" without significant change until 1935, were an 
important factor in the persistence of triumphal memory in Australia. 
T he mam tssue tn historical scholarship m relation to post-war 
commemoration and public memory has concerned a di stinction between "tradition" 
and "modern memory.'· This interpretative distinction, which has framed much debate 
on the cultural legacy of the First World War, has been discussed by scholars such as 
Jay Winrer and Rosa Bracco.55 As they demonstrate, "modem memory" of the war 
emphasised disjunction between pre- and post-war eras, and concentrated upon "the 
creation of a new language in truth-tell ing about war. "56 "Tradition," on the other 
hand, as its name suggests, uti lised conventional images and ideas, albeit often in new 
forms. 
Many scholars have recently been piecing together an understanding that both 
"modem memory" and "traditional' ' responses ex is ted in the inter-war period, as 
befits a commemorative system in flux.57 Indeed, a multiplicity of reactions to the war 
has been delineated by scholarship both in Australia and overseas. The most striking 
fact about the responses revealed in studies such as Paul Fussel l's Great War and 
~~ See Winter, Sires of Memmy, pp.2-9: Rosa tv\ aria Bracco, Merclumrs of Hope: Brirish middlebrcm 
writers and rhe Firsr World Wt1r. 1919- I 939. (Providence: Berg, 1993 ). pp.l -21. 
56 Winter, Sites of Memory, p.2. 
57 This was also the case in British literature. Jacques Berthoud argues that ''the best" Georgian poetry 
"is. like the fi ction of the period, caught in the interplay or traditionalism and modernism." Jacques 
Berthoud. "Literature and Drama." in Boris Ford (ed.), The Cambridge Cultural Hisrorr of' Britain. 
volume 8: Early twenrieth-centwy Britain. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), pp.46-99. 
p.69. 
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,\4odern Memm:1·, Antoine Prost's In the WaktJ of War, Rosa Bracco's Merchants of 
floptJ. Jay \A/inter's Sites oj" MemO/:\'. Alistair Thomson 's Anzac Memories, Robin 
Gerster"s Big-noting, Raymond Evans's Loyalr.t· and Disloyalry. and Joy Damousi 's 
La hour of Loss is thei r contradiction. SR Fussell's "dynamics of hope abridged" in the 
work of the anti-war sold ier-writers rested uneasi ly with Bracco's "middlebrow" 
wri ters and their attempt to ensure that "the centre held," while Thomson's work on 
the memories of retumed soldiers shows that the literary big-noting explored by 
Gerster was often difficult to Jive with, or to live up to.59 Prost insists that most 
French retumed soldiers became convinced pacifists, leaning to the Left in politics, 
while Evans shows Australian veterans acting as enforcers, mainly for right-wing 
groups.60 
This contradiction has been spec ifical ly hi ghlighted by authors. For instance, 
Samuel Hynes has elaborated the existence of two "cultures" in early post-war 
Brita in . one ·'monumental" and one "anti-monumental ;" one holding fas t to traditional 
patriotism and so-called " Big Words," the other stri ving to represent the reality of the 
war.
61 These two cultures, were, he asserts. ··separate and distrus tful of each other; 
each had its own art, and each denied the other."62 Rosa Bracco illustrates the 
contradiction of the late 1920s starkly. She points out that in Journey ·sEnd , the most 
popu lar war play of a ll time, "not a word was spoken against the war," as its author 
attested.6·' It was firs t performed, and had its extraordinari ly successful run, at the 
same t ime - early 1929 - that the anti-vvar tour de force All Quier on the Western 
Front was breaking all -time records for the sale of a war book.64 George Masse and 
sx Paul Fussell. The Great War and Modern A4em0/y, 25'h anniversary edn. (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2000): Antoine Prost, In the Wake of War: Les anciens comba11ants and French 
.mcietr. Helen McPhail (trans.). (Providence: Berg, 1992); Raymond Evans. Lora/tv and Disloralrv: 
Social conflict on the Queensland homejiw11. 1914-18. (Sydney: A lien and U nwi~, 1987). · -
' Q 
· Fussell. Crear War, p.35; Bracco, Mi!rclwnts o.f Hope, pp.l99-205; Thomson, Anzac Memories, 
rr 157-74. 
<~• Sec Prost, In the Wake u(War, pp.SI-78; Evans. Lorain· and Disloyally, pp. l4 1-73 . 
t•l .. Big Words" was the tit le of an ironic poem by Robert Graves, written during the war. See Robert 
Graves, Complete Poems. mi. / , (Manchester: Carcarnet, 1995), pp.l8- 19. 
"' 
- Samuel Hynes, A War Imagined: The First World War and English culture, (New York: Macmi )Jan, 
1992). p 2g3. Austra lia had sim ilar developments, as Chapters Two and Three exami ne. 
63 R.C. Sheriff. quoted in Bracco. Merchanls of Hope. p. 149. 
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Ann Lindar have demonstrated that the Germa n experience was both more overtly 
politicised, and controlled to a greater extent by conservative social and political 
forces, than that in the victorious European states.c'5 The ir accounts offer useful points 
of comparison, for Australian reactions had certain similarities with Gennan 
responses, with conservative forces controlling the public memories of the war 
throughout the inter-war year period and promoting strongly positive public 
memones. 
Jay Winter establishes that many of the writers Fussell sees as commi tted to a 
break with past forms and ideas actuall y used traditional images and concepts 
throughout their work. For instance Winter shows that Wilfred Owen, war poet par 
excellence, reworked and reinterpreted older forms, rather than rejecting them out of 
hand.66 Winter's thesis is that there was a ''vigorous mining of eighteenth and 
nineteenth-century images and metaphors to accommodate expressions of mourning" 
during and after the First World War.67 A similar development occurred in Australia. 
In many countries. in undertaking to commemorate their dead, people cast their 
glance backward, and adapted traditional commemorative symbols and other images 
to contemporary requirements, in the process sometimes remaking them, sometimes 
re-using them in a self-consciously retlex ive form to emphasise continuity. In many 
nations, local war memorials honoured local men rather than the traditional generals 
and other leaders. In the ceremonies in which these memorials were unveiled, local 
men were praised in tem1s that had once been the exclusive province of the great - for 
heroism, for a panoply of martial and civic moral vi riues, for a kind of secular 
martyrdom in which the men had laid down their lives in the service of their nation, 
and in Australia, for winning the war itself. Along with this were affirmation of the 
ca use as just, and evocation of va rious fo rms of communi ty - the community of the 
dead, the community of the living, and the national community which joined the two, 
for example. 
6~ Bracco. Merchants of Hope, pp.l 45-95. On All Quiet. see Hynes, A War Imagined. pp.424-6. 
65 George L. Mosse, "Two World Wars and the Myth of the War Experience." Joumal cJ( 
Conremporar1· Histmy, 2 I (October 1986 ). pp.49 1-51.1: George L. Mosse, Fallen Soldiers: Reshaping 
the mem01y ofthe World Wars. (New York and Oxford Oxford Uni versity Press. 1990); Ann Li ndar. 
Princes of rhe Trenches: Narrating rhe German experience c?f rhe Firsr World War. (Columbia: 
Camden House, 1996). 
66 Winter, Sites o.f Memo')', pp.204-22. 
67 Winter, Sites ofMemOiy, p.5. 
21 
The contradictions of post-war E urope are summed up by two opposing 
visions of the war. two opposing public memories which also were observable in 
Australia . The first has been seen as aris ing in Britain, the second in Germany. 
Samuel Hynes labels the British vis ion, accompanying the "modem memory" 
interpretation of the war, "the Myth of the War." This myth, he argues, emphasised 
"the butchery, the sacrifice of the young by the old, the mindless hatred and the cruel 
patriotism."6!l A signa l example of this thinking is embodied in Ezra Pound's poem 
" Hugh Selwyn Mauberley:" 
Died some, pro patria, 
non "dulce" not "et decor" ... 
walked eye-deep in hell 
believing old men's lies, then unbelieving 
came home, home to a lie, 
home to many deceits, 
home to old lies and new infamy; 
usury age-old and age-thick 
d I. . bl. I 69 an tars 111 pu JC p aces. 
"The Myth of the War" contrasts in the most striking manner with the "Myth of the 
War Experience," identified by George Mosse in post-war Germany, ''which looked 
back upon the war as a meaningful and even sacred event."70 Mosse argues that through 
this Myth "the memory of the war was refashioned into a sacred experience which 
provided the nation with new depths of religious feeling, putting at its disposal ever-
present saints and martyrs, places of worship, and a heritage to emulate."7 t Mourning, 
although widespread, did not dominate German public memories of the war. Instead, 
Mosse, argued, a feeling of pride "mixed in with the mourning, the feeling of having 
taken part and sacrificed in a noble cause."72 A simi lar situation occuned in Australia, 
while the differi ng reactions embodied in these two myths minor the British and 
Australian attitudes to trophies indicated above. 
6~ Hynes. A War l111agined, p 283. 
r.
9 Ezra Pound, Selected Poems 1908-1959, (London: Faber, 1975), p 100. Structured as Pound 
presented the poem. 
70 Mossc, Fallen Soldiers, p.7. 
71 Mossc, Fallen Soldiers, p.6. 
7
: Mosse, Fallen Soldiers. p.6. Ann Lindar agrees with this. Lindar. Princes o.fthe Trenches, pp.1 -4. 
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Jay Winter points out that collection of the hardware of war was common to 
many be ll igerent countries, even if Australia's collection was unique in becoming pat1 
of its nation's memorial. Winter confirms that collection of the ephemera of the war 
was common to B1itain and France, in the latter country as a private concem, as well 
as Austra lia. Such col lecting, he argues, \Vas a patriotic act, in France and Britain 
being mainly the work of "civilians detennined to uphold the dignity and honour of 
their country's war effort." 7·' He also points out that "by their very nature, they both 
glorified the war effort and contained, at least initially, little about the appa lling 
character and costs of trench warfare."7.J Winter further argues that "commemorating 
the war in this ill-info1med and blatantly non-combatant manner took on the air of 
propaganda," and that "like most Propaganda it did not dwell on the sadder facts of 
the war: the maimed, the deformed, the dead, the widows, the orphans and the 
b d .. 75 ereave . 
In contrast to these CIVJC museums, Winter notes that the pacifi st Emst 
Friedrich set up an Anti-war Museum in Berlin in 1924, packed with gruesome 
photographs and other evidences of the true horrors of the war, designed to both 
campaign against war, and to point out the dangerous selectivity of the patriotic 
museums. He also notes, however, that Friedrich's museum was unpopular, and that 
the concept of an anti-war museum was not adopted elsewhere. Remembering the 
horrors was not popular in the early inter-war years in Germany, as in other nations 
including Austra lia. 
IV 
This dissertation offers both a complement to previous research on the early Memoria l 
and a critique of it. The Memorial's early period, 1922-35, has been little studied, 
although most authors who offer an interpretation of the contemporary institution in 
Canberra also examine the Memorial's origina l objectives at least cursorily. Thus, 
most writing on the Memorial has at least some relevance to this period. The largest 
work is Michael McKernan's commissioned institutional history, Here is Their Spirit, 
73 Winter, Sites of Memory. pp.80- l. 
74 Winter. Sites ofMemo,y , p.SI . 
75 Winter. Sites a./Memory, p.81. 
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but other stgntficant studies include those published by Ken Inglis. Tony Bennett, 
Ann 1illar. Kimberly Webber. Jenny Bell. Fiona Nicoll. Margaret Browne and 
Jcffrc) Williams, Margaret Anderson and Andrew Reeves, Peter Stanley and 
Catherine Styles.u' I differ from these writers in that I base my conclusions very 
strongly upon my reading of the main rhetorical displays, as well a archival and other 
sources. By placing these displays at the forefront of ana lysis, and by seeking their 
cultural roots and antecedents, a clearer picture of both the Memorial itself and of 
inter-war commemoration and Australian attitudes to the war generally emerges. Both 
the plans of the Memorial's creators, and the public relations statements of Bean -
which have, I feel, been taken as the last word as to the way the Memoria l operated in 
Australia - become eas ier to interpret. 
Regardless of these reservations, the extant literature has illuminated many 
vita l aspects of the Memorial's nature. Firstly, Michael McKeman makes the key 
observations that Bean and Treloar wished to "commemorate Australian service and 
sacrifice" and to "help a generation to grieve."77 He argues persuasively that the 
Memorial thus became a surrogate grave for those many Australians who could never 
afford to visit their loved one's final resting place overseas. 78 Thus, McKeman argues. 
76 l'vlcKeman. llere i.\ The1r Spirir: K.S. Inglis. "A Sacred Place: The making of the Australian War 
Memorial." War and Soch''·'· 3,4 (September 1985), pp. 99-126: Inglis, Sacred Places. pp.333-47; Tony 
Bennett. The Birrh of rill.! Museum.· History. rheo1:1·. politics. (London: Routledge. 1995), pp. 122-3. 133-
-10: Ann Mil lar, "Gal l1 poli to Melbourne: The Australia n War Memorial 1915- 19," .Journal o.f rhe 
Australian War tllemorial. 10 (April 1987), pp.JJ-42; Kimberly Webber. "Con~truet ing Australia 's 
Pa~t: The development of historical collections, 1888-1938." in Patricia Summerfield (ed.), 
ProcC'edings o/ rhe Council of' A usrra/ian Museum Associations Cm!/l're,tce. P~>rrh WA 1986, (Per1h: 
Western Australian Museum. 1986), pp.l 55-73: Jenny Bell , "The Australian War Memorial : A 
mi~under!>IOOtl institution." Ausrralian Historical Association Bulletin, 66-7 (March-June 1991 ). pp.44-
52: Nicoll, Fmm Diggers to Drug Queens. especially pp.J-34; Margaret Browrre and Jeffrey Williams. 
"A Museum a~ a Memorial," Journal of rhe Royal United Sen·ices Institute of Ausrralia, 6,1 (April 
1983), pp.69-74: Margaret Anderson and Andrew Reeves. "Contested Identities: M uscums and the 
nation in Australia," in Flora Kaplan (ed.). Museums and the Making of "Ourseh·es:" The role of 
ohjecl\ in 1/clfunw/ ichmri~t·. (London: Leicester University Press. 1994), pp. 79- 124: PeiCr Stanley. 
"Gallipoli and Po.deres: A legend and a memorial: Seventieth anniver!>ary of the Gallipoli landing," 
Awtralicm Foretgll A/fairs Record. 56.4 (April 1985). pp.281-9: Catherine Styles, "An Other Place: 
The Au~tro~lian War Memorial in a Freirean framework:· PhD Di~::.enation. Australian ational 
Uni' er,ity. :woo. 
7 f\lcKernan. //ere ts Their Spirit. p.xiv. 
7~ No Auwalian \~ar dead \\ere ever brought back to Australia. with the !>ole exception of Sir William 
Bndges. Divi!>ional Commander killed in the first weeks at Gall ipoli. Sir William Throsby Bridges 
( 1861-1915). b. Greenock, Scotland. d. Gallipoli Theatre. Raised AIF on the outbreak of war. and 
commanded it until ht:-. death. Interred at the Royal Military College, Duntroon, which he had done 
much to create. A DB. ,·of. 7. pp.40R-J I; Chris Coulthard-Ciark. "Major-General Sir Wil I iam Bridges: 
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many bereaved people went to the Memorial to "help them with their grief."79 He 
points out that ' 'it was not uncommon" for a surviving mate "to bring the mother of a 
dead man to the museum and to show her, on the large-scale terrain maps [in the 
Memorial's parlance, "'plan models"] that the museum had constructed, where her son 
had died and where he was buried."g0 This phenomenon was one of the keys to the 
Memorial's popularity. The Memorial offered the bereaved a vision of their dead as 
great warriors and heroes. 
McKernan has also explored the right-wing political connections of the 
Memorial. He details the political (or, as Bean called them. "semi-political") tactics 
used. mainl y by Bean himself, but also by Treloar, in their endeavour to have an 
expensive building constructed. He shows their all iance-bui lding, both on a personal 
and on an inst itutional level , with other agencies within the Digger-Nationalist 
complex. McKernan demonstrates that these included the RSSILA and other returned 
sold iers. particularly the command officers such as Sir Brudenell White, Sir Harry 
Chauvel. Sir Neville Howse and Sir John Gellibrand. as well as the National ist 
Govemment, whose members included Howse and Donald Cameron, who had been 
an officer, but not a general or regimental commander.81 McKeman brings these 
relationsh ips to the fore in positioning the Memorial within Australian society. 
Australia 's first field commander," in D.M. Homer (ed.), The Commanders: Australia11 mililarr 
leadership in the 11t'eiJ/ielh cenlw:\', (Sydney: Allen and Unwin, 1984), pp.l3-25. 
79 McKernan, Here is Their Spiril, p.xi 
RO McKeman, Here is Their Spirit, p.xi. 
81 Sir John Monash. Australia 's premier soldier of the war, was brought in on the strength of his 
reputation alone and not on terms of frie ndship as the others were. Sir Cyril Brudenell Bingham 
White ( 1876-1940), b St Ar1aud, Victoria. d. Canberra, ACT. Served in the Boer War from February 
1902 in the I" Battalion. Australian Commonwealth Horse. Chosen as chief of staff for the 1$' Division, 
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Birdwood at Gallipoli and on the Western Front. Planned Gallipoli evacuation. now considered the 
only well-planned action of the campaign. Served as Australian Chief of the General Staff from 
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leadership in rhe TWemie!h cen/IIIJ'. (Sydney: Allen and Unwin, 1984). pp.26-43. Sir J ohn Gellibrand 
( Hl72-1 945), b. Ouse, Tasmania, d. Balaclava, Victoria. Served in the Boer War as captain in the 3'd 
Battalion, Manchester Rcgi ment. Appointed deputy adjutant to the I" Division. A IF, in August 1914 
and organised logistical parties on 25 April 1915. Took 6'11 Brigade to France in March 19 16. 
Commanded 3'd Di vision during the Allied offensive of 19 18 following the promotion of Sir John 
Monash in May 1918. A close friend of Bean's. Sir Donald Chades Cameron ( 1879-1 960). b. and d. 
Brisbane, Queensland. Served in an American infantry regiment during the Boxer Rebellion in China 
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Regi ment (hereafter LHR). Commanded 5'11 LHR at Batt le of Beersheba (31 October 19 17). Nationalist 
MHR for Brisbane 191 9-31. and for Lilley 1933-37. A leading spokesma n for the RSSILA. ADB. ,·ol. 7. 
pp.532-3. 
25 
However, he avoids discussing the politica l messages inherent in the Memorial's 
displays, and makes few comments on the political implications of such groups 
controlling the national war memorial. 
Both these arguments have much to recommend them and I accept that they 
are vital to any understanding of the Memorial. However, to argue that the Memorial 
commemorated service and sacrifice alone provides only part of what must become a 
larger understanding of the institution. Certainly both service and sacrifice were 
depicted in the Memorial , but they were not predominant in the first decade of the 
inter-war years. Bean and Treloar also wanted to commemorate a great victory, to 
"prove" Australian mi litary supremacy, and to create "national tractitions" based on 
these. In this objective they were joined by many others in the Digger-Nationalist 
complex, and enjoyed strong popular support. 
In remembering the triumphs of the war, especia lly of 1918, a good many 
bellicose images were presented to the Australian public. Representations showing 
Australian soldiers defeating their enemies - overcoming them with ferocity, 
determination and ruthlessness - were common in the Memorial, as they also were in 
Anzac Day speeches and writings, war literature, and war art. To perceive only 
service and sacrifice in the Memorial in the inter-war years is to see half the s tory at 
best. Images of victory were indeed more p reva lent than images of sacrifice, and were 
depicted much more directly.82 The "plan models" on which the survivors showed 
mothers where their sons were buried had labels that were not laments but epics, tales 
of triumph over fearful odds. 
McKernan is certainly correct when he states that the motto accurately 
embodied one of the Memorial's most vital missions - to ensure that the "spirit" of 
the AIF animated the d isplays. He argues perceptively that "Bean strongly believed" 
that the collecti on consisted of "the sacred reminders of the great deeds of the 
Australians."83 However, he again declines to inteJTogate his term ··great deeds. " 
Indeed, McKernan tends to con fl ate these unspecified actions with mourning, arguing 
that " Bean knew how remote those thousands of graves were from people who sti ll 
cherished the memories of the dead and he hoped that, by reading their words and 
~2 Sec Appendix One: "Statistical Evidence'' and Chapters Four to Six. 
~ 1 McKernan, Here is Their Spiri r. p.xi 
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studying their mementoes, the Australian people would remember them."84 This 
description of the operation of the Memorial is far too pacifist, as I demonstrate in 
Chapters Four and Five, which address, among other issues, the Memorial's war 
narrative and its proof of Australian military supremacy. The Memorial 's audiences 
would remember the dead, and Austral ian troops in general , as great warTiors who had 
destroyed the flower of the Prussian Guard, for they would see them depicted doing 
so. 
The fundamenta l insights of Ken Inglis explain much about the Memori al and 
Australian commemoration generally, but l feel that his work requires qual ification. I 
agree with Inglis' s basic premise that religious and sacred e lements existed in 
Austra lian commemoration and the Memorial, and that commemoration formed part 
of a "civil reli gion" in Australia.85 Inglis argues that Bean intended the Memorial to 
be "a repository of sacred things," and, ulti mately, to be a '"temple or specia l 
shrine. "'86 Examining some of Bean 's writings about the Memorial , he conc ludes that 
Bean was trying to construct a '"holy place,'' a repository for "sacred things."87 
Through exhibitions and possession of these sacred things, and through a building 
designed to evoke mystical experiences between the liv ing and the dead, the 
Memorial vvould become ··a sacred place."88 There is no doubt that Bean did wish to 
create a sacred place, and that his thinking did develop more and more a long those 
lines as the years progressed; after the Second World War he drew up a document 
outlining display policy which offic iall y rejected tri umphalism and embraced the 
sacred.89 For Bean, the "sacred things'' connected the "sacred memory'' of the dead to 
the ' 'sacred nation' ' of Australia. However, 1nglis neglects the historical elements of 
x
4 McKeman, Here is Their Spirit, p.xii. 
A> Inglis, "A Sacred Place," p.99. 
~1' Inglis. "A Sacred Place," pp.l 02 and 113. 
s7 Ingl is. "A Sacred Place," p.l02. 
xx Inglis, "A Sacred Place," p.99. 
sq "Note on the Principles Govcming the Exhibition of Relics at the Australian War Memorial." 
(Written 1957). A WM 38 J DRL 6673, Item 620. McKeman, Here is Th eir Spiril. p.222. Bean points to 
the displays and their labels and guidebooks as subjects fo r study in rhe same post-war document, 
asserti ng that "the atmosphere of the Memorial can be very largely determined by the captions to the 
relics, and by the references to them in the guidebook." "Principles Governing the Exhibit ion of 
Relics." 
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the Memorial's messages. whi ch in this period were more important than the sacred. 
In the Memorial, "the sacred"' was subordinated and fused to the triumphal in this 
period . The Memorial was not simply ''a sacred place," but al so a didactic place and a 
place of tri umphal martial nationalist story-telling. 
Additionally, in the Memorial during the inter-war era, the elements of the 
2004 Memorial which are most "sacred" - the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier, the 
Hall of Memory, the Cloisters and the Pool of Reflection, not to mention the 
architecture of the building itself- did not exist.90 What sacred element there was 
carne only from the objects themselves . The space was sanctified only by the 
deposition within it of objects considered sacred . Although this was itself an ancient 
and revered practice, and even though many of the Memorial's supporters believed 
the Melbourne and Sydney Exhibitions Buildings had been sanctified by receiving the 
objects, with several going on record to that effect in parliament, I would contend that 
thi s s till made for an immensely less sacred space than that now seen at the foot of 
Mount Ainslie.91 The museum displays alone could never offer the same overall 
experience as is now provided in Canberra . McKernan points out that the Memorial 
lost much in its first surroundings, and I fee l this is true.92 It lost some of the element 
of the sacred that would later come from the solemn, spiritual, symbolically 
commemorative inner part of the Memorial. What remained, along with the objects, 
was a nationalist war history, incorporating defeats, selected war realities and a little 
of '"the sacred," but offering as its main theme Australian military and moral 
supremacy. Moreover, the display oftrophies, and the designation of those trophies as 
sacred objects, created a militarised sanctity, or sacred militarism. 
The sacred thrives upon the mysterious, upon the symbolic, upon images and 
concepts that can bear many imprints. This is their greatest power, as the concept of a 
national Unknown Soldier illustrates. A ll citizens can (theoretically) 11nagme a 
connection with the Soldier, whi le observers routinely claim that the tombs 
themse lves symbolise the sacrifice and efforts of the entire nation in their very 
anonymity. As Australian Prime Minister Paul Keating declared at the dedication of 
90 Inglis himself mentions this in "A Sacred Place," p. l l3. but does not examine the displays. 
91 These statements arc examined in Chapter Two. 
<}
2 Michael McKernan, "A Monument to the Dignily of Man." Journal of the Ausrraliun War Memorial, 
19. (November 1991 ). pp.4-I O, p. 8. 
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the nation's Unknown Soldier at the Mernorial on I I ovember, Armistice Day, now 
Remembrance Day, 1993: "We do not know this Australian's name and we never 
wi ll ," but "he is all of [the dead]. And he is one of us.'m Simi larly, reactions in 
London to the temporary cenotaph placed in Whitehall in 1919 are testimony to the 
mysterious ab ility of these empty tombs, imaginatively holding all the "Glori ous 
Dead,'' as its inscription asserted, to provide emotional catharsis for large numbers of 
people.94 In both these cases, the lack of explicit exposition is the key to the operation 
of the symbol. 
The earl y Memorial, on the other hand, offered exhibi tions which were the 
epitome of positivism and realistic presentation, backed by a strong and public 
commitment to portraying "what really happened.'' While this portrayal included a 
very strong "spiritual" element of things that had "really happened," this was 
primarily the "spirit" which animated martial nationalism, not commemoration. The 
invocations of spirit were those associated with nat ion-bui I ding displays depicting 
mili tary actions. These spiritual phenomena were "courage," "determination," 
"devotion to duty," "sacrifice for victory," and so on. They were not, primarily, in this 
period, "sacred'' phenomena of a non-martial character. 
Other scholars have examined the Memoria l's nationalism. These studies 
demand a further analysis that I attempt to provide. Post-structuralist museologica l 
theorist Tony Bennett, for example, argues that the Memorial provided Australia with 
what was considered a "true" history: 
In its remembrance of the heroism of Australian troops in Europe 
and the Middle East (the theatres of "real history"), this 
institution ... enabled there to be fi gured forth and materialised an 
Australian past which could claim the same status, weight and 
dignity as the European pasts it so clearly sought to emulate and 
surpass." 95 
Simi larly, Jenny Bell argues that the Memorial was designed "to be a focus of 
nationalism and to continue the nation building which had occuned during the 
93 
www.awm.gov.au/commemoration/keating.htm. 
94 Winter, Sites ojMemoty, pp.l 02-5. 
95 Bennett, Birth of the Museum, pp. l22·3. Margaret Anderson and Andrew Reeves agree. See 
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War."96 Kimberly Webber identifies the nationalist motivations and imperialist 
orientations of the creators.97 These studies provide important insights into the 
Memorial, yet beg the question as to what this Australian past being "figured forth 
and materialised," this nation-building, consisted of in its specifics, something none of 
these scholars has examined in any detail. This is, however, a key issue, for the 
Memorial 's public history, seen by three million visitors, was a significant element of 
the post-war commemorative landscape. 
These insights also lead to Bennett's museological theory concermng the 
"significance'' of history museu ms. This, he argues, "is not a function of their fideli ty 
or otherwise to the past 'as it really was.' Rather, it depends on their position within 
and relations to the presently existing field of historical discourses and their 
associated social and ideological affil iations."98 It is in both of these areas - the 
content of the national history displayed by the Memorial, and the connections of such 
hi story to wider Australian social and cultural trends and developments - that this 
dissertation makes a contribution to the historical understanding of the Memorial. 
Elements of the symbolic have also been identified in the Memorial, although 
again I fee l the story told has been somewhat partial. For instance, Webber notes the 
symbo lic intentions behind the Memorial's display practice, quoting the motto, but 
carries the argument too far, erroneously stating that "'at the War Museum artefacts 
were not valued for the ir information content."99 There were, in fact, an enormous 
number of di splays of a purely technical nature, exp laining how mi litary hardware 
operated, and even the "symbolic" displays had a great proport ion of factual 
infonmllion. Indeed, as Chapters Four and Five explore. the authenticity provided to 
the museum by factual displays promoted the notion that the symbol ic interpretations 
offered by the Memorial vvere every bit as natural and factual as the descriptions of 
ordinance and the accounts of numbers of prisoners captured. This was moral 
instruction within technical instruction 
%Bel l. "A Misunderstood Institution." p.45. 
q
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In pariicu lar, Webber argues that a famous uniform, wi th battlefield mud 
caked to it and barbed-wire rents in the knees , "has been transformed into a holy relic 
and its display has become an opportunity for veneration rather than discussion. 
Ordinary objects have become symbols of national greatness." 100 This was a uni form 
from Morlancourt, where three actions were fought by Australians in early I 918.10 1 
Webber misunderstands Bean' s origi nal intention, for he was hoping to provoke both 
veneration and discussion, as McKernan affi nns.102 Webber's account empties the 
Memorial of its vital historica l meanings. T he d isplays operated as the major pub lic 
history of the Australian overseas war experience - the only way for Australians to 
obtain infonnation about where their men had fought and what had occurred during 
these actions without paying for it. Tluee million visitors took up the opportunity. 
Several scholars have made claims about the Memorial with which I must 
disagree. Catherine Styles, claiming to be following McKernan, argues that "the War 
Memorial was never intended, by its vis ionaries, to venerate or glorify the military 
instituti on. Rather, that wh ich it sanct ified was the willing sacrifice of the ordinary 
man."
103 I wou ld argue that the Memorial did both of these things - glorified a 
nu litary institution and sanctified wil ling sacrifice. The two went hand in hand, the 
latter being a subset of the former. The Memorial was designed to protect the fighting 
reputation of the Alf, as Chapter Th ree demonstrates. It was speci fically intended to 
venerate one specific military institution, the AIF. For instance, in Bean's own 
memoir of the Australian War Records Section (A WRS), the Army organisation 
which was the precursor to the Memorial, he stated that the latter would be "the finest 
monument ever erected to any ann y." 104 Further, when curator A.G . Pretty wrote to 
the Hotel Windsor in 1923, seeking ass istance with adve11ising, he reminded the 
manager that "admiss ion is free, the Committee's aim being to keep green the 
100 Webber, "Constructing Austral ia 's Past." p.l66. 
101 On 28-30 March, 4-9 May and I 0 June. See Chris Coulthard-Ciark. The £nq'clopedia of Australia ·s 
Ba11/es, (Sydney: Allen and Unwin, 2001 ), pp.l 39. 146, 148 for details. 
102 McKernan, "Australian War MemoriaL" p.77. 
103 Styles, "An Other Place," p. l58 . 
104 C.E.W. Bean, Memoir of AWRS, pp.30-1. AWM 170 l / 1. On the AWRS. see Michael Piggott , 
''The Austral ian War Records Section and its Aftermath, 1917-1925." Archives and Manuscripts, 8 
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memory of the A IF.''105 Finally, a review of the Memorial in the Sydnl!y Morning 
Hl!rald in 1924 referred to it as "a facsimile ... of details of [the AIF's] story." 106 
Certainly ·'wil ling sacrifice" was depicted often in the Memorial, but it was 
subordinated to victory and supremacy during the inter-war years. All of these 
rhetorical elements made up the overarching glorification of the men of the AIF and 
the Force as a mi litary organ isation and institution. This was hardly unique; many 
returned soldiers spoke or wrote of the AIF in the inter-war period as if it still existed. 
The Memorial' s Senior Historian, Peter Stanley, argues that the Memorial's 
objective was " to depict the sufferings and misery of the war." 107 Catherine Styles 
agrees, stating that in its early years the Memorial was committed to "representing 
war as appalling. " 108 Stanley goes further, contrasting the truth-telli ng Memorial with 
"the Anzac legend,'' whi ch he sees as constructed , partial and propagandising. 109 This 
interpretation, however, does not serve for the inter-war period. F irstly, I would argue 
forcefully that the Memorial had a great dea l to do with the maintenance of the Anzac 
Legend, and that the two cannot be separated so conveniently. Further, the 
Memoria l's own displays were far from the value-free, scrupulously objective texts 
Stan ley claims them to be. They were, as Chapters Four to Six explore, very caref1.11ly 
constructed, and as Chapter Three demonstrates, des igned to inculcate certain values 
into the nati on. As for truth-telling, Chapter Six addresses the manner in wh ich the 
Memorial depicted defeat, death, wounding and other "truths" of war, which 
contrasted both in tone and content with the "truth-telling" anti-war books of the late 
1920s, which did represent the war as appalling. The Memorial's displays were 
ce11ainly governed by a strict realism in presentation, following a deliberate policy. 
Bean was committed to realistic modes of display, and the Memorial depicted a war 
that was terrible in many respects. However, as indicated. this realism served a 
triumphal master, with the enormity of the ordeal making the Australian victory over 
105 A . o· I' . . tllng trector. Austra tan War Mcmonal (A.G. Pretty) to Manager, Hotel Wmdsor, 10 October 
1923 . AW M 93 20/ 1/6. 
106 Sydm:_l' Alurning Herald. 15 August 1924. p.R. 
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it a ll the greater. The criticism •vhich was so fundamenta l to anti-war literature was 
also absent. 
Michael McKernan makes the astonishing assert ion that ' 'the A WM did not 
have an ideological or national purpose." 11° Chapter Three, especially, demonstrates 
that this was not the case, and that both ideology and nationalism were at the very 
heart of the Memorial project. Further, McKernan mistakenly argues that the main 
reason for Bean's desire to educate was that Australians did not appreciate the horror 
of the war sufficiently: 
During the war. people in France, in Germany or in Britain had 
been constantl y confronted with the s ight of hundreds of 
wounded men return ing home from the front, convalescing there 
and then returning to the front. Husbands on leave would tell 
w ives something of what they had seen, and even if they did not 
speak of war, in their s ilences they wou ld show the horror of it 
al l. . .. Whenever people heard the guns or saw the wounded, they 
thought again of the cost of war. Australians were spared these 
things. Though not insensitive to suffering and aware of the 
anx iety with which people had lived during those dreadful years, 
Austral ians had missed the sights and the smell of war. The 
Memorial, Bean hoped. would teach Australians about war. 111 
This li ne of reasoning is d ifficu lt to accept. As Chapter Two demonstrates, most 
Australians did not wish to remember the horror of the war, and few did do so 
publicly. The Memorial. as Chapter Six explores, most certa inl y did not do so. 
Moreover, as Chapters Four and Five illustrate, it depicted a war which, though 
dangerous and difficult, had seen the glorious triumph of Australian arms. 
McKeman, however, argues in several places that an anti-war spirit animated 
the early Memorial. ln doing so, he goes too far. He argues anachronistically that the 
Memorial, conceived in 1916- 19 and opened 1922, was in touch w ith a feeling of the 
future: 
European art and literature, and even the popul ar culture in the 
years between 1929 and 1939, have a distinct and separate mood, 
as if the inter-war years produced a literary and artistic climate 
different from what preceded and what followed those harrowing 
110 McKernan, "A Monument to the Dignity of Man,'' p.7. 
11 1 McKernan, Here is Their Spiril, p.xii. 
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times. ln its planning and 111 its original concept, the Memorial 
reflected that mood. 112 
His suggestion is that the Memorial was an "anti-monumental" institution embodying 
the sentiment of anti-war literature such as that written by Erich Maria Remarque, 
Ernest Hemingway and Robert Graves. 
There are several fundamental problems with this assertion. Looking at the 
statement prosaically. it ought to be reiterated that the Memorial was initiated in the 
1916-19 period, not in 1929. Secondly, the fact that the Memorial published 
Australian Chivalry to counteract the perceived evils of books like All Quiet on the 
Western Front ought to be enough to dispel the claim, while Bean denounced 
Modernist, anti-war art as ·•freak art" and useless for commemorative purposes, being 
an insult to the relatives of the dead. 111 Furthermore, McKernan is here discussing 
European cu lt.ure, and attempting to apply a conclusion about it to Australian culture. 
As I have indicated, considerab le differences existed, and it is inappropriate to s imply 
borrow a European model and apply it to the Australian situation. European 
developments provide excellent sources of comparison, but commemoration was 
distinctive in each country. 
McKeman ' s assertion does, however, provide a useful point of comparison for 
my own argument. Ant i-war literature presented the First World War as the "heroes' 
twilight," as the title of Bernard Bergonzi's influential study succinctly labelled it. 11 4 
The key stance of this literature was a reaction agai nst the perception that traditional 
rhetoric on war had glorified it and exalted the warrior's power, courage and nobility. 
Anti-war writers saw this as a monstrous lie, a despicable falsification of war so far at 
odds with its brutal, dehumanising reality that it had to be opposed, and the truth told. 
As Ernest Hemingway has his protagonist say in his anti-war novel A Farewell to 
Arms, "I was always embanassed by the words sacred, glorious, and sacrifice and the 
expression in vain ... 1 had seen nothing sacred, and the things that were glorio us had 
112 McKernan. ''A Monument to the Dignity of Man," p.8. 
111 Peter Pierce . .. Is War Ve1:v Big? As big as New Sattih Wales~·· War and parochialism in Australia 
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no glory and the sacrifices were like the stockyards at Chicago if nothing was done 
with the meat except to bury it." 115 
Anti-war literature sought a new meaning in war, one based on truth-tell ing, 
no matter how brutal or shocking such testimony might be. In fact, shock was one of 
the main objectives of anti-war writers who had served in the trenches, for they felt 
that civilians knew nothing of war, and needed to have the blinkers ripped from their 
eyes. Many felt that ifpeople knew the truth about wars they wou ld be less inclined to 
start them in the fu ture. This implied a political critique in anti-war literature, and it 
was indeed a canon ded icated to the most stringent criticism of tbe conduct of the 
war's leaders. A succinct example is Siegfried Sassoon's "The General," written in 
April 1917: 
"Good-moming; good morning!" the General said 
When we met him last week on our way to the line. 
ow the soldiers he smi led at are most of 'em dead, 
And vve're cursing his staff for incompetent swine. 
"He's a cheery old card," grunted Harry to Jack 
As they s logged up to Arras with rifle and pack. 
* 
But he did for them both with his plan of attack. 116 
Horror, terror, shock. dehumanisation, anger - these were the emotions poured forth 
in anti-war literature. Irony, as Pau l Fussell has shown, was its main literary mode, 
which meant that it offered the "dynamics of hope abridged'' and its protagonists had 
less power of action than readers did. 117 They were by no means heroes of the 
traditional type, who, in the "high-mimetic" art form of epic literature, had enjoyed 
more power of action than their audiences, being superior waniors and thus superior 
people. 118 Anti -war protagonists endured appalling conditions, constant terror and 
sanity-threatening shocks, and the frequent death of com rades, many killed in heart-
wrenchingly tenible ways. They were often afraid, and when they did kill the enemy 
they suffered from overwhelming gui lt, as Remarque 's Paul Bai.imer did as he 
l iS Emest Hemingway, A Farewell to Arms, (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1929), pp. l43-4. 
116 Siegfried Sassoon, Collected Poems. /908- /956, (London: Faber, 196 1), p.75. 
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crouched in a shel l-hole with the slowly dyi ng man he had stabbed in a fear-frenzy. 11 9 
Anti-war literature made soldiers into victims, generals and politicians into fools and 
murderers. 
The Australian War Memorial, I wi ll show, was in no way part of this anti -war 
movement, with its "modem memory" of the war. It was, rather, part of that 
.. traditional" war rhetoric that the anti-war writers railed against. The Memorial 
presented Australian soldiers as traditional heroes, having considerable power of 
action on the battlefield and being brave, strong and "terrible in aspect," yet courteous 
to women and compassionate towards the weak. It made a sustained argument that 
they had achieved a remarkable level of military success, and that such suc.cess was 
due to their moral qualities. Both, it argued, were worthy of great praise. lt showed 
selected realities of the war, including death, but did not depict horror, fear, or 
dehumanisation, nor attack the leaders of the war effort. Rather it supported them, 
hardly surprising considering that some of them were on its controlling committee. 
Tony Bennett represents a consensus of scholars when he argues that the 
conception of the nation within the Memorial was not militaristic. 120 Styles, following 
McKernan, declares that Bean "deplored the term 'trophies' as connotating victory 
over the vanqui shed." 121 This is true, Bean did, but at the same time, as Chapter Five 
demonstrates, the Memorial still had a sign ificant number of displays designed not 
simply to connote victory, but to denote Australian military supremacy. More 
generally, Australia developed its own brand of militarism from the earl y 1900s, and 
by the 1920s and 1930s some of those who had fought the First World War, who saw 
themselves as an elite in Australia and the guardians of the nation 's future, were in a 
position to elucidate an official version of Australian national identity. ln so doing 
they based the typica l Australian male on an idealised warrior of the AJF. Further, 
returned men were given certain special civic rights not available to non-returned 
119 This powerrul passag.e cli maxes in a savage denunciation of war: ·'·Comrade: I say to the dead 
man. but I say it cal mly. ' today you. tomorrow me. But ir I come out of it. comrade, I will fight aga inst 
this. that has struck us both down: fi·om you. taken life - and rrom me - ') Life also. I promise you 
comrade. It shall never happen again.··· Erich Maria Rcmarque. All Quiel on 1he Wes1ern Fronl, 
(London: Grenada. fJ 9291 1977). pp.l4X-9. The whole incident is to be found pp.l38-51. 
12
" Bennett, Birlh o./lhe Museum. p. 139. 
1 ~ 1 ··An Other Place." p. l50. She paraphrases McKernan: ... Relics' and 'trophies' were, in the early 
years. used interchangeably. but increasingly Bean discouraged the latter tenn as inappropriate in 
suggesting a spirit of the victor over the vanquished." McKernan, Here is Their Spiril , p.45. 
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citizens - nominally 111 some cases, literally in others. Preference 111 the 
Commonwealth Public Service was dependant upon wartime serv ice, and a host of 
informal social benefits accrued. 122 This was mos t definitely not a Prussian-style 
militarism, where the armed forces exerted political control directly. It was Australian 
militarism, in which the principal returned soldiers' organisati on had direct access to 
federal cabinet, and, more ominously, \.Vhere prominent returned men led right-wing 
paramilitary groups dedicated to the eradication of political enemies such as 
commun ists, some open ly boasting of having the wil l and the means to do so 
physically if the communists attempted to "to turn Australia into a Bolshevik 
country.''123 Military definitions of national identity came to the fore during the 
wattime and post-war per1ods, and the Memorial was a major institution purveying 
such a vision. 
This "militari st turn" in Australian society is an underlying theme of this 
dissertation. Indeed, the Memorial 's displays, which strongly supported returned 
men's demands fo r extra ri ghts due to their actions during the war by offering proof 
of those actions, played an important role in strengthening the Australian version of 
militarism. By international standards, Australian militmism was extremely weak, for 
the mi litary had no power in government whatsoever, nor did returned soldiers' 
groups call for war to be used to solve international disputes. That said, when a 
criminal offender can escape punishment solely due to a distingui shed war record, 
mi litary service has been deemed to have created a relevant difference between 
people. 124 Australia meets another test for mi litarism, Herbert Spencer's "spirit and 
traditions of military life." 125 These were self-consciously maintained by returned 
men's groups, and are examined in Chapter Two particularly. The Digger-Nationali st 
~~~ See Chapter Two for a discussion of these points. 
m Svdney !14orning Herald, 15 May 1928, p.12. Raymond Evans affi rms that Bolshevism was seen as a 
"foreign" political theory, anathema to " British" Australia. Raymond Evans, "'Some Furious Outbursts 
of Riot:· Returned soldiers and Queensland 's ' red nag' disturbances, 1918- 19," War and Socie(v, 3,2 
(September 1985). pp.75-98. 
124 Terry Ki ng, ·Telling the Sheep From lhe Goals: ·Dinkum Diggers' and others, World War 1," in 
Judi th Smart and Tony Woods (eds), An Anzac Muster: Wa r and society in Australia and Neu· Zealand 
19/4-18 and /939-45: Selec1ed papers, (Melbourne: Depa1ment of History. Monash University. 
1992), pp.86-99, p.92 
m The origin of this phrase is uncertain, but it was ascribed to Spencer by the 1913 edi tion of 
Webster ·s Unabridged Dictionary. See the electronic version oft he dictionary released by Project 
Gutenberg at www.gutenberg.org/d i rs/etex J/pgwht04 .txt. 
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complex controlled viwl public platforms fo r the delineation of national identity, and 
th1s 1dentity was based solidly on military virtues. blended with home-grown 
egalitanani sm and plebeian sensib ilities. Australian mil itarism was primarily a 
cultural. rather than a political, phenomenon. Add to this popular martial nationalism 
and widespread triumphalism. and it is clear that Australia was a more militarised 
society in 1928 than 1901. 
The fina l argument l wish to consider concerns the glorification of war. Dutch 
writer Freek Colombijn argues that one of the Memorial's two ''distinctive features·· is 
"the glorification of war."126 In contrast to this, Peter Stanley argues that " the 
Memorial was intended to show not that war was an ennobling thing - as [Bean] may 
have believed on Gal lipoli - but, as he found at Pozieres, that it was a horror which 
must not be glorificd."127 I would argue that neither party is entirely correct, but also 
that, for the inter-war period, Colombijn 's assertion, although in fact made about the 
Memorial of the 1990s. is the more accurate. 128 Catherine Styles agrees with Stanley, 
arguing that "C.E.W. Bean·s vision was for a memorial museum that anctified the 
effort of Australia's military forces in the Fi rst World War, but did not serve to 
legitimise, let alone glorify. the war itself.'' 12 '> How this sanctification was also not 
going to legitimise the war itself is difficult to imagine, and Chapters Three to Six 
demonstrate that legitimising the war, as well as the AIF's contribution to the war 
effort, were fundamenta l aspects of the Memori al' s mission and operation. 
The Memorial did not glorify war per se in the manner in which Prussian 
apologists such as Hei nrich von Treitschke had done in the pre-war period. Bean 
asse11ed that hi s museum wou ld not increase the likel ihood of another war through its 
displays, and this was the case in the vast majority of them, anti -German displays 
being the principal exceptions. The Memorial certainly never claimed that war should 
be the first method of settling differences, or should be used pre-emptively for 
polit ical purposes. It did not glorify war as an abstract notion. What it did do, though , 
1 ~" Freck Colombij n, .. Canberra: Sheep in wolfs clothing." /nremarional Journal o.f Urban and 
Regimwf Research. 22.4 (December 1998). pp.565-5~ I, p.572. 
1 ~ 7 Stanley. '·Gall ipoli and Poz iere~:· p.286. 
11~ The question of whether the Memorial glorifi ed war in the 1990s is beyond the scope of this 
disserta tion. but Colombijn's assertion. for which he docs not offer evidence. would at first glance 
appe<lr to require considerable qualilication and interrogation. 
1 ~·· Styles. "An Other Place." p. l82. 
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was glorify soldiers, glorify victories, and, as a corollary, glorify killing. The moral 
qualities seen in war were also very strongly panegyrised, and formed the moral basis 
of the "national traditions" the Memorial offered the nation. 
v 
A substantial study of the early Memorial is desirable for several reasons. The 
Memorial is a major museum, and as the Nationa l War Memorial is one of the central 
symbolic instituti ons in Aust ralia, embodying a nexus between war and nation which 
is fundamental to Australian identi ty. By examining the Memoria l's early life, 1 seek 
to cast some light upon the nature of this nexus generally in that period, through the 
study of its expression in a vital agency. 
Studying the Memorial also te lls us more about the beliefs of the Digger-
Nationalist commemorative complex, a dominant group in Austral ian society who 
held federal political power and commemorati ve control in the period of this 
dissertation. Indeed. the Memorial has always been under the control of right-wing 
political groups and organisati ons, from the Nationalists and the RSSILA of 1922 to 
the Liberal-National Coalition and the Returned and Services League (RSL) in 2004. 
The groups who control the Memorial are jealous in guarding their hegemony, as 
Stua11 Mac intyre po ints out in The Hisrorv Wars .uo Part of the reason for the 
zealousness with wh ich this guardianship is undertaken is the belief of those involved 
that the conservati ves in Australia are the true standard-bearers of nationalism, the 
only group who can be trusted with the nation's future. This disseiiation examines one 
of this group's main institutions, and seeks to high light the lessons it taught its fe ll ow 
citizens about ideal character, beliefs and actions. In short, it fo llows the Memorial's 
ideal citizen, and sees in him the ideal citizen of a powerfu l segment of Australian 
society. 
The dissertation represents a reassessment of the Memorial with its displays in 
the central position. The first three chapters provide context for the fina l three, which 
anal yse the displays directly. Chapter One explores the images, ideas, and practices of 
the martia l national ist theories prevai ling in the pre-war period in Europe. It then 
traces the infl uences of these in Australia, inc luding the local adoptions made by 
130 Stuart Mac intyre and Anna Clark, The History Wars. (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 
2003), pp.202-6. 
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Australians. Particularly important here were the ideas that success in war proved the 
nation's mettle, that a nation was defined by its great battles and soldiers to a greater 
degree than nny other element of its life. and that military service was glorious if it 
was done in the nation ·s name. The time period is c.l890 to 1918, and includes a brief 
examination of the early development of Australian national reactions to the war. 
Chapter Two examines public memories of the war in Australia 1916-39, 
particularly in the 1920s. This covers the political factors affecting commemoration as 
well as tackling commemoration proper. concentrating on expressions of 
triumphal ism. Other elements of commemoration have been the focus of studies by 
Inglis, Damousi, Luckins and Thomson, among others. The chapter outlines the 
contest for domination of Austral ian public remembrance between the "two cultures" 
of "modem memory'' and "tradition," and highlights the importance of formal 
political control to this contest. Right-wing forces, championing tradition, obtained 
dominance in formal politics and were able to usc this to promote their visions of the 
past. The Memorial was a direct result of such formal political control. 
Chapter Three explores Bean's objectives for the Memorial , and how these 
were shaped by his upbringing in an Anglo-Australian, Imperially-loyal milieu, and 
by his war experiences, from which he developed a deep respect and admiration of the 
AIF verging on hero-worship. and an unshakeable desire to tell their stories. His 
objectives for the Memorial were. in brief, the strongly "traditional'' ones of praising 
the men of the A IF in the strongest terms, protecting and enhancing their reputation, 
especiaiJy their fighting reputation; telling military stories that would instil a public-
minded nationa list "spirit" into the institution's vis itors and would form the basis of a 
"true" national history, one based on martial success as European ones were; and, as 
much as it was consistent with the first two goals, the "modem memory" goal of 
educating the Australian public as to the real conditions of the fighting in Gallipoli, 
France and Palestine. This latter goa l was important, and helps show that traditional 
war rhetoric was undergoing significant change during the inter-war period, as it shed 
its more outrageous glorificatory elements. 
Chapter Four begins three chapters of analysis of the Memorial's displays 
which are the core ofthe dissertation. exploring the Memorial's contributions to the 
Anzac Legend. It examines the war narrative offered by the Memorial , and the moral 
qualities of the troops which were integrated into it. This narrative showed the 
Australians triumphing over difficult conditions and powerful enemies, in the process 
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revealing a number of martial viriues, such as ferocity , determination and 
resourcefulness, which enjoyed wide circulation in Australia in this period, being 
claimed as characterist ic of Australians. This collective portrai t of the Australian 
troops, which makes up the second half of this chapter, showed a composite of 
virtues, such as determination, which were seen as typical of Britons and as showing 
the Austra lian "racial'' heritage, and those other virtues such as resource, as well as 
humour, which were seen as home-grown, particu larly being seen as "bush" virtues. 
Chapter Five examines the manner in wh ich the Memorial attempted to prove 
Australian military supremacy, a textbook martia l nationalist notion which also 
supported the ''the central element [ ofJ the Anzac Legend ." Some of these 
representations featured graphic triumphalism and "a spirit of the victor over the 
vanquished." This was the apotheosis of glorification in the Memorial during the 
inter-war period. 
Finally, Chapter Six then exp lores the "nati onal" interpretation of such 
''truths" of war as death , defeat and wounds. Here the Memorial's national ism was 
most clearly seen, and as was the desire of its creators to honour the dead through 
depicting them as heroic, triumphal warriors. Whilst acknowledged with varying 
levels of realism and directness, these were ordeals which, the Memorial claimed, the 
Australians had passed through victoriously, and the awe and reverence which Bean 
hoped to invoke in audiences were greatl y enhanced by these representations. At the 
same time, sadness and irony, two anti-war notions, were seen in these displays. 
As this dissertation is undertaking a different type of investigation, a note 
about sources is necessary. The most important potential problem in assessing the 
displays is the relatively small number of labels that have survived from the huge 
number written. However, the number which do survive is still considerable, and is 
sufficient to gauge their typical style and content. Further, labels for the dioramas, or 
"p icture models," cons idered by many including Bean to be vita l elements of the 
Memorial, surv ive intact. So too do the labels of the photographic exh ibition. Bean's 
guidebooks, in which he selected those d isplays he felt were most interesting, and 
which were widely used, are also extant. The layout of the museums is easi ly 
discernible, and the contents of many display cases is known. Thus. the material 
which exists still offers a rich insight into the Memorial's displays , and the 
institution's master narrative of the Australian overseas war experience can be 
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completely reconstructed. In addition to these sources, the fo lio book of artwork, 
Australian Chi\'(/li:r, strongly informs the dissertation. 13 1 This is because it was 
pub lished wi th a deliberate rhetorical intent - to counteract a perceived debased image 
of Australian and other soldiers being espoused in anti-war books. 132 In the book 's 
preface, Treloar made considerable claims for it: 
''Great nations," said Ruskin , " write their autobiographies in 
three manuscripts - the book of their deeds, the book of their 
words, and the book of their ati." ln this record of a vital chapter 
in Australian history, the first and third of these " manuscripts" 
b. d iB are com me . -· 
The book 's extremely long labels were the Memorial ' s last word in the inter-war 
period on the major battles fought by the Australians, and probably also the labels for 
the paintings in the museum itself. 
In addit ion, many of the representations were unchanged for the whole period 
of the earl y Memorial. The guides had large sections of identical text, and the 
photographic exhibition from Melbourne was expanded, but little changed, when it 
moved to Sydney, where it remained , without alteration, until 1935. Of the 174 
photographs displayed in Melbourne, 163 , or 94%, were also displayed in Sydney, 
with identical captions. 
A masculinist logic and doctrine make up a consistent undercurrent throughout 
this dissertation. The his tory created for Austra lia during the war was perceived to 
have been achieved by men , for waging war was their sole province. This implied that 
true citizenship - the deepest, most spiritual connection with the nation- was brought 
upon by military service, and thus open a lmost exc lusively to men in this period. 134 
Women, who had received nominal equal political rights, including the right to vote, 
in 1902, were principal ly cast in traditional non-participant ro les during the war, and 
post-war commemoration rein forced the division. Despite the many advances made 
l .l l J.L. Treloar (cd.), Aus/ra/ian Chind1:r: Reproduclions in colour and duo-tone o.f official H'ur 
paintings. (Melbourne: Australian War Memorial, 1933). 
1
'
2 Pierce. "Is War Verr Big? " 
m Treloar (ed.). Ausrmlian ChiPali :l', Preface. 
1
u Nurses were olien honoured in early post-war commemoration, but there was never a suggestion of 
true equality when it came to turning service into a political mandate. Returned nurses had no 
significant voice in the "national" side of the returned soldiers' advocacy work. 
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during the war in women's workforce participation, which saw women perfonning 
"war work," and the eno1mous amount of voluntary labour undertaken by women, as 
well as the participation of nurses on active service, only the latter was considered 
sufficiently special to be mentioned by commemorative speakers and writers. Apart 
from this small acknowledgement, women's participation in the war was generally 
ignored by commemorative agencies, including the Memorial. The Memorial was 
dedicated to the overseas war experience, so by definition it excluded all women but 
those nurses with the AIF. This masculinist reaction, privi leging men's contribution to 
the nation. was a response to ''First Wave" feminism. 1t can be read as an assertion 
that despite women's newfound political equality, men retained heir prime position in 
society, although such a hypothesis requires investigation. 
A number of subjects offer themselves for further study. Firstly, these include 
the Memorial's role as a mil itary technology museum. Secondly, the return of some 
objects to mainstream military use during the Second World War, something that also 
happened to some trophy guns, is, from a museological perspective, an interesting 
development, for it is unusual for museum objects, once they have crossed the portal 
of the museum and thus become in Tony Bennett's phrase "facsimiles ofthemselves," 
to be returned to their original use. 135 Also promising is the treatment of the enemy 
within the Memorial, which, beyond a brief, representative survey, was eliminated 
from the dissertation due to lack of space, as was an assessment of the treatment of 
individuals, especially leaders. As Bean was always pre-occupied with leadership, and 
had a preference for ''fi ght ing" leaders, such analysis is appealing. Also interesting 
would be a detailed analysis of the Memorial's art collection, including a critical 
reading of the entire art collection on display in 1922-35. However, as 1 do not 
pretend to be an art historian, this task, which has been undertaken in part by Ann 
Grey and others, awaits its author. Finally, the relationship between the Memorial and 
the RSSILA would be a fruitful subject for detailed analysis. 
Finally, in this disse1tation I have sought primarily to understand the stories 
surrounding the A JF's experiences rather than those experiences themselves, 
exami ning the latter only in contrast to the former. I seek not to criticise actions in 
France or at Gallipoli, but those of politicians, writers, speakers and display-makers in 
Australia in the 1920s. Other scholars have taken up the question of whether the 
135 Bennett, Birth of the Museum, p.l 29. 
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Australians really were as magnificent a tighting force as Bean and his allies claimed 
they were. and they have concluded, as Bean did, that "at any rate towards the end of 
the "var," they were indeed a fom1idable force, both in France and in Palestine. 136 I 
accept this judgment, which my own research has confinned. I am not critical of, nor 
do 1 systematically explore in this dissertation, the actions and character of the AIF 
from the point of view of establishing empirical "facts." Rather I am critical of the 
political use of the past by Hughes and many others, in which the actions, and the 
deaths, of ordinary Australians were arrayed agajnst other Australians as weapons in a 
rhetorical battle. Alistair Thomson affinns that some returned soldiers stayed away 
from Anzac Day rituals in the early inter-war years because t~y felt the rituals were 
being used to glorify war, and for political purposes with which they did not agree, 
and theirs is a position with which I have a degree of sympathy. 137 
Figure 2: Entry, Sydney Exhibition. 
Source: Australian War Memorial Collections Database. 
cas.awm.gov.au. Photograph PO 1936.00 I 
136 C.E. W. Bean. ·'Sidelights of the War on Australian Character," Address to the Royal Australian 
Historical Society. 27 May 1927, Royal Australian Histoncal Soctety Journal and Proceedings, 13,4 
( 1927), pp.208-23, p.211 . On the quality of the AIF as soldiers, see Andrews, Anzac Illusion, pp.l44-9; 
Jeffrey Grey, A Mtlrtary History of Australta, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999),pp.84-7, 
I 06; Beaumont, "The Anzac Legend," pp. l57-6l; P.A Pederson, "The AIF on the Western Front: The 
role of training and COtlll1land,'' in M. McKernan and M. Browne (eds), AusTralia: Two centurtes of 
war and peace, (Canberra: Australian War Memorial in association with Allen and Unwin, 1988), 
pp. l67-93. 
137 Th -omson, An:ac i\;femones, pp.l25-7. 
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Figure 4: Layout, Sydney Exhibition, 1925-8. 
Source: Australian War Memorial Architectural Plans, Drawer 2 Folder 3. 
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Chapter 1: The Rise of Martial Nationalism in Australia, 
c.1870-1920 
Figure 5: Postcard, Australia, 1917: "The Battle of Polygon 
Wood: From original drawing by A. Pearse, war artist." 
Source: Australian War Memorial Collections Database. 
cas.awm.gov.au. Photograph H00563. 
To set the scene for the arguments and contentions advanced in this dissertation, it is 
necessary to investigate firstly the pertinent formative traditions upon whose basis the 
Memorial was conceptualised and predicated, and secondly the contemporary 
Australian reactions to these traditions and to the First World War in this context. The 
first of these tasks can be divided into two parts: an outline of the cultural roots of the 
Memorial's commemoration, which lay in European martial traditions of great 
antiquity, especially as they had been interpreted by late-nineteenth-century 
nationalists in Britain, Germany, France and elsewhere, and an exploration of home-
grown Australian expressions of these traditions. The latter featured yearnings for a 
perceived moral cleansing and revitalisation brought on by war, and for the possible 
creation of a nation as an emotional entity through the same agency. 
The second element is focused upon Australian nationalist responses to the 
First World War during the confl ict itself. These included celebration of Australian 
military success in the nation's name, beginning with the storming of the cliffs at 
Gallipoli on 25 April 1915 and progressing throughout the war. The effects of 
censorship were such that even battles now known to have been terrible failures were 
celebrated as magnificent victories. During the war, the Anzac Legend was 
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established, a national myth strongly influenced in origin and content by the pre-war 
European traditions examined in subsequent pages of the chapter, and based upon the 
assertion that Australians were superior soldiers. Testifying to the influence of these 
traditions, both victory and sacrifice were seen as necessary for the satisfactory 
creation of a nation in an emotional, so-called "spiritual," sense. These were the 
nationalist influences upon Australian commemoration wh ich went a long way toward 
shaping its typical expressions, from Anzac Day speeches to the Memorial's displays, 
as the following chapters explore. 
Late-nineteenth-century Europe saw the nse of a decidedly "martial" 
national ism. The development had several strands to it. Firstly, it was felt that mil itary 
action created "nations." 1 This belief was given powerful support by a number of 
notable cases, particularly Gem1any and Italy, in which wars had indeed provided that 
theoretical nationalist ideal - a State for the nation? For other nationalists, mil itary 
service was sufficient to create a ''national sentiment," and for nationalists in 
established political entities, no longer needing to concem themselves with obtaining 
political control of a State, the establishment of a "national sentiment" of which they 
1 The definition of ' 'nation" has proved diflicult to pin down since it first appeared in the eighteenth 
century. Here. by "nation" I mean nation-state. that is. both the "nation" conceived as a group of people 
who have an emotional bond, referred to in many cases by its adherents as a "spiritual" bond. and the 
"nat ion" conceived as a political entity in comrol of its affairs. That is. I am referring throughout to 
groups who had control of a polit ical State, rather than those who were yet to obtain it, such as the 
Poles and the Czechs. Many of the points could apply to them equally well , but there are technical and 
theoretical issues which I do not wish to enter into here involved in the distinction between the two 
kinds of "nat ions." those with or those without control of a polit ical entity. I also do not wish to be 
delayed by the fact that Australia did not truly have control of its own affairs in this period, being 
yoked firmly to British Imperial foreign pol icy, for instance. For the vast majority of Australians, the 
ethnic British '·blood tic" was more important than their lack of power over foreig n policy. They were 
part of a larger "nation" based on British heritage. See Douglas Cole, "The C1i mson Thread of Kinship: 
Ethnic Ideas in Australia I 870- 1914," Historical Studies, 14,56 ( 1971 ), pp.515-25. Cole argues convincingly 
that Austra lian nat ional identity at this time was "pan-Anglo-Saxon' ' nationalism. based on the B1itish "race." 
The literature on nationalism is vast: some important works. on which the following discussion is partially 
based. include Carlton J.H. Hayes, Nmionalism: A religion, (New York: Macmillan, 1960); Emest Gellner. 
Nations and Nationalism, (Oxford: BlackwelL 1983); E.J. Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism Since 
1780.· i\~wh. programme. realirr. (Cambridge Cambridge University Press. 1990): Benedict Anderson, 
Imagined Communities: Reflections on the origins and grol1'th of nmionalism, rev. cdn. (London: Verso, 
1991); Elie Kedouric, Nationalism. 4'h edn, (Oxford: Blackwell. 1993); John Hutchinson and Anthony D. 
Smith (eds). Nationalism , Oxford Readers, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994); Anthony D. Smith, 
/V~l'lhs and Memories o(rhe Nation, (Oxford : Oxford University Press, 1999). 
2 The theoretical ideal of nationalism was that "the polit ical and national unit should be congruent." 
Gell ner. Nations and Na tionalism, p.l. The "political unit" could take on various forms - republican, 
monarchical - but the "national unit'' was generall y held in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries 
to be an ethnically-based group of people, ''historically constituted" (in Joseph Stalin's influential 
phraseology) and economical ly integrated. sharing a common language and worldview. See Clive 
Christie, Race and Nmion: A reader. (London: Taurus, 1998). pp.3-72 ; Anthony D. Smith, The Ethnic 
Origins o( Nations, (Oxford: Blackwell, 1986). 
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approved was the key question. The people had to be made to feel part of a group 
larger than their immediate district or extended family, nationali sts felt, and give that 
~:,rroup their ultimate loyalty.-' Under the influence of social Darwinism, another strand 
of this thinking saw war as good for an established nation, cleansing it of the 
perceived ills of peace. Military service was also seen as good for the individual 
citizen, imbuing them with a sense of duty. In addition, active service - the defence of 
the nation, as it was perceived - was considered the greatest act a citizen could 
perfonn in his [sic] life. In addition, it was fe lt that war proved the nation's mettle, 
and thus the greater the enemies overcome, the greater the nation. Ultimately, a nation 
was defined by its great battles and the great leaders who had fought them - national 
history was first and foremost the history of a nation's wars.4 As all classes were 
perceived to strive together in a truly national war, all classes were able to see 
themselves in the vision of the triumphal nation, still usually personified in the late 
nineteenth century by its great leaders , with supplementary praise flowing to the 
ordinary soldier. 5 
In Australia, these ideas, which I have dubbed "martial nationa lism," were 
widely accepted and expressed, at the same time being adapted to local conditions. 
Conscription was felt by some to be a positive force, while many nationalists looked 
forward to a future war that would cleanse the nation, prove its viril ity and its mettle, 
and simultaneously provide it with a history. During the First World War, many 
national ists announced that the war had indeed brought about many of these martial 
nationalist ideals. Firstly, it was claimed alternatively to be cleansing or to have 
already cleansed the nation, saving it from moral and physical decay. Secondly, the 
actions of Australian soldiers were claimed to have created the nation "as an 
emotional and spiritual entity." Military service was claimed to be glorious, a 
soldier's death heroic. These same actions were claimed to have proved the nation's 
mettle and to have provided it with a history which might compete with existing 
heroic European histories, one based on victories. A practice of trophy-taking and 
display, prominent in Europe during the nineteenth century, was adopted, with objects 
3 David Thomson, Europe Since Napoleon , ( Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1966 ). p.587. 
4 Michael Howard, "War and the Nation State," in The Causes o_(Ji'ars and Other Essays, 2"d edn. 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), pp.23-35, pp.23-9. 
5 On the uniting force of modem nationalist war. see Nigel James Young, The Nation State and War 
Resistance, Ph.D. Dissertation. University of California. Berkeley. 1976, pp. l 00-2. 
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taken from vanquished enemies displayed to glorify national strength, the national 
moral fibre that had been proved. 
Since 1 argue and demonstrate that the Memorial was part of the Australian 
commemorative mainstream which grew out of, adopted, and deliberately refetTed to 
the traditions of martial national ism, especially those of Britain, an exploration of 
some of its major images and ideas is necessary. 1n addition, as Chapters Four to Six 
demonstrate, the Memorial deliberately harked back to events in the British past, and 
refetTed to British military and martial nationalist traditions. Thus, again, these 
traditions require examination. 
While the decision to focus this chapter on the European roots of Australian 
commemoration has meant that the Memorial figures less prominently in the 
discussion at this point, the contextualisation is fe lt to be essential in establishing 
points of reference for subsequent chapters, thus obviating the need for extrapolation 
in Chapters Four to Six. 
1 
A number of cu ltural and political developments led to this "martial" nationalism. The 
1870-1914 period of European history saw e;,rreatly increased internati onal economic 
competition, an increasingly complex and fragile system of military alliances, the rise 
of socialism to contest the political and economic power of the capitalists, and the 
hegemony of the pseudo-scientific theories of social Darwinism, which were 
especially imp01iant to martial nationalism. It was also the period of High 
Imperialism, when the national aspirations, fears and self-images of the British and 
the Germans, in particular, were evident in debates surrounding the acquisition and 
expansion of empires.6 Social Darwinist theories asserted that competition was the 
normal pattern of intemational relations; nations. equated with "races," and through 
them with species in nature, were seen as being in a constant struggle for survival.7 
6 German nationalists felt slighted because their nat ion, great in cultural accomplishments, as evidenced by 
the likes of Goethe and Beethoven, had no Empire. Their striving for prestige was accompanied by a naval 
building programme which, along with a profound and every-increasing economic rivalry, led to "the 
Anglo-German Antagonism," which was a major cont1ibuting factor to the First World War. Paul M. 
Kennedy. The Rise t~/the Anglo-German Antagonism. 1860-1914, (London: Allen & Unwin, 1980). 
7 See Mike Hawkins, Social Darwinism in European and American Thought 1860- /945: Nature as 
model and IWture as threat, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), pp.l 84-2 I 5. For a 
discussion of social Darwinism as it influenced Britain, including a general examination of the subject, 
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Superior races, marked out as such through superior racial ''characteristics" which 
assisted thei r survival, would triumph over those with inferior qualit ies, who would go 
under. T hus, war was the greatest "test" of a nation's mettle, for it faced extinction if 
defeated 8 Moreover, qualities were inherited and thus were inherent, but were also 
thought able to improve or decline. 
War had a vital role in the improvement of"races," also, accordi ng to Gem1an 
nationalists such as Heinrich von Trei tschke and Friedrich von Bemhardi. In his 
Germany and t/u: Next War. Bernhardi put fonh a reasoned case that war was a 
positive influence on the nation, because it led naturall y to people acting in a 
communal way. placing the benefit of their fe llow citizens to the fore, while at the 
same time, in a thoroughly social Darwinist manner, it separated the wheat from the 
chaff:9 
All petty p rivate interes ts shrink into ins ignificance before the 
grave decis ion which a war involves. T he common danger unites 
all in a common effort, and the man who shirks this duty to the 
community is deservedly spurned. T his union contains a 
liberating power which produces happy and permanent resul ts in 
the national life. We need only recall the uniting power of the 
War of Liberation or the Franco-German War and their historical 
consequences. The brutal incidents inseparable from every war 
vanish completely before the idealism of the main result. Al l the 
sham reputations which a long spell of peace undoubtedly fos ters 
are unmasked . Great persona lities take their proper place; 
strength, truth , and honour come to the f ront and are put into 
play. "A thousand touching traits testify to the sacred power of 
the love which a righteous war awakes in nob le nations."10 
see Michael Howard. ''Empire, Race and War in prc-1914 Britain," in The Lessons of HisloJ:I', (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 1991 ). pp.63-80. 
~ Herbert Spencer. for example, argued that "the ki lling off of relat ively feeble tribes, or tribes 
relatively wanting in endurance, or courage, or sagacity. or power of cooperation. must have tended 
ever to maintain, and occasionally to increase, the amounts of life-preserving powers possessed by 
man." S1udy ofSociology ( 1873), quoted in Hawkins, Social Darwinism, p.86. 
9 Spencer argued that ''warfare among men, like warfa re among animals. has had a large share in 
raising their organisation to a higher stage." Study of Sociologv ( 1873), quoted in Hawkins, Social 
Darwinism, p.86. 
1
° Friedrich von Bemhardi, Germany and the Ne.xl War. Allen H. Bowes (trans.). (London: Arnold. 1913). 
p.20. The quote came from Heinrich von Trei tschke's His /01y of Gern1any in the Nine1eenrh Centw:r 
( 1879-94). Bemhardi continued: "Frederick the Great recognised the ennobling effect of war. ·War,' he 
said, 'opens the most fruitful field to all vi rtues, for at every moment constancy, pity, magnanimity, 
heroism, and mercy, shine forth in it ; every moment offers an opp011unity to exercise one of these vi rtues."' 
On the glorification of war by German intellectuals. see Michael Howard, "Prussia in European History," 
in The Lessons of Histmy . (New Haven: Yale University Press, 199 1 ), pp.49-62. 
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In Bemhard i 's view, as in that of Frederick the Great, war was really a magnifying 
force for humankind. Its .. brutal incidents" would "vanish completely" before the 
glory of this magnification, which the fortunate nation, saved from the shams of 
peace, would be experiencing in its wake. 
Despite the invective later heaped upon German nationalist thinkers by 
Austral ians during the war, the notion that \var was good for a nation was extremely 
popular in Australia before and during the war. 11 More importantly, the Memorial 's 
principal message was strikingly simi lar to Bemhardi's, although the Memorial also 
frank ly acknowledged the cost of war in a manner Bemhardi did not. Pre-war 
li terature included the work of W.H. Fitchett, an Australian, whose popular volume 
titled Deeds Thm Won the Empire: historic bailie scenes was first published in 
1894. 12 Fitchett made it clear that he wrote to promote "emotional" nation-building, 
building up a "sentiment" through tales of heroic triumph. ln so doing, he mirrored 
some o f the Gennan nationalists' positive attitudes towards warfare: t:\ 
The tales here are told, not to glolify war, but to nourish patriotism. 
They represent an effort to renew in popular memory the great 
traditions ofthe Imperial race to which we belong. 
11 Williams. A11zacs, rhe Media, pp.20-l. Professors George Arnold Wood and Ernest Scott, amongst 
others. provided intellectual denuncia tion, while Bill Gammage records similar attitudes amongst 
soldiers in the AIF. See John Anthony Moses, ?russian-German Militarism 1914-18 in Australian 
Perspeclit ·e: The !110ughr o.f Gt>orge Arnold Wood. (Bern: Peter Lang. 199 1 ); Ernest Scott, "The Nature 
of the Issue," lecture delivered in the Masonic Hall, Melbourne, on June IS'h 1915 University o.f 
Melbourne War Lee lures. (Melbourne: University of Melbourne, 1915). pp.l9-28: Gammage, The 
Broken )'ears. pp.22 1-3. George Arnold Wood ( 1865- 1928), b. Salford, England, d. Randwick, NSW. 
Professor of IIi story, Uni versity of Sydney, I X9 1- I 928. A DB. 1•ol. I 2, pp.556-8. Sir Ernest Scott 
( 1867-1939), b. Northampton. England, d. Melbourne, Victoria. Professor of History, University of 
Melbourne, 19 13-36. ADB. 1'01. I I, pp.544-6. 
1 ~ William Henry Fitchett ( I 84 I-I 928). b. Grantham, England, d. Melbourne, Victoria. A Methodist, 
he beca me well-known in the Methodist world and was a " forceful and fervent" preacher. ADB. vo/8 , 
p.512. Wrote a series of mart ial nationalist books glorifying British arms from 1897 until the First 
World War. President of Mc1hodist Ladies' College. Kcw, I 882-28. ADB, vo/.8, pp.SII - 13. 
11 It ough1 to be noted here that in I 894 the Anglo-German Antagonism was still more than a decade in 
the future , and many in Britain, conscious that lhey shared many views with their "racial cousins" in 
the Teuton lands, looked fo rwa rd tO closer co-operation, perhaps even a military alliance, with 
Germany. See James Joll. Europe Since / 870: An inrem(/fional his !o1y. (Harn1ondsworth: Pengui n, 
1973), pp.96-8. Gordon Buxton provides Austra lian examples of the same sentiment. G. L. Buxton, 
" I X70-90 ... in F.K . Crowley (ed. ). A Ne11· History 4Ausrralia, (Melbourne: Heinemann, I 974), pp. I 65-
2 15. pp.2 14-5. 
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The history of the Empire of which we are subjects - the story of 
the struggles and suffe1ings by which it has been built up - is the 
best legacy which the past has bequeathed us. But it is a treasure 
strangely neglected .... There is real danger that for the average 
youth the great names of British st01y may become meaningless 
sounds, that his imagination wi ll take no colour from the rich and 
deep tints of history. And what a pall id, co ld-blooded citizenship 
that must produce' 
War belongs, no doubt, to an imperfect stage of society; it has a 
side of pure bruta li ty. But it is not all brutal. Wordsworth's daring 
line about "God's most perfect instrument" has a great truth behind 
it. What examples are to be found in the tales here retold, not 
merely of heroic daring, but of even finer qualities - of heroic 
fortitude which dreads dishonour more than it fears death; of the 
patriotism that makes love of the Fatherland a passion. These are 
the elements of robust citizenship. They represent some, at least, of 
the qualities by which the Empire, in a sterner time than ours, was 
won, and by which, even in these ease-loving days, it must be 
. . d 14 mamtame . 
What Bemhardi was describing as an ideal Fi tchett was actively seeking to 
perpetuate, to immonalise. He, in common with a large number of nationalist activists 
in numerous countries, felt driven to publicly glorify his nation in the hope that his 
fe llow citizens would become ti red with an emotional attachment to the complex of 
virtues, including courage, determination , devot ion to duty and nobility, which 
Fitchett 's stories offered as characteristic of the "British." Fitchett was very popular in 
Austra lia, at least among the middle classes. His books (there were others such as 
14 W.H. Fitchett. Deeds That Won the Empire: Historic bailie scenes. (London: Bell. 1905). Preface. 
The line from Wordsworth seems almost certainly a corruption of one from the poet"s 1816 poem. 
"Ode: The morning of the day appointed for a general thanksgiving." The alteration in connotation is 
marked: 
For Thou art angry with thine cnemies1 
For these, and for our e lTOn;, 
And sins that point their tCITOrs, 
We bow our heads before Thee. and we laud 
And magnify thy name. Almighty God! 
But thy most dreaded instrument. 
In working out a pure intent; 
Is Man - arrayed for mutual slaughter. -
Yea, Carnage is thy daughter1 
"Reading Text 1" of the poem. William Wordsworth, Shorter Poems of William Wordsworth. !807-
1820. Carl H. Ketcham (ed.), (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1989). pp. l87-8. 
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Fighrs j ()J· the Flag) ran into many editions and were widely given out as school 
rrizes.15 
The Memorial shared some of Fi tchett ' s objectives for nationalist education; 
for instance, it was principally concerned with ensuring that the ''great" names of 
Australian his tory were not forgotten, and, through the inspiration of tales about these 
Australians , sought to create strong, robust citizenship. Furthermore, the positive 
vi sion of war which Fitchett expressed was mirrored in the Memorial, as was 
Fitchett's focus on mora l virtues. This conf,•Tuence is illustrated by a description of 
Brigadier General Harold Edward "Pompey" Elliott which appeared in the 
Memorial ' s Canberra Guide, as late as I 967, bearing a striking resemblance to 
Fitchett ' s description of General James Wolfe, the conqueror of Quebec. Of Wolfe, 
Fitchett wrote in exuberant tenns: 
In warl ike genius he was on land as Nelson was on sea, 
chivalrous. fiery , intense. A "magnetic" man with a strange gift 
of impressing himself on the imagination of his soldiers, and of 
so penetrating the whole force he commanded with his own spirit 
that in his hands it became a teiTible and almost resistless 
instrument of war. 16 
This may be compared to the description of Elliott in the 1967 Guide to Australian 
War Memorial: "His staunchness and vehemence, and his power of instilling those 
qualities into his troops, turned his brigade into a magnificently effective 
instrument.''17 The connection speaks of a quite deliberate harking back to past British 
military heroes. 
Some nationalists went further than Fitchett. ln 1896 poet Henry Lawson 
published a poem titled "The Star of Australasia," which expressed in the clearest of 
terms that war was far better for the nation than peace: 
1 ~ W.H. Fitchell. Fights/(Jr the Flag, (London: Smith and Elder, 1898): Fightsfor the Flag: Adopted 
.for use in schools. 1rith illus /ralinns am/ pla11s. (London: Bell 191 0). Robin Gerster affirms that the 
book was in its I wcnty-ninth impression in 1914. Gerster, Big-no!ing. p.l5. 
16 Fitchett, Deeds That Won 1he Empire. p.l4. 
17 
Australian War Memorial. Guide 10 Aus1ralian War Memorial, (Canberra: Govemment Printer. 
1967). p.58. The entry appears in all issues of the Guide up to this date also. Harold Edward Elliott 
( 1878-1931 ). b. West Charlton. Victoria, d. Victoria. Served wi th 4'h Victorian Contingent in the Boer 
War. Commanded 7'11 Battalion, Alt. at Gall ipoli and 15' 11 Brigade on the Western Front. Prominent in 
defensive and offensive operations in 19 18. Nationalist Senator for Victo1ia 1920-3 1. Bit1er at 
perceived slights in relat ion to higher commands, Elliott committed suicide in 1931. ADB. voli?. 
pp.428-J I . 
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A nation's born where the shells fa ll fast , or its lease of life renewed. 
We in part atone for the ghou lish strife, 
and the crimes of the peace we boast, 
And the better pa1t of a people's li fe in the storm comes uppermost. 18 
It also included numerous ideas that were later to form fundamental elements of the 
Australian "national" renctions to the Fi rst World Wnr, such as the inherent military 
ability of the lanikin and the notion that there were no classes in war. Lawson presented 
a pure Jn<utial nationalist vision of a nation united in a sweet war, which would rid it of 
unspecified peacetime ills. and in which great deeds would be done for the honour of 
doing them. War was the stuff of life, for in this war the wan·iors would live more 
vigorously than was the case in the turgid days of peace: 
The soul of the world they will feel and see 
in the chase and the grim retreat -
They'll know the glory of victory- and the grandeur of defeat. 19 
The romanticism of Lawson's vision of war is striking, for his is not a vision of medieval 
knights: he sees the shells "fall fast." Lawson frankly and clearly glorified war, mirroring 
the extreme statements of Bemhardi and Treitschke, seeing the nation enter a new era of 
glory: 
And sou them nation and southern state, aroused from their dream of ease, 
Must sign in the Book of Eternal Fate their stormy histories? 0 
For Lawson, national hi story could only truly begin in war. Only in conflict would it 
sign the Book of Eterna l Fate and join the mainstream of the historical nations of the 
world. This idea survived the outbreak of the war, and in 1916 the Prime Minister, 
W.M. Hughes, declared that "war has saved us from moral and physical 
degeneracy. "21 Hughes felt that, just as Bemhardi had advocated and Lawson had 
predicted, the war had cleansed the nation. 
IR Henry Lawson, 'The Star of Australasia," in In the Days When rhe World Was Wide and Other Poems. 
(Sydney: Angus and Robertson, 1896), pp.l16-123. p. l22 . 
19 Lawson. "The Star of Australasia." p. 120. 
20 Lawson, "The Star of Australasia." p. l23. 
21 Quoted in Richard White, Inventing Ausrralia: Images and idenriry. 1688-1980, (Sydney: Allen and 
Unwin, 198 1), p.l27. 
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This was the most extreme Australian nationalist reaction to war, but its 
positivity was typical. For instance, school children were taught songs in which 
defending the Empire was asserted as the duty of every white Australian: 
Thy dormant days are ended, 
Thy hours of rest are run; 
Now rouse thee for a nation's work, 
And keep the Empire won! 
Beneath thy bright blue skies, 
I . F . . 122 Austra ta au·, anse. 
Australian nationalists were aware of the fact that war had, indeed, created a sense of 
solidarity whi ch contemporaries acknowledged, as Bemhardi had asserted. 23 
Australians were certainly conscious of the development, and in the late nineteenth 
and early twentieth centuries Australian nation-builders searched for a military event 
that might bring together the Australian nation. For some, any military participation 
was sufficient. For example, in 1885 the offer of a contingent for the Sudan campaign 
had prompted one Austral ian politician to claim that the offer had "precipitated 
Australia, in one short week, from a geographical expression to a nation."24 This 
optimistic asse11ion, however, came to nought, for the Sudan campaign was unpopular 
in Australia and the Australian contingent did very little, but nationalists tried again 
during the Boer War.25 However, once again there was insufficient public interest in 
what was an increasingly distasteful imperial conflict, which W.M. Hughes accused of 
n C'oiiiiiiOnwealth School Paper, I June 19 10, quoted in White, In venting Australia, p.l26. 
~' Indeed. Bernhardi gave two examples. T he other was equal ly adamant: "Even defeat may bear a rich 
harvest. It often, indeed. passes an irrevocable sentence on weakness and misery. but often, too, it leads 
to a healthy revival, and lays the foundation of a new and vigorous constitution. ·r recognize in the 
effect of war upon national character,' said Wilhelm von Humboldt. 'one of the most salutary elements 
in the moulding of the human race.'" F1icdrich von Bernhardi, Germany and 1he Next War, p.20. 
l• Victorian Premier James Service quoted in Buxton. "1870-90," p.200. Buxton also quotes James 
Munro, who served as Victorian Premier from !890 to 1892, denouncing the Sudan involvement in the 
strongest of terms. referring to it as a "mean, miserable, contemptible fight. " 
15 Buxton also quotes James Munro. who served as Victorian Premier from 1890 to 1892, denouncing 
the Sudan involvement in the strongest of terms, referring to it as a "mean, miserable, contemptible 
fight." Buxton. " 1870-90,'' p.200. See also Malcolm Saunders. Britain, the Australian Colonies and the 
Suda11 Campaigns of / 884-5, (Arm idalc: University of New England Press, 1985); Grey, MilitaiJ' 
History, pp.45-8. Grey states that "the derision and parsimony with which they were received on their 
return was in marked contrast to the scenes which had heralded their dispatch." Grey, Military History. 
p.46. 
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being cowardly and contemptible! 6 Martial fulfilment would have to wait on a greater 
war and a greater Australian effort. 
In the meantime, earnest preparations were undertaken in Australia for a 
possible race war. Many Australians perceived threats from Asian ''hordes" coveting 
Australian space and natural resources. Compounding this was the determination of 
almost all Australians to exclude immigrants from Asia, Africa and Southern Europe, 
which was thought to add an insult to !,'Teed and an undefined natural hostility as 
motivations for an attack from Asia.27 Australia thus needed protection, it was felt. 
With Japan's defeat of Russia in 1905, aniving on the heels of the recall of some of 
the Royal Navy ships from the Australian station in reaction to the increasing threat 
posed by the German naval building programme, Australians felt vulnerable.28 To set up 
the rudiments of a defence of the continent they had seized, militarists such as ALP 
politician W.M. Hughes envisioned a nation in an11S: 'The whole population (male) 
ought to be trained to arms .... I take it this country does not want an offensive army, but 
an armed people who can shoot straight."29 Hughes, at least, did not envision Australia 
as a pacifist nation, but as one which contested aggressively with others in the struggle 
for survival which was life. As Manning Clark observed, "as a believer in the survival of 
the fittest, Hughes now accepted blood sacrifice as a rite in which man gained an insight 
into the meaning of life."~° Convinced by Hughes and other advocates, early Australian 
govenm1ents set up a scheme of peacetime conscription3 1 
~6 C.M.H. Clark, A Historr of Australia. vol.5: The People Make Loll's. 1885-1 915, (Melbourne: 
Melbourne University Press. 1981 ), pp. 168-17 I. 
27 Separate fears of attack from the Russians and the French had surfaced at earlier times. See Buxton, 
" 1870-1890." p.J99; F.K. Crowley. " 1901-1914," in F.K. Crowley (ed.), A New Historv of Australia, 
(Melbourne: Heinemann, 1974), pp. 260-3 11, pp.29 l-5. 
1~ Clark, The People Make Laws, p.257; Humphrey McQueen. A New Britannia: An argument 
concerning the social origins of Australian radicalism and nalionalism, (R ingwood: Penguin, 1975). 
pp.84, 110-1. McQueen explores invasion scares, which began in the middle of the nineteenth century, 
pp.56-60. 
29 W.M. Hughes, Bulletin , l3 February 190 I. quoted in McKinlay, Documentw:r His tori' q{ the 
Australian Labour Movemen t, p.22. 
3° Clark, The People Make Laws, p.294. 
31 On the introduction of the scheme, sec Clark, The People Make LaH'S, pp.289-95: Russell Ward, A 
Nation for a Continent: The history of Australia I<){) 1-1975, (Richmond: Heinemann, 1977), pp. 70- I. 
83-7. 
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Conscription. to its supporters, would both defend the nation 's geographic and 
political integrity and improve it morally through the disciplining of bodies and 
minds.32 The principle behind compulsory military service was that all (male) 
citizens, without distinction of wealth or rank. should bear anns in national defence, 
an idea originating in the French Revolution. ·' ·' The idea was sti ll popular in the early 
twentieth century. with the Council of French Deputies providing a seminal example 
of this kind of thinking in 1905, when its report announcing increased conscription 
rates argued that conscription was a positive moral force, and a sign of a healthy 
democracy.34 John Keegan, however, also points out that conscription had the effect 
of "militarisi ng" society. One of the most complete examples of this occurred in 
Germany, Keegan argues, for unlike its French counterpart, the German State did not 
give conscripts political rights in return for compulsory service. Rather, he observes, 
it offered ''the exhilarations of nationalism. "35 
In Britain, there was no tradition of peace-time conscription. but in the early 
twentieth century there was a growing conviction among members of the ruling 
classes that national service was beneficial for the nation. The Chichele Professor of 
the History of War at Oxford University. Spenser Wilkinson, wrote in 1909 that an 
individual reached his ful l potential in service to his State: "To make a citizen a 
soldier is to give him that sense of duty to the country and that consciousness of doing 
it which, if spread through the whole population, will convert it into what is required 
- a nation.'·.1<> Wilkinson's pronouncement extended the image of the mmy as 
defenders ofthe people, following the French in his belief in the ennobling, indeed the 
>! There \vere related developments in youth education, involving the disciplining of younger 
Australians through uniformed youth groups and •·publ ic"' schools. See Martin Crotty, Making rhe 
A usrralian A4ale. Middle-dass masczdini~1· 1870-1920, ( Melboume: Melbourne University Press. 
200 I): Bryan Jamison. '"A Great Social Force Making for Order and Morality:"' An analysis of 
institutions for nllional recreation in late Victorian and Edwardian Brisbane. PhD dissertation, 
University of Queensland, 2002. 
H Thomson. £urnpe Since Napoleon. p.42: John Keegan. A Historr of War/are. (New York: Vintage. 
1994). pp.233-4, 347-9. The fact that. in the nineteenth century, men had a monopoly on this ultimate 
national service. as well as on the right to vote, was no coincidence, with the former helping to justify 
the tarter. 
) J Keegan. A Histurr (d. War/iu·e. p.358. 
3~ Keegan, A Hisrory ()/War/tire, p.234 . 
.1<> From Brirain 111 Bay ( 1909). p. I 9 I. quoted in Howard. The Causes of Wars. p.24. Wilkinson was 
attempting to create a ''Nation in Arms," accord ing to Howard. and this text was a part of his campaign. 
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nation-building, etTects of military servtce. In Australia, both ideas appeared 
persuasive to different part ies, as the peacetime mi litia was created in the early years 
of the twentieth century, although the actual form of the military system adopted was 
based upon the Swiss model. Australia began to take a "militarist turn" in the first 
decade of the t\-ventieth century. according to Keegan's formula that conscription 
militarises society, and from the beginning of peacetime conscription those undertaking 
it were praised in nationalist newspapers such as the Adelaide Observer as "Our 
Defenders."37 Compared to the Getman example, this militarisation was very weak, but 
it had begun. These ideas would coalesce during the First World War and in its 
commemoration. 
Two martial nationalist notions were of most importance to Australian 
commemoration and the Memorial. The first was the belief that participation, and 
especially successful participation, in war proved the nation's mettle, providing it with 
intemational respect and status.38 The second was that a nation was defined by its great 
battles and personified by the leaders who fought them. :~9 Both of these notions were 
vital to the Memorial, which transf01m ed each one, especially the latter, democratising it 
radically. The nation was still defined by its great battles, but it was personified in the 
ordinary soldier. The social Darwinist idea that nations, or "races" as they were often 
known, were competitive, led to national, or "racial," worth being measured in 
competitive mi li tary tern1s by performance on the battlefield40 As several scholars have 
shown, Bean agreed, and when the Memorial came to depict the Alf's expetience of the 
First World War, the difficulties faced. the ''test," would be strongly and frankly 
shown.41 A third mariial nationalist idea was that war provided a nation with matlllity, 
37 Sec Bill Gammage, "The Crucible: The establishment of the Anzac Tradition. 1899-1918.'' in M. 
McKernan and M. Browne (eds). Aus1ralia: Tu·o centuries of war and peace, (Canberra: Australian 
War Memorial in association with Allen and Unwin, 1988), pp. l47-66: p. l59. 
JR White, /n vellling Australia. p. 125. 
39 As Michael Howard asserts, "France li 'OS Marengo. Austerlitz and Jcna: mil ita ry tri umph set the seal 
on the new-found national consciousness. Britain H'as Trafalgar - but it had been a nation for four 
hundred years. since those earlier bat'tles Crec;y and Agincourt. Russia was the triumph of 1812. 
Germany was Gravclottc and Sedan. Italy u•as Garibaldi and the Thousand (and there remained perhaps 
a frustrated sense among the Italians of the Giolitt i period that it had all been too easy. that there had 
not been enough fight ing. that Italy had not full y proved herself)." Howard. "War and the Nation 
State," pp.26-7. 
40 Buxton, "1870-1890," p.204: White. Inventing Australia , pp.66-84. 
~ 1 On Bean. see for example Inglis, Bean, p.23 and Will iams, Anzacs, 1he Media, pp.22-4. 
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which Australia was thought by many to lack. For instance, The Bulletin criticised the 
new flag. when it was adopted, as being that of an immature nation, not one thing nor the 
other.4 ~ Successful participation in a serious conflict would overcome the perceived lack 
of mtistic and literary achievement in Australia, and provide a maturity which otherwise 
would take a long period to establish, it vvas felt. 
At the tum of the twentieth century, during the Boer War, fears of degeneration 
brought about by a warm climate and through "weakening" social security duelled with 
optimistic pronouncements that the British race was strongest at its extremities.43 
Overall, optimism predominated in public expressions of the mettle of the Australian 
" race" (although few were yet sure if they could dare this sobriquet). Thus, in 1902, 
Justice Owen dec lared that Australians had true British blood: " Although we have 
changed our skies we have not changed our strenhrth. We are not degenerating, but are 
of that old British bull-dog breed ... wmthy descendents of that noble stock.'"'4 
However. influenced as they were by social Darwinism, many Australians awaited a 
"stemer test" of the Southem Briton than chasing the Boer homesteaders around the 
veldt, with huge material superi ority. before they could feel that the Australian 
national virtue had been proved beyond doubt.45 In South Africa the lamentable 
Wi lliamsrust debac le had cast a pall over the entire undertaking, although it was 
publicly forgotten as soon as possib le.46 Material superiority had not stopped the 
Boers from dealing savagely with the unprepared, poorly-led and clearly inferior 
Victorian contingent at Williamsnrst. Numbers and war materiel, which eventually 
did beat the Boers. were seen as suspect advantages, which might allow morally 
inferior peoples to triumph. Material advantages were not the equal of courage, 
detennination and steadfastness.47 A greater test was felt to be necessary to prove the 
national mettl e concl usively.48 
4' 
-Crowley. '' 1901-1 9 14." p.263. 
J> See Whire. !Jwenring Australia, pp.63-84. 
~J Quoted in Crowley, "1 901 -19 14," p.271. 
~ 5 White argues rhat. in social Darwinist logic. Ausrralian mettle had only been " half proved" by the 
Boer War. White, lm·enting Ausrralia. pp.72-6. 125. 
46 On Wi ll iamsrusr. sec Gavin Souter, Lion and Kangaroo: The initiation of A usrra/ia. 1901 -1919, 
(Sydney: Coli ins, 1976 ). pp.55-7 1. 
H In m<~ny ways it was this moral superiority that national ist propagandists who concentrated on war 
were actually trying to prove. Perhaps as a reaction to the perceived dehumanising effects of the 
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In considering their national history, Australians were influenced by a large 
existing corpus of mainly British popular nationalist propaganda. As Michael Howard 
argues, the national frame allowed those who subscribed to it a "link to the glorious 
deeds - or the terrible atrocities awaiting revenge - that were performed by others 
long ago. "~9 In the early twentieth-century Australian case, it was glorious deeds, 
although it \Vas those of Britons, rather than of Australians, which were celebrated . 5° 
This was because a perceived racial tie with the British, a "blood bond" wh ich 
transcended geography, allowed Australians to consider themselves to be, in Alfred 
Deakin's famous phrase, "Independent Australian Britons."51 Britain had that 
nationalist ideal, a "rich legacy of remembrances," and Australians fe lt entitled to 
bask in a reflected glory. 51 for example, the New South Wa les colonial secretary 
Henry Parkes declared at the Corowa Federation Conference in 1893 that "the glory, 
the incomparable beauty of her traditions are all ours as much as if we had been born on 
British shores. In all respects we are one and the same people.',s3 The Memorial, as 
Chapter Four investigates, was concerned to a significant degree with educating future 
Australian generations about the glorious deeds of Australians, locating them within 
larger British military traditions. 
There was, by 1900, already a large body of British popular historical writing 
and popular literature, particularly juveni le literature, available in Australia which 
celebrated British strength of arms and a number of moral qualities - martial virtues -
which had apparently led to these victories. This was the basis of the "national" 
burgeoning industrialism, such nationalists tried to emphasise that individual human beings had 
intrinsic value. 
48 White. lnveming Ausrralia. p.l25:. McQueen. A New Briwnnia , p.89. 
49 Howard, ''The Causes of Wars," pp.2n-7. 
~° Crowley, " 1901-1914," p.263. 
~ 1 John Hirst. " lndependenl Australian Britons," in Graemc Davison, John Hirst and Stuart Macintyre 
(eds) with the assistance of Helen Doyle and Kim Torney, The Ox/iml Compunion to Austrufian 
History, (Melbourne: Oxford University Press. 200 1 ). p.343. The Australian historian Keith Hancock 
popularised the phrase as an explanatory tool in his Australia, (Brisbane: Jacaranda, [1930) 196 1 ). 
pp.39-5 1. 
~~ The expression was coined by Ernest Rcnan in his lecture at the Sorbonne University in 1882. "What 
is a Nation?" The lecture has been anlhologised in several places, such as in Christie (ed.), Race and 
Nation, pp. 39-48. 
53 Quoted in Cole, "The Crimson Thread of Kinship," p.S2l. See B.K. de Garis, "1890-1900," in F.K. 
Crowley (ed.). A New History of Australia, (Melbourne: Heinemann. 1974), pp.2 16-59. pp.254-S: Crowley. 
" 1900- 1914," pp.261-5. 
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interpretation later applied to the First World War, and was essential to the Anzac 
Legend. The work of writers of juvenile literature, such as G.A. Henty and Henry 
Rider Haggard, combined history with didacticism, seeking to entertain young people 
(primarily boys) while inculcating certain values into them. Henty, for instance, wrote 
tales of adventure in which young heroes, full of pluck and English moral virtues, win 
through over foreigners. As C.C. Eldridge points out, his intention was "to teach his 
readers some history, and inculcate the correct manly values, the moral code of the 
English gentleman."54 ln 1884 Henty published With Clive in India , in which he 
described a typica l young English hero in tenns which would become standard for the 
description of Australian soldiers by Bean and many others thirty years later: 
[Charlie Marryat was] slight of build, but his schoolfellows knew 
that [his] muscles were as firm and hard as those of any boy in 
the school. In all sports requiring activity and endurance rather 
than weight and strength he was always conspicuous. Not one in 
the school could compete with him in long-distance running, and 
when he was one of the hares there was little chance for the 
hounds. He was a capital swimmer and one of the best boxers in 
the school. He had a reputation for being a leader in every 
mischievous prank; but he was honourable and manly, wo~tld 
scom to shelter lumself under the semblance of a lie, and was a 
prime favourite with his masters as well as his schoolfellows. 55 
As Eldridge asserts, the Henty hero ''was an abstraction of pluck, physical endurance 
and honour, the qualities which supposedly had built the British empire."56 
The "building" of an Empire had been ach ieved primarily through military 
victories. The Seven Years' War against France in the eighteenth century had secured 
North America for Britain , whi le victory over Napoleon bad left Britain as the 
uncontested great power in the world. It was sllch "achievements" which were the 
main ingredient of popular nationalist histories written in the later nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries. Henty set many of his books in Imperial wars, as in the case 
of Clive above, while Fitchett's Deeds That Won the Empire featured rousing 
.<• C.C. Eldridge. The Imperial Experience: From Car(~'/e to Forster, (Basingstoke: Macmi llan, 1996). 
p.69. 
55 G.A . Henty. Wirh Clive in India: or. The Beginnings of an Empire (I 884), p. I I, quoted in Eldridge. 
The llllfJeria/ Experience. pp.69-70. 
o<> Eldridge, The Imperial Experience. p. 70. 
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descriptions of battl es from Quebec to T rafalgar. For instance, his chapter on Wo lfe's 
victory at Quebec waxed enthusiastic about the glories of British anns: 
The year of 1759 is a golden one in British history. A great 
French army that threatened Hanover was overthrown at Minden, 
chiefly by the heroic stupidity of s ix British regiments, who, 
mistaking the ir o rders, charged the entire French cavalry in line, 
and destroyed them .... At Quiberon, in the same year, Hawke, 
amid a tempest, destroyed a mighty fl eet that threatened England 
with invas ion; and on the heights of Abraham, Wolfe broke the 
French power in America.57 
What was more, Fitchett insisted, this battle had had even greater ramifications, for 
with it "began the history of the United States."58 Fitchett was in no doubt that war 
made history. These g lories were the benchmark of a "real" national history in the 
opinion of martial nationalists in Australia in the pre-war era. 
Social Darwinism, and the Imperial issue of rul ing other "races," were central 
concerns of British martial national propaganda. The British were, it was believed, a 
"ruling race,·· who had wrested control of huge portions of the Earth through their 
superior moral virtues. As early as 1878 Benjamin Disraeli had told the House of 
Lords that .. all. .. communities [within the Empire] agree in recognising the 
commanding spi rit of these islands.''59 For many later imperialists, such as Henty, it 
was even more important that foreign communities recognised that commanding 
spirit.60 The idea of Australians as a "ruling race" was also very popular, and a major 
influence on Australian martial nationalism and later on commemoration in the 
immediate post-war period 61 
The enforcement of the right to rule, ultimately reducible to force of arms, was 
a major theme of much of this British propaganda. Concern with competition between 
"races'' was increasing by 1892, when Rudyard Kipling, " the laureate of Empire" as 
' ' Fitchett, Deeds That Won the Empire. p. l3 . 
.<1< Fi tchett. Deeds Thai Won 1he Empire, p.13. 
59 Speech to House of Lords, 8 April 1878, quoted in Eldridge, The Imperial Experience, p.48. 
60 See, for example. the incident in which a young Briton "proves his mettle" by thrashing. a 
treacherous young Boer in Henty's With Roberts to Pretoria: A wle of 1/te Soullz A.fi-ican War, 
(London: Blackie, 1902), pp.S I-3. 
61 White. lnveming Auslralia, pp.66-72. 
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some would later call him, published his first, extremely popular, work of poetry, 
Barrack-raom Ballads. In 1847 Disraeli had argued that "all is race ; there is no other 
truth."6~ It was the mettle of the "Anglo-Saxon race," he thought, that had "rendered 
an island, unknown to the ancients, the arbiter of the world."63 Now, with Germany 
beginning to challenge Britain 's place as "arbiter of the world," that racial truth had to 
be backed up, to be proved, by military success, the ability to defeat the other race 
before it defeated one's own. This was a significant point. For a nation's soldiers 
simply to sacrifice their li ves in a good cause, or to survive what the enemy threw at 
them, was not enough to prove the "race's" mettle. Victory was required for this. 
Social Darwinist understandings of national interactions emphasised, in Herbert 
Spencer's famous phrase, "the survival of the fittest.'' Spencer linked the destiny of 
races with political organisation, and his idea was a wellspri ng of martial nationalism: 
''In the struggle for existence among societies, the survival of the fittest is the survival 
of those in whi ch the power of mi litary cooperation is greatest, and military 
cooperation is the primary kind of cooperation, which prepares the way for other 
kinds."64 
Those races least able to cope with the world would ultimately disappear (in 
Australi a, the prime example of course was thought to be the Aborigines, widely 
believed at that time to be a "dying race").6s Those who fai led d id so due to their 
inferior moral qualit ies, be they indolence, lack of detennination, lack of "spirit," or 
physica l weakness caused by lack of healthy activity. 
Worryingly for some Australians, it was seen as quite possible for a group to 
be seen as having the courage to sacrifice themselves, but to be inferior and possibly 
doomed nonetheless. Robert MacDonald provides an example of this notion from 
Kipling's verse, in which one of his British soldiers praises the courage of "Fuzzy-
Wuzzy" - "You're a pore benighted 'eathen but a first-class fightin' man" - whom he 
conquered regardless of th is courage - "Our orders was to break you. an ' of course we 
62 Eldridge, The Imperial Experience. p. I 40. 
c.; Eldridge, The Imperial Experience, p. I 40. 
6~ Herbert Spencer. The £mlution of" Society: Se/ecrions ji-om Herbert Spencer 's ··principles of 
Socio/ogr ", Robc11 L. Ca nciro ( cd.), (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, I 96 7). p. 78. 
65 See for example Clark, The People Make Laws, pp.l 03-4, 254, 278. 
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went an' did."66 As MacDonald points out, "Fuzzy-Wuzzy . . . is ' a first-class fightin' 
man·, but doomed in the face of British superiority, whether of weapons or morale.''67 
Superior technology, while questionable as an advantage over the "Aryan" Boers, was 
s imply more evidence of the vast superiority of the Briton over the "benighted 
heathen." The British ·were superior to the coloured colonial "races," and the ultimate 
proof of thi s was the fact that they won the vast majority of their battles over them -
or so nationalist propaganda asserted. 
What was created by propagandists such as Henty, Kipling, Fitchett, and a 
host of others, was a popular nationalist history, based on war. Robert MacDonald 
sees this history as ··a stage on which kings and queens, genera ls and admirals, made 
their entrances, conducted their heroics, and exited, winning in each battle more glory 
for the cause. "68 By the tum of the twentieth century, repetition had yielded a British 
popu lar nationalist history which MacDonald calls "The Island Story:"69 
It began in the Celtic past, announcing its character in Boudicca, 
defender of the race against the conquering Romans; it 
discovered its true ancestry in the Anglo-Saxons, and its first 
national hero in King Alfred; it absorbed the shock of 1066, and 
rationalised the Norman invasion as a Good Thing. From then on 
the course of nationhood seemed obvious, and the narrati ve had 
only to touch on the great heroic names to make the emergence 
of the imperial fact inevitable: Richard the Lionheat1, the Black 
Prince, Henry V, Elizabeth, Hampden, Cromwel l, Blake, 
Marlborough, Wolfe, Cl ive, Rodney, Pitt, Nelson, Wel linJ:,'Ion-
66 Rudyard Kip I ing, Barrack-room Ballads and Other Poems, 19'h edn. (London: Methuen, 1902), 
pp.I0-1 2, p.l l. 
67 Robert MacDonald, The Language o_{Empire: 1'vfyths and metaphors of popular imperialism. 1880-
1918. (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1994), p. l50. 
68 MacDonald, The Language of Empire, p.5 1. 
69 This term was used by, amongst others. Tennyson. in his "Ode on the Death of the Duke of 
Wellington:" 
Not once or twice in our fair island-story 
The path of duty was the way to glory. 
Alfred, Lord Tennyson, Poems o.f Tennyson, 1829-1868, (London: Oxford University Press. 1929), 
pp.412-9, p.4 17. Henrietta Elizabeth Marshall published a popular children's book. Our Island St01:1', 
which followed this story to perfection. Kipling published a similar children's book in 19 1 L again 
following the Island Story. Henrietta Elizabeth Marshall. Our Island St01y: A child 's hist01:1' o.f 
England, (London: T C. Jack, 1905); C.R.L. Fletcher and Rudyard Kipling. A HistO(I' of England, 
illustrated by Henry Ford. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 19 11 ). 
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they marched forward together in the grand parade that was itself 
a confim1ation of the triumphant present. 70 
The Island Story was extremely influential in Australia, providing heroes to compete 
\vith and rhetorically imitate, and most especially, to connect Australian soldiers with 
through a nationalist lineage. These were some of the "traditions" which the 
Memorial later argued Australians had added to, as Chapter Four examines. 
The main ingredient of the Island Story was victory. The "great heroic names" 
were all successful mi litary commanders who had achieved notable victories in 
important conflicts. Henry V, for example, had presided over the Battle of Agincourt, 
which came to be seen as "the archetypal patriotic victory of the 'few' fighting in a 
just cause against a foreign foe," and a favourite comparison with Gallipoli for later 
Australian nationalists71 The anachronistic rhetorical connection of the modern nation 
with ancient heroes which the Is land Story created was a typical nationalistic strategy 
which has been much commented upon.72 
In fact, High Imperialis t writers often rhetorically linked the perceived 
military superiority of late-nineteenth or early-twentieth-century Britons with that of 
supposed warrior forebears. For example, in King Solomon's Mines ( 1885), Rider 
Haggard described his hero Sir Henry Curtis as being as proficient with a battle axe as 
his Viking ancestors: 
There he stood, the great Dane, for he was nothing else, his 
hands, his axe, and his armour all red with blood , and none could 
live before his stroke. Time after time I saw it sweeping down, as 
70 MacDonald. The Language of Empire. p.51. 
71 John Gi ll ingham, "Agi ncourt." in Juliet Gardiner and Nei l Wenbom (eels). The HisiOJY Today 
Companion 1o Bri!ish His lOri' , (London: Collins and Brown. 1995 ). p.8. The Swiney Morning Herald 
leader on Anzac Day 1928 asserted a direct connection: '' Exactly 500 years before Anzac on St 
Crispin's Day, 25'11 October - within six months to a day - an English am1y set forth on another forlorn 
hope at Agincourt. Before the battle Henry V addressed his troops: 
This story sha ll the good man tell his son: 
And Crispin Crispian wi ll ne 'er go by, 
From this day to the end of the world, 
But we in it shall be remembered. 
The words attributed to Henry V by Shakespeare could be applied to Anzac Day. As long as Austral ia 
is a nation it will be remembered, and rightly so." Svdney Morning Herald, 25 Apri l 1928, p.l 0. 
7~ The seminal study is Eric Hobsbawm and Terrance Ranger (eds), The lnvenlion u.f Tradilion, 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 1992). See also Hobsbawm's Na 1ions and Nationalism Since 
1870: Carlton Hayes, Nationalism: A religion; Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communilies. 
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some great warrior ventured to give him battle, and as he struck 
he shouted '0-hoy! 0-hoy!' like his Berserker forefathers, and 
the blow went crashing through shield and spear, through head 
dress, hair and sk ull. 73 
It was such jisum that had led to the >vinning of the Empire, as Disraeli had told the 
House of Lords in 1878: " the Empire was fom1ed by the energy and enterprise of your 
ancestors."74 This was why the British ruled - they were as unstoppable in combat as 
their "Berserker forefathers.'' This was the richest of historical legacies. Haggard-style 
bellicosity, in which the blood of fall en enemies confirmed the superiority of the hero, 
was a characteristic of British martial nationalist propaganda in the I 870-1914 period. 
When Australians later made their own "Story," such vi rile martial power would form 
a fundamental part of it, also. 
By the end of the nineteenth century, national commemoration of war bad, in 
many countries, created heroes beyond the great leaders. As the Arc de Triomphe 
( 1806-36) attests, the victorious leader remained an important subject for 
commemoration. However, nations created new kinds of praise for victories, because 
they created new social re lations. Particularly in countries such as France, which had 
a consciipt am1y, nationalism in the nineteenth century brought about what Barbara 
Ehrenreich has called a ''democratisation of glory."75 Armies, made up in medieval or 
early modem times of mercenaries and members of the lowest socio-economic 
groups, and consequently having a poor reputation, as George Mosse points out, now 
consisted of "one 's sons, brothers, or neighbours - respectable citizens of the local or 
national community."76 Moreover, the wars which they fought following the 
Revolution were " no longer fought mere ly on behalf of a king, but for an ideal which 
encompassed the whole nation under the symbols of the Tricolour and the 
Marseillaise. The Republic honoured these soldiers; they were its heroes."77 This idea 
had not been seen since classical Greece, whose commemorative practices were 
73 H. Rider Haggard, King Solomon's Mines , p. l50. quoted in Eldridge, The Imperial Experience, p.72. 
74 Eldridge, The Imperial Experience, p.47. 
75 Ehrenreich, Blood Rites, pp. l75-93. 
76 Mosse quotes signs in pre-Revolutionary France as prohibiting "dogs, prostitutes and soldiers" from 
public places. Fallen Soldiers, p. l g. 
77 Mosse, Fallen Soldiers, pp.l8-9. 
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in lluential in nineteenth-century Europe, not least in Victorian Britain. Australian 
attitudes to military service were egalitarian from the begiru1ing. 
In Britain. in comparison, a parallel development occurred. Glory could hardly 
be said to have been democratised, as the cults of commanders Nelson and Wellington 
were far stronger than any celebration of the ordinary soldier. 78 In Britain, wi th its 
professional non-conscript army, glory was not truly "democratised" until after the 
First World War.79 However, beginning at the time of the Napoleonic Wars, soldiers, 
who for several centuries had suffered from the perception that they were an 
instrument of tyranny, increasingly began to be portrayed as the defenders of the 
people.80 British soldiers again received increasing public sympathy in the 1850s, 
when William Russell and other war CO!Tespondents reported the sufferings of 
ordinary soldiers during the Crimean War, at the expense of an officer corps depicted 
as incompetent. ~< 1 In the 1870s war artists such as Elizabeth Butler gave those 
sufferings dramatic and popular fonn in paintings such as The Roll Call ( 1874 ). Then, 
as the later years of the century witnessed the growth of a bellicose High Imperialism 
in Britain, war artists, including Butler, reverted to a more romantic style of depicting 
war as the victory of British moral forces over colonial foes. 
After the First World War, Austra lians adopted another martial nationalist 
practice that had been popular in Europe during the nineteenth century - the public 
display of trophies, usually guns, taken from defeated enemies. The British, along 
wi th the Gem1ans and the French, were particularly partial to this, a renovated 
7~ Welli ngton, having outlived his victory. was hailed as the saviour of his nation and showered with 
honours: Nelson's was the quintessential triumphant death in the nation's cause. Arth ur Wellesley, 
First Duke of Wellington ( 1769-1852), b. Dublin, Ireland, d. London. England. Main commander of 
British forces in the Peninsular War against Napoleon Bonaparte 1808-13. Commander-in-chief of 
All ied forces at the Ban le of Waterloo on 18 June 18 15. Tory Prime Minister of Britain I 828-30. 
ODNB. m 1.5X, pp.l-29. Horatio Nelson, First Viscount Nelson ( I 758-1 R05). b. Burnham Thorpe, 
England, d. Cape Trafalgar, Spain. Orchestrated victories over the French at St Vincent n 1797, The 
Ni le in 179X, Copenhagen in 1801 and Trafa lgar in 1805. ODNB. vol.40, pp.396-41 0. 
N Borg. War Memorials , pp. l 04-24. 
xu W.J. Reader. AI Du(\' 's Call: A swc~r in obsole1e patriotism, (Manchester: Manchester University 
Pres~. 1988), p.4 1. 
~ 1 See A.J . Barker. The Vainglorious War. 1854-56, (London: Wcidenfcld and Nicolson, 1970); Beth 
Hogg, The No ise of' Drums and Trumpets: W.H. Russell reports .fi'om the Crimean War, (London: 
Longman. 197 1 ): Matthew Lalumia, Realism and Politics in Victorian Art o.f the Crimean War, (Ann 
Arbor: UM I Research Press, 1984); J.W.M. Hichberger. Images o.f 1he Amt_l': The milita1y in BriTish 
ar1. 18 15-1 914. (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1988): John M. McKenzie (ed.), Popular 
Imperialism and 1/ie Militarl'. 1850-1950, (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1992). 
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Ancient Greek practice. In pre-classical Greece, a trophy was ''a suit of enemy armour 
set upon a stake,' ' according to the Oxford Classical Dictionmy. 82 It was "originally 
intended as a miraculous image of the theos tropaios [god of the trophy) who had 
brought about the defeat of the enemy, ... [and) marked the spot where the enemy was 
routed.''83 Especially in classical times, the Greeks also took captured arms back to 
their home cities, and there "trophies were also dedicated in the sanctuary of the deity 
to whom victory was ascribed."84 From the fourth century BC onwards, trophies 
became pennanent monuments, whi le "sculptured trophies accompanied by statues of 
captives and victors decorated the buildings of Hellenistic kings and took an 
important place in Roman triumphal art from the first century BC."85 
In the nineteenth century, this practice was revived in Westem Europe. The 
Berlin Victory Column, for example, erected in 1864-73 to commemorate the first 
"nation-making" Prussian victories, those against the Danes in 1864, incorporated 
gilded captured cannon into its construction. It eventually included mosa ics and 
plaques celebrating al l three of the German Wars of Unification , and a golden Victory 
Goddess, holding a laurel wreath and a sceptre topped with an Iron Cross. 86 The 
nat ion' s triumph was wrought in gold for all to see. 
R~ Simon Hornblower and Anthony Spawforth (eds), Orford Classical DiCiion'"J'. third edn, (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1996), p.l 556. 
~> O~ford Classical Dictionary, third edn, p. l556. "Tropaios" derives from the verb "to tum," and the 
phrase "1heos 1ropaios" refers to both the god of the trophy itself, and also the god who made the 
enemy turn. who caused the battle to be won. I am indebted to Professor Tim Parkin. Professor of 
Classics and Ancient History at the University of Queensland, for this infom1ation. Personal 
communication 13 September 2004. 
~4 0-\(ord Classical DiCiion(IJ:I'. third edn, p. l556. 
ss Oxford Classical DictionmJ', thi rd edn, p. 1556. 
~6 The other two wars were against Austria in 1866 and France in 1870-1. These were all stunning 
victories for an efficient German military machine, and had a profound in fluence on military thinking, 
as well as foreign policy, in the next forty years. France. especially, was obsessed with reversing the 
resul t of its ignominious defeat of 1870. which had seen Germany take possession of Alsace-Lorraine. 
See Stig Forster, "The Nation at Arn1s: Concepts of nationa lism and war in Gcm1any, 1866-19 14," in 
Hartmut Lehmann and Hermann Wcllenreuthcr (cds), German and American Nalionalism: A 
comparwive perspec1ive, (Oxford: Berg. 1999), pp.233-62. One of the principal ways in which the 
Third Republic sought to overcome a perceived military inferiority to Germany was through the 
securing of all iances, first with Russia and later with Britain. These. as has been exhaustively discussed 
by historians, were principal causes of the First World War. A recent survey of this literature is Frank 
McDonough, The Origins of !he First and Second World Wars, (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press. 1997). 
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Figure 6: Berlin Victory Monument (Siegessaule). 
Source: hapepo.delberlinimaglberlin_siegessaeule.htm 
After the First World War, Australians forewent the sceptres and the Victory Goddess 
(except in newspaper and literary illustrations), as well as the gold, but kept the guns, 
the most direct, unmediated proof of having conquered an enemy.87 
In Britain and France, war material was often remade. The British Guards 
Crimean Memorial, for instance, had figures made from captured cannon, which the 
first Victoria Crosses were also constructed from. 88 Further, both the relief panels 
showing Admiral Horatio Nelson 's four great victories at the base of his Column 
(1840-3), and the huge statue of Wellington as Achilles in Hyde Park Comer (1822), 
were cast from captured French cannon, offering tangible - and public - evidence of 
British superiority. 89 
81 See for example The Sydney Mail, 26 April 1922, p.6; The Great Adventure of 1914-1918, (Gordon 
and Gotch, 19--), p.31. The latter depicts the victory parade on Peace Day 1919 overseen by an angel 
and a toga-wearing Victory Goddess, sporting an Athenian Hoplite headdress and symbolically 
crowning the entire gathering. 
88 Borg, War Memorials. Figure 11. 
89 The reliefs depicted Nelson at the battles of St. Vincent ( 1797), the Nile ( 1798) and Copenhagen 
( 180 I), and his death at Trafalgar ( 1805). www. victorianlondon.orglbuildings/nelson.htm. This website 
brings together a number of contemporary descriptions of the column. 
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Figure 7: The Duke of Wellington as Achilles (Richard 
Westmacott, 1822). 
Source: www. victorianweb.org/sculpture/ 
warmonuments/1 O.html. 
In the case of Wellington as Achilles, it was more than the Greek practice that 
was borrowed, with the very figure of the greatest ancient hero serving to personify 
the nation through one of its great defenders. The Iron Duke - a reactionary and 
unpopular prime minister after the statue was erected - was remembered publicly in 
perpetuity as a romantic figure of heroic physique and noble bearing. He was the very 
model of a nineteenth-century chivalrous gentleman - strong of limb and noble of 
character - defending his people. Although the specific image, as a sculpture, was not 
used in post-war Australia, the idea that Australian soldiers had taken Wellington 's 
place as defenders was widespread amongst martial nationalists. Australians were 
presented as saviours, defenders, deliverers and mighty warriors in the image of 
Achilles within the Memorial, in war literature (especially), and in the media. 
The French, especially under Napoleon, also erected triumphal statues which 
deliberately harked back to perceived great heroes of antiquity. Napoleon 's column at 
Place Vendome in Paris is a case in point. [t was covered in reliefs, each constructed 
from captured cannon and deliberately fabricated in imitation of Trajan 's Column in 
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Rome, itself highly triumphal 9 0 Atop it was a statue of Napoleon as Caesar, hardly a 
subtle statement. Also, Napoleon's tomb at Les lnvalides in Paris, which C.E. W. Bean 
later claimed was the institution closest in kind to the Memorial, featured reliefs of 
unambiguous triumphalism:91 
Figure 8: Relief: Les Invalides, Paris. 
Source: www.artandarchitecture.org.uk. 
These physical commemorative structures embodied the national superiority that 
martial nationalists claimed. For them, victory in war, as embodied in these 
monuments, crowned national superiority in all things, both "material" - industry, 
science- and "moral" - art, letters, and other creations of the nation's "genius." 
Associated with trophy-taking and display per se were a complex of 
monuments which praised victory without necessarily parading trophies to do so. This 
too was an ancient practice, pre-dating the trophy. Alison Yarrington points out that in 
the nineteenth century, "large-scale monuments to Wellington and Waterloo fit within 
90 Borg describes Trajan's Column itself in these terms: "The column is a victory statement, on the one 
hand symbolic and deriving from Egyptian obelisks which were symbolic statements of the ruler's 
power, and on the other narrative and related to ... ancient battle narratives. Since the Emperor's ashes 
were subsequently buried in a casket beneath the column it is also a mausoleum, making it a monument 
of considerable complexity and sophistication." War Memorials, p.56. See Lino Rossi, Trajan 's 
Column and the Dacian Wars, J.M.C. Toynbee (trans.), (London: Thomas Hudson, 1971), pp.98-120, 
130-212; Borg, War Memorials, p.56. 
91 Sydney Morning Herald, 24 March 1928, p.J8. See also his evidence to the Public Works Com.mittee 
in 1928. Standing Committee on Public Works Report, p.323. On the French institution, see "Les 
/nvalides, Paris." History Today, 41 (February 1991), pp.62-3. 
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an established vocabulary of commemorative and patriotic display redolent of 
classical antiquity:m This wider complex, which ultimately encapsulated trophies, 
concretised martial national narratives, wedding State power with a symbol of its 
triumph. 
The creation of monuments to victory was an ancient practice, with early 
examples including the Temple of Nike near the Propylaea of the Acropolis of ancient 
Athens, Trajan 's Column in Rome and the institution of the triumphal arch 93 Alan 
Borg points out that at Adamklissi in Romania Trajan created a rare early example of 
a memorial space which included an acknowledgement of the cost of war, but that, 
signifi cantly, the circular mausoleum inscribed with the names of those 3,800 Romans 
who died defeating the Dacians (the same victories commemorated on the inscriptions 
on Trajan 's Column) was dominated utterly by a much larger victory monument. 
Borg postulates that "there can be no doubt that the important thing to commemorate 
was the Emperor' s victory, rather than to dwell on the price of that victory in human 
lives:'94 This was typical of commemorative monuments up until the twentieth 
century. 
In nineteenth-century Britain, t~en, the military leader and his triumph were 
still very much the subjects of monument-making, complemented by a martial 
propaganda machine, as the example ofNelson indicates. Robert MacDonald outlines 
the combination of public commemoration and popular historical writing that created 
a popular national military hero: 
In his own day, Nelson was immensely popular, his victories 
celebrated with great enthusiasm, his death mourned by all 
classes of the public .... Robert Southey's Life (1813) sealed the 
legends of Nelson's heroism - and was still being reprinted at the 
end of the century. Nelson's monument in Trafalgar Square was 
designed as the symbolic centre of the national and imperial 
capital ; the column was erected in I 842, and Landseer's 
91 Alison Yarrington, His Achilles Heel? Wellington and public art, (Southampton: Uni versity of 
Southampton Press, 1998). p.9. 
93 Triumphal arches were especially popular in modern Europe. The French Arc de Triomphe was the 
most famous, and the largest, but Germany, for example, had the Brandenburg Gate in Potsdam. bui It 
in 1770, and the Victory Gate in Munich, created 1834-54. Borg. War Memorials. p.60. 
94 Borg, War A4emoriafs, p.56. 
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supporting lions in 1867. In St Paul 's Cathedral Nelson 's tomb 
was positioned in the place of honour below the dome95 
Having saved the nation from possible invasion in 1805, and having won the other 
great victories whose stories were depicted on the reliefs cast from the cannon of his 
vanquished enemies, Nelson had become one with the nation. This was martial 
nationalism in the purest form - the great hero 's column became the symbolic centre 
of a whole Empire, one which shared the "true glory" of both his devotion to duty and 
his triumph over great enemies. It was of such stuff that the Imperial British race was 
made. 
Australians agreed. Souter illustrates this with a photograph of Trafalgar Day 
celebrations in Sydney in 1906, featuring a large bust of the Admiral and semaphore 
flags spelling out Nelson' s famous directive ''England expects every man will do his 
duty." 96 During the war, postcards and other ephemera used the expression to create 
nationalist messages combining Imperial loyalty with martial discipline: 
Figure 9: Postcard, Australia, First World War: ''Old England." 
Source: Australian War Memorial Collections Database. 
cas.awm.gov.au. 
The mam message of war memorials, then, had always been victory. War 
memorials were tangible symbols of a military success celebrated in the words of 
95 MacDonald, 7he Langua?,e of Empire, p.82. 
~6 Souter. !.ton and Kangaroo, Figure 15, p. 128. 
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nationalist propagandists, and especially in the late nineteenth century, with the 
advent of socia l Darwinism, this success was claimed to reflect superior "qualities" in 
the nation. Moral virtues were glorified over all material factors (Napoleon himself 
had said that "in war. moral factors account for three quarters of the whole, relative 
material strength accounts for onl y one quarter") the argument being that if a nation 
won a battle or a war, it was due to inherent factors - French elan, British grit, or 
Gennan spiri t. '>7 
There can be no doubt that Australian nationalists, of whom there were many, 
were strongly influenced by this corpus of ideas and images, and did desire, very 
strongly, to have a history of "their own" based on military actions and a recognisable 
identity which was anchored to it. This was, of course, conceived as an identity within 
the Empire, but was still definitely and self-consciously focussed on Australia and 
addressed to Ausn·alians, often involving comparisons with the English (naturally 
favourable to the southern strain of the British line). These comparisons were 
important, for they brought into domestic Australian usage two notions which had 
matured in Europe. The first was that war created nations, the second that therefore 
national history was based on warfare - usually, in the case of establ ished and 
powerful political entities such as Germany, Britain or France, warfare which had 
been victorious. According to martial nationalist orthodoxy, what were needed for an 
internationally significant national hi story were major, strategically-important 
victories, if Australia was truly going to acqui re one which could compete with the 
likes of Britain's, embodied by heroes such as Wellington or Nelson, on martial 
nationalist ground. On 4 A ugust 1914, following a crisis brought upon by the 
assassination of the heir to the Austro-H ungarian Empire, which ignited 50 years of 
"explosive materials," a major European war started in which Australians would do 
exact) y that. 98 
II 
An Australian all-volunteer expeditionary force was raised on the commencement of 
hostilities. The Australian Imperial Force (AIF) would eventua ll y enlist over 400,000 
97 
"Observations sur lcs affaircs d'Espagne, Saint-Cloud, 27 August 1 808." Sec J. Christopher Herold 
(ed. and trans.), The Mind o.f Napoleon: A selection o/ his written and spoken words, (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1955), p.219. 
98 B.H. Liddell Hart, Hist01y o.f the Firs! World War, (London: Pan, [ 1930] 1970), p.l. 
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soldiers, se nd ing 330.000 of them overseas and losing 60,000 dead. They remained 
the only all -volunteer-force at the end of the war. The AIF went into battle on 25 
April 1915 at Gallipoli in Turkey, and the first major account of what has always been 
called "the landing" (not invasion) was published on 8 May that year. Australians, 
still concerned about the possibility of racial degeneration, had been deeply anxious 
about how well their men would perfonn, militarily, in their first engagement in the 
great European war. When the first lengthy report arrived, from English war 
correspondent Ellis Ashmead-Bartlett, praising ''a race of athletes" who had stormed 
the cliffs, there was real celebration, as well as relief. Ashmead-Bartlett' s article was 
an old-style narrative dispatch, a standard First World War method, so some 
newspapers, such as the Hobart Mercwy, introduced it with a summary of the 
contents. The MercWJ' assured readers that their men had won a great victory, proving 
the nation 's mettle: 
We publish today a brilliant description of the landing of the 
Australians and New Zealanders on Gallipoli Peninsula by that 
experienced war correspondent, Mr Ashmead-Bartlett. It is a 
thrilling story, a story that will make us all feel proud of our 
soldiers. They have shown that, though transplanted to these 
southern skies, the breed is still the same as that of the men of 
Mons and Waterloo, and a hundred other great battles. They 
were in a desperate position when they landed on the narrow 
beach in the dawn, but they did not hesitate. They carried the 
Turkish trenches on the beach and on the cliffs, and, without the 
suppo1i of artillery, held on all day of Sunday, April 25. Their 
dash and courage saved the situation, and no troops that ever 
marched have done better.99 
The Australians, the Mercury felt, had lived up to that great military example of the 
British heroes who had overcome Napoleon and held a rampaging Gem1an Army at 
bay in August 1914. This was not yet equal in historical importance to Waterloo, but 
the military qualities needed to achieve the cleari ng of the first lines oftrenches were 
equivalent to those of the heroes of Flanders. The Australians were of the "Bulldog 
Breed." 
The a11icle itself declared that the Australians had performed magnificently, 
determined ly "carrying" the Turkish trenches with that most British of weapons, the 
cold steel : 
99 
www.anzacsi te.gov.aul llanding/bartlett.html. 
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RUSH FOR TH E TRENCHES. 
The Austral ians rose to the occasion. They did not wait for 
orders, or for the boats to reach the beach, but sprang into the 
sea, formed a sort of rough line, and rushed at the enemy 's 
trenches. Their magazines were not charged, so they just went in 
with the co ld steel, and it was over in a minute for the Turks in 
the first trench had been either bayoneted or had run away, and 
the Maxim guns were captured. 
A CRITICAL MOMENT. 
Then the Australians found themselves facing an a lmost 
perpendicular cliff of loose sandstone covered with thick 
shrubbery. Somewhere half-way up the enemy bad a second 
trench strongly held. from which there poured a tenible fire on 
the troops below and on those pulling back to the torpedo-boat 
destroyers for a second landing party. 
SCALING THE CLIFFS. 
Here was a tough proposition to tackle in the darkness, but these 
Colonials are practical above all else, and went about it in a 
pract ical way. They stopped for a few minutes to pull themselves 
together. got rid of their packs and charged the magazines of 
their rifles. Then this race of athletes proceeded to scale the 
cliffs, without responding to the enemy's fire. They lost some 
men, but did not worry. In less than a quarter of an hour the 
Turks had been hurled out of their second position, all either 
bayoneted or fled . 
. . . No finer fea t has happened in this war than this sudden landing 
in the dark. and the storming of the hei ghts. and, above all, the 
holding on whilst reinforcements were landing. These raw 
colonial troops, in these desperate hours, proved worthy to figh t 
side by s ide with the heroes of Mons, the Aisne, Ypres, and 
Neuve-Chapelle. 100 
The Mercury's interpretation of the battle, celebrating its tactical victories in the most 
rapturous of tem1s, was a textbook example of the "national" reaction to the war -
gazing upon the conflict from afar and seeing not death or loss but fantastic mil itary 
success and magnificent achievement by one's compatriots. Around the country there 
was an outpouri ng of relief and happiness: the men had done well. 101 This was far 
more convincing proof that the race had not degenerated in Australia. Henry Lawson 
100 
www.anzacsite.gov.aull landinglbartlett. html. See also Argus. 8 May 1915, p.19. 
101 Souter, Lion and Kangaroo, pp.208-42; Stuar1 Macintyre, The Oxj()l'(i His/OI')' of Aus/ralia, ro/.4: 
The Succeeding Age. /9() 1-42, paperback edn, (Melboumc: Ox ford University Press. 1993). pp. l46-52: 
Clark, The People Make Laws, pp.40 1-8. 
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seized the hour to write that he had been certain the men would acquit themselves 
wel l: 
The wireless tells and the cable tells 
How our boys behaved by the Dardanelles. 
Some thought in their hearts "Will our boys make good?" 
We knew them of old and we knew they would! 
Knew they would-
Knew they would; 
We were mates of old and we knew they would. 102 
These Australians, Lawson assured their compatriots, "got into scrapes," but they also 
made the Pyramids shake and the Sphinx wake up. 103 Then "they stormed the heights 
as Australians should,'' and " they'll win for the South as we knew they would."104 
Such reactions - part celebration, part relief - were tempered by shock at the 
length of early casualty lists (tiny as they were by later standards). Nevertheless, when 
it came to contemplation of the "national" impact of the war on Australia, it was 
celebration that predominated . Australian moral qualities were claimed to have led to 
the "achievement" of stonning the cliffs at Gallipoli. After evacuation of the 
peninsula in December I 9 15, most Australians agreed that the defeat there had not 
been the fault of the Australian troops . Some argued rather that those who had not 
volunteered were at fault. The first anniversary of the landing, dubbed "Anzac Day," 
saw many Australians declaring that a nation in an emotional sense had fina11y been 
created in Australia tlu·ough the achievement and the sacrifice of Gallipoli. 105 Both 
were needed, it was felt, for a nation to be created, and both had been seen on the "far 
shores'' of Gallipoli. 
Over the subseq uent course of the war, the AIF in France and Palestine fought 
a large number of battles, successfully backing up the Gallipoli "achievement" with 
102 Henry Lawson, "Song of the Dardanelles." in Collected Verse, (Sydney: Angus and Robertson, 
1969), pp. l52-3, p. l52. For several weeks the Gallipoli campaign was known by the term "the 
Dardanelles," which referred to the strai ts connecting the Aegean Sea to the Sea of Marmora, also 
known as .. the Hellespont." 
IQJ Lawson. "Song of the Dardanelles," p. l52. 
1~ Lawson, ·'Song of the Dardanelles,'' p. l53 
105 Sec Will iams, Anzacs. the Media. pp.98-110; Richard Ely, "The First Anzac Day: Invented or 
discovered?" Joumal o.fAustralian Studies. 17 (November 1985), ppA 1-58; Eric Andrews, ''25 April 
19 16: Fi r~1 Anzac Day in Austra lia and Britain, .. Joumal of the Australian War Memorial, 23 (October 
1993 ), pp. 13-20. 
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actions which propagandists could certainly use to create a martial nationalist hi story. 
Despite the lack of significant military success between the Gallipoli campaign in 
1915 and the final campaign in the summer and autumn of 1918, the Australians held 
their own against the German am1y, and in Palestine they routed the Turks in 1917-
18. This was success enough for nation-builders to work with, but when the final 
offensive campaign across Picardy (August-October 1918) lett the Gem1an A1my 
beaten and close to total collapse, the war was sealed as perfect material for 
Austral ian ma11ia l nationalist propaganda. lf the nation was going to see itself in its 
battles, it could see itself as a glorious people, the equal of any warrior nation on 
Earth. 
ln add ition, during the war itself many of the battles of J 9 16 and 1917, now 
considered less than triumphant, were described in Australian newspaper coverage as 
victories. In fact , Jolm Williams has shown that Australians were fed on a steady diet 
of military success during this period, although they were not always reul victories.106 
Propaganda and censorship ensured that Australians read of advances, objectives 
taken, prisoners captured and casualties inflicted with light loss. In relation to the 
latter, although the length of Australian casualty lists, also published in the papers, 
suggested another story, no comprehensive source of alternative inforn1ation existed. 
A leader published in the Brisbane Daily Mail on 16 May 1917 offers an illustration 
of the prevailing Austra lian wartime understanding of the manner in which their men 
were fighting, as well as the traditional heroic parameters being used to comprehend 
the conflict in Europe. The article is all the more illuminating because it was focussed 
upon the apparent " triumph" of Firs t Bullecourt, during which the 41h Brigade lost 
over 2,300 out of 3,000 troops and I , I 70 Australians were taken prisoner, the largest 
number for a s ingle battle in the whole war. In short, the battle of which it wrote was a 
disaster: 107 
Month after month of war, battle after battle, heroic feat after 
heroic feat - they have been repeating themselves in the cable 
messages till they have come to be accepted almost. .. as a matter 
of course. It takes something of more than epic quality to arrest 
the attenti on of the world now. And yet the Australians at 
Bullecourt have provided this something!. ... lt is hardly possible 
106 Williams, Anzacs. the Media. 
107 Coul thard-Ciark, Enc~vdopedia, pp. l 25-6. 
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yet to realise what the unflinching valour of these Australians 
must have meant, what sublimity of endurance was theirs, what 
added lustre they have bestowed on their countrymen, what their 
d 1 · ·ll · } · I 08 feat of arms means now, an w 1at 1t w1 mean m 11story. 
The unconsc ious irony of the final clause makes its innocence all the more poignant. 
It is clear from this article that many Australians , havi ng read "the cable messages," 
were confident, indeed convinced, that their soldiers were mighty warriors . 
Popular culture was also enlisted for national duty, as James Wieland 
demonstrates in his study of wartime picture postcards. 109 He notes that "popularising 
cards" claimed that Australian history began at Gallipoli, and feels that on the picture 
postcards produced during the war Australian ' 'nationalism was measured by feats of 
arms.' '
11 0 It was not until the late 1920s that the awful conditions of the war, and the 
nature of some of the appalling disasters, strongly influenced the public domain. 11 1 
They were known privately, primarily by returned soldiers, but were not widely 
discussed in public, and certainly were not the focus of commemoration in the period 
to 1935 which this dissertation concentrates on. 
The many reports of Australian military success published during the war 
emphatically established the notion that "the Austra lian soldier was naturally and 
unusually competent," which Joan Bea umont reminds us was the " the central element 
[of] the Anzac Legend." 112 The Legend developed as a layering of stories, images and 
ideas about the war, based on fact but heavily constructed, which glorified the soldiers 
in tenns of the ir military accomplishments and the moral values said to underpin 
those accomplishments: courage, feroc ity, resourcefulness, loyalty to mates and the 
cause, dash, and so on. 113 The basic assertion of Australian supremacy was assumed 
lOR Quoted in Williams, Anzacs. the Media , pp. I 73-4. 
W<l James Wieland, "W hat Do You Think of this Card?,'' in Anna Rutherford and James Wieland (eds), 
War: Australia ·s creotil'l? response. (Sydney: Allen and Unwin, 1997), pp.l33-54. 
110 Wieland, "What Do You Think of this card?," p.l43. 
111 Fromclles, the first and one of the worst diastcrs, was an exception, being publicly discussed soon 
after the war ended. However, this did little to bring the terrible truths of the war to the fo re in public 
memories. Williams, The Quarantined Culture, p. l 18. 
l ie Beaumont. "The Anzac Legend." p. l 52. 
IIJ The literature on the Anzac Legend is considerable. See for example K.S. Inglis "The Anzac 
Tradition:· Meunjin, 24, I ( 1965), pp.25-44; K.S. Inglis, "The Australians at Gallipoli," Part J, 
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by almost all those who contributed to the Legend's making. Indeed, much of the 
Legend was concerned with explaining why Austra lians made such good soldiers, 
with moral qualities being at the centre of the explanation. Robi n Gerster, studying 
Australian war literature, brings together these two important strands of the Legend, 
arguing that many writers made a case that "Australians excel, even revel, in 
battle." 114 T he actions of the soldiers, eu logised thoroughly and consistentl y, were 
also interpreted as having fundamenta l importance for Australian nationhood .115 The 
actions of the soldiers during the war were various ly cla imed to have created the 
Aus tralian nation from an emot ional poi nt of view, to have revealed an already-
existing A ustralian character, and to have proved that Australians were worthy 
members of the British Empire. 11 6 
Jay Winter argues that the Anzac Legend "converted military defeat into 
moral victory." 117 This is an early-twenty-fi rst-century understanding, which I will 
show does not fi t the inter-war situation particularly well. Rather, the Anzacs were 
praised most strongly for a perceived military victory - at Gallipol i, the stom1ing of 
the cliffs on the fi rs t morni ng and the establishment of a strong defensive line there. 
This dissertation examines some of the ways in which this more triumphal vision was 
articu lated in the inter-war peri od. 
A number of key contributors to the Anzac Legend have been identified. 
Scholars have pointed out that Bean was the most crucial si ngle individual. His 
HisTorical Studies, 14,54 (April 1970), pp.2 19-30, Part II, HisTorical Studies. I 4,55 (October I 970), 
pp.J6 1-75: Phi ll ip Kitlcy. ' 'Anzac Day Ritual," Journal ofAustralian Studies. 4 (J une 1979), pp.58-69; 
White, Inventing Australia, pp. I 25-39: Ely. '"The First Anzac Day:" Gammage, "The Crucible:" 
Marilyn Lake. ·'The Power of Anzac," in M. McKernan and M. Browne, Australia: Two Centuries of 
War and Peace, (Canberra: Austral ian War Memorial in association with Allen and Unwin, I 988), 
pp.194-222: Andrews, "First Anzac Day in Australia and Bri ta in;" E.M . Andrews. The Anzac Illusion: 
Anglo-Australian relations during World War One, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993 ): 
Joan Beaumont "The Anzac Legend." in Joan Beaumont (ed.). AusTralia ·s War. 19/4-18, (Sydney: 
Allen and Unwin, 1995), pp. J49-80: 113 "A nzac Legend," in Peter Dennis, Jeffrey Grey. Ewan Morris 
and Robin Prior with John Connor. The Oxford Companion to Australian Militar1· Hist01:v. 
(Melbourne: Oxford Universi ty Press. 1995), pp.42-9; Bruce Kapferer. Legends of People, 1\llyths (~{ 
Stale: Violence. intolerance. and political culture in Sri Lanka and Australia, (Bathurst: Crawford 
House. I 998): John F. Williams, Anzacs. t!te Media and the Great War, (Sydney: University of New 
South Wales Press, I 999). 
114 G t s· · 2 ers er. 1g-noTmg, p . . 
11
' "Anzac Legend," in Oxford Companion to Australian Milit(lfy His toJy , p.44. 
116 Will iams, Anzacs. the Media, pp.24-6. 
117 Jay Winter. "Anzac Legend," in Graeme Davison. John Hirst and Stua11 Macintyre (eds) with the 
assistance of Helen Doyle and Kim Tomey, The Orford Companion to Australian His TOt )'. (Melbourne: 
Oxford University Press, 200 I), pp. 28-30, p.28. 
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reportage had been seen as important, but even more crucial, according to several 
scholars, was his selection and editjng of The Anzac Book, a collection of poetry, 
stories and artwork written by the troops at Gallipoli and published in Apiil 1916.11 8 
Other important contributors included the Engl ish war correspondent Ellis Ashmead-
Bartlett, who wrote the firs t substantive report on the initial attack at Ga ll ipol i, and the 
Australian poet C.J. Dennis, whose Moods ol Ginger Mick embodied a popular 
martial loyalty to the Imperial cause which he labelled "pride o' race" and saw as 
redempti ve.119 Institutions such as the RSSILA and the Brisbane Anzac Day 
Commemorati on Committee (ADCC) have also received attention as contributors 
through their influence on commemorative ritua ls. 120 Poli ticians such as W.M. 
11
" Sec D.E. Kent. "The Anzac Book and the Anzac Legend: C. E.W. Bean as editor and image-maker," 
Historical Studies, 2 1 ( 1985), pp. 376-90. Kent repeats his arguments in "Bean's ' Anzac ' and Making 
of the Anzac Legend," in Anna Rutherford and James Wieland (eds), War: Australia's crealive 
response, (Sydney: Allen and Unwin, 1997), pp.27-39. Whilst the point is an interesting and 
illuminating one. I feel that Kent goes a little too far in ascribing primacy to this book. It was certainly 
extremely imp01ant in reinforcing an already-exist ing myth, but was not the pri ncipal means of the 
myth's defi nition. This was because The Anzac Book appeared in Apri l 1916, a year after the landing. 
In the interva l. Australians had read an enormous number of words about the troops. and had heard 
equally large numbers from speakers. The myth was already far in train by the time The Anzac Book 
uppcared. As indicated, it was a powerful force of reiteration. given all the more effectiveness for being 
the product of the soldiers themselves. On this point see also Gerster. Big-noting. p.25. Significantly. 
Kent docs. however. point out that Bean was a highly selective editor when assembl ing The Anzac 
Book. ·'rejecting anything which might have modified his vision or tarnished the name of' Anzac.'" 
Kenl. "Bean as edi tor and image-maker:· p.376. John Barrett took exception to Kent, and to several 
other writers. und published ''No Straw Man: C. E. W. Bean and some critics,'' Aus1ralian Historical 
S11ulie.1. 23,89 (April 198S). pp. 102-112, a passionate, albeit at times strained. defence of Bean against 
accusations Barrett clai med had been levelled at him fo r being too uncritical in his w1itings. Apart from 
Kent. Barrett part icularly took exception to Alistair Thomson's review of Gal/ipo/i Correspondem (a 
published selection of Bean's Gall ipoli diary) in which Thomson accuses Bean of being far less critical 
in his History than in his diary. Thomson repeats such crit icisms of Bean in "Steadfast Until Death? 
C.E.W. Bean and the representation of Australian mi litary manhood," Australian Historical Studies, 
23.93 (October I 989), pp.462-78 and Anzac Memories. pp.142-56. See also Gerster, Big -noting. pp.13-
20.27-34. 62-82. Bean did fo llow such a course of putting really shocking information in his diaries 
ra ther than his HistUJ:L but as I examine in Chapter Six. he most likely did this as part of an overa ll 
design to allow details to emerge when he fe lt they would be most easily absorbed by Australians 
society. 
11
q Kevin Fcwsrer, "Ellis Ashmead-Bm1lett and the Making of the Anzac Legend." Journal ()/ 
Australian Studies, I 0 (June I 982). pp. I 7-30; Gerster. Big-noling. pp.IS-16; C.J. Dennis, The Moods 
o{ Ginger Mick. (Sydney: Angus and Robertson, I 9 I 6). Ginger Mick 's original print run was 39,324, 
which the ADB claims was •·unprecedented." ADB. vol.8, pp.286-7. p.2S7. 
1
'
0 
• I 28 4 
- On the RSSILA, see for example Thomson, Anzoc Memones. pp. - 2. On the Anzac Day 
Commemoration Committee (hereafier ADCC). sec John A. Moses. "The Struggle for Anzac Day 
I 916- I 930 and the Role of the Brisbane Anzac Day Commemora tion Comminee." Journal of the 
Roral A u.\'lralian Historical Soden·. 88, I (June 2002). pp.54-74 and "Canon David John Garland 
( I R64- I 939) as Architect of Anzac ·Day," Journal of 1he Royal Hislorical Society of Queensland. 17.2 
(May 1999). pp.49-64. Cannon David .John Garland ( I 864- 1939), b. Dublin, Ireland, d. Brisbane, 
Queensland. Honorary organising secretary for recrui ting in Queensland in 19 I 8, and the Honorary 
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Hughes, wartime Prime Minister, also added their vision. Graham Seal has recently 
shown that fo lk traditions had a great deal to do with Anzac as a popular cultura l 
phenomenon rather than an official and semi-official construction. 12 1 
The Memorial was concemed with al l of the themes of Anzac. In fact, it was a 
major contributor to the Anzac Legend, and this dissertation explores its contributions 
to all three arguments. The Memorial argued that the Australians had been 
magnificent troops, winning many battles, and that this was because of superior moral 
vi1iues, or character. The ''assertion that the Australian soldier was naturally and 
unusually competent" was widely accepted in Austral ia, but Bean was always aware 
of the fact that what he called "the fighting reputation of the AIF" could be contested, 
and he was anxious to ensure it was proved beyond doubt. The Memorial , along with 
its twi n project, the Official Hist01y, was designed to do so. In fact, the Memorial was 
a vital element in the Digger-Nationalist complex generally, offering the most 
complete public narrative of the Austra lian overseas war experience delivered to a 
mass audience, and holding physical objects that were offered as proof of many of the 
claims made by its agents. The Mem01ial claimed to be "the Australian authority on 
matters associated with the war," and evidence suggests it was afforded this position 
by important groups within the Digger-Nationalist complex, such as the RSSILA.122 
As a permanent public museum, seen by almost three million people, the Memorial 
was one of the most impo11ant sources of propaganda for nation-building based on the 
war experience. What is more, in its rhetoric the Memorial spoke to the nationalist 
issues of the day in the early post-war period - loss, triumphal ism, soc ial Darwinjsm, 
anti-Germanism, real ities of war and so on- as this dissertation examines. 
Scholars have seldom looked to the Memorial in efforts to explain the Anzac 
Legend. It has been assumed that Ashmead-Bartlett, The Anzac Book, the History and 
Anzac Day rituals were deci sive. Clearly these were vital factors in the rise of the 
Anzac Legend, but there are good reasons to look to the Memorial, as well. It offered 
Secretary of the ADCC 19 16-35. Garland argued that Anzac Day was a civi lian tribute to the soldiers. 
ADB. vo/.8, pp.619-20. 
n• Graham Seal demonstrates that Anzac was both "myth" and "tradition.'' the first being officiall y 
constructed, the second flowing from pre-existing folk traditions in Australia. I examine only the 
former in this dissertation. See Graham Seal. Inventing ANZAC: The Digger and national mythology. 
(St Lucia: University of Queensland Press, 2004). 
122 Press Release, November 1929, pp.3-4. A. W.M. 93 201111 A. This release gives a list of people who 
sought advice from the Memorial. 
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an accessible, complete public history of the Australian overseas war expenence, 
which reached far more people than the History did. Over three million Australians 
saw the displays, so the Memorial ought to be considered of as much importance as 
other inter-war developments in the triumph of the Anzac Legend as the dominant 
public memory of the war. By studying the Memorial's representations, we learn 
more not only about Australia's first national cultural institution, but also about inter-
war commemoration general ly, especially Australian attitudes to war, nation and 
remembrance. 
As the nation emerged from the war, nationalists quickly moved to reiterate 
both the fundamental assertion of martial pre-eminence and the myriad of positive 
moral "explanations" for it. There were several means by which this occurred. For 
instance , a large number of books appeared in the first few years of the peace. 
Histories of periods of the fighting or particular theatres or units appeared, many 
sporting the Hentyesque title With the Australians to ... 123 These books invariably 
praised the endurance, loyalty and "fighting qualities" of the troops, and few failed to 
point out that the Australians had beaten the Germans. In doing so they sought to 
create an "Australian Story" along the same lines as the British " Island Story" - that 
is, a series of heroic and successful battles leading to historically-important outcomes, 
in this case, the defeat of Germany and Turkey. Such tales would easi ly rank with 
those attached to Wellington and Nelson, for it was a commonplace by 1919 that the 
"Great War,'' as it was known, was, as its name suggested, the greatest conflict in 
human history. Australian success on this s tage could, if one was apt to view the 
world in such a way, quite easily put any past military achievement in the shade. As 
we shall see in the next chapter, many Australian writers and speakers had such a 
VIeW. 
Before, dUJing and immediately after the war, then, Australians looked to 
British military traditions both as a measure of their troops ' abilities as soldiers and as 
a means of celebrating them. They patiicularly adopted trophy-taking and display as a 
I)J See for example A. Sc John Adcock, Australasia Triumphant' With the Austmlittns and Ne11· 
Zealanders in the Great War on land and sea, (London: Simpkin. 1916), actually published after the 
failure at Gall ipoli yet before the successes of 1918; Australian Army, Australia ·s Fine Record: The 
Bailie ofAmiens and q/ter. How the German tide was turned, (London: s.n., 1919); George Wilkins, 
Australian War Photogroflhs: A pictorial record from Nowmber. 191 7 to the end of the war, (London: 
A J F Publications Section, 1919); Henry Tardent, In Freedom 's Cause: Australia's contribution to the 
World War, (Brisbane: Watson and Ferguson, 1923). 
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practice, using weapons to prove that their nation, geographically so far from where 
"real" history took place, in Europe, stil l patiook to the fu ll of that history, and 
interacted on history' s greatest stage - a major war - on tenns o f equa lity or better 
with the world's premier military nations. The war period, during which time the 
Anzac Legend was created and took hold as a dominant memory, was characterised 
by propaganda and censorship, leading to a skewed view of the AJF's war experience, 
over-emphasising victory and playing clown or even ignoring defeats, which was to 
last for virtually the whole inter-war period. 
This, then, was the cultural " matrix" within which the Memorial was created. 
The museum 's audiences had already been assured repeatedly that the Australians had 
done great things militarily during the war. An "Australian Story' ' had already been 
told in the flashes and details of the daily news reports. Some synthesis had begun, 
with a number of publications and speeches. The Anzac Legend had been established; 
trophies had been brought home. The scene was set for the Memorial to make strong 
contributions in all these areas - to the popu lar public history of the " Australian 
Story" through a complete and accessible narrative of the AIF overseas war 
experience, and to the Anzac Legend through proof of Australian military supremacy 
coupled with moral interpretation of the sources of that supremacy. 
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Chapter 2: War Memory, Politics and Society in Australia, 
1916-39 
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Figure 10: Postcard, First World War, 
Australia: "A Gallipoli Souvenir." 
Source: www. pukeariki .com/en/resources/ 
on I ineexhibitions/postcard _ 0 l .htm 
The Memorial was developed in the period in which memories of the First World War 
were at their freshest and most influential, affecting every part of Australian society, 
from formal politics and the workplace to the family and the churches. There were 
two main types of war memories in post-war Australia, focused alternatively on the 
actions of the sofd iers overseas or on developments at home - primarily the 
conscription debate, but also sectarian and industrial conflict. The tone of public 
expressiOns of the former was overwhelmingly congratulatory, and often 
glorificatory, while that of the latter was bitter and rancorous. The two had strong and 
important connections, however, with both being part of a larger ideological conflict 
and an associated struggle for formal political power, both of wh ich had begun during 
the war. 
The "national'' interpretation of the war had "modem memory" competitors 
for dominance in wartime and immediate post-war Australian society, primarily the 
product of social ists who, at least in the early post-war years, denied the very 
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legitimacy of nations. Public memories served political activists in several ways: they 
were enlisted to provide authority on various subjects, invoked in order that activists 
might be publicly associated with them, and used as weapons to attack opponents. 
This was the back!:,rrotmd, and often even the avenue, of commemoration. The mixing 
of praise for the soldiers with attacks on political opponents, a development of the war 
period, was still common more than five years after it. 
The Memorial was part of a larger "commemorative complex," comprising the 
RSSILA, and thus most Anzac Day orators, the mainstream press and Anglican 
clergy, and Nationalist and Country Party politicians, which conducted almost all 
Australian commemoration in this period. There was considerable overlap between 
the Memorial's messages and those of certain agencies of the Digger-Nationalist 
complex. The Memorial told stories, as did soldier writers, newspaper editors and 
journalists, essayists and numerous speechmakers. Narratives were often used, and 
attitudes to war were strongly positive overall. The nation was urged to celebrate its 
troops for their victories overseas and for the moral virtues felt to have underpinned 
them. In tum the nation was urged to congratulate itself that such vi11ues were 
typically national, and to give thanks. 
Glorification of the AIF in terms of their military success and martial virt.ues 
became a vvell-established and widely-supported form of commemoration in the first 
decade of the peace in Australia. Glorification of victory was influenced strongly by 
the paradigms of nation-building examined in the previous chapter, but also by local 
political concerns of this crucial period in the development of Australian society - the 
"politics ofvictory." 
The narrative comprising this chapter traces the creation of parallel overseas 
and domestic public memories in Australia, and some of the connections that were 
asserted to exist between them. It begins with a brief examination of wartime 
Australian politics, particularly the question of conscription and its companion 
concept, the desire for complete, non-negotiated, victory in the war- a victory which 
the Memorial later celebrated and set out to prove in displays. It then proceeds to a 
detailed examination of Anzac Day speeches and writings in the 1920s, the period 
most significant to the Memorial , which saw strong triumphalism in many speeches 
and writings. It also touches briefly on the triumphalism seen occasionally on 
Armistice Day and often on Empire Day to illustrate the breadth as well as the depth 
of the Australian commitment to the celebration of the 1918 victories. Examining the 
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simultaneous creation and utilisation of domestic war memories, beginning in 1916 
with the first conscription referendum, helps interpret some of the political rantings 
which intruded into commemoration until around 1925, and into a debate about 
ongoing Memoria I funding as late as 1929 (examined in Chapter Three). 
I 
When the AIF returned to Australia in 1919 it was to a society that had been through a 
great upheaval. The war years saw a sudden and fierce upsurge of both political and 
sectarian rancour, and traditional anti-Asian xenophobia was extended and 
transformed into a hysterical anti-Gennanism. 1 All these developments were direct 
results of the stresses of the war, although most histOiians agree that there was one 
factor which focussed all the others: the issue of conscription for overseas military 
service. As the war dragged on into 1916 and then 1917, all belligerent nations except 
Australia introduced conscription, as their voluntary systems broke down under the 
stress of enonnous troop losses.2 As AIF casua lties increased throughout 1915 and 
191 6, and volunteers fell, conservatives began to call for conscription in Australia as 
well. 
1 For example, Lutheran churches were bumt down and people of Gcrn1an ethnicity attacked. Large 
numbers were interned, including citizens who had been living in Australia for up to thirty years. See 
Gerhard Fischer. Enemy A liens: ln!ernment and the home_li-ont experience in Australia, 1914-1920, (St 
Lucia: University of Queensland Press, 1989). On social divisions more generally see Evans, Loyalry 
and Disloyal!) ': Marilyn Lake. A Divided Society: Tasmania during World War I, (Melboume: 
Melbourne University Press, 1975 ). 
~ France and Germany already had conscription, while Britain adopted the measure in January 1916, 
New Zealand in August 1916 and the USA in May 1917. Canada, where Quebecois opposition made 
the process more difficult, waited until January 1918. 
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Figure 11: Enlistments and Casualties, Australian Imperial Force, 1915-18. 
Sources: Joan Beaumont, Australian Defence: Sources and statistics~ A. G. Butler, The 
Australian Army Medical Services in the War of 1914-1918. vo/.2. 
The Universal Service League, for instance, was formed as early as 1915, arguing that 
conscription was necessary due to the extraordinary nature of both the threat from 
Germany and of the war itsetr.J The Anglican Church agreed; its Synod, declaring "a 
religious war," argued that "the forces of the Allies are being used by God to 
vindicate the rights of the weak and to maintain the moral order of the world."4 
Therefore the Synod "gives its strong support to the principle of universal serv ice." 
The menace that Germany was seen by some to pose was expressed clearly by 
Professor Ernest Scott in one of the University of Melbourne "war lectures" series in 
1915. Scott asserted that Germany had planned world domination in response to 
Bernhardi 's "desperate alternative of ' Weltmacht oder Niedergang · -world-power or 
downfall."5 He then warned of the very real possibility of German world domination: 
[German] national egoism could not contemplate the possibility 
of such elaborately organised preparation for victory eventuating 
in Niedergang: it must be Weltmacht. And it might well have 
been so if Germany had been as well served by her diplomacy as 
3 L.L. Robson, The First AIF: A study of its recruitment. 191-1-1918. (Melbourne: Melbourne 
University Press, 1970), p.70. 
J Age, 8 September 1916, quoted in McKinlay, Documentary History, p.72. 
5 Scott, 'The Nature of the Issue," p.20. 
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she has been by her wonderfully efficient military staff. Nay - it 
11ill be so - let us frankly face the issue - it will be so - unless by 
the patient, unremitting pressure of the Allies, the unflagging 
valour of their troops, the constant reinforcement of their trained 
annies by ever more and more men, and the overwhelming 
expenditure of ammunition, the bullying spirit of Prussia JS 
utterly broken.6 
The ALP, who were 111 Government, were committed to an all-volunteer 
expeditionary force, so although the Prime Minister, Hughes, came to agree with 
Scott, and to believe that conscription was required to win the war, he felt it 
politically necessary to put the idea to plebiscites in October 1916 and December 
1917, which were defeated by very small margins; a fact which in itself points to the 
division the issue caused. 7 
The referendums, as they were known, brought forth statements of definite 
nationalist principle by many in Australian society, and are instructive. Firstly, 
Hughes made his plea for conscription in terms of a compact between citizen and 
State. ln his "Manifesto on Conscription" of August 1916, in which he laid out his 
case, Hughes argued that the citizen owed a military duty to the nation: "No patriot 
can deny the necessity of reinforcements; no democrat can impugn the right of the 
nation to demand this duty from its citizens. Democracy and nationalism are one. The 
supreme duty which a democrat owes to his country is to fight for it."8 He quoted both 
democrat Abraham Lincoln and French socialist leader Jean Jaures in support of his 
argument that unionism and conscription were perfectly compatible, even 
complementary.9 Through Jaures Hughes evoked a "national" variety of socialism.10 
6 Scott, "The Nature of the Jssue," p.20. 
7 The decision on overseas service had been taken as early as 190 1. when the Labor Caucus decided 
that "No member of the Forces shall be required unless he voluntarily agrees to do so, to serve beyond 
the limits of the Commonwealth except in the case of naval forces while on board ship." Caucus 
Minutes, 25 July 190 I, quoted in McK inlay, DocumentGTy His tOJy , p.23; L. F. Fitzhardi nge, William 
Morris Hughes. a Political Biography. volume 2: Th e Lillie Digger. /914-1 952. (Sydney: Angus and 
Robertson, 1979), pp. l71 -80; The first plebiscite resulted in a "No" majority of 71,549 out of 
2,246,2 13 votes cast (3.2% of votes cast); the second had a slightly higher "No" majority, 166,588 out 
of 2. 196,906 (7.6'Yo of votes cast). Frank Farrell, The Fractured Society: Australia during the Great 
War. (Sydney: CCH Australia, 1985 ), pp. 61 and 95. 
R "The Prime Minister 's Manifesto on Conscription," quoted in M. Clark (ed.), Sources o( Australian 
His tOJy, (London: Oxford University Press, 1957), pp.536-42, p. 538. 
9 Jaures had said "Socialists demand military service fo r everyone ... they wish to be in the army .. .. 
Democracy and nationality arc one.'· Prime Minister's Manifesto," p.539. Lincoln's Gettysburg 
Address was later popular with Australian commemorative agencies. For instance, C. E. W. Bean wrote 
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He was praised by conservatives, his nominal political opponents, for 
''statesmanship,'' and attacked by some of his putative friends on the Left of 
Australian politics. 
Secondly, the Anglo-Australian, Imperially-loyal position was that Australia 
had a moral duty to do as Britain told it to do, accepting conscription if that was 
required. No attempt was made by supporters of this view to question the quality of 
British conduct of the war. Hughes was one of these, but the Round Table put the 
view in its most eloquent yet reasoned form, in an article written in December l9J 6 
and publ ished in March 1917. 11 Firstly, it stated that what was required was simply 
troops enough ''to maintain the five Australian divisions and reinforce them at a rate 
equal to what experience shows to be their losses.''12 The article continued with the 
asseriion that "the fundamental fact was ... that at the present rate of recru iting we 
shall not be able to replace anything like the number of casualties." 13 At no time was 
there even the slightest question as to whether the "losses" and the "number of 
casualties'' were higher than they might have been, whether they could have been 
lowered. Austral ians were told, often by thei r .leaders and here again by the Round 
Tah!e, that they should not question the generals, but just keep sending men.14 
in The Sr01y of,.! n:ac II. (p.901i) that in December 19 15 "the hi II sides consecrated by such a wealth of 
devotion had now been abandoned." On Anzac Day 193 1 the Age leader declared that "in spirit and 
intention we keep Anzac Day as a holy day in loving remembrance of those who 'poured out the sweet 
red wine of youth' that freedom might not perish from the earth." Age. 25 April 1931 , p.IO. Both 
borrow from the famous final sentence of Lincoln's speech: "It is rather for us to be here dedicated to 
the great task remaining before us. - that from these honoured dead we take increased devotion to that 
cause for which they gave their last full measure of devotion: that we here highly resolve that these 
dead shall not have died in vain: that the nation shall , under God, have a new birth of freedom. and that 
government of the people, by the people, for the people, shall not perish from the earth." Garry Wi ll is. 
Lincoln ar Gerrys f>urg: The words tha i remade America, (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1992), 
pp.261. 263. The words quoted are included in both the text spoken and the so-called "final " written 
text of the speech. Will is discusses the myriad problems with establishing a definitive version pp. l91-
203 . 
10 The "national' ' reaction to the war was not greatly different in Germany and Austral ia, and this led to 
a number of similar reactions, especially the understanding that the nation had received a spiritual tonic 
from the war. 
11 The Round Table was founded by Lord tv1 ilner and others in his circle of Imperial Confederationists 
in 19 J 0. L. L. Robson ( ed.), Australian Commenlaries. Select articles from !he Round Table, 
(Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 1975), pp. v-vii. 
t2 "The Conscription Referendum," Round Table, 7 (March 1917) pp.J?g-94, in L.L. Robson (ed). 
Ausll'iilian Commenraries: Selec1 arricles from the Round Table, (Melbourne: Melbourne University 
Press, 1975), pp.S l-62. p.55. 
13 Robson (cd), AusTralian Commenlaries, p.55. 
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The Round TabLe explained that such unquestioning loyalty was one of 
Australia's most important ethical responsibilities. The fact was, the articl e declared, 
"few other nations have been so well -favoured as [Australia] bas been, and no other 
nation has been so completely and utterly dependent on the protection of another as 
Australia is on the Bri tish nation." 15 Protected by ''British anns," Australia had "been 
free to gather in the 1iches of a vast continent."16 Further, "such guardian effort and 
sacrifice have piled up a moral debt," which Australia had, up until this referendum 
vote. been doing a good job of discharging, as impossible as this truly was. However, 
something within the nation had made it hang back from fully accepting its duties: 
In some respects the attitude of Australia throughout the war has 
been admirable. The many thousands of her sons who have gone 
to the war have been well equipped and supported, and millions 
have been given by the public to carry on the war chmities. No 
Australian soldier has ever complained of the hardships he has 
endured, none has regretted his sacrifice, or felt that it has been 
in vain. Australia has never complained of the statesmanship that 
led to the war, nor the way in which the war has been carried on 
by British statesmen. This much is extremely creditable. But the 
national will has not been strong enough to secure support for a 
policy wh ich would enable it more fully to discharge its moral 
obligations. 17 
Significantly, the Round Table felt that the war was itself potentially the saviour. 
Casting an eye upon Britain, the writer saw the war in positive spiritual tenus. The 
tendency towards treating the war as "'Business as Usual'" was all too evident in 
Australia, the article claimed, but in Britain a miraculous transformation had taken 
place: 
These tendencies were present in England at the beginning of 
the war, but they have been overcome there, and in her 
concentration on the sublime purpose of the vindication of 
liberty and justice in international relations England bas 
reached a spiritual plane from which all sorts of great results 
14 Hughes agreed. He baldly stated in 1916 that "we must supply the men asked for. It is the price we 
are asked to pay for our national ex istence and our liberties. We must get the men - so much is certain. 
The question, then, is. how shall we get them'~" His answer was that voluntarism had fa iled, and 
conscription wa~ the only way. "The Prime Minister's Mani festo on Conscription," p. 538. 
15 Robson (cd.), Ausrralian Commenraries, p.6 1. 
16 Robson (ed.), Auslralian Commenraries, p.61. 
17 Robson (cd.), Ausrralian Commenlaries, p.6 1. 
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will be possible in the future. Australia has not shared this 
discipline; and when the call to a supreme sacri fice came she 
did not respond. The moral elevation of spirit which might 
have come as a product of this dreadful conflict wi ll not be 
hers, and in the future her politics wi II be, to a greater degree 
than before, a dismal record of sordid strife. 18 
This dire end could, of course, be reversed by the adoption of conscription. 
ln opposition to this "Imperialist" vision of Australia's identity as it had 
apparently been revealed in the war was an "Australianist" one promoted by some on 
the Left of pol itics. In one such example, appearing in the anti -conscriptionist journal 
the Distributing Trades Ga::eue in September 1916, the Australian war commitment 
was. significantly, still celebrated, yet was presented not in Imperial terms but in 
terms of a continuing Australian protection of liberty, which entailed freedom from 
conscription: ''the seeds of liberty, sown in the blood-stained soil of Eureka, had 
created an Australian environment which was responsible for the bold, courageous 
and self-sacrificin g characteri stics which had made her sons the admiration of the 
world."19 This too was an Australian national vision, as Hughes beheld, but its 
orientation and focus were fundamentally different. This was a moderate leftist 
" nati onal" interpretation of the war. The fact of Australian involvement was not 
questioned here, nor did it become a serious issue until much later in the war, 
especially in its final year when war-weariness was extreme. The failure of the Left to 
take control of images of the heroic Australian during the period of the conscription 
debates was vital, though, for there was never later to be any chance for it to do so. 
The Diggers did not, in dominant public memory of the inter-war years, fight for the 
anti-authoritarian ideals of Eureka; they fought rather for the Empire. This palpable 
fact cast a shadow across the entire inter-war period. 
Hughes predicted a campaign without rancour, because he felt there was near-
universal approval for conscription. The result was, rather, as Liberal parliamentarian 
William Watt prophesied, "one of the most acrimon ious struggles Australia has ever 
seen."20 The debates leading up to each vote were the most bitter and perhaps the 
IR Robson (ed.), Australian Commentaries, p.60. 
19 Quoted in Robson, The First A IF, p.96. 
20 Hughes's assertion was made in parliament on 1 September 1916, Watt's on 15 September 1916. See 
Fitzhardinge, The Lillie Digger, pp. 187-8. 
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most spiteful in the country's history, the former only exceeded by the latter in fury, 
with conscriptionists accusing the "antis" - as they were pejoratively branded - of 
cowardice, and of leaving the soldiers at the front to their fate , while facing the 
counter-thmst that they wished to send men to their deaths. The Liberals, Anglican 
and other clergy of ·'Establishment" churches, mainstream newspapers, and other 
institutions of the status quo and the elite, came to call themselves " loyalists," that is, 
they were unquestioningly loyal to the Empire, as instructed by Hughes and the 
Round Table.21 They branded as "disloyal" an inchoate group of Bolsheviks, 
"Wobblies," Sinn Feiners, Catholics, unionists, pacifists and, most importantly, the 
ALP.22 The following poster put the pro-conscriptionist position succinctly yet 
dramatically: 
The Coward's Cry 
Thr rnOOI ""'"''"l"lbl~ «y oh~ A.mls """" J'<l poll 
l lllwanl Ia u .. o 
Allrtralla 18 E!Pt Weeks frcma tbe Battle FNIIt % 
Thousands of AastraliaDS are Oghtbtg 
for you 111 tllat battle llle t 
The atllis live here ln comfort and safely 
l>chi rl •l 111•• tmrr<c:tule oJ Austr.aUan herolsn1 
ond valor. Ou:r ooys are llahlln& In lhe 
1renclles lor your honor and your pr<.~IC.:Ii()n 
und Lhelr lives. 
Th~ onlit Vfto\ You 10 reave them •ht:re alone 
and unsuppcm ecl. 10 de.'lerl your own ne~l'l 
ond blood. Yo u ~•tlltu.~lr&te such d.e.~piellble 
ueachcry by 11 
"YES" VOT:.& 
..<-
Figure 12: Pro-conscriptionist poster, Australia, 19 17. 
21 The terms "loyalist'' and "disloyalist" were used extensively by Bean's contemporaries The very 
appellations attached to each indicate the power relationship which obtained at the time: the Right of 
the politica l spectrum was able to claim the positive tag, an important victory in the ongoing battle 
between nationalism and socialism for the allegiance of Australians. See Evans, Loyalty and 
Disloyalty. 
22 
"Wobblies" were members of the syndicalist group The I.ndustrial Workers of the World. They have 
proved a popular subject for historians, party because of their aggression and radicalism, but mainly 
because twelve of their members were the victims of a manufactured case accusing them of conspiring 
to bum down Sydney. The " IWW Twelve·· were found guilty and received prison terms of between 
five and fifteen years. After an inquiry i.n 1920 all were released. See McKinlay, Documentary History, 
pp.597-605; Ian Turner, Sydney 's Burning (A n Australian Polrtical Conspiracy) , (Sydney: Alpha, 
1969). See also Frank Cain. The Wobblies at War: A history oft he Industrial Workers of the World and 
the Great War in Auslra/Ja, (Melbourne: Spectrum, 1993); Verity Burgmann, Revolutionary Trade 
Umonism: The Indus/rial Workers of the World in Australw. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1995 ). 
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Source: Australian War Memorial Collections Database. 
cas.awm.gov.au. 
In rebuttal , ·'antis" offered equally emotive fare , such as the famous poem 
·'The Blood Vote," which appealed to Australian women, newl y enfranchised as they 
were, to vote against sending men to the war: 
Figure 13: Anti -conscriptionist poster, Australia, 191 7. 
Source: www.takver.com/history/myunion/myunionp22.htm. 
The animosity of these well-documented campaigns cast a shadow upon all 
post-\.var references to the war, including those made by the Memorial. 23 Many of the 
antagonisms which surfaced during the war remained in full force afterwards, and the 
actions and positions of individuals and groups during the confl ict were often 
interrogated and used against them in an ongoing ideological and political battle that 
began during the war. 
Conscription also caused a major pol itical realignment Hughes and a group of 
followers were expelled from the ALP and formed a new political party. the 
Nationalist Party, with their former political enemies, the Liberals, with the stated 
intention of winning the war. The formation of the party was a watershed in 
23 See for example Robson, The First AJF, pp. 62-1 22, 142-81 ; Souter. Lwn and Kangaroo, pp.251 -64; 
Evans, Loyalty and Disloyalty, pp.87-11 2; Clark, The Young Tree Green, pp.29-42, 67-79; Macintyre. 
The Succeeding Age. pp. 162-5, 172-4. 
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Australian political life. and for the next 24 years conservative forces controlled 
federal politics, the ineffectual Scullin Government notwithstanding. The first Hughes 
ationalist government had a huge majority - 53 seats to Labor's 22 in the House, 
and 24 to 12 Senators.24 The Nationalists were the self-proclaimed "win-the-war" 
party, with victory their oveniding priority. With this control came an abi lity to 
publicly promote such war memories as they saw best, and to veto those which they 
opposed. Under this influence, the old labour-dominated image of the egalitarian 
independent-minded bush worker as hero gave way to the conservative vision of the 
Imperially-minded, ' 'loyal" Digger. 25 The period of the conscription campaigns saw 
the beginning of this cha nge, which then continued throughout the I 920s and beyond. 
By the final year of the conflict, war-weariness had long since taken hold of 
the country. By 1918 some Austra lians fe lt so sick at heart that one wrote to the 
Brishane Courier that "people pray for peace; they wish the war was over; they care 
little apparentl y which side wins."2<' Another could not see beyond the grief, the pain 
and the horror, as she wrote to the Queensland Premier, T.J. Ryan: 
I voted agai nst conscription. We have enough broken-hearted 
people already and, to be just, I think we have given enough of 
the flower of o ur land- l mean, a good percentage - a fair thing, 
and oh, such awfu l deaths - if they were shot through the heart 
and died instantly it wou ldn't be so terrible - but the lingering 
awful pain .... Genevieve Macalister said, "Mustn't Heaven be 
full Aunty just now?" but I said, "I think Hell must be 
overflowing - the hellish deeds that have been committed in this 
frightful war.'.27 
Reflecting this sense of horror and despair, the ALP adopted a pro-negotiated peace 
platform in June 19 18 as a requ irement of its support for recruiting efforts, and 
publicly put ·'Australia's paramount needs" before those of Britain, which was to be 
~~ Table POL 24-2ll: "i\ustra li an I louse or Representatives Scats Won by Party, General Elections 
1901-1983." Historical Swtistics. p.395. 
~~ Alistair Thomson affirms that "the League had appropriated the defi nition of 'the digger' so that 
'radical digger' had become a contradiction in terms. and many left-wing veterans shed their identity as 
rctumed men and gave their fir!>t loyalty to the labour movement." Thomson, Anzac Memories, p. 125. 
~~ Brisbane Courier. I 0 J;muary 1918 . Quoted in Evans. Loyalry and Disloyally. p. lll . 
~7 Mis!> L. Hetherington (Gladstone). to Premier T.J. Ryan. 6 February 191S. Quoted in Evans, Loyalty 
am/ Disloyalty, p.ll I. 
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assisted "under the vol untary system ... to the best of our capability. ,n Typical of the 
polarised times, th is was prompt ly dubbed a "peace-at-any-price" position by 
opponents (which it was not - i t was ''upon the basis of no annexations and no penal 
indemnities") and attac ked. 29 The intensity of the bitterness, and the longing for 
victory, that characterised the last year of the war, pa11icularly. are summed up from 
the loyalist point of view in an at1icle in the Melbourne Argus in August 1918, 
following the successfu l All ied breakthrough at Amiens in France: 
Australians are playing a conspicuous and dashing part in the 
great advance now being made by the Allies in France. They are 
helping to win the war by gallantry and by resource. To them, as 
to their o ld comrades who have returned, the words "peace by 
negotiation" have no meaning, excepting that of contempt.30 
This connection of military success in France with poutical conflict in Australia was 
of the utmost importance, fo r throughout the next five or six years, during which time 
the Anzac Legend was being diffused throughout the country along with the returning 
troops, publi c memories of France or of the New South Wales general strike mixed 
freely.31 
The war greatly magnified ideals and emotions. The ALP may have won the 
conscription argument, but their heavy defeat in the 1917 federa l election, fought by 
Hughes on a "win-the-war" platform which used a healthy dollop of martial 
nationalism (Hughes argued straight facedly that his party "put country before party"), 
s ignalled their crippling as a force in national politics. Many were bitter, and the 
strength of feeling can be assessed from an article in 1917 in The Australian Wo~·ker, 
casti ng Hughes in the role of the most famous turncoat in Western civilisation, Judas 
Iscariot. 32 
2~ Official Reporl of/he Sevenrh Commonwea/rh Conference o,(the Ausrralian Labor Parry, Perth, June 
19 18, quoted in McKinlay, Documen/(l}y HisrOIJ' o/rhe Australian Labour Movement, p.86. 
'9 
• Sevenrh Commonwealth Cor~{erence o.f the ALP, p.86 . 
. lO Argus, 12 August 1918, quoted in F.K. Crowley, Modern A uslralia in Documenls. vol.l: I 9() I - I 939, 
(Melboume: Wren, 1973), p.304. For more details on Amiens, see Chapters Two and Four below. 
31 For instance, in February I 921 Sir George Fuller, who as Premier of NSW later brought the 
Memorial to Sydney, told the official dinner of the National Club that "he desired publicly to 
acknowledge the loyalty and assistance of his colleagues and of the community,·which stood so much 
to the credit of the State during the dark and strenuous days of the I 917 strike." Sydney Morning 
Herald, 23 February 1921, p.16. 
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The intensity and scale of the fighting, the killing and the dying, and of the 
horror, for soldier and anxious civilian alike, demanded of most people a delineation 
of loya lties, and a com mitment to them, of the most stringent kind. Huge numbers of 
people made these commitments, and were bound by them for decades to come. The 
demand for avowal grew during the war, also, and at the same time tolerance for other 
opinions seemed to disappear. There was, then, strong continuity of these acrimonious 
relations into the peace. Few groups or individuals were willing to forgive and 
fo rget.J3 
IJ 
The returned soldiers were in tbe centre of the political storm when they returned 
home in 1919 and 1920. The Diggers' status as national heroes who had defeated a 
terrible tyranny led most mainstream political groups, and even some from the 
extreme Left, to attempt to associate themselves with them. War memories came to 
the fore here clearly and unambiguously in political debate. For example, a cartoon 
from the Australian Worker in 1919 linked this famed AIF solidarity with the One Big 
Union movement. The cartoon Digger's cry of "Cut it out, Fat! Is there anything in 
my record as a soldier that would suggest that I would go back on my mates?" 
announced a radical attempt to remake the nature of the bonds of military loyalty from 
nation to class.34 This was ultimately unsuccessful, mainly because counter-memories 
>~ Australian Worker. 12 Apri l 1917, quoted in McKinlay, Documentcuy His/o1y o.f 1he Australian 
Labour Movement. pp.80- 1. 
J> Anti-foreigner violence was also in large part triggered by appeals to memory. For example, in 
March 19 19 a speaker at the loyalty demonstration that led to the Red Flag Riots in South Brisbane 
inOameu the crowd to anti-Russian violence with the question, '"Who let you down at the war '?'' - the 
answer in his mind being the Russians. whose "alien" Bolshevik creed was the reason proffered as to 
why such betrayal had occurred. Evans, "'Some Furious Outbursts of Riot,'" p.88. See also Raymond 
Evans, The Red Flag Ri01s: A study o.f intolerance, (St Lucia: University of Queensland Press, 1988). 
At the same time, wild anti-German outpourings in 19 19-20 were fuelled by writers appealing to 
memories of at rocity stories which were fictiona l in any event, and to some of the other worst excesses 
of wartime propaganda. A signal example of this came fro m Smith ·s Weekl1•, the self-styled "Digger's 
Advocate" and fiercely anti-foreigner rag. In 19 19 it ran a story entitled "The Horror We Keep at 
Holdsworthy," as part of a general campaign to have all Gem1a11s deported. This was a tale of a well-
coordinated and ruthless armed uprising of German in te rnees, who take over areas of Sydney, massacre 
civilians and hold oul for a week before fi nail y succumbing. It has all the ridiculous desperation of the 
pre-war invasion scare literature, but is presented in all seriousness. accompanied by an artist's 
rendering of the scene. The campaign to deport fo reigners wa!; widely supported, and resulted in the 
deportation of large numbers of former internees. many of whom had lived in Australia for decades. 
Smi!l1 ·s Weekly. 22 March 19 19, p.13 . On anti-Gcrmanism after the war generally, see Fischer, Enemy 
Aliens. pp.280-302. Fischer confi1ms that a total of 5.4 14 former internees were deported after the war. 
34 Quoted in McKinlay, Documemary Hist01y o(fhe Australian Labour Movement, p.422. 
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were mobili sed by the Right. Raymond Evans quotes a clergyman, the Reverend 
Stan ley Morrison, tell ing an Orange Lodge Thanksgiving Service that "the peace-at-
any-price people" had "backed the wrong horse," and were "now scurrying to seem 
' true blue,.,, through attempting to ident ify themselves with the soldiers, sayi ng, 
apparently, "'Hooray! Brother Anzac. We have won the war!'" However, " Brother 
Anzac was too astonished to speak."~5 As Evans points out, when the war fina ll y 
ended, "loyalists, in thought and deed, demanded cap itulation and atonement rather 
than reconci liation.''36 
Hughes went further than demanding atonement; he sought to cast the 
disloyalists out of the Australian national gro up entirely. As early as Jul y 1916 he had 
stated that post-war Austra lian society would have ''no ti me" for the eligi ble man who 
did not en list (in contemporary parlance, ' 'the shirker"), who would become "a pariah 
and a leper upon whom men shall spit."37 Hughes, along with many loyalists, was 
ready and detennined to ensure that people did, indeed, "spit" on the disloyalists. His 
first post-war speech in Australia, made fo ll owing his return from the Versailles 
Peace Confe rence, indicated this in clear terms. Speaking in August 1919, Hughes 
argued that the country cou ld be d ivided into two groups. "all those who have done 
something here or abroad, however humble, to help [the war effort]," and "those who 
have done nothing."38 The first group had, in Hughes 's view, "earned sa lvation," 
while the other had not.39 Hughes made it plain that in post-war Australia the 
35 Quoted in Evans, Loyalty and Disloyal(\', p. l48. Morrison' s stringent attack was simply a 
continuation of typical wartime loyalist propaganda. which had cast disloyal ists as traitors. For 
instance. the Sydney Morning Herald argued in June 1918 that the Labor Pa11y's leaders could have 
only odious motivations fo r seeking a negotiated peace: "There is no possible room for negot iation, and 
we must fight on or surrender .. . all who talk in te rms of surrender. whether as fools or knaves ... arc 
aiding the enemy, and today, that is treason." Sydll(l' Morning Herald. 2 1 June 19 it{, quoted in King. 
"Dinkum Diggers," p.96. 
36 In Evans, Loyalty ond Disloyally, p.l48. Many who were cast as "disloyal'' argued that they were in 
fact strong Australian nationalists, who loved their country. but Hughes was in no mood to take their 
word for it. Many historians have argued that his main reason for continuing the fight after the war was 
that he required a sense of crisis to survive as the non-conservative leader of a conservative political 
party. At the same time, the mood of the loyalists was vengeful, and Hughes, the ul timate political 
opportunist, no doubt seized on this to improve his own personal popularity through public displays of 
solidarity with the soldiers and opposition to anti-conscriptionists, socialists. unionists and the ALP. 
See King, "Dinkum Diggers,"' p.97; Macintyre, The Succeeding Age. p. l87. 
37 Quoted in King, "Dinkum Diggers," p.94. 
JR Quoted in King, "Dinkum Diggers," p.86. 
39 Quoted in King, "Dinkum Diggers," p.86. 
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divisions of wartime were to be perpetuated, for the former group "are my friends. 
The others need not look to me."40 
As we ll as their uses within fonnal politics, memories were found useful in 
social politics. Memories of the Australian troops' wartime actions were exploited by 
leaders of returned soldiers' groups and other advocates to provide status for the 
Diggers as a new social elite. The main arguments for returned soldier privilege all 
rested upon memories of their service and actions during the war. The RSSILA, for 
example, argued that they deserved a special place in Australian society because they 
had defeated the flower of the Prussian Guard. 41 The Memorial was dedicated to 
supporting the position of the returned soldier in Australian post-war society, and its 
displays can·ied out the mission. As Chapters Four and Five show, they purported to 
prove beyond doubt that the AIF had, indeed, beaten the flower of the Prussian Guard; 
this was one of the Memorial's most important objectives. 
There is ample evidence that the returned soldiers' prot,•Tamme was successful 
on many levels. The wearing of badges by returned soldiers who belonged to various 
organisations provided outward proof of membership of this elite, and there is 
evidence that doing so was socially advantageous. For example, Alistair Thomson 
reports oral testimony from returned soldiers who stated that "the sight of the 
League's [RSSILA 's] 'great big badge' often prompted job offers or favours."42 As 
Terry King points out, wearing A IF unifonns allowed men to enter racetracks free, 
and the glamour of the unifonns and medals of the Australian soldiers is also 
indicated by the number of men who fraudulently wore them.43 Further, King 
40 Quoted in King, "Oinkum Diggers," p.96. 
41 See Martin Crotty, ''Good Men and True: The beginnings of the Australian Returned Services 
League:· Paper Presented at the 12'h Biennial Australian Historical Association Conference, Newcastle, 
5-9 July 2004. The RSSILA became the major returned service personnel's association, mainly due to 
the fac t that it made a compact wi th the rul ing Nationa list-Country Party Government which allowed it 
to effectively lobby for improvements in the material circumstances of the returned men. Other 
organisations existed. however, particularly in the early years of the peace. These included the 
Victorian Returned Soldiers' No-Conscription League and the Returned Soldiers' and Soldiers' 
Democratic League, the latter del iberately named to oppose the " Imperial" RSSILA. Thomson, Anzac 
Memories, pp. l20-&. The beginnings of the League arc exami ned in G.L. Kristianson. The Politics of 
Pmriotism: The pressure group actil ,ities o(1he Re1urned Servi~·emen 's League. (Canben·a: Australian 
National University Press, 196o), ppJ-24. 
4~ Thomson. Anzac Memories, p. 126. 
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mentions the example of a man who was discharged by a magistrate on the basis of 
his vvar record while other men were tined and jailed.44 However, politics retained its 
primacy; King also mentions the case of a Gall ipoli veteran whose radical politics led 
to accusations that he was "disloyal," military service or no. 
A further indication of the status of Diggers is provided by an incident in 
February 1928, in which Sydney Stipendiary Magistrate (SM) May found himself in 
hot water with the Legacy Club and the RSSlLA over remarks he had made about 
returned soldiers. He had told a returned man who appeared before him that "the war 
has been over for I 0 years now, and it is time those who went to it realised that they 
are now civi lians. lf you are going to bring any returned soldiers' business into this 
affair, I don ' t want to hear you."45 There was a fairly clear indication here that the SM 
had encountered special pleading before. The Club expressed its strong objection, 
with the president telling a meeting, to considerable acclaim, that "we strongly 
denounce any derogatory comments passed about the returned soldier."46 The 
magistrate felt constrained to issue an explanation for his comments several days 
later, asse11ing that "I never meant in any way to be offensive to any returned 
soldier. "47 This explanation was sufficient, it seems, for the executive of the State 
Branch of the RSSJLA, who "decided to inform Mr May that the executive not only 
accepted his explanation with pleasure, but also without reserve."48 
Reinforcing the returned soldiers' social status was their central role in vital 
commemorative rituals during the inter-war period. As scholars have shown, rituals 
and the monuments at wh ich they were performed helped the bereaved to come to 
terms with their grief.49 At the same time, they provided a powerful sense of 
community wh ich in turn was a major reason for the continuing right-wing control of 
43 King, "Dinkum Diggers." pp.91 , 93-4. There was a notorious case in which a prominent "colonel'' 
gained rank and honours by the year, only being dis<.:overed as a fraud when a member of his rutativc 
regiment came on the scene. 
44 King. "Dinkum Diggers," p.92. 
4~ 
- Sydney Morning Herald, 17 February 1928, p.l 6. 
46 Sydney Morning Herald, 17 February 1928, p. 16. 
47 Sydney Moming Herald. 22 February 1928, p.l6. 
4
R Sydney Morning Herald. 28 February 1928, p. 12. 
49 Damousi, The Labour of Loss. pp.35-8; Winter, Sites of Memo1y, pp.93-8: Luckins, The Gates of 
Memory, pp.87- I 06; Ingl is. Sacred Places, pp.222-3. 
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commemoration. For instance, in 1922, the Argus reported that "jn accordance with 
the spirit of solemn observance there was no street parade or other pageantry."50 
However, this brought about a less than satisfying day for most people, as the paper 
elaborated: 
Many members of the public seemed uncertain how to spend 
Anzac Day. Crowds of men, women and children wandered 
about the city streets, apparently with the understanding that the 
anniversary was one for commemoration rather than celebration 
in the holiday mood, yet not knowing quite how to commemorate 
it or what to do with their day offreedom from work or school. 51 
This uncertainty led, the Argus was afraid to report, to some Jess than commemorative 
activities taking place: "The theatres and refreshment shops were open, and both had 
many visitors. So had the hotels, and now and then intoxicated men were to be seen in 
the streets. Tn some of the suburbs youths and men played cricket or football."52 
Need less to say, the Argus disapproved of this situation, as did other groups such as 
the RSSILA. Changes were made. Hotels were forced to shut, race meetings were 
banned, and marches were held.53 
Marches provided a foca l point for the whole population within the evolving 
collection of ri tual actions that made up Anzac Day in the 1920s. They provided an 
opportunity for all to participate in a public ritual that was both solemn and triumphal 
in its elements. The nation cou ld come together to give thanks for those who had d ied 
to protect them, with those who had stayed also offering respect, admiration and love 
to those who had returned from defending them. The Melboume Age, which 
subscribed to this logic, reported as late as 1931 that the returned men took front row 
"among a people united in grateful reverence."54 The nation could give thanks for the 
50 Argus, 26 April I 922, p. I I. 
~ 1 Argus, 26 April I 922, p.l I. In its etlition that day, I he Argus ·s riva l the Age ran a mythical history of 
the AIF as its main Anzac Day story, as this was for the Argus. This history included a long description 
of the Ga llipoli landing. A sample of the style makes a pointed comparison with the moral anxiety of 
1he Argus story: "U nder the hail of death the wave of youlh rolls shorewards; surges upon the beaches, 
and essays the cliffs, as some great breaker leaping high in air. Across the beach, sweeping the last few 
Turks before them. by ridge tO steep: now the young South is joined in battle with the ancient East; 
with the dawn and for the time the East is swept as sand before the South." Age, 25 Apri l, 1922, p.7. 
52 Argus. 26 April 1922, p.l l. 
51 
"A nzac Day:· in 04ord Companion to Australian Militm:v Hist01y, pp.37-42. 
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victory won, for justice and liberty preserved, and for the t~1ct that it had come 
triumphantly through its first test, and that the greatest test of nations the world had 
ever seen. All could participate, either as marchers, or as adoring audience. depending 
on who they were. Roles were strictly prescribed, in the main, by a logic that gave 
pre-eminence to the returned soldiers, and placed the rest of the nation in a position of 
thankful indebtedness; and by the very structure of the march. 55 
Dawn services were mainly for the returned men, although this was because 
groups of returned soldiers , backed up by the Establishment press, enforced the 
exclus ivity. The Age came to the point, in so doing illuminating deeper anxieties 
about social change: 
Women have invaded walks of life, manners and customs that 
once were thought the sole preserve of man, and man has been 
the last to question their right. There are times, however, when 
he feels impelled to voice an objection. Such an occasion was the 
Dawn ceremony at the Shrine of Remembrance yesterday. ln 
spite of many requests that the observance should be exclusive to 
men, several hundred women, s ingly, in groups and with male 
companions, attended an observance that is peculiarly that not 
on! y of men, but of returned men. 56 
Despite their prescriptive nature and resultant friction, there is evidence that 
returned men, at least, felt a profound sense of community in the marches: 
ON THE MARCH: The Digger Feeling (by one who marched) 
What a fine muster it is - crowds of men - an inspiring sight. All 
of them getting back in the old spirit of the AIF, happily 
renewi ng friendships as they found the old unit. Surely the war 
spirit was a big thing; to co-operate for an ideal! There must be 
something in that. 
The s ignal to move off in columns of eights, the great feeling of 
swinging along behind a good band again in grand company; 
crowds of proud people lining the route, many women among 
them; a mother wearing her husband 's medals and bringing the 
54 Age, 25 April 1931. p.8. 
55 However, Inglis does give an example of a loca l grandmother assuming a prominent role in early 
commemorative ritual s. Inglis, Sacred Places, pp. l26, I 98-200. 
56 Age, 27 April, 1938, p.2, quoted in Joy Oamousi, ''Private Loss. Public Mouming: Motherhood, 
Memory and Grief in Australia during the I ntcr-war Y cars," Women's Hislorl' Rel'iew. 8.2 ( 1999), 
pp.365-78, p.372. In 1939 the Age reported that "women arc specially requested not to attend the 
[dawn] service." Age, 24 April 1939, p.l 2. 
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young ones along to see the men march; many boys and girls, 
who will catch the proper spirit; very little clapping, but much 
enthusiasm - you read it in the eyes and faces and feel it in the 
air. It makes you proud, swinging along now down Bridge Street. 
The old feelings of wartime come back; the quiet determination 
to do one's duty; the feel ing of companionshjp. It is the march 
that had done it. We seem to be taking part in a piece of ritual -
the close massed ranks become the symbol of the inner spirit of 
the unity of men fighting for an ideal.57 
This sense of community was part of the reason for the right-wing take-over of 
commemoration. By assisting, albeit imperfectly, many Australians to come to terms 
with their war experiences, marches were powerful rituals. Their control by right-
wing forces was fundamental to the overall political and commemorative hegemonies 
created in the inter-war years by loyalist forces. 58 
Social and formal politics came together at times. Some leaders of the returned 
men's movement saw themselves as leaders of the nation in all things. In 1922 the 
Victorian State president of the RSSILA, Edward Turnbull, cast his eye upon the state 
of Australian post-war society and did not like what he saw. "Disintegrating forces" 
were at work, " but the league recognised that it had an important part to play in the 
promotion of national welfare .... It was for the League not only to minister to the 
requ irements of returned soldiers, but to set an example in all that was upright and 
honourable in citizenship. " 59 
For some returned soldiers, pa1i of thi s example involved opposition to 
communism. Here again was a contlation of overseas and domestic memories. For 
example, in May 1928 the Melbourne sub-branch of the RSSJLA ca lled a meeting to 
consider how to prevent a recurrence of an incident that had apparently occurred on 
Anzac Day that year: 
;
7 S)•dney Morning Herald, 26 April 1928, p. l 0. 
~.~ This control was enforced both economical ly. through Sir Otto Niemeyer's 1930 mission on behalf 
of the Bank of England. which made clear the impotence of the ALP to dispute deflationary economic 
orthodox ies. and physically through the formation in the late 1920s and early 1930s of anti-communist 
paramilitary groups. Sec Macintyre, The Succeeding Age, pp.254-74; Michael Cathcart, Defending the 
National Tuckshop: Australia 's secret army i111rigue o( !931, (Melbourne: Me Phce Gribble, 1988); 
Andrew Moore, The Secret Arm\' and rhe Premier: Conservative paromilirary organisations in New 
Sowh Wales 1930-32. (Sydney: University of New South Wales Press, 1989). 
59 A 26 ·1 9?? rgus, Apn I __, p.l I. 
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A document containing offensive references to the men who 
fought in the Great War, and alleged to have been issued by the 
Melbourne branch of the Communist party, was distributed in the 
street. A resolution was carried calling upon the Commonwealth 
Government to prevent any such fl agrant abuses in future."60 
The meeting had a more sombre warning for radical s, as well, declaring that "if an 
attempt were to be made to turn Australia into a Bolshevik country members of the 
AIF would have something to say in the matter."6 1 The Victorian Governor also 
linked perceived past victories with envisioned future ones, telling his audience that " 1 
fee l sure that those who have returned will be a source of strength, showing by the 
lives which they lead that they are determined to overcome al l difficulties, and to win 
through as they did on so many occasions during the war. "62 Whether returned 
soldiers appreciated this heavy extra pressure upon them to be "glorious" in peace is 
an open question, but research indicates many were not able to live up to the 
publicity.63 
Ill 
As well as being the central figures in rituals, the Diggers were the main subjects of 
commemorative speeches and writings. What fol lows is not a comprehensive analysis 
of post-war commemorati on, for it includes, for instance, none of the usual 
lamentations for the dead expressed on Armistice Day. I acknowledge that 
lamentation was a predominant response on that day, but wish to illuminate an area of 
commemoration which has been less fully explored - the numerous references to 
Australian victory and military supremacy common in the 1920s. This said, the 
section on Anzac Day does attempt to provide examples of all the in1portant 
commemorative reactions, especially the extremely common contlation of death and 
triumph. In fact, the victory of 1918 was held up as the justificati on for all the 
sufferings and deaths of the war. The Western Mail report on Anzac Day as late as 
1929 affirmed the notion, referring to " the emotions predominant in men's hearts" as 
60 Sydney Morning Herald, 15 May 1928, p.J2. 
61 Sydney Morning Herald, 15 May 1928, p. l2. 
61 Argus, 26 April 1922, p. l I. 
63 Thomson, Anzac Memories, pp.l 57-74. 
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including "remembrance of the unreturning dead and ... thanksgiving for the victory 
which was the result and the reward of a sense of sacrifice unparalleled in the whole 
history of the world."64 This was the standard combination of grief and pride which 
Hughes had summed up in 1922: "our hearts swe ll with pride ... but our eyes are wet 
with tears."65 As Anzac Day was the most impo1iant commemorative day, it is 
examined in detail. However, first we shall explore the appearance of triumph m 
monuments, trophies, and the ritual days of Empire Day and Armistice Day. 
Scholars are beginning to piece together an understanding of the early post-
war period as a time of militarist commemoration. The key to this were the large 
numbers of trophies - objects taken from the enemy on the field of battle - which 
symbolised Australian victory. As Mark Clayton indicates, these field guns, machine 
guns and mo1iars, over four thousand in all, were distributed free to many 
municipalities, and, being free , were often the first war memorial in a particular area. 
Even after masonry memorial s were constructed, the trophy guns remained part of the 
overall memorial , and thus " remained for many years integral , if not central , to the 
am1t1al Anzac ceremony.''66 In fact, the practice of blending trophies with monuments 
neatly encapsulates the blending of the notions of tri~1mph and sacrifice common to 
post-war Australia. Clayton also points out that the 173 guns captured by the AIF on 8 
August 1918 at the Battle of Ami ens "were all shipped to Australia and subsequently 
unve iled as war memorials, affording the only material evidence of Australia 's 
crowning achievement."67 Just as the AIF craved kudos, Australians generally sought 
physical evidence of the success of their nation's soldiers.68 Some municipalities 
objected, for example, that their al location was unworthy of their effon.69 
64 Western Mail, 2 May 1929, quoted in Seal, Inventing ANZAC, p.l27. 
1
'
5 Age, 26 April 1922, p.7. 
66 Clayton, 'To the Victor,·· Part 3, p.22. 
67 Clayton, 'To the Victor," Par1 3, p.22 . 
<.x Eric Andrews points out that Australians loved recognition, while Gerster argues that "the classicist 
Chares Rowan Beyc could just as easil y have been ta lking about the Diggers when he remarked of 
Achilles. Agamemnon, Ajax and company that they, ' like movie stars, can endure anything but being 
ignored .. , See Andrews, Anzac Illusion, p. 178: Gerster Big-noting, p.2. 
1
'() Clayton, ·To the Victor," Part 3, pp.6-9; Inglis, Sacred Places, p. l79; McKernan, Here is Their 
SjJirit, pp. 71-2. 
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Australians had strong emotional attachments to the trophies. For instance, on 
the same day that it reported the returned men's opposition to communism, in May 
1928, the Swiney Morning Herald claimed that trophies were "the last gifts of fallen 
soldiers themselves to their country, gifts meant by them to be a speaking record of 
the Alf's adventures, its effo1ts, and its sacrifices."70 They created, the paper 
continued, "direct personal links to the heroes we would honour."71 Trophies aroused 
strong passions, often linked to wartime politics. For instance, when the ALP Lord 
Mayor of Sydney, William Lambert, refused a gun for a local war memorial in 
Sydney in 1921, The Bulletin ridiculed him in a cartoon in which the Little Boy From 
Manly levels two devastating questions at "The Pacifist" which actively link 
militarism with Australian identity: "Doesn 't that stir your blood? Aren't you an 
Australian too?" 72 The link between captured arms and emotional nation-building is 
readily apparent. 
In addition to trophies, there were a smal I number of masonry memorials with 
bellicose themes. When erected within Australia. these monuments proved 
controversial. 73 However, there was one really notable bellicose memorial outside 
Australia, the 2nd Division Memorial at Mont St Quentin in France, which appears to 
have received a considerable measure of support. Erected in I 925, it stood, as Inglis 
points out, on the site of the Division's "climactic triumph."74 Its clear bellicosity 
reflects, yet goes far beyond, the image of Well ington as Achilles, sword in hand to 
ward off the foe. Here, the foe was seen at the feet of the victorious Digger, about to 
be ruthlessly finished off: 
70 Sydney Moming Herald, 15 May 1928, p. 12. 
71 Sydney Morning Herald, 15 May 1928, p. l2. 
72 The Bulletin, 3 February 192 1. ll was a sign of the militarist rurn The Bulletin had taken that in 1905 
it had ridiculed the Bri tish Empire as being an "Empire of JINGO ideals." Quoted in Souter, Lion and 
Kangaroo, p. I I 6. 
73 Inglis, Sacred Places, pp.223-4 discusses the reception of C. Web Gilbert's The Bomber, a 
thoroughly "traditional" heroic representation of a Digger hurl ing a grenade. 
74 Inglis, Sucred Places, p.260. The Memorial's representations of thi s battle are explored in Chapter 
Five. 
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Division Memorial, Mont St Quentin, France, 
1925-40. 
Source: Australian War Memorial Collections Database. 
cas.awm.gov.au. Photograph Hl l698. 
In its symbolic depiction of the Australian Digger destroying the German eagle, the 
memorial embodied both the moral righteousness perceived by loyalists to have 
animated the Australian cause, and the bloody racial triumphal ism of Rider Haggard. 
It was certainly not des igned to heal wounds or diminish wartime enmities, and in 
1940, the invading Germans tore down the memorial. 75 
Inglis sees this monument as an aberration , and in some respects it was. Few 
masonry memorials ever went to such bellicose extremes, principally because they 
were bui lt to assist the bereaved with grieving at least as much as, if not more than, to 
symbolise triumph. The guns attached to those four thousand monuments provided 
ample triumphalism, in any case. However, the 2"d Division memorial, being located 
in France, did not serve this domestic function. Moreover, the idea which it 
symbolised was extremely common in post-war Australian publ ic war memories more 
generally. Literature, as Gerster has shown, was filled with tales in which the German 
Eagle was finished off by the Australian Digger, while commemorative rhetoric itself 
was replete with them. It became established Australian dogma in the inter-war years 
73 Inglis. Sacred Places. p.260. Criticism in Cicero that pennanent representations of v1ctory would 
perpetuate enmity indicate that sentiments had changed little. Cicero, On fnventwn. 2.23. pp.69-70. in 
Michael M. Sage. Wcu:fare in Ancient Greece: A sourcebook, (London: Routledge, 1996), p. l02. Bean 
hated the memonal, but as Chapter Six shows, his Memorial employed similar imagery at times. 
108 
that Australians were superior soldiers. Further, the eminently mainstream Sydney 
Morning Herald infom1ed readers approvingly about the monument on the tenth 
anniversary of the battle: 
This battle was considered by higher command as one of the 
most spectacu lar and important of the war. The Second Division 
decided to erect on this famous hill a monument commemorating 
its operations in Europe, and a noted Australian sculptor, the late 
Mr Web Gilbert, was commissioned to prepare the design and 
carry out the work .... Two years ago on the anniversary of the 
battle, this monument was unvei led by Marshall Foch, in the 
presence of a distinguished gathering, including the High 
Commissioner for Australia, Sir Joseph Cook and Mr W.A. 
Holman .... The site on which the monument rests was given to 
the Second Division in grateful acknowledgement of the 
deliverance of the village from the hands of the enemy. 76 
This was an aberrat ion, then, endorsed by the same man who endorsed the fighting 
qualities of the Alf in the foreword to Bean 's guide to the Memorial, and by 
Australia's first wartime Prime Minister. The last sentence is notable, for the 
rhetorical use of foreign thankfulness was common in post-war Australian 
commemoration, but connecting that thanks to such bel licose imagery was not. This 
adds to the complexity of our model of Australian commemoration, for in other places 
fore ig11 thankfulness was represented as most clearly associated with sacrifice. 
Triumphalism continued in Empi re Day speeches. The birthday of Queen 
Victoria, 24 May, saw many panegyrics to the arms of the Empire, and the President 
of the United Imperial Navy and Army Veterans' Association felt this was as it should 
be: "Empire Day [gives] veterans an opportunity to perpetuate the memory of great 
leaders and brilliant feats of arms."77 Empire Day was also a day when children were 
urged to prepare themse lves for battle, something wh ich was far Jess common on 
Anzac Day or Annistice Day, the two strictly commemorative days. On the same 
page as the Sydney Morning Herald report quoting Matthews was one in which the 
New South Wales Attorney-General, Francis Boyce, told 2,500 children at Chatswood 
Intem1ediate High School that "my advice to the children is, when it is necessary, to 
76 Sydney Morning Herald, 31 August 1928, p.12. 
77 Sydney Morning Herald, 25 May 1928, p. l4. 
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fight with all your might for the Empire, w hich gua rds and protects us and which will 
continue to do so as long as the Union Jack floats over this Commonwealth."78 
Triumph was even seen on Armistice Day, although this was much rarer. 
Australians generally followed the advice of Archbishop Weddy, who argued on 
Anzac Day 1922 that they should ·'sound a note of affectionate pride on Anzac Day 
and the more mournful note of tender regret on Armistice Day."79 However, in 1927 
the Sydney Morning Herald ran an article by F.M. Cutlack, Bean's former 
collaborator in his work as a war correspondent in 1918 and later editor of The War 
Lellers of General Monash - a stalwart of the rhetorical apparatus which interpreted 
the war for Australians 8° Cut lack, who had stated in 1919 that the image of Australia 
had become "that strong, picturesque, romantic figure of the Australian soldier,"81 
now wrote in unambiguous terms oftriumphalism: 
Citizen soldiers from an unwarlike people, a people utterly 
untrained in arms, they never failed in battle before the mightiest 
army the world has ever seen .... We may ... be proud of the 
indomitable tenacity of our soldiers on the Somme and at Ypres, 
and of the valour and resolution exemplified in the counter-attack 
of Lagnicourt, the night assault upon Villers-Bretonneux, and the 
storming of Mont St Quentin. Mothers, wives, and sweetheat1S 
may mourn those who died there, but the nation as a whole will 
lack something of the spirit of its manhood when its war 
memories have forgotten the proper pride and exultation in those 
feats of arms . Let our people by al l means recall, and recall with 
meek tenderness, that many brave men died, but let them never 
cease to remember that before all but death they were 
invi ncible.82 
It seems clear from this article that not all Australians fe lt that only a mournful note of 
tender regret need be sounded on Armistice Day, and that praise of v ictory was 
78 Sydney /v!nrni11g Herald, 25 May 1928, p.14. 
79 Argus, 26 Apri I 1922, p. I I. 
Ro Sir John Monash, War Lellers of General Monash, F.M. Cutlack (ed). (Sydney: Angus and 
Robe r1son. 1934) Frederick Morley Cutlack ( 1886- 196 7), b. Upper Lancing. England, d. Burwash. 
England. Served in the Bri tish Army I 9 I 5- I 7. Attached to J'd Division, AI F. headquarters April 19 I 7. 
Chosen by C. E. W. Bean to assist him a~ Australian Official Correspondent on the Western Front. 
taking up the position in January 19 18. Wrote Volume Eight of the Official History of Australia During 
the War. 1923 . AOB. t·o/.8, pp.186-7. 
xr Quoted in Wi lliams, Anzacs. !he Media. p.25. 
~~ 5)·dner Morning Herald. ll November 1927, p.12. 
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appropriate then also. The narrative elements used are important, for during the inter-
war years there was a clear relationship between the use of narratives, which 
invariably climaxed in great Australian victories, and triumphalism. Further, the 
insistence that victory ought to have primacy over sacrifice shows, I feel, the main 
thrust of mainstream Australian public memories in the first decade or so of the peace. 
Anzac Day saw a great deal of triumphal ism, but as with Armistice Day there 
was no single response to the war expressed that day. Indeed, examining Anzac Day, 
the publication of the Queensland Anzac Day Commemoration Committee, helps 
trace the contours of I 920s commemoration. 83 This pamphlet is useful because it 
conveniently collected sermons and speeches from around the State, and thus offers a 
sampling of mainstream commemoration . In such commemoration early after the war, 
solemnity was seldom the predominant emotion. The 1924 edition, recording 
speeches made the previous year, had definite triumphal overtones, but was relatively 
restrained from that perspective compared to later editions. This was because it a lso 
inc luded, as its first several pages, photographs of the unvei ling of the Stone of 
Remembrance and Cross of Sacrifice in l924. These pictures, with the Governor-
General presiding, clergy and high-ranking officers to the fore, Union Jacks draped on 
buildings in the Toowong Cemetery, and an accompanying naval honour guard with 
bayonets drawn, offered a solemn beginning to the volume. Also, the preface 
infonned readers that 350 retumed soldiers had been buried in the cemetery s ince 
their retum from the war. 84 This was, however, the most solemn section of the book, 
for the speeches printed in the edition, all from the previous year's ceremonies, were a 
litany of praise for national military successes and the national attributes they were 
thought to have illustrated. 
The first speech, that of the Governor at the Brisbane Anzac Day 
Commemorative Meeting, contained a classic nationalist connection between past and 
present warriors, similar to that used by the Hobart Mercury had in 19 I 5: 
When I was a boy I read many times "A Voice From Waterloo," 
an account of the fight by one who had fought there as a non-
83 This group claimed to have created the rituals of the day, and to have been the first to decide to hold 
commemorative marches in 19 16. H.J. Diddams. Anzac Commemoration 1921: A briefhistOIJ' o(rhe 
Movement: Sermons and addresses delivered throughout Queensland: The Immortal stOIJ' of the 
Landing, (Brisbane. s.n., 192 1), pp.7-1 2. 
84 Anzac Day (Queensland: Anzac Day Commemoration Committee. 1924), p.iv. 
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commissioned officer and was then still living and every year 
when the 18th June came round I pictured to myself, as I still do, 
the happenings on the Flemish battlefield on that momentous day 
of 1815. Now every year before the 25th April I read of the 
landings at Gallipoli, and think of the dogged attack on that day 
in 1915 as a companion picture to the one of the resolute defence 
8'i 
of one hundred years before. · 
The Governor's speech continued with a standard recounting of the story of the 
Landing, and finjshed with a plea that the dead never be forgotten. The Governor 
actually named some men as examples, and then made another plea, that compounded 
military deeds with national posterity: 
I hope, if there is not already a history of the work of the 91h 
[Queensland] Battalion at Anzac, one will be prepared to 
preserve, in a fom1 which boys can read, the story of the deeds of 
the Queens landers who fell fighting there, and of those who, 
happi ly for us, still gloriously heighten the value of the people of 
this country. There is no battle story of the Empire more worth 
while the telling.sc) 
The Mayor of Brisbane, Aldern1an Harry Diddams, referred to the Battle of Amiens 
as "one of the greatest exploits of the world war," and included in his speech another 
message from Marshall Foch: "You saved Amiens! You saved France!"87 The Mayor 
of Townsville dwelt upon "a loyalty and devotion that was faithfu l unto death," 
argu ing that this loyalty "hence enabled them to confer upon Australia a glory that 
will never fade."88 Speaking to the undergraduates at the University of Queensland, 
Major R.A. Hendy agreed: "When the Empi re was called upon to anm the response 
was magnificent. ... Those who answered the call, in the main, did so in the true spirit 
of patriotism."89 The strongest triumphalism came in an excerpt from in Freedom 's 
Cause, an award-winn ing essay published in 1923. Concentrating on 1918, its author 
R) An: ac Dar. 1924, p. l. See Edward Cotlon, A Voicefi·om Waterloo. A histo1y of rhe baffle .fought on 
the 1/?th June 18 15, (London: B.L. Green, 1849). Cotton was the original owner of the Hole/ du Musee. 
which housed a museum of Waterloo th<ll strongly influ enced Bean. Dudley McCarthy, Ca//ipo/i to the 
Somme: Thesr01:1· o(C£. W Bean, (Sydney: John Ferguson, 1983), p.30. 
R6 Anzac Dar . 1924, p.4. 
~) Anzac Day. 1924. p.9. 
AR A nwc Day, 1924, pp. I 0. 12. 
S9 Anzat Dar. 1924, p. 15. 
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Henry Tardent (a.k.a "Anzacophi le") wrote of "the irresistible Australians, who 
crowned their victory by storming the supposed ly impregnable Hindenburg line."'JO 
The 1924 edition also incl uded a tribute to the AIF from the Bishop of Amiens which 
expressed thankfulness for "deliverance," an appreciation of Australian martial 
vi1tues, and an appreciation of martial nationalism as keen as that of any Australian: 
As Bishop of Amiens I owe you and your illustrious Dead my 
heartfelt thanks, because the land of my Diocese has been your 
field of battle and you have de livered it by the sacrifice of you r 
blood 
During the painful days of the invasion you made a rampart of 
your breasts, behind which you shielded the last shreds of my 
territory: later, when Victory at last began to smi le upon our 
arms, the Australian Army distinguished itself by the audacity of 
its attacks, by its utter disregard of death, by its doggedness, and 
by the rapidity of its advances ... 
It takes blood to cement the foundation of a country, and you 
could not refuse it in the World War, to the cause of Christianity. 
You have indeed lavished it with a saintly generosity, and in so 
doing have written a glorious page in the history of Australia.91 
This was one of the most complete examples of maJtial nationalist responses to the 
war. 
In 1925 the pamphlet reported the speeches surrounding the unvei ling of the 
Stone of Remembrance and Cross of Sacrifice in the Toowong Cemetery. 1t included 
speeches by the Govemor-General and the ALP Premier at the dedication, and a 
sermon preached by Canon David Garland, "the life and soul" of the Queensland 
ADCC, along with a commissioned article on war memorials and a large number of 
photographs of local memorials from around the State. The speeches ran the gamut of 
inter-war commemorative interpretations, including lamentation, triumphalism, and 
political attacks. The Governor-General signalled a triumphant note: "The pages of 
history wilt record the undying story of thei r triumph. So long as the British race last 
their fame shall live. And so we set the Stone of Remembrance, and fame.'m The 
Labor Premier, however, made a passionate plea for peace: 
')()Anzac Day, 1924, p.29. 
91 Anzac Day, 1924, pp.38-9. 
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The on ly lasting comfort or reward for those who lost their sons, 
their brothers, their husbands, or their fathers, is the fulfilment of 
the promise of a lasting peace. There is no doubt that the 64,000 
Australian soldiers who gave up their lives with those of other 
patis of the Empire did so in that hope. These men were told 
from ten thousand platfonns and pulpits that the war was a war 
to end war and to save the world, and they risked and gave their 
lives in the honest conviction that this was so ... 
It behoves teachers, preachers, statesmen, scholars, editors and 
authors and Governments throughout the Empire this day to 
remember that promise to the living and the dead, and to see to it 
that their every utterance and action conforms to it, for by so 
doing the broken-hearted, with their burden of loneliness and 
their legacy of sorrow, and those with their physical sufferings, 
may take real consolation from the King's message of 1916, in 
whicl1 he said: "May those who mourn their loss find comfort in 
the conviction that they- the soldiers- did not die in vain.'m 
Added to these somewhat mixed messages was the Canon's sermon, preached at the 
Requiem Eucharist on Anzac Day 1924, addressing the biblical text ''Their Name 
Liveth For Evennore" that was inscribed on the Stone in Toowong. Much of it was 
pious, and quite standard as well , with, for example, loyal menti on made to the King's 
1922 pi lgrimage to continental war cemeteries and the assertion that "in the long 
annals of human history the stories of their self-sacrifice and heroism will be handed 
on from generation to generation."94 What made this speech remarkable was its 
vicious attack on shirkers, a common enough topic for wartime sermons, but now 
seen six years on. The Canon contemplated an experience he had had during the war 
after meeting some of the AIF in Palestine: 
I thought of that unse lfishness which, to me, stood out more 
vividly than to them, because I had not long before been in the 
streets of the capital cities of Australia, where 1 had seen men 
sturdy in health lean ing against veranda posts as they waited for 
trams to racecourses. There would have been fewer deaths in the 
aggregate had those who hung back shown the same spirit of 
sacrifice as those whose name liveth for evermore . As we think 
of that additional sacrifice of life made necessary by the 
selfi shness of some, I blame not only those who refused to go, 
Q> 
-Anzac Day, 1925, p.2. 
03 Anzac Day. 1925, p.6. 
94 D Anzac ay, 1925, p.8. 
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but even more the whole body of Christian influence which was 
so weak and feeble that it had not bui It up the true ideals of 
sacrifice and duty.95 
This was a powerful attack six years after the war had fini shed. Taken witb the other 
two speeches, the note struck was not primarily of victory, although that was a 
significant idea. Contemporary politics intruded so strongly that it tended to 
somewhat overbear the other two speeches, and overtake either victory or sacrifice as 
the main theme. 96 
While these commemorative deve lopments were occurring, the notion that the 
memory of the dead, and the dead themselves, were sacred was also very strong. As 
Mosse affim1s, such feel ings were at the heart of the Myth of the War experiences, for 
through the latter ''the memory of the war was refashioned into a sacred experience 
wh ich provided the nati on with a new depth of religious fee ling, putting at its disposal 
ever-present saints and martyrs, places of worship, and a heritage to emulate.'m It 
seems unli kely that '"sacred" nationalism would be fully developed without such war-
created developmentsY8 It feeds off the emotional intensity vvhich wars produce, and 
thus, the strongest sense of nationalism requires war, and blood sacrifice, for it to 
develop. This was Bean 's understanding; although he did not worship war, he saw it 
as a positive experience for his nation. 
After the war, Australian commemorative rhetoric abounded with "sacred" 
references. A Sydney Morning Herald letter to the editor on Anzac Day 1928 , entitled 
"Anzac: A Vision," provided a dramatic stage for the sentiment, along with a seminal 
enunciation of it. This letter, written by Captain L. Nisbett Wright, detai ls the writer' s 
visit to Gallipoli, where he feels a communion with the dead heroes entombed there. 
He is visiting the grave of one of his o ld friends, who, he claims, "died in my arms 
with a smile on his lips in those great old days," a sentiment straight from Ashmead-
Battlett's fi rst wartime dispatch, indicating that the peace had not dulled the ability of 
writers to create romantic notions of war far at odds with the realities as we now know 
95 Anzac Day, 1925, pp.ll- 12. 
96 Coming directly after the anti-conscriptionist Premier's article, it may have been designed to rebuke 
him. 
97 Mosse, Fallen Soldiers, p. 7. 
n Ehrenreich makes this point also. See Blood Rites, p.205. 
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them to have been .99 Regardless, the writer is at Gallipoli, and he hears a bugler signal 
.. The Last Post.' ' It is then that he is moved to communicate with the dead: 
A great emotion overwhelmed me. I stretched out my anns to the 
mighty dead, and cried, "0 spirits of the great dead, a comrade 
greets you; may your spi1it purify the motherland from baseness 
and self-seeki ng; then your great sacrifice will not have been in 
vain! farewell, I salute you!" I turned around and found my way 
down to the beach as in a dream. As 1 stepped on board the 
launch, a crisp voice said banteringly, "Colonel [s ic], you look as 
though you had seen a ghost." "1 have stood on holy ground," r 
repli ed in a low voice, and as the launch receded from the shore, 
1 could hear the voices of the dead Anzacs calling, call ing across 
the water as in olden days. 100 
The plea to the dead to retum in spirit and save a society seen as increasingly in need 
of"the Anzac Spirit" was common in the late 1920s and early 1930s. Some expressed 
hope that such spirit might repair the damage of the Great Depression, others that 
perceived fai lures of the peace might be overcome by it. 101 
In 1928 Anzac Day published an entirely different collection of articles, all 
dedicated to praising the counter-attacking victory ten years before on 25 April at 
V illers-Bretonneux in France. W.M. Hughes, as he had in his parliamentary speech on 
the Versailles Treaty, listed some of the battles he felt Australians had excelled 
themselves in: 
This day stands for Gallipoli, and also for Messines, Pozieres, 
Bapaume, Villers-Bretonneux, A lbert, Mont St Quentin, 
Peronne: it stands for the action in April 1918; it stands for the 
glorious hundred days, and the triumphant advance of the 
Dominion troops, amongst whom the soldiers of Australia - in 
fi ve divisions acting together- formed one of the main parts; and 
it stands for that wonderful campaign in Palestine which 
culminated in the shattering of the mili tary power of Turkey in 
what was perhaps the greatest military victory of the war; for 
Mesopotamia: for the "Sydney" and the "Australia"; for all that 
our men did on land and sea and in the air. Anzac Day stands for 
IJIJ Ashmcad-Bart lctt wrote: " I have, in fact. never seen the like of these wounded Australians in war 
before ... . Although they were shot to bits and without hope of recovery, their cheers resounded through 
the night.. ." Ellis Ashmead-Bartlett, Ashmead-Bar/{e/1 's Despalches(rom the Dardaneffes: An epic o.f 
heroism. (London: Ncwncs, 1915), p. 77. See e~lso Argus , 8 May 1915, p.l9 
1011 Sydney Murning Herald, 25 April 1928. p.6. 
101 Damou~i . Th e Labour of Loss. p.35. 
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all of these. It is like a great pillar set up on a wide plain , so that 
all may see it from afar, a monument o f courage, of endurance, 
of sacri ficcs, reminding us now and fo r all time of the day when 
this country and its libe1iies were in deadly peril, and of how we 
were saved, and the price. 102 
This was true triumphal commemoration, and it was supported in fine style by the 
next article in the pamphlet, written by Brigadier-General C.l-1. Foot on the same 
subj ect. 10'1 This was, without doubt, a more triumphal message than that of just three 
years before, and the main factor that led to the overall triumphali sm were these two 
narratives of victory. Lamentations for the dead were entirely absent from the 1928 
pamphlet. The tenth anniversary of the 1918 victories was the high point of inter-war 
triumphalism. as an anni versary function for the victory on 8 August 1918 at Amiens 
helps illustrate. 
As a legitimately decis ive battle, Amiens was widely eulogised throughout 
Australian commemorative rhetoric of the inter-war period. On 9 Aut,•lJSt 1928, the 
Sydney Morning Herald reported that on the previous evening there had been a 
reunion of 1.600 ex-servicemen in the Town Hall - with seats in the upper galleries 
open to the public - to commemorate the victory of a decade before. Under the 
headline "'August 8: A Great Victory," and accompanied by a large photograph of the 
celebrants, the repmi illustrated vital acts of remembering and forgetting that those 
present were undertaking in their public representations of the battle, and of the war. 
The appropriateness of celebration on this day was firstly underlined by the paper, 
which argued that "August 8, 1918, was the day o f reborn hopes, the day when, of all 
days, the Allies struck certainl y towards victory.'' 104 Secondly, the journalist clai med 
that the gathering, whi le not coming together " to glorify an appalling war," were 
consciously rejecting memories of the war's negative aspects: 
102 Anzac Day. 1928, pp.4-5. Hughes had told parliament something quite similar in 19 19: "Not only on 
the Western Front. around Villcrs-Bretonneux - thai glorious name - at Mont St Quentin or Peronne, 
or in the piercing of the Hindenburg line, did the troops of Austral ia take a splendid share in achieving 
victory. but also in Palestine. where. perhaps, the greatest victory of all ages was achieved by the forces 
under General Al lenby. the flower of whose Army was made up of Australian soldiers. Where Coeur 
de Lion and Napoleon had failed. Allenby succeeded: and as soldiers of Australia in the frozen and 
sodden trenches of France and Flanders had endured and battled so did their brothers press forward 
under the burning sun of Palestine, and across its deserts. to achieve a great and complete victory." 
Quoted in Clark. Sources ofAustralian HisloJ:v, pp554-77, p.555 . 
103 Anzac Day, 1928, pp.6-7. 
104 Sydney Morning Herald, 9 August 1928, p.l 2. 
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The blood, the disaster, the death: the enemy - none of all this 
they very vividly remembered .... There were, in fact, mill ions of 
incidents to be remembered, matters much more pleasant than 
the days when a man went on climbing in and out of shell holes. 
cold one minute, sweating the next, hungry yet cursing the meat 
that is packed in tins for soldiers, fighting and worse, waiting, 
. I ·f-.. . 10s and always, tn one way or anot 1er, su 1enng. 
During the celebration, however, the speakers did not even allude to these negatives, 
as the joumalist did. 106 Rather they dwelt, as in the case of the Govemor, the British 
Admiral Sir Dudley de Chair, on glory, and Australian military success in a decisive 
battle: 
It is fitting that we should meet and talk over our battles on this 
memorable day - the 8'11 of August. It is a day that none of us 
should ever forget, for you remember that Ludendorff, that 
famous German General , in his diary of the war, referred to this 
day as "the black day of the German Army." This day marked 
the commencement of a f:,JTeat offensive along the whole Allied 
line, and the result was the signing of the Armistice. Australians 
have every good reason to remember this offensive, fo r the 
various Australian Divisions once more covered themselves in 
glory and renown of their gallantry and conduct on this occasion, 
and played a most important part in bringing the offensive to a 
successful termination. (Cheers). 107 
Later W.M. Hughes, then a backbencher, rose - to "an outburst of cheering that lasted 
several minutes" - to respond on behalf of the soldiers to the Chairman's toast to 
'The Day We Celebrate."108 He made it clear that, to his mind, victory in battle was 
105 Sydney Morning Herald. 9 August 1928, p.l 2. 
106 Following his study of soldiers' fo lksongs. which included the examination of reunion ephemera, 
Graham Seal concluded that "it is clear from the tone of re-union literature that such reminiscence [as 
occurred) was mostly of the 'good old days' variety, with a de-emphasis of the negative aspects of the 
wa1iime experience." Graham Seal, Digger Folksong and Verse of World War One: An annotated 
antholo:,>y. (Perth: Antipodes Press. 1991 ), p.3. He quotes t·hc foreword to a 1938 collection of Digger 
songs: "(The] Compi ler offers them to you hoping that they will bring back to you in these piping days 
of Peace happy recollections or some occasion, pleasant thoughts of dear cobbers, and help to preserve 
that fe llowship that existed to such a marked degree in the AI F." Parches. (Adelaide. 1938), quoted in 
Seal. Digger Folksong, p.3. 
107 S):dney At/orning Herald, 9 August 1928, p. l2. Incidentall y, the Admiral received a mention in one 
of the Memorial's displays, through a German medall ion "struck for the purpose of satirising" him. 
Relics and Records, April 1928, p. l L December 1931 , p.44. I have chosen to cite three guides: the 
first, the last before the December 1928 rearrangement of the Sydney exhibition. and one close to the 
~ 
publication or AusTralian Chiva!J y. 
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the greatest element of national history: "In the his tory of all nations there are events 
which stand out like great mountain peaks above the rolling downs of their ord inary 
lives. These events mark crises in their history, victories gained, disaster averted, 
liberty won. " 109 There was no mention here of failure as a spur to nationhood in the 
manner of the modern Anzac Legend. Victories gained, disaster averted and liber1y 
won were all triumphal notions that were integral to traditional martial nationalism as 
it had been expressed in the pre-war era. Hughes then made it clear how the Battle of 
Amiens formed par1 of this vision of national history, using his typical Biblical 
touches: 
Tonight we celebrate a great event in Australia's history, and in 
that of all civilised nations - the opening of the great offensive 
that tumed the tide of war, and brought the peoples of the world 
- long walking in the Valley of the Shadow of Death - within 
sight of the sweet green pastures of peace .. .. We do well to 
celebrate this great event in which Australians played a leadi ng 
role, whic h meant so much to Australia, to the Empire, and to the 
civilised world. (Loud cheers). 110 
Hughes 's conception of the importance of this battle includes all the elements of post-
war Australian martial nationali st commemoration. Firstly, Hughes fe lt that the battle 
had led directly to a better world, safe from the Valley of the Shadow of Death. He 
implied that now, after the successful completion of the war, Australians were indeed 
in "the sweet green pastures of peace." Australian soldiers had had a vital part in this 
battle, with its wonderfu l o utcome, and thus it was fitting, in Hughes ' s nationalist 
view, that the battle be celebrated. The governor, a British Admiral during the war, 
agreed, illustrating the close links between Australjan loyalist national ism and 
traditional Imperial views of the va lue of military victories. 
Yet it was the "sweet green pastures of peace" that were vital to the whole 
argument. If the battle was not seen as leading to such a favourable outcome - if it 
had not averted disaster and won liberty- it could not have been constructed in this 
way, for it was the battle's result that was the focus of the argument. If listeners felt 
that they were not then walking in the sweet green pastures of peace the whole case 
lOR Sydney Morning Herald, 9 August 1928, p.l2. 
109 Sydney Morning Herald, 9 August 1928, p. 12. 
110 Sydney Morning Herald, 9 August 1928, p. 12. 
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would not survive scrutiny. If listeners were to retort that the battle had led to "death 
and debts,·· which was the position Nevi lle Howse declared in 1926 that some people 
had adopted, the entire line of reasoning would fail. 111 
The toast to which Hughes had responded included an uncommon and 
surprising argument which indicated the high level of positivity towards the war's 
outcome that was still felt in many quarters in Australia. The Chairman had argued 
that the war had brought prosperity to Australia, while reiterating the standard 
argument that the Australians had been masters of war: 
Ten years ago, the whole five Australian divisions went into 
action as one body. Now, 10 years afterwards, a German cruiser 
was visiting Australia, and they were pleased to know that 
officers and crew of that cruiser would find Australia in a very 
prosperous condition. That was a great result of the war. 
(Cheers). The Australian soldiers ... were victorious in many 
wonderful battles, and were now, in peace, achieving wonderful 
things. 11 2 
To argue that the war had been full of "wonderful battles" was to make a case 
diametrically opposed to anti-war literature, while the argument that the war had 
enriched Australia, never especially popular, seems at odds with the increasingly 
difficult economic position of mid- 1928. That the 1 ,600 attendees cheered the latter 
assertion leads one to raise an eyebrow; perhaps the refreshments were being liberally 
partaken of. The most important fact here, though, is that the men were celebrating "a 
great victory," even ten years later, and in a climate where some were questioning the 
nature of the war experience. 113 This incident provides strong evidence that such anti-
war interpretations were actively rejected by influential retumed soldiers and 
politicians, and the loud cheers throughout the speeches suggest the rank-and-file 
went along with the rejection, and with the equally conscious forgetting of unpleasant 
pa1is of the war experience. In short, victory was still publicly popular and a major 
pa1i of Australian public memories ofthe war in 1928. 
111 Quoted in inglis. Sacred Places, p. 2 17. 
112 Snl11ey Moming Herald, 9 August 1928, p.1 2. 
11
' On opposition to war during the 1920s. see Carolyn Rasmussen. The Lesser Evil ? Opposirion w war 
and fascism in Australia. 1920- /941 , (Parkville: History Departmeni. U ni vcrsity of Melboume, 1992). 
pp.6-18. 
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Such affirmations of victory continued until the mid-1930s, when the rise of 
Hitler and the deteriorating world situation led many to believe that the victory of 
1918 had been either lost or chimerical in the first place. 11 4 The sweet pastures of 
peace looked less green with each passing week in the late 1930s. The Spanish Civil 
War signalled the end of any remaining optimism. Also, the Depression had broken 
the direct connection with most of the political actions taken during the war, as the 
press of more immediate concerns - the seemingly overwhelming need for 
economies, for example- pushed many of the pressing wartime concerns to the edges 
of public discourse. For the Left, it was now more important that there were thousands 
of retumed men in indigent ci rcumstances than that the capitalists had profiteered 
during the war. but both accusations were clearly connected. 
By the end of the inter-war period. the confidence of its first decade was gone. 
A poem written by a woman whose sweetheart had died at Gallipoli, and printed 
prominently in the Age on Anzac Day 1939, indicates the change in mood. It displays 
considerable sadness and an underlyi ng bitterness, while eschewing triumpha lism of 
any sort: 
We had been middle-aged now, you and l ; 
Happy, my hea11 is sure, fulfilled and kindly. 
The years that dimmed the rapture and fire 
Of Love's first flame would leave their own fair dower 
Of deep content, or perfect comradeship. 
So do 1 dream on this Anzac Day; and taste 
The never-ceasing heartache of such dreaming. 
For 1 am ageing, lonely, chi ldless, loveless; 
And you, beloved, sleep on Anzac's Beach. 
Our love was newly born when War erupted, 
Fragile and shy; unspoken . I wear no ring of yours, 
No right is mine to rank in love's proud sonow 
With Mothers, Wives, Betrotheds, on Anzac's Day of Pain. 
114 However, there had been intimations even from the early post-war period that the peace was not 
living up to expectations. This is exemplified by the Age's mythical history of 1922, which contrasted 
"the foretold millennium" with the greed-fi lled. foreign-influenced strife of the post-war period: "The 
idealist is engaged in another and more lucrative line of business than wartime idealism. Miserable 
strife from Europe has engendered strife among us here. We have been infected by foreign pestilences: 
always these pestilences have troubled us with vile sectarian wrangles affronting common sense and 
common decency, and contemptible political and industrial strife. based on the common greed. By this 
ignoble and diseased strife the Austra lian people have as yet been cheated from the attainment of their 
inheritance - a nation for their making." Age, 25 Aprill922, p.7. 
12 1 
I am the spinster, withering, loveless, bitter. 
You sleep for ever young by Suvla's curving bay. 
Have we betrayed you, you, the heart's beloved? 
You and your comrades, heroes we extol? 
Did you not die to break the power of evil, 
To build a brave, bright world of peace and Ch1ist's own dream. 
YET ... see the war-clouds, the fear, the greed among us. 
Our sacrificial dead, our shining ones heroic, 
Do we mock you and set you at naught, And rob you of final achievement? 
Was it al l in vain that you yielded your youth and your manhood? 1 15 
IV 
The Right's main rhetorical strategy was to assert the positive aspects of the war, 
which were mostly ·'sentimental"- such as the creation of the nation, the revelation of 
Australian character, and Australian success in the most important international event 
that had ever occuned, the Great War. The Left, on the other band, sought to make the 
pain and loss of the war years the primary issue, trying to tap in to a feeling of 
rebellion against the existing order which the war precipitated and which saw 
revolutions in Russia and Germany, riots in Britain and Australia, and the fom1a tion 
of right-wing paramilitaries in Victoria and New South Wales amid the fear of 
comm unist revolution. Early in the post-war period, especially, the Left tried to use 
the real fee lings of disenchantment and bitterness which were the legacy of the 
conscription debates to unite a voting bloc against the Government. They, too, used 
memories as political weapons in order to gain and enhance political power, as the 
example of the Australian Worker's One Big Union cartoon attests. 
lt is useful here to make a d istinction within the Left, based on attitudes to 
nationalism. " Mainstream'' Left groups and individuals accepted the idea of nation, 
and indeed many pronounced themselves passionate nationalists. Included in this 
group were most members of the ALP and moderate unions, as well as moderate 
labour newspapers. On the other hand, "radical" Leftists, such as the communists, 
rejected the idea of nation entirely, claiming it was artificial and simply a method for 
capitalists to control society. These attitudes implied greatly differing attitudes to war 
commemoration, given that it was cast almost wholly in national terms in Australia. 
I I) Age, 25 April 1939, p.3. 
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Mainstream Leftists often agreed with their right-wing opponents that the soldiers had 
fought and died for the nation, that thereby they had placed the rest of society in their 
debt, and that they ought to be honoured publicly. They disagreed, however, with the 
martial turn which nationalist rhetoric took in the hands of right-wing speakers and 
writers. Radica l Leftists had rejected the war's prosecution, following Lenin in 
claiming it was an imperialist power struggle, and now they rejected both the 
nationalism and commemoration of the war, recognising in these the diametric 
opposites of their internationalist, class-focused political theories. 116 
Both mainstream and radical Leftist groups referred often to the poor 
economic situation of many returned men, and called upon Hughes to honour his 
wartime pledges. 117 The labour papers, which generally had a more radical bent than 
politicians did, attempted to show the people that the Imperial cause had simply been 
that of the capitalist, and that, basically, they had been duped. For example, in April 
1922 The Australian Worker ran a story exposing the fact that a British firm had sold 
artillery to the Turks (presumably before the war), and that this war materiel had then 
been used on the Allied soldiers : 
The Bedford war trophy makes it evident that British 
workmen applied their sk ill to the fashioning of death-dealing 
instruments, which instruments in time (their capitalist 
owners having made a lucrative deal out of them meanwhile) 
were used for the s laughter of British soldiers, and that 
Bedford women are widows today and Bedford children are 
orphans through this means. 1 18 
This behaviour was not considered treason, the paper cried bitterly, only good 
economic policy. 
One strategy used by the majority of the labour papers in most years was to 
completely ignore Anzac Day, concentratjng ins tead on the plans for the upcoming 
May Day celebrations. However, The Australian Worker leader of 26 April 1922 
carried the title "Anzac Day." Unlike Establishment editorials, it concentrated entirely 
116 McDonough, The First and Second World Wars, pp.36-7. This was in the era before Joseph Stalin 
inaugurated the slogan of "Socialism in One Country," after which socialists were able to reconcile 
their beliefs with national ism. See Thomson, Europe Since Napoleon, pp.669-72. 
117 See, for example, "Unemployed Retumed Soldiers: Prime Minister 's broken promises," The 
Australian Worker, 14 Aprill922, p.l4. 
I IR The Australian Worker, 19 April l922, p.l9. 
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on the plight of unemployed Diggers, without a single mention of the exploits of the 
AIF, or of the war itself. Opposite the leading article was a cartoon showing the 
contrast between the grand image of the Anzacs' status in society and the sad reality 
for unemployed returned soldiers. 
The radical The Worker's Weeklv tried a different tack in 1923. ln an article 
entitled "Capital and Labor: Patriotism and war," the paper repudiated marlial 
nationalist doctrine, asserting an organic connection between ''the nationa l spirit" and 
a destructive "war spirit: " 
Patriotism of the kind: "My Country, Right or Wrong!" is being 
taught in the schools of Australia. The children are told all 
about England's soldiers and kings from Alfred the Great to 
George V .... Everything being done in the way of saluting 
flags, praying for "God, King and Country," etc, etc, is being 
done to inculcate a spirit of patriotism in the children. Thus the 
dope of the militarists is still being circulated. Britain and the 
Empire is the real religion of the patriots .... Britain, France, or 
America, or wherever the Imperial religionists live, is the only 
sacred thing . .. 
Communists must counteract by every means in their power 
these terrible doctrines. We must hold anti-war and anti-
patriotic demonstrations. We must hold our own button-days. A 
"NO MORE WAR" button and button day would be a good 
thing in this direction. Hurry on, Comrades! Fight against 
Patriotism and Capitalism's wars! 11 9 
This was a complete rejection of the right-wing understandings of the war seen above, 
and of the British Public School ethos which underpinned much of it. It was also a 
rejection of the emotional attachments described by the Digger "who marched," and 
thus of commemoration itself. The communists had no time for such " bourgeois 
sentimentality;" they were focussed on the material conditions of Australian society, 
and it was far from clear to anyone in 1919 that the war had brought about any 
improvement in these for most workers. On the contrary, real wages had fallen 
considerab ly since 1914, and would not regain their pre-war level until 1921. 120 This 
was the crux of the matter for radical Leftists; a war-time poster that appeared in the 
119 The Worker ~~ Weekly, 16 November 1923, p.1 . 
1211 Ward, A Nation (or a Continenl, p. 1 I 0. 
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IWW journal Direct Action asked whether the home in Australia that "father" fought 
and died for was something worth fighting and dying for, implying that it was not. 121 
In post-war Australia, this idea was stil l very much to the fore in radical thinking. 
The Worker's Week(1·. and its prev ious incarnation, The Communist, were not 
afraid to attack sold iers, either. something which more moderate Leftists, such as ALP 
politicians, almost never did, mindful of their eminent stature in post-war society. For 
instance, in December I 922 its youth supplement, The Young Communist, carried a 
poem titled "The Soldier's Creed." Perhaps a response to wartime "The Anti's 
Creed," this verse made its point in the crudest of terms: 
"Captain, what do you think," I asked 
"Of the part you soldiers play?" 
But the Captain answered, " I do not think 
1 do not think, I obey!" 
"Do you think you should shoot a patriot down, 
Or help a tyrant slay?" 
But the Captain answered, "I do not think, 
I do not think, I obey!" 
"Do you think your conscience was made to die, 
And your brain to rot away?" 
But the Capta in answered, "I do not think. 
I DO NOT THI NK, I OBEY!" 
"Then if this is your sold ier's creed," I cried, 
"You' re a mean umnanly crew: 
And for al l your feathers and gilt and braid 
I am more of a man than you !" 
For whatever my place in life may be, 
And whether I swim or s ink, 
I can say with pride: " 1 do not obey, 
I DO NOT OBEY, I THINK!"122 
The Young Communist had no time for the soldier - unless it be the class soldier, 
perhaps. 
The paper was looking to posterity 111 the same manner in which the 
nationalists (and Nationalists) were, and ran , alongside the poem, a primer entitled 
1 ~ 1 "War: What fo r?", quoted in McKinlay, Documental) ' HisfOIJ o.f the Aus tralian Labour Movement , 
p.566. 
122 The Young Communist, December 1922, p.4. 
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"The Class Struggle," which began " I want to tell you why there is a Young 
Communist movement here today . .,m The extent of the battle for young minds then 
raging between nationalism and social ism was never more evident than here if one 
compares this to the children's Anzac Day service in Moore Park reported in The 
Sydney Mui/. 124 
Not surprisingly, The Communist also attacked mainstream commemorative 
rheto1ic. Tn 1922 it published a cartoon re-working the ma instream commemorative 
slogan ' 'Lest We Forget," with a demonic Hughes wielding the whip of 
conscription. 125 Then, in a d irect attack on the rituals of Anzac Day in 1923, The 
Communist unleashed its full invective on capitalism, the Nationa lists, and all they 
stood for: 
On Wednesday, 25111 April, a section of the Australian Working 
Class paused in its task of making profits for the Boss, and 
united with our exploiters in honouring the sacred name of 
ANZAC. 
Eight years have passed s ince these working-class stalwarts 
essayed to scale the impregnable heights of Gallipoli at the 
instance of a blunderous gang of incompetent imperialist 
swash-bucklers . 126 
This was the diametric opposite of Bean's most cherished values, as well as those of 
Australian mainstream commemoration, and as we shall see in Chapters Four to Six, 
of the main messages of the Memorial, as well. The communists were announcing a 
wi ll ingness to engage the Right in a direct battle for control of public memories of the 
war, and especiall y of their political interpretations. As mentioned, they were trying to 
show Australians that their political leaders had lied to and manipulated them. 
Ultimately, though, the Ri ght won the battl e of the war memory, being able to 
effectively take over defi nitions of ideal national attitudes as a result. The Leftist 
efforts at redefini tion of wartime stereotypes and the attempts to steer commemorative 
12
' The )'oung Communist, December 1922, p.4. 
12
J The Sydney Mail, 26 Apri l 1922, p.20. Manning Clark quotes a girl claimi ng she had gone to 
a Social ist Sunday School. Clark. The Young Tree Green , p.170. 
"' ·rz C ·· '"e ommunisl. I December 1922. p.2. 
1 ~1' Th e Communist, 1 1 May 1923, p. I. 
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impulses into radical poli tical outlets was a failure on a grand scale. By the late 1920s 
the Leftist papers had very little to say about the last war. 
The victory of the Right can, I bel ieve, be put down to three main factors. 
Alistair Thomson points out two of them, asse1ting that loyalists won "the battle for 
the Anzac Legend" in the inter-war years because they "achieved control of public 
commemoration, but also because the version of the war that they enshrined in 
commemoration fulfilled the subjective needs of the majority of Australian ex-
servicemen." 127 Control over commemorative public rituals had important 
consequences, giving the Right a monopoly on the positive images which cou ld be 
attached to war memories, and allowed the widely-held and deeply-felt urge to 
commemorate to be channelled into public memories which tended to legitimise both 
right-wing conduct of the war and continuing direction of nationa l affairs. This was 
vital. lt might be added that the former was made possible by right-wing federal 
political power, and the second fac ilitated by the all iance formed between the 
Nationalist Government and the most prominent returned soldier's organisations, 
which effectively co-opted a majority of the returned men. 128 Thirdly, the emotional 
commitments that many Australians had made to the cause during the war, in the 
uncompromising consctiption campaigns and through the voluntary nature of the 
national army, generated an inclination to accept positive interpretations of the war 
memory, and therefore of its conduct by parties of the Right. 
The Right won the "battle for the Anzac Legend," and therefore, in public 
memories at least, martial nationalism held sway. This was the background against 
which and in relation to which the Memoria l was created and functioned. As an 
integral member ofthe Digger-Nationalist complex, the Memorial added much to the 
speeches and writings we have considered in this chapter. For the Memorial held the 
trophies and relics, the objects which served as evidence for many of the claims of 
military supremacy made by the I ikes of Hughes and Cut lack. For example, as 
Chapter Five explores, it contained convincing evidence that the Austral ians had 
beaten back the enemy at Villers-Bretonneux, just as Hughes said they had.129 1t also 
127 Thomson, Anzac Memories, pp.128-142. 
128 On this issue sec Thomson, Anzac Memories, pp.l l&-28; Beaumont. "The Anzac Legend," pp.149-
80, pp.l68-75; Cathcart, Defending the National Tuckshop, pp.82- l 00; Kristiansen. The Polirics c>f 
Patriotism, pp.3-24. 
127 
provided a complete his tory in a public space, lending its authenticity as a museum to 
all claims based on assertions of extraordinary Australian military competence, be 
they made on beha lf of returned sold iers or of the nation in general. Thus it strongly 
supported the Anzac Legend. In turn the speeches and writings of officers, politicians, 
clergy, journal ists and others added a tacit authority to the Memorial's own 
explanatory labels through their repetition. Moreover, the respect and deference 
offered to the museum and to Bean personally as authorities by the RSSILA and 
others provided it with vital cultural power. 
Bean's ideas were, however, his own, infused throughout with his sincere and 
passionate Jove for his nation and his integrity and adherence to a set of strict moral 
principl es . Bean did not use the past as a weapon to castigate those who had been on 
the other s ide of the conscription divide, as Canon Garland did. He was a 
thoroughgoing loyali st, but his Memorial never accused other Australians of being 
disloyal even wh ile reiterating the Imperial cause. As Ken Inglis affi rms, he disliked 
any political rhetoric which did not take the whole of society as its basis.130 Thus, the 
politics of division, a Hughes speciality, were anathema to him. He wished to protect 
the "fighting reputation" of the AlF, and to simultaneously inspire future generations. 
The imprint which Bean laid upon the Memorial was very strong. The next chapter 
therefore explores Bean 's life , his beliefs, and his plan for a martial nationalist 
museum as a memorial. 
12
<J The Memorial did not support the pol itical assertions and denunciations with which Hughes often 
fo llowed his triumphal narratives. 
1111 K.S. Inglis, C.£. W. Bean: Australian Historian , (St Lucia: University of Queensland Press, 1970), 
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Chapter 3: C.E.W. Bean and the Plan for a Memorial 
Figure 15: C. E. W Bean, by George Lambert. 
Source: Australian War Memorial Collections Database. 
cas.awm.gov.au. Painting ART07545 
The Memorial was primarily the brainchild of C. E. W. Bean, Australian Official War 
Correspondent and Official War Historian. He guided the Memorial's lite from its 
inception to the time of his death in 1968, drawing up the official plan for the 
institution, lobbying the government, writing labels and guidebooks, and shaping the 
label-writing work of Treloar. Bean was an ardent Anglo-Australian and British 
nationalist, a sensitive mao of integrity who was devoted to the AIF, and a master of 
subtle propaganda who put his heart into his work. The Memorial's rhetorical 
position, one of considerable complexity, mirrored Bean's own conflicting feelings 
about the war. He was legitimately appalled by the death and the horror, yet saw 
overwhelmingly positive signs for his nation emerging from the war. He loved the 
AIF, and he was proud of their contribution to the war effort. He wanted to defend 
and enhance their reputation, both because of his emotional tie with the troops and 
because he sincerely felt they deserved great praise according to his English public 
school standards. 
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The institution which Bean planned to perpetuate the AIF's memory was also 
a product of his worldview. It was infonned deeply with his passionate martial 
nationalism and Public School ethos of chivalrous conduct in achievi ng mi litary 
victory through strength of limb, purity of heart, and boldness of spirit. Feeling 
honestly that Australians had demonstrated such vi rtues, Bean sought to incorporate 
them as morals in national fables attached to objects, especially trophies, which linked 
audiences with the actions of the AIF. Through this link, Bean hoped, audiences 
wou ld form a link with "spirit of the AIF," and it was, ultimately, this connection he 
wished most to facilitate. 
Bean's v ision was generally accepted, and received wide endorsement by 
political eli tes, who were the mai n group who debated the Memorial. There were, 
however, some dissenters, and their ex is tence illustrates that there were alternative 
ways of viewing the Australian war experi ence to that of Bean. Bean saw the honor, 
but on balance fe lt that the war experience had been positive for the Australian nation. 
Others fe lt the negative results were too great and outweighed any positives. Some 
could see nothing pos itive in the war at all. Such people, who included ALP politician 
Frank Brennan, opposed the Memorial. This reminds LIS that the Memorial 
represented a particular vision of the war, which I have dubbed the " national " 
interpretation. 
1 
Although Bean was bom in Bathurst, New South Wales, and later became a major 
Australian nationalist activist, he was at first an English nationalist, then an Anglo-
Australian, which he remained (within certain parameters) until he died. 1 Bean lived in 
England from the ages of ten to twenty-five, and developed a strong emotional 
attaclm1ent to the people and the landscape, in exemplary nationalist style. For example, 
Bean described his joy at returning to England from holidays overseas: "We climbed 
into one of the clean glossy carriages of the clean glossy English train standing there 
ready amid the clean smells of tar and rope on the wharf, and set off to race for an 
1 Bean was born in I R79 and died in 19M{. This section does not attempt to provide a biography, 
merely exa mining certain beliefs and experiences relevant to the War Memorial project. No full -scale 
published biography of Bean exists, although biographical infom1ation may be found in K.S. Inglis, 
.. C.E.W. Bean," ADB. vo/.7, pp.226-9; Ingl is, Bean: Stephen Ellis, "C.E.W. Bean: A study of his life 
and works," M A Disscrtat ion. University of New England, 1969, pp.l 0-41 ; and McCarthy, Gal/ipoli to 
thf! Somme, pp.9-97, which provides a colourful picture of Bean 's life up to the beginning of his 
involvement wi th the AI F. 
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hour or so between the gentle English hill s." ~ He enjoyed seeing ca1iers and porters 
"going about their business without shouting or gesticu lation - just doing their job in 
the matter-of-fact, quiet English way," and ultimately fe lt "a certain deep spirit of 
content and agreement that expressed itself in that orderly quietness."' 
The sense of an almost spiritual fu lfi lment which Bean experienced tumed out 
to be readily transferable to his native land when he retumed to Australia. Off the coast 
of Western Australia he had a pleasant shock of recognition, for the porters of 
England had been replaced by men on the bridge of an Australian tug, "cold, si lent, 
business-like fibrures:·· 
We had come 12.000 mi les, and we seemed to have forgotten 
that men who ministered to the wants of the great steamer, or the 
extravagance of the passengers, could steer a boat or give a 
command or sell a shawl or load a cari without such swearing 
and jabbering and spitting of fire and fl inging about of arms as 
reminds the uninitiated of a dog fight. ... Here we were 12,000 
miles from England; and here at last, at the end of the world, 
were men of English race, English order, English quiet, and the 
English language. It was very much like a coming home.4 
The landscape, too, excited him: ''What beaches those are! I have not seen the like of 
them in Europe .... I doubt if the children of Australia realise their luck.''5 Later, he 
was ''enraptured," Dudley McCarthy claims, by the Mount Kosciusko high country, 
and called the far New South Wales outback "the real Australia."6 Bean's Australian 
nationalism was also emotionally-laden, then, and this passion stayed with him for the 
rest of his life. Bean had enonnous affection for Australians. 
The fee ling of "coming home," of recognising "English" behaviour patterns 
and values in Australians, grew in Bean in the years he was in Austral ia before the 
war. 7 He actively searched for these values in Australians. for their importance had 
2 C. E. W. Bean, "What England Means to Me," manuscript for an address to the Women's League of 
Empire. Sydney. March 1934, quoted in Inglis, Bean. p.5. 
3 Bean, "What England Means 10 Me,'· quoted in Inglis, Bean. p.5. 
4 Bean, "What England Means to Me," quoted in Inglis, Bean, p.9 and McCarthy, Ga//ipoli to the 
Somme, p.49. 
' Bean, "What England Means to Me," quoted in Ingl is, Bean, p.8. 
6 See McCarthy, Ga//ipoli to 1he Somme, p.64: Inglis. Bean. p.l2. 
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been impressed upon him by his father and his schooling, and he felt he found them in 
many places, especia lly in the bush. Early travel through country New South Wales 
when he was a judge's associate led him to this conclusion, and he reported his 
findings in a se1ies of articles published in the Sydney Morning Herald entitled "The 
Impressions of a New Chum."8 
In an articl e enti tled 'The Australian," Bean made several important assertions 
about Australian men which would later help shape his view of the Austral ian as a 
soldier.9 Drawing on ideas which had been concerning Australians since the 1880s, he 
argued that '"Australian country life ... has hammered out of the old [British] stock a 
new man,' ' whom be described, in phrases reminiscent ofHenty, as " tall, spare ... clean 
and wiry rather than muscular." 10 Jn character, "the Australian and the Englishman are 
very near to one another," Bean felt, and elaborated that a simple logic had led 
Australian men to embrace the ideals of the chivalrous English gentleman. 11 The 
character of the typical Austral ian was " the simp lest imaginable ... tak[i ng] everything 
on its merits, and nothing on authority." 12 This scepticism was extended to "men," 
Bean argued, their reputations meaning nothing, and being required to prove 
themselves, especially if they were of a traditionally superior English gentlemanly 
class. However, those of high birth who displayed "delicacy or generosity or courage" 
were embraced, as "the Australian is the fi rst to recognise these qualities," for the 
7 That is, 1904-10, and 1913-14. The remainder of the time he was stat ioned m London as the 
representative of the Sydney Morning Herald. See Inglis, Bean, p.13; ADB, p.227. 
" Inglis mentions the fact that this tit le was somewhal unusual, as a "new chum was ordinarily a raw 
immigrant rather than a returned native." Inglis, Bean, p.9. 
<> Bean did not often dwell on the qualit ies of Australian women, although he did refer to them in a 
general way at various times. 
10 C.E.W. Bean, ·'The Australian," Sydney Morning Herald. 22 June 1907, p.6. See White, Inventing 
Australia, pp. l25-6. On the ' 'Austral ian Type," sec White, lnvenling Australia, pp.63-84. 
11 The assct1ed affini ty between Australians and the English was a vital aspect of mainstream 
Australian nationalist belief at this time, and has been very well-documented. See for example Charles 
Grimshaw. ··A ustral ian National ism and the Imperial Connection 1900-1 914." The Australian Journal 
of Polirics and Hisronr, 3,2 (May 1958). pp. l6 1-82 : Douglas Cole, "The Problem of 'Nationalism' and 
' Imperialism' in British Settlement Colonies," The Journal of British Studies, I 0,2 (May 197 1 ). 
pp. J60-82: McQueen, A Neu · Brilannia, pp.21-41: Souter, Lion and Kangaroo, pp. l 09-34; Rickard, 
Ausrralia: A culll.mJ/ ltisr()l:l', pp. l1 1-39; Raymond Evans, Clive Moore, Kay Saunders and Bryan 
Jamison, I 90 I - Our Fulure ·s Pas/: Documenting Auslralia 's FederaTion, (Sydney: Macmi llan, 1997). 
pp.l78-89' 229-40 
12 Bean, "The Austral ian," p.6. 
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Australian was ''pre-eminently a lover of the truth."D Bean felt that the gentlemanly 
code he had teamed in England was a universally beneficent life credo, and was 
extremely happy and enthusiastic about observing elements of it in ordinary 
Australians. 
In addition, Bean wrote in his books on the outback, On the Wool Track and 
The Dreadnought of the Darling, that Australians in the bush exhibited '·typically 
Anglo-Saxon traits" such as initiative, versati lity, inventiveness and courage, as Ellis 
observes. 14 These were traits Bean later ascribed to the men of the ATF. Further, as 
Ellis argues, "the thesis of [Flagships Three] was that there was a quality of 'sea-
faring-ness' peculiar to the Anglo-Saxon race which made it virtually inevitable that 
Australia would become a naval power. " 15 This quality had, Bean felt, enabled 
Australians to seize and hold the continent.16 
Bean was a finn believer in the notion of national "spirit," and often in the 
pre-war era envisioned this in military terms and expressed it in military metaphors. 
Considering the mi litary potentia l of Australian men, he asserted that "the Australian 
is always fighting someth ing ... [such as] drought, fires, unbroken horses, wild cattle; 
and not unfrequently [sic], strong men.'' 17 Bean felt that "all this fighting with man 
and nature, fierce as any warfare, has made the Australian as fine a fighting man as 
exists."18 However, he was not, Bean claimed, a soldier, for the Australian questioned 
the wisdom of dying 'just because somebody with half a yard of gold lace on their 
cuff is making a fool of hirnself." 19 In a final twist, though, Bean felt that the 
Australian male had in him the stuff of military greatness: 
13 Bean, "The Australian," p.6. 
14 Ellis, ''Bean," p.l27. On rhe Wool Track, (London: Alston Rivers, 1910): The Dreadnought of the 
Darling, (London: Alston Rivers, 19 11). 
15 Ellis, ''Bean,'' pp.l27-8. 
16 Ell is, "Bean." p.l28. 
17 Bean, "The Australian," p.6. 
18 Bean, 'The Australian," p.6. 
19 Bean, "The Austra lian," p.6. The idea that Australians were too undiscipli ned to be called real 
soldiers was still being raised in early 1917, when General Sir Henry Rawlinson commented that the 
Australian Imperial Force were "fine fighters but ... not soldiers." Quoted in Andrews, The Anzac 
Illusion, p. l 03. There were numerous other examples of this criticism by British officers, but 
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If the right and reason of going to be killed is clear to him , he 
will be killed cheerfully and with a very pretty courage, and will 
do a deal more damage before he is killed, and perhaps - if you 
will pardon it - wi ll not be killed at all in the end, and that where 
99 out of I 00 would be slaughtered like sheep.20 
Here, perhaps, was the seed of Bean's Anzac Legend: tough, resourceful men, willing 
to sacrifice themse lves for a good cause, but, in all likelihood, being so tough and 
resourceful as to not actually be sacrificed, rather surviving, even thriving, on the 
battlefield.21 As we shall see below, when he went with the First Contingent, Bean 
was hoping his predictions of 1907 would come true, and after an anxious early 
period, he decided to his enormous satisfaction and relief that they had. 
A significant factor in Bean's nationa lism was an attraction "to England's 
military and naval glory, past and present," as Ken Inglis observes.22 In textbook 
mmiial nationalis t s tyle, he was "brought up on tales of Cre<;y and Agincourt, 
Trafalgar. Waterloo, the Indian Mutiny and the Crimean, Afghan, Zu lu and other 
British wars."23 As a youth, he had responded to these tales with a romantic 
imagination, creating a military hero, "John Mo." Bean ·s brother John later 
remembered that this worthy had begun as "a humble American Negro" and "ended 
up as ' Field Marshall John Mow' , I fancy with an epitaph on his tomb - probably in 
[Westminster] Abbey. One of the pictures depicted his eaming the V.C. - running an 
Indian hill tribesman through with his officer's sabre and fending off other attacking 
Rawli nson's is notable because the Memorial later prominently displayed his glowing praise of the AIF 
in 1918. See Chapter Four for details. 
10 Bean, "The Australian.'' p.6. 
21 Lawson had fo rce fully expressed this idea in "The Star of Australasia:' ' 
There are boys out there by the western creeks, who hurry away from school 
To climb the sides of the breezy peaks or dive in the shaded pool, 
Who' ll stick to their guns when the mountains quake 
to the tread of a mighty war, 
And light for Right or a Grand Mistake as men never fo ught before. 
Lawson, "The Star of Australasia:· p. ll 7. 
~ ~ Inglis, Bean. pp.5-6. 
~~ The quote is from C.E.W. Bean, Anzac to Amiens: A shorter histo1:v of the Australian fight ing 
services in the First World War. (Canberra: Australian War Memorial, 1948), p.9. Inglis deduces that 
Bean was referring to his own upbringing in this passage. in which "Australians" in general arc actua lly 
mentioned. I follow Ingl is 's interpreta tion. Inglis. Bean. p.6. 
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lndians."2~ The latter image is reminiscent of Louis Desanges' Lieutenant William 
Kerr winning the V. C .. Ju~l ' 1857, one of the famous Victoria Cross series which was 
exhibited almost constant ly in the Crystal Palace in London from I 862 to 1880, and 
reproduced extensive ly.c~ In many ways, this idealised image of the clean-l imbed, 
noble young officer ga llantly taking on the foe never left Bean's imagination, and it 
ce1iainly blended with his deve loping ideas of nationalism to inform his attitudes to 
heroism and nationalist education. 
Bean's interest in British am1s extended to the contemporary hardware of the 
navy. He pored over naval publications, and stated that these were the highl ight of his 
week. When he became a journalist in Australia, he was able to turn professionally to 
the navy. In 1908 he \Vent to Auckland aboard the HMS Powerful, fl agship of the 
Royal Navy squadron on the Australian station, to meet the U.S. "Great White fleet." 
Bean carne away from this fi rst close encounter with British military men with a great 
respect for ''those brave, quiet. great-hearted men.''26 Bean's book on his experiences, 
entitled in Henry-like fashion With the Flagship f!f the South, cu lminated in a call for 
an Australian navy, for even though "Sir H. Campbell Bannerman at the Imperia l 
Conference gave his word unasked to the Colonies that Britain would be responsible 
for their safety at sea without seeking anything back ... it is hardly worldly wisdom to 
put even one's best friend to a test li ke that."27 He fe lt the fulfi lment of his naval 
dream was quite possible, for Australians "are Anglo-Saxons; and anythi ng that can 
be done, the Anglo-Saxon stock can do."28 Indeed, in the preface to the second edition 
of the book, Bean marvelled that, due to the danger represented by Japan, ''within less 
than a year of what the writer thought was a fa r-off prophecy . .. an Austral ian Navy 
has come"29 
24 John Bean, quoted in Inglis, Bean, p.7. 
25 On Desanges, sec H ichbcrgcr, Images o.f the Army. pp 63-8. 
26 C. E. W. Bean, With 1he Flagship ofihe Soul h. (Sydney: Will iam Brooks, 1909). p. I 28. 
~7 Bean, With the Flagship, p. I 28. As well as cal ling for the formation of a navy, Bean was a member 
of the Austral ian National Defence League. whose raison d 'etre was the establishment of compulsory 
military service. See Ellis. "Bean," p.2 1. 
2
s Bean, With the Flagship, p.l I 9. 
29 Bean. Wirh the Flagship, Preface. 
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With the Flagship fi nished with "a fasc inating dream," a militarist VISIOn, 
accompanied by a quote ti·om The Iliad in the or iginal Greek, of "a great Admiral -
one whose name goes for more in the courts of the world than a Prime Minister in the 
old time" - bringing "the Australia-China fl eet back for its yearly trip to the home 
waters."-'0 Bean fe lt that the best place to defend Australia was in China; forward 
defence was his creed before the wa r. The blatant militarism of the admiral whose 
name ··goes for more in the courts of the world than a P1ime Minister in the old time," 
while perhaps exemplary of his naivety at that time, was reinforced many years later 
by a more sober meditation on the war, in which he speculated that if the First World 
War had gone on longer, some men may have been given special civic honours for 
the ir prowess in battle. 
Bean's firs t experience with British men of arms, and h is subsequent call for 
an Australian navy, also brought to the fore his interest in education, and his concern 
with living a moral life. Taking the latter firs t, it is revealing that he describes a Royal 
Navy clergyman aboard the HMS Powe,.fiJI as preaching ''the gospel of a s traight, 
clean, simple life.''~ 1 Bean was much concerned with the ' 'clean," the "straight," and 
the " upright," especially as ideals for the young to strive to, and his war writings are 
full of such all usions. He was referring to the ideals o f the English public schools, 
which he had taken as his creed for life. These ideals included patrioti sm and a group 
of mora l values which were thought of as being essentially English. Bean summed up 
much of his thinking when he wrote o f his own understanding of the values 
symbolised by the flag carried by ships of the Royal Navy: 
It stands for each and every one of those ideas - for generosity in 
sport and out of it, for a pure regard fo r women, a chivalrous 
mani age tie, a fa ir trial, a free speech, liberty of the subject and 
equality before the law, for every British principle of cleanli ness in 
body and mind, in trade o r politics, of kindness to animals, of fun 
and fairplay, for a politeness that is no mere foreign paper cunency, 
but, like a Bank of Eng land note, represented by so much gold in 
ba nk cellars, politeness that will be made good in real life by rea l 
111 Bean, Wi!h the Flagship. p. l l8. The quote was from Book 22, in which Achilles chases then kil ls 
Hector: "It was not fo r a sacri ficial beast or an ox hide ... " The complete quotation is " It was not for a 
sacrificial beast or an ox hide that they strove, such as arc men's prizes for swiftness of foot, but it was 
fo r the life of horse-taming Hector that they ran." Homer, Iliad, Books 13-24, A.T. Murray (trans.), 
(Cambridge, Mass.: llarvard University Press, 1999). p.465. I am grateful to Emeri tus Professor Bob 
M ilns of I he University of Queensland for this translation. 
' ' Bean. With the Flagship, p.l30. 
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sacrifices if need be, for British games and the right to play them , for 
the Briti sh Sunday, for clean streets and a decent drainage, for every 
other canon of work and sport and holiday, and a thousand and one 
ideas, wrung out by British men and women from the toil and sweat 
and labour of nine hundred years, that make Anglo-Saxon life worth 
living for the Anglo-Saxons.32 
This passage refl ected not only Bri tish nationalist propaganda, but also the racial 
nationa lism that had become popu lar in the late nineteenth century. Lt complemented 
the martial nationalism we have already examined. and neatly summed up the gentler 
sides of the ideals ofthe gentleman. 
To these notions can be added the more bell icose ones expressed 111 Henry 
Newbolt's poem about his Alma Mater, "Clifton Chapel" ( 1898). 
To set the cause above renown, 
To Jove the game beyond the prize, 
To honour, while you strike him down, 
The foe that comes with fearless eyes; 
To count the life of battle good, 
And dear the land that gave you bi11h, 
And dearer yet the brotherhood 
That binds the brave of aJJ the earth. D 
Here were some of the notions of chivalry that were extremely influential in the image 
and ideal of the English gentleman in the late nineteenth century. 34 The element of 
ferocity here should be underlined, for it was a s ignificant aspect of the ideal of a 
cultured English gentleman at the turn of the twentieth century, as well as being 
extremely popu lar in Australian "greater public schools."35 A gentleman ruled, and 
had to be able to enforce his authority if necessary. 
32 Bean, Wirh the Flagship, pp. 129-30. 
3' > Henry Newbolt, Poems New und Old, (London: Murray, 1912). pp.76-7, p.76. Bean also attended 
Clifton College, as did Field Marshal l Sir Douglas Haig, Commander- in-Chief of the British 
Expeditionary Force from December 19 15 until the end of the war, and General Sir Will iam Bird wood. 
who commanded the Austral ians from 19 15 until May 1918. Sir William Riddell Bird wood ( 1865-
195 1), b. Kirkee. India, d. Hampton Court Palace, England. ADB. vol.7, pp.293-6. 
34 Mark Girouard, The Return of Camelo1: Chivab:v and 1he English genrle111an, (New Haven: Yale 
Universi ty Press. 198 1); Debra N. Mancoff. The Arthurian Reviml in Vicforian Arr. (New York: 
Garland, 1990). 
35 On the glorification of mil itarism in Australian publ ic schools. see Crotty, Making rhe Aus1ralitm 
Male, pp. 74-94. 
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Bean appreciated Newbolt' s poem to the point of using another of its lines as 
the title of his history of independent schools in Australia, published in 1950, Here, 
My Sun .36 He also followed both the tone and the poetic style of this verse when in 
1909 he ended hi s call for an Australian Navy to defend White Australia with a poem 
of his own: 
To harbour no uncleanness; 
To own no mortal fear· 
Deem hateful only meanness 
And only honour dear; 
And fresh and frank and fearless, 
And as the ocean free, 
With strenuous hand 
Make good the land, 
And wrest and rule the sea:17 
Taken altogether these were Bean's most cherished values, which he addressed in his 
writings again and again over the next thirty years or so: cleanness of body and soul; 
fairness of conduct in peace and war; chival rous yet ferocious combat; a just, healthy 
and prosperous civil society; public-mindedness in all conduct. After long and 
intimate contact w ith his native land, Bean was to add to these the Australian notion 
of egalitarianism, arguing that this represented a huge improvement over England's 
class system. Bean wrote about these issues in many places, beyond the HistOJy and 
the Memorial. This dissertation looks only at some of these, because the Memorial did 
not discuss civil society or conduct in peacetime, only in war, and only in the 19 I 4-18 
war.38 
16 C. E. W. Bean, Here. 1\1/y Son: An accounr of rhe independenl and orher corporate boys' schools of 
Ausrralia, (Sydney: Angus and Robertson, I 950). The line used was the tirst one: 
This is the Chapel; Here, my son 
Your father though the thoughts of youth. 
And heard the words that one by one 
The touch of life has turned to truth. 
Newbolt. Poems New and Old. p. 76. 
37 Bean. Wirh the Flagship. p. l32. 
JR Moves to widen the Memorial 's commemorative focus in the 1920s fail ed. Thus, Boer War veterans 
were excluded from the Roll of Honour in its planning stages. See CPD. Representatives. vol.l ll. 16 
September 1925, pp.24S3-9. 
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Bean ' s interest in education brought together his nationalism and his public 
school life creed. Take for example his disct1ssion of the prevailing method of 
choosing and educating young naval officers. He noted with satisfaction that they 
were firstly chosen for their "pluck. 'vvit. morals,'' and that they had "the pick of the 
nation to teach [them]. men chosen for what they are more than for what they 
know."39 The first great hero of the Is land Story would, Bean fe lt, pass on his racial 
legacy to a new generation of warriors, for their teachers had, along with the best 
schools, "all the traditions of the same navy with which Alfred drummed the Danes to 
back them."4° For Bean this was the best of all worlds, educati11g the mind, body and 
character of the young officers . ~ 1 
To Bean' s mind, traditions were a vital force in education: "If one says that in 
a school of little boys it may be the thing to use cold water rather than hot, not to 
growl at a fair defeat, always to put the school fi rst and yourself after, and never to 
tell a mean lie, they may understand how traditions mean more than anything else."42 
As a corollary, Bean warned of the "forces of disunion" that he fe lt were attempting to 
destroy the British Emp ire, but fe lt that "so long as the big things in life, which are 
sentiment, bind the Anglo-Saxon race together, there is no fear of disunion."43 He 
scornfu lly dismissed " trade! As though it were a pennyweight in the ba lance against 
that sentiment for which they [people who opposed an Austra lian Navy] have a 
portentous, ignorant contempt."44 This educational ideal, emphas is ing the moral over 
the material, embodied an idea that was extremely common in British and Australian 
thought in the pre-war era.45 
39 Bean, With the Flagship. p.l23. italics added. 
~0 Bean, With the Flagship. p. 123 . 
41 Bean argued lhat "the proper object for cducalion is every part of the boy which can be educated -
that is: body, mind and character," but "I he most important of the three qualities of every Australian is 
character." C. E. W. Bean In Your Hands. Aus tralians, (London: Cassell. 19 18). pp.89-90. In making 
such an argument, Bean echoed Herbert Spencer's I R70 monograph. Educa1ion: lntellecrual. moral. 
physical, (London: Will iams and Northgate, I 870). 
42 Bean, With the Flagsl11j>, p. 123. 
43 Bean, With the Flagship, p.l29. 
44 Bean, With rhe Flagship , p. 129. 
45 Crotty examines the anti- intellectual bias in many public schools in 1\1/aking rhe Aus1ralian Male. 
pp.31 -94. 
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Displaying another aspect of his belief in tradition, Bean gave powerful 
evidence of his attachment to the nationalist idea of the immemorial past in his two 
navy books, With the Flagship and Flagships Three. ln the latter he perceived a direct 
continuity between a Viking longboat, the HMS Powe,jid and the new flagship of the 
Austral ian Navy, the HMAS "Australia." The longboat was, Bean felt, ' 'the first 
flagship of our race," and he had a vision ofthe occupants of the vessel: "some of the 
first ancestors of our race, coughing the North Sea fog through their sagging red 
moustaches and heavy beards. "46 Bean stated that the book recounted "the birth of the 
latest of a very famous and ancient and heroic line of Navies- the coming of the first-
born to the British Navy."47 In following such a course Bean was underlining yet 
aga in his attaclunent to the prevailing Australian ''pan-Anglo-Saxon" nationalism 
which would continue to surface often in the period up to the end of the 1920s at least, 
and the supposed Nordic racial legacy, much beloved of those considerable number of 
Australian nationalists who were influenced by social Darwinist theories of 
racialism.48 
In many ways, then, Bean's nationalism was an archetypal ''martial" case, 
anchored in a strong emotional bond , dwelling on the perceived virtues of the national 
group, and pre-occupied with the defence of that group and its territory. It was given 
expression in w ritings on such large nationalistic questions as defence, education, 
immigration, and the Imperial "blood tie." In 1913, when he published Flagships 
Three, his nationalism was about to be greatly enhanced by his service in the First 
World War. 
46 C.E.W. Bean, Flagships Three, (London: Alston Rivers, 191 3), p.3. 
47 Bean, Flagships Three. p.x. 
<R The term "pan-Anglo-Saxon national ism" was coined by Douglas Cole in 'The Problem of 
'National ism"' to refer to Austral ian raciall y-based national ism. Cole's thesis is that Australian 
na tional identity was based on a perceived "racial" tie with Britons all over the world, but especially in 
the British Isles themselves. Cole's thesis. if not his phraseology, has been generally accepted. 
Humphrey McQueen, for example, writes of ··race patriotism." and the intensification of perceived 
ethnic solidarity in the early years of the twentieth century, coinciding with the rise of Japan as a world 
power, is well documented. McQueen. A Ne11 · Britannia, p. IO. Social Darwinist ideas remained popular 
after the war, when, for example, in 1927, Mr J. Lyng. Harbinson-Higgi nbotham Scholar at the 
University of Melbourne, wrote of the Australian population in terms of the proportion of "Nordic," 
"Alpine" and "Mediterranean" racial groups. See J. Lyng. Non-Britishers in Australia: Influence on 
population and progress, (Melbourne: Macmillan, 1927). Bean himself published a defence of the 
White Australia Policy in 1907 in The Spectator, and again in 1913 in Flagships Three. Ell is argues 
that "his historical assumptions remained basically Darwinian" throughout his li fe. El lis, "Bean," 
p. I03. 
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Bean's war service was the pivotal experience of his life. His connection to Australia 
and Australians grew enormously under the strain of war. Observing first the beari ng 
of Australians under fire, and later their military successes, rei nforced and deepened 
his love for his countrymen, and ki ndled in hi m a great awe and reverence for 
Australian serv icemen - for their character, and for the deeds he felt were motivated 
by it. Along with th is attachment, a passionate and abid ing desire to commemorate 
these deeds, and this character, in words and symbols arose in Bean. The war brought 
together Bean 's ideas of service, nationalism, and "spirit" as an educational tool, his 
somewhat romantic attac hment to Imperial military history and his tendency towards 
hero-worship, manifest in a desi re to depict the AIF as heroes. All these factors 
impacted upon Bean's evolving ideas about commemoration, and one of the principal 
results of this coa lescence of sentiments and experiences was the creation of the 
MemoriaL 
From his fi rst association with the AIF, Bean hoped that the troops would 
display the same "English" virtues that he felt he had seen in the bush workers ofNew 
South Wales and in an office r cadre that had vvelcomed him, but expressed concern 
over whether they would.49 For instance, Bean had been told that the "second lot" -
the 41h Brigade, a new Light Horse Brigade, and 3,000 reinforcements - were "a big 
fine lot, mostly country men owing to the new method of selection by which a man 
can be selected in the back blocks by police without coming to Sydney or Melboume 
or the other capitals to try his luck."50 Bean hoped that these men, being country-bred, 
would behave well. However, there were reasons to expect otherwise, as "a hundred 
or so of them got ashore without leave , and made a name for Australia in Colombo 
(some of the officers in the force since they have anived tell me the thing is 
49 This cadre were generally public school-educated as well, and thus shared many of Bean 's most 
precious values. It included Brudenell White. Neville Howse, Will ia m Birdwood and Bean's brother 
John. Ell is makes this point also, and argues that Bean 's •'transparent honesty and discreet patriotism" 
helped win over these and other officers after initial scepticism of war correspondents as a rule. Ell is. 
"Bean," pp.83 and 25. Sec also Andrews, who is less sympathetic to Bean, arguing that "his reluctance 
to judge between good and bad Australian officers, together with his partiality for Birdwood and 
White, in whose small coterie he fe lt at home, weakened his analysis." Andrews, Anzac Illusion , p.1 45. 
50 Bean Diary, 9-30 January 1915, in C. E. W. Bean, Gallipoli Correspondent: The fi·on!line dimy c1( 
C.E.W. Bean, (Sydney: Allen and Unwin. 1983), p.40. 
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exaggerated: others say it was not. .. )"51 What's more, "the first incident we saw" was 
a man being caught going AWOL (amusingly enough "down the rope in the bows"). 
As well as this man, "four others got away before the military police got them. The 
ship was crowded with men ... who hooted the police .... One couldn't help thinking 
that we are in for a hot time in Cairo if they are all going to be like this."52 
Fortunately, he noted, "the flagship , which came in just after, seemed to contain a 
much steadier lot."5·' Bean 's tension and apprehension, as well as his hope, are clear 
in these lines. 
ln seeking a positive resolution Bean turned to the ancient idea of redemption 
through battle: 
I think we have to admit that our force contains more bad hats 
than the others, and I think also that the average Austral ian is 
cer1ainly a harder liver. He does do bad things- at least things 
that the rest of the world considers as really bad .... I think that 
the Australian will have to rely on the good things he does to 
wipe out the bad ones; and I think the sum wi ll come out on the 
right side when it is all toted up. That is my great comfort when 1 
wonder how J shal l ever manage to write up an honest history of 
this campaign. I fully expect the men of this force will do things 
when the real day comes which will make the true history of this 
war possible to be written. 54 
Bean was committed to presenting as " true" a history as possible, but clearly wanted 
to present the men in a good light. Concentrating on military successes would do this, 
and would even allow some of the men's vices to be transformed into virtues, through 
the argument that the Australians' wildness helped them in battle. 
Bean was following a well-established tradition of "'the sacralisation of war" 
in his determination to focus on actions on the battlefield. 55 The idea that battle could 
redeem had received expression in such places as Ancient Greece, where Pericles, in 
his oration over the Athenian war dead (in 430 BC) that Bean later excerpted to use as 
the Memorial 's motto, argued in terms strongly remini scent ofBean 's: 
'
1 Bean Oi;uy. 9-30 January I 9 I 5, in Bean, Gallipoli Correspondenl, p.40. 
52 Bean Diary, 9-30 January I 915. in Bean. Gaflipoli Corresponden /. p.4 I. 
<' 
··' Bean, Gal/ipoli Corresponde111, p.4 1. 
;
4 Bean Diary. 9-30 January I 9 15, in Bean, Gallipoli Corresponden/. p.39. 
55 Ehrenreich. Blood Riles, pp. I 59-74. 
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It seems to me that the consummation which has overiaken these 
men shows the meaning of manliness in its first revelation and in 
its final proof. Some of them. no doubt, had their fau lts; but what 
we ought to remember first is their gallant conduct against the 
enemy in defence of their native land. They have blotted out evil 
with good, and done more service to the commonwealth than 
they ever did ham1 in their private lives. 5(' 
Later, during the Christ ian era in Europe, " participation rn a crusade [had) had 
the ... effect [of] cleansing a man from prior sin and guaranteeing his admission to 
heaven.' '57 Of course, Bean was not specifically making such a spiritual assertion , but 
there was an element of immortality in the notion of the everlasting commemoration 
which Bean developed. Generally, his classical education at Clifton and Oxford 
Un iversity strongly influenced his attitudes to commemoration. 
Bean was also concerned with the men's behaviour and mora ls because he saw 
hjs job as official war correspondent as consist ing partly of propaganda work for the 
A IF, aimed at home front morale: "the bright side has to be written up in one's letters 
[dispatches]. and that leaves a great deal more than the due proportion of criticism for 
the diary.''58 After the AIF went into action he stated that he was seeking to present 
"scenes that will stir Australian p1ide .. . which is what the nation I represent wants to 
,,, 
hear."-' 
In working as a propagandist, Bean was following a tradition of British war 
correspondents stretching back to the late nineteenth century. His views mirrored 
those of Will iam Maxwell who, when reviewing his own career in 1913, said that "in 
loyally serving the Army" the correspondent "serves best in the end the public, his 
newspaper and himself.''60 Also part of the correspondent's traditional role was 
Bean's desire, echoing a statement made by the famous correspondent Arc hi bald 
56 Thucydides, Hist01y of the Peloponnesian War, Rex Warner (trans.), (Hannondworth: Penguin. 
1954), p.l48. 
57 Ehrenreich, Blood Rires, p.l71. 
ss Bean Diary, 3 Aprill91 5, quoted in Bean, Ga!lipoli Correspondenl, p.49. 
59 Memorandum to AIF First Division Headquarters, 27 June 1915 . Attached to Bean Diary. 26 June 
1915, in Bean, Gallipoli Correspondenr. p.135. 
60 Roger T. Steam, "War Correspondents and Colonial War, c.l870- 1900," in John M. McKenzie (ed.). 
Popular imperialism and the Mi/it(lly. 1850-1950, (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1992), 
pp.l39-61, p.145. 
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Forbes in 1879, the year of Bean's bi11h, ''to write so as to earn the respect of 
soldiers."6 1 Bean was devoted to the AIF, and remained so decades after it had been 
officially disbanded: for him, as for many returned men, the force never really 
demobilised.62 Bean wrote in large part so as to earn the men's respect, and it is clear 
that he succeeded completely. Prominent former soldiers, such as his friend Brudenell 
White, praised him generously for his dedicated work "in the interests of the 
Australian sold ier. "6·' Bean also generally followed the nineteenth-century 
correspondents when, as Roger Stearn argues, they "tough-mindedly saw the horrors 
of war in this context [colonial wars, 1870-1900] as the necessary price of victory and 
a condition of heroism, not as dominating or condemning war."64 
Bean was content to be a propagandist, but he would not lie, nor, as he stated, 
would he give his country "soft pap.''65 Thus he needed the men to "do well" in battle. 
If they did, all the poor discipline would be forgotten. As a consequence, when it 
became clear that the AJF were about to invade the Dardanelles, Bean looked forward 
to a successfu l first engagement. He was confident in early April; casting his eye upon 
his brother Jack's 3rd Brigade, chosen to land first at Gallipoli , he declared that "if it's 
a difficult landing r should say these fellows are just the men to carry it out. Whatever 
else they can do they can certainly fight .''66 
However, when the men did actually invade the peninsula, Bean found himself 
extremely anxious. Would they really do well? The na1ntive of excitement, woJTY 
and relief that fills Bean's diary for 25 April 1915 was fuelled by the depth of his 
commitment and attachment to the men and the nation they represented. Early in the 
morning, before he could see the battlefield with any clarity, Bean's early April 
optimism evaporated, replaced with a deep anxiety about the success of the attack: 
61 Steam, "War Correspondents," p.145 Henry Gullett told Bean that he did this to an excessive 
degree. See McCarthy, Gallipoli to the Somme. p.294. 
6~ The last paragraph of Bean '~ last volume on the AI F. published in 1942, made this clear. The AIF, it 
declared, was .. not dead." but "marches still down the long line of its country's history, with bands 
playing and rifles slung." Bean. The A IF During the A /lied Offensive, p.l 096. 
63 .~1 ·dner Moming HerCIId, II October 1927. p. l l. 
6
"' Stearn. "War Corespondents,' ' p. ISI. 
65 Bean Diary. 4 March 1915. in Bean. Ga/lipoli Correspondent, p.4J . 
M> Bean Diary. 3 Apri l 1915. in Bean, Ga/IJjJoli Correspondent, p.48. 
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4.45 [a.m.] ... Not a sign yet from the beac h. Only that ceaseless 
knocking, knocking, knocking. Presently a curiously oval object 
floats past us low in the water. It is a small rowing boat bottom 
upwards. That was the fi rst sign we saw. 
Now at last as we moved in we could see on the sea, just below 
the line of the beach, a swarm of small boats - small boats 
everywhere. They seemed to be going each on its own and going 
every soti of way - rowing, not bei ng tugged some were 
stationary - or seemed so . It is hard to tell at this distance. "J 
don ' t like the way they're all scattered about," said a staff officer 
near me. Some seemed as though they might be helping others in 
difficu lties. 
The warships are fir ing more heavil y now - there go two great 
turret guns together. The enemy is sti ll scattering his shrapnel 
over the water but always between the ships or j ust short of them. 
5.15: Two shells pretty close to us. Those small boats returning 
for all they are worth each on its own - we can see them much 
clearer now - makes one just a little anxious. Why are they going 
so many ways - digging out fo r al l they are worth [?] Has the 
landing been beaten off - is this the remnant[?t7 
Perhaps the men were not going to prove great fighters, as he had predicted. Perhaps 
he had observed them incorrectly, after all. Perhaps they were going to fai l in this, 
their first great battle. Perhaps they were being beaten off by the Turks, considered at 
that time to be fighters of a much lower quality than the Germans the Bri tish Army 
was engaged with.68 
This anxiety continued until the light began to improve, when Bean was 
finall y able to confi rm that the attack was progressing reasonably well, to his gTeat 
relief: 
6.45 ... Ten minutes later someone sees men upon the skyli ne. 
The rumour grad ual ly spreads around. At 7. 17 I heard of it. 
Through the telescope you can see them, numbers of them -
some standing full length .... Are they Turks or Australians [?] 
The Turks wear khaki, but the attitudes are extraordinarily like 
those of Australians.69 Just below them, on our side of them a 
67 Bean Diary, 25 April 1915, in Bean, Gallipoli Correspondem, pp.61 -2. 
6R Even after the Gallipoli campaign this feeling remained common, with Haig famously te ll ing White 
in 19 16, ·'You are not fight ing Bashi Bazouks now' " Quoted in Grey, Militw ~· His101:v, p. J03. 
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long line of men is digging quietly on a nearer hill. They have 
round caps. 1 think clearly you can distinguish that round disc-
like top. They are Australians! And they have taken that further 
line of hills! - three ridges away you can see them; the outlines 
of men on the furthest hill ; men digging on the second hill ; and 
the white fl ags of signallers waving on the ridge nearest the 
I , 70 s 10re ... 
The sense of relief Bean felt on realising that the men were doing so well is very 
evident in his diary. This was success. Not total success, perhaps, but as much as the 
British Anny had enjoyed on the Western Front, a substantial achievement within the 
context of the war up unti l then. 
Confidence restored, within days Bean was writing contentedly that " the 
Australian, when he fights , fights all in. And the Turk knows it - he is said to be 
afraid of us." 71 He continued on to note with satisfaction that Australians were great 
soldiers. as he had predicted: 
The truth is that there is no question (at least for operations such 
as those we have had) that the Australian leaves the N. Zealander 
behind. There is no doubt on this subj ect amongst those who 
have seen them fight here. The N.Z. man is a good trustworthy 
sold ier, but he has not the devil of the Australians in him; the 
wi ld pastora l independent life of Australia, if it makes rather wi ld 
men, makes superb soldiers. 72 
This superiority was, in the best old Imperial style, acknowledged by the inferior New 
Zealanders, who "are outspoken in their praise of the way the Australians fought," 
and "are proud of any praise given them by the Australians."73 
69 The characteristic appearance of the Australians was a favourite topic of Bean 's during the war. He 
wrote about it, and drew it. It was a very popular idea generally. as exemplified by the number of 
writers who mentioned the dress and physical bearing of the Anzacs. See for example the famous lines 
from English poet John Masefield. that the Anzacs were "'the finest body of men ever brought together 
in modem times. For physical beauty and nobi lity o f bearing they surpassed any men I have ever seen." 
John Mascfield. Gallipoli. (London: Heinemann, 19 16), p. l9. Thi!i quote became a staple of Australian 
commemorati ve rhetoric, and the concept was seen in the Memorial, although it was not one of the 
museum 's major themes. 
70 Bean Diary, 25 Apri l 1915. in Bean, Gollipoli Correspondenl, p.65 
71 Bean Diary, 29 April 19 15, in Bean, Gal/ipoli Correspondenl, p.83. 
7~ Bean Diary, 29 April 19 15. in Bean, Ga/lipoli Correspondeni, p.83. 
n Bean Diary, 29 April 1915, in Bean. Gallipoli Correspondenl, p.82. The corresponding idea that the 
"savages .. of India and Africa recognised the superiority of the Bril ish, and lhere fore accepted Imperial 
control as being for their own good, was a leitmotif around the turn of the century, and one which Bean 
had himself evoked in The Dreadnought o.f the Darling. In that volume see chapter 24, with its title, 
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As the campaign developed, Bean began to see the military qual it ies of the 
troops being revealed, and he was deeply impressed by what he saw. In May he went 
to the ti p of the peninsula at Cape Hellcs with the 2"d Brigade, and participated 
intem1ittently in the attack on Krithia as a stretcher-bearer and runner. Here he saw 
the steadiness under fire, stoicism and determination of the Australians to continue in 
a very difficult attack. At the same time he came to truly appreciate the fear, horror 
and pity of war, and thi s understanding seems to have left upon him an incredibly 
strong sense that the men 's conduct under fire was all the more glorious, and awe-
inspiring, because of the enormity of the horror they were struggling with. 
Bean was tremendously moved and affected by his experience of death and 
pai n at close quarters, and one short example helps us understand the bond of the 
trenches which such exposure tended to fos ter, as it fostered Bean's love of the AIF: 
On the way back to the Tommy's trench I saw one poor devil -
one of the hundreds who were lying there - trying to get back to 
cover. I asked him if I could help him - he was hit through the 
leg, high up, and was crawling. We went some way together, 
limping- he was in great pain - when he fell saying: "Oh God -
Oh Christ - oh it's awfu l. '' He had been hi t a second time 
through the same leg, or the other leg. I asked him if he could 
still come on. "Oh, no - no 1 can' t," he said. The plateau was 
very exposed, so I simply dragged him by both legs - he 
consented - into the nearest thing to a dimple in the ground that I 
could find - got hold of two packs and put them round him, and 
·'The Benighted Heathen,'' redolent of Kipl ing, wherein ''The Sydney passenger'' (Bean himself) argues 
with an Afghan camel teamster about India: 
"We want to stop the Russians from pushing into India." answered the Sydney 
passenger. "The British don't wa nt to push on except so as to stop the 
Russians. The Russians would be worse for you than the English." 
"We know that." said the Afghan promptly. "We hate Russians. But we don't 
want British always pushing on. Why you not give Indians to rule themselves. 
Money you take away. Why you not let them alone?" 
" Now look here," said the Sydney passenger, "you know Indians - the 
Bengal is and Madrassis. You know what sort of men they arc. Do you think 
they could be left by themselves')" 
"Yes I know;· admitted the other. "They cannot remain by themselves. But 
you might give them to rule themselves more.'· 
See Bean, The Dreadnoughl o.f 1he Darling, pp.l 57-8. On the top1c 111 Imperial literature, and 
propaganda more generall y, see. MacDonald, The Language of Empire: W.J. Re<Jder, AI Dufl· ·s Call: A 
study of obsolete patriotism, (Manchester: Manchester Universi ty Press, 1 9~R), ppJS-59: J.A. Mangan, 
Making Imperial J\;fentalilies: Socia/isalion and Brilish Imperialism, (Manchester: Manchester 
University Press, 1990). 
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left him. He had tom open his trousers, as they general ly do, to 
see the wound, and was bleeding pretty freely. l don ' t fancy he 
can have li ved - poor chap.74 
ln h is diary there is a strong sense of horror, and of pity, and the strength of his 
emotional attaclm1ent to the men shines out. 
At the same time Bean saw martial virtues at close quarters, and this made an 
even deeper impression on him. In one passage on the battle at Krithia, Bean noted 
both patriotism and practicality, mirroring virtues he had recorded in On the Wool 
Track and The Dreadnought ol the Darling before the war; at the same time he saw a 
stern aspect revealed for the first time: 
They came on very fast, and they were given three minutes in the 
trench - and then in every case they went over it with a shout of 
··come on Australians!!" If there were no officers to lead them 
on an N.C.O. would. I heard one chap say: "Come on chaps, 
we've got to get it sometime. We can ' t stay here always;" and 
that was the spi1it - that, and the feeli ng that being Australians 
they must get on . It was very fine to watch , and it was t,rreat to 
watch them as they went, absolutely unaffected by bullets. J 
never saw one man whose manner was changed by them, except 
in that moment when they got up and faced them; and rushed 
over the trench - then their faces were set, their eyebrows bent, 
and they looked into it for a moment as men would into a 
dazzling flame. I never saw so many determined faces at once -
Oh! what a photograph I missed. 75 
For Bean, a sense of awe and a desire to pennanently capture the ''sp iri t" of the men 
for posterity seem to have developed together. As the war continued, and the AIF 
moved to France, Bean saw the tTue honor of war, which confinned him in his belief 
that those who simply did their job in appalling circumstances were heroes. But he 
also saw, amidst the rain of steel that had descended on the Westem Front, heroism of 
a more "traditional" kind. That is, he saw, and wrote of, a series of smaLl, tactical 
victories. These were, he felt, very impressive, because other units - espec ially British 
units - failed to advance or take their objectives at all. For instance, he pointed out 
that the Australian seizure of Pozieres village in 1916 was the only success on the 
7
J Bean Diary. 8 May 19 15. in Bean, Caflipoli Correspondent, p.95. 
1
" Bean Diary, 8 May 191 5. in Bean. Caflipoli Correspondent. p.93. 
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whole British front. 76 Bean was fully aware of the horrors of the war, but was 
cognisant of his role as a propagandist. and wrote little of what he saw in official 
publications, instead putting his thoughts down in copious detai l in the diaries, which 
he \>Vas keeping to assist him in the subsequent production of a his tory. 77 
As the A lF became a highly professional, well-organised and effective 
military organisation, Bean was increasingly proud and in awe of what the Australian 
soldiers had created . The level of selfl ess, disciplined and concerted action that he 
observed in the army that had been so raw and rowdy in 1915 deeply gratified him. In 
1918 the AIF first helped to stop, then rout, the Gennan am1y in Flanders, achievi ng a 
recognisible superio1ity over the Germans, thought to be the strongest army in the 
world. By then, Bean was sure that the AlF was an extreme ly strong and flexible 
military machine made up of men of magnificent fibre and represented a great 
achievement. A dispatch written by "Austral ian conespondents" (and therefore 
possibly F.M. Cutlack, but signed by Bean nonetheless) a11d published in April 19 18 
made this explicit: ''When history comes to be written Australia and the Empire will 
realise what a magnificent buttress the Australian Imperial Force has been to the 
cause of our race, humanity and civilisation."78 The Memorial would show how this 
buttress had done its work. 
111 
Bean did not feel that the public appreciated the heroism he was witnessing, nor what 
the AIF had achieved militarily. He determined to ensure that Australians came to a 
realisation of what their troops had endured, and what they had done. At the same 
time, he saw in the telling of stories about the troops the possibility of performing 
nationalist education. He was not alone. In 1917 he discussed the creation of a war 
museum in Australia after the war with a group of officers inc luding the artist Will 
Dyson.79 More importantly for the immediate creation of an officially-sanctioned, 
76 See Bean. The AIF in France, 1916. p.530. These issues are discussed more full y in Chapters Four to 
Six. 
77 See Chapter Six for a discussion of this issue in more deta il. 
78 Quoted in Williams, Anzacs, !he Media, p.2 1 5. 
79 McKernan, Here is Their Spirit, pp.S5-6. William Henry Dyson ( 1880-1 938). b. Bal larat. Victoria, 
d. Chelsea, England. Earned a reputation for political satirical cartoons in pre-war England, 
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publicly-funded museum. in early 1918 he corresponded with the Australian Minister 
for Defence. George Pearce, with a view to securing objects and creating such a 
museum. lt is in this correspondence that the manner in which the Memorial was to 
commemorate was most clearly explored for the first time. 1t also demonstrates 
conclusively Bean's attachment to martial nationalism, and to trophy-display as a 
means of martial nationalist education of the populace. 
Bean and Pearce were of a mind that Austral ia was creating "real" history for 
the first time in its existence, and that the material evidence of this history was 
wanted for nationali st education of a pseudo-spiritual nature. The material to which 
they were referring was predominantly made up of "trophies" - objects, usually 
weapons, taken from the enemy, and "relics" - objects used by the AIF. This 
dist inction was used throughout the war, and for a long period into the peace. In the 
mid-1920s Bean sought to eliminate any usage of the word "trophy" in relation to the 
Memorial, but was not entirely successful, for as late as 1934 the RSSILA New South 
Wales State Secretary referred to the Memorial' s di splays as "trophies" in a circu lar 
letter to sub-branches, without mentioning the word "relics" at all.80 
In March 1918 Pearce, who had joined W.M. Hughes and twenty-three other 
ALP members in leaving the party over conscription in 1916, and who was now 
Minister for Defence in the "win-the-war·· ationalist Government, wrote to the 
British Colonial Secretary seeking control of Australian trophies, for Pearce felt that 
his country needed these more than did Britain: 
Britain already has a history and traditions and relics and trophies 
extending back for centuries and the present war, however great, is 
only adding to a long record and collection, whereas Australia has 
none here other than what she draws from the mother country. A 
nation is built upon pride of race and now that Austral ia is making 
history of her own she requires every possible relic associated 
with this to educate her children in that national spirit thereby 
ensuring loyal adherence to and defence of the Empire of which 
she fom1s pan.x1 
"championing the working man boldly and without reserve" in bitter and dramatic pictures fo r the 
Dai~l' Herald. A DB. \'IJI.8. p.397. Accepted the war a~ just and necessary. Published the anti-German 
Kullllr CariOOilS in 1915. Became the first Au, tralian war anist in December 1916 and was twice 
wounded. Worked for the Daill' llerald 19 19-22. and for Melbourne Herald and its successor Pu11ch. 
CEW Bean's favourite war anisl. ADB, ' 'o/.8, pp.396-R. 
~~~ RSSILA circular letter. undated (1934). AWM 93 20/ 116. 
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Pearce was concemed with "emotional" nation-building, having already suggested to 
Bean that he should write the "national" history of Austrn lia in the war8 2 Here he 
provided a succinct exposition of martial nationalist ideology in its lrnperiaiJy-loyal, 
Anglo-Australian guise. "Pride of race," the emotion to which C.J. Dennis ascribed 
Ginger Mick ·s change from larTikin to national hero, and on which the nation was 
built, would be constructed through the display of relics and trophies, through the 
telling of stories about war.83 The national spirit he invoked was inseparable from the 
war which had given the nation a "history of her own." 
Bean congratu lated Pearce on this cable, and shared his own view of how the 
objects would aid the Austral ian nation: 
The great meaning of our records I have never seen better 
expressed than in your cable to the Colonial Secretary, telling him 
that they mean to us our history and tradition, for the education of 
our children in the nationa l spirit, which Australians would wish to 
animate their country. The War has given one an immense belief 
in the youth of Australia, and I believe that our countrymen are 
capable of any achievement, provided a high, unselfish national 
incentive can be encouraged in them; and no-one is readier to be 
seized with this than the youngsters of Australia, if given the right 
leadership and opportunity. Australia has lost thousands of her 
best and finest men, but I believe the history of them, and the 
appeal which their lives make to young Australians, through the 
galleries and museums and, not least, the histories of our country, 
will be the greatest of several great results of their sac1ifice. 84 
Bean wished to use the records of the AJF, both physical and written, for national ist 
education. A ''high, unselfish national incentive' ' would be encouraged through the 
appeal of the lives of the dead, as expounded in "the histories of our country,'' which 
of course he would help form. 85 Clearly the dead would be panegyrised "through the 
~ 1 Cablegram, Secretary of Defence to Administrat ive Hcatlquarters AI F London, including text of 
message to Colonial Secretary. No. WT 18, 3 March 1918. A WM 38 3DRL 6673, lrem 621 . 
xz McKernan, Here is Their Spirit, p.34. 
RJ Gerster, Big-noting, pp. 15-16. 
R
4 C. E. W. Bean to George Pearce, March 1918, AM W 93 12/ 12/ 1, Pa11 l. Henry Rider Haggard wrote of 
the British war dead in The Times on 1 0 October 1914 that "the history of these deeds of theirs will surely 
be a beacon to those dest ined to carry on the tradition of our race." Quoted in Wendy R. Kratz, Rider 
Haggard and the Fiction of Empire: A critical s tudy of British lmperialfiction, (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1987). p.59. 
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galleries and museums" - although in practice, as no other museum or gallery was 
built, it was only the Memorial that would be left to undertake this goal. ft would 
create a public .. history of our country," or at least of its war experience. 
These statements were definitive examples of martial nationalist reactions to 
the war. Both Bean and Pearce were here looking to what inspiration would emerge 
from the war - pride of race, built on mi litary achievement. They were not looking at 
honor or bereavement in tllis conespondence, and were clearly gazing beyond 
commemoration per se to nation-building aspirations. 
At the first meeting of the Australian War Museum Committee (A WMC) 
following Bean's return to Australia, held on 31 July 1919, the committee adopted a 
plan of deliberate nation-building, based upon military success and to be conducted 
through the public display of war trophies, with relics slightly subordinate at that early 
stage (a situation which would later be reversed in public statements). The plan was 
Bean's, developed on the ship home after his "mission" to Gallipoli earlier in the year, 
and encompassed the distribution of trophies to the States as well as the establishment 
of the Memorial.86 It included the clearest exposition of the connections perceived by 
Bean and his allies between remembrance of the dead and remembrance of victories, 
between war commemoration and emotional nation-building based upon the military 
paradigms of pre-war Europe. 87 
The connection lay in the trophies themselves. Firstly, a large proportion of 
them, and almost all those distributed to the States, were indeed captured enemy 
arms.88 Unlike Victoria Crosses and the reliefs ofNelson 's Column, but similar to the 
Berlin Victory Monument, these cannon were not melted down but remained 
discernibly weapons of war. Secondly, they would be distributed to States "with due 
R~ Indeed, for Bean it was "histories" that he created, fo r he was instrumental in the creation of the 
Memorial 's publ ic history of the AIF as well as the O.fficial HisiOJ)I. 
~6 Sec McKernan. Here is Their Spirit. p.60. Bean described the Australian Historical Mission's trip to 
Turkey in Gallipoli Mission , (Canberra: Australian War Memorial. 1952). 
s
7 The members of the committee present included Bean's "hero" Brudcnell White. A WMC Agenda 31 
Jul y 19 19. A WM 170 Ill. White was a strong supporter of the Memorial's nation-building objectives, 
as he indicated as ea rly as J 917. when he prodded the secretary of the Department of Defence to obtain 
objects for the Memorial: " From a nalional and educational point of view the value of such a museum 
will be immense." CB.B. White to Thomas Trumble, 19 July 1917. Quoted in McKernan, Here is 
Their Spirit , p.41 . 
~R A WMC Mi nutes, 31 Jul y 19 19, "Outline of Scheme,'' pp.l - 1 0, p.l. A WM 170 1/ J. 
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regard to the sentiment attaching to their capture."89 The capture of enemy weapons 
was, the outl ine stated, the stuff of future Australian tradition: as a letter to the State 
Premiers explained, a distribution of trophies would be made to the States because 
"these relics are of the greatest value and interest in the places where their captors are 
personally known.''90 The Premiers were assured that the trophies from which they 
would rece ive their share ··comprise the finest collection, proportiona lly speaking, that 
has been >von by any portion of the British Ernpire."'>l Reactions suggest that symbols 
of triumph were indeed as hi ghly valued in the home of their captors as Bean believed 
they would be. with over four thousand displayed, and complaints made at times that 
some towns were not receiving their fair share of the spoi ls.92 As indicated, many 
were the focus of commemorative rituals - solely until masonry memorials were built, 
then jointly in many instances.93 Standing in promi nent public places, they brought 
some of that sense of .. history," or at least, martial nationa list hi story, that Australia 
had previously been seen to lack. The loca l landscapes of Australian towns and 
municipalities were historicised with these evidences of victory won by local men in a 
great war. 
The official principles for the allocation of trophies, also agreed at this 
meeting, further explained both the division of the collection and the martial 
nationalist mam1er in which these symbols of victory were intended to be used. The 
collection of trophies was divided into two catego1ies, those "of technical interest" 
and those "of general interest."94 This dissertatim1 does not pursue the former type. 
Those of general interest were further subd ivided into technical and "national" 
categories. The fom1er were "specimens showing sort of instrument used,'' and, being 
similar to the purely techn ical objects, lie beyond the scope of this dissertation.95 On 
R
9 
"Outline of Scheme," p.2. A WM 170 1/ 1. 
9Q A WMC Minutes. Appendix C (i), "Suggested Letter to the States' Premiers,·· paragraph 2. A WM 
170 1/1. 
91 
"Suggested Letter to the States' Premiers." paragraph 1. 
92 Clayton, ''To the Victor,'' Part 3, pp.6-9: Ingl is. Sacred Places, p.179: McKernan, Here is Th eir 
Spirit, pp.71-2. 
93 See Clayton, ·'To the Victor," Part 3, pp.21 -6. 
94 A WMC Minutes, Appendix E: "Trophies: Principles: Allocation." AWM 170 Ill. 
95 
'Trophies: Principles: Allocation." 
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the other hand, the "national:· as I have labelled them, were those ··relics to which the 
romance of some particular national story is attached," with which this dissertati on is 
sole ly concemed.96 The Memorial was to select "national" trophies from "those 
connected with some parti cular outstanding character or unit in the A IF, .. . those 
connected with some historical action or event whose actual author or unit is not 
known ... [and] those showing the general effec ts of orne common incident of the war 
(e.g. marked by mine or shell explosion)."97 The fanner two types would be chosen 
on the princi ple that "if the event [to which they were connected] is of such national 
importance that it is likely to fon11 one of the most prominent traditions of Australia, 
the exhibit should be required for Australian Museum."98 The third type of"national" 
exhibit, which showed the general effects of common incidents, "not being exhibits 
connected with any incident which will be a tradition for any State or loca lity in 
Australia, but rather exhibits showing the nature of the war," one of the Memorial's 
objectives, would go to the Memorial.99 
The Memorial, then, was to exhibit objects captured in battle with the 
expectation that they would form "the most prominent traditions" of the new nation. It 
would thus form a nexus between nation-bui lding and commemoration, triumph and 
remembrance. ot onl y wou ld the dead be remembered, but so too would the 
victorious actions in which trophies were captured.100 Through the dissemination of 
information about these battles, they would become national traditions. Throughout 
the whole scheme and the resolutions adopted on 31 Jul y 19 19, the strongest emphasis 
was on the public acknowledgement of victory through the display of its tangible 
symbols. As other authors have argued, Bean intended that people should worship the 
AlF, and it is clear from these documents that such worship was to be not primaril y 
for service and sacrifice. but for triumph and the capture of enemy war material. 101 
91
' "Trophies: Principles: Allocation." 
'
11 
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•N "1 rophic : Princ irlc~: Allocation." This document also asserted that the Memorial would show "t he 
general nature of the fi ght1ng in the Great War.'' 
"" As we shall ~cc m Charter~ f our to Six. such actions could be. and ofl cn were. smaller r arts of 
ba t11e-, which the Aust ralian~ failed 10 win. or which were pyrrhic vic t orie~. 
1111 
' " bb ··c · 1· · P .. vv c er. onstructmg Au~lra 1a ~ ast. 
154 
Chapter Four and Chapter Five, especial ly, examine some of the ways in which the 
Memorial directed this worship. 
Bean's position is thus clear: the Memorial would undertake national 
education based on Australian mil itary success. His principal all y, John Treloar, who 
as Director wrote all the labels for objects under Bean's guidance, agreed. Treloar 
believed whole-heartedly with Bean's objectives fo r the Memorial. In 1925 he wrote a 
memorandum to the curator of the Memorial which stated in the clearest tem1s his 
understanding of the nation-building objectives of the institution. He also made it 
clear that large audiences were wanted to better achieve the aim. He wrote in part: 
The larger the attendances at the Museum the nearer would it 
come to achieving the objects for which it exists (the 
development of a strong national esprit founded on true 
knowledge of the achievements of the Australian forces during 
the war. and our larger responsibilities to the memory of the 
men).I 01 
Th is was perhaps the clearest exposition of the Memorial's martial nationalist 
objectives. Again there was a strong commitment to the truth, but it was also clear 
that nationa l educational imperatives would order the manner in which the truth was 
presented. It was also a definitive example of the martial nationa list reaction to the 
war. centred on past victories ("achi evements''), yet oriented towards the fu ture 
through nationalist education. 10·' Whether such "true knowledge" would be the whole 
truth or a selected truth requires an examination of the knowledge offered, which 
Chapters Four to Six undertake. 
Martial national education was thus the key to the whole Memorial operation 
as it was initial ly constituted in 1919. Bean was acutely aware that Australian 
civilians knew very li ttle about the war in its specifics. Bean reflected this ignorance 
when he wrote, in 1922, that "1 know of nothing which has enabled my own friends to 
grasp the meaning of a 'trench' in the same way at the Mont St Quentin model has 
done."104 Thus, the heart of the Memorial was the telling of Australia's overseas war 
102 Director, Australian War Memorial, Melbourne, to Curator, Austral ian War Memorial, Sydney, 28 
September 1925 . AWM 93 6/3/ 1. 
103 The label for the Somme plan model said it succinctly: "The capture of Mont St Quentin and 
Peronne was one of the great achievements of the AI F." Bain to Treloar, IS May 1929. AWM 265 
21/4/5, Part 2. 
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story. ut ilisi ng trophie and relics as focussing agents which provided a direct 
connection with the past. The Memorial's account was put into the Australian public 
doma in as a master narra tive, against which individual s and groups could measure 
their own recollections of the war. Indeed, Treloar was very proud of the fact that 
returned men turned to the Memorial to resolve their conflicting memories. The 
Memorial claimed to be .. the Australian authority o n matters associated with the war," 
and the RSSILA afforded the museum this position. 105 
One of the most fundamental parts of the education that Bean wished the 
Memorial to conduct was s imply to teach civi lians about the AJF's battles and the war 
in general. He wished to tell "the bare and uncolou red s tory" of the AIF, and the result 
of this was the largest public narrative of the nation 's war experience which existed in 
Australia. 106 Stories, realistically presented, proved that the Australians had been to 
the war. had won the battles people said they had won , had suffered terribly but had 
come through gloriously. 
Bean spelt out clearly in 1928 that the Memorial was a key part of his Official 
History project which, he declared, was dedicated to the protection and enhancement 
of the '' fighting reputati on of the A I F." When testifying in front of the Public Works 
Committee to urge the prompt erection of the permanent building, he finnly stated 
that the Memorial was a national necessity because it would help protect this 
reputation. The Memoria l was necessary, because "the history of ["our fighting forces 
during the war"] cannot be written unless the documents [upon which it is based) are 
carefully preserved. and worked upon in such an institution as that which we are 
proposing. Otherwise it would not command the confidence of historians abroad. " 107 
If such confidence could not be commanded, "we should find the performance of our 
so ldiers in some of these battles being questioned.'' 1 0~; He lamented that "the tendency 
to do that is already observab le:· and feared that ' 'hi torians in time will say. 'What 
was there. after all , in this fighti ng reputation of the A IF?"'109 Bean maintained that 
IU4 ( 
.E.W. Bean to George Pearce. 12 June 1922. AWJ\11 3R 3DRL 6673. Item 803 . 
II) I Press Release, November 1929. A WM 93 20/111 A. 
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prophylaxis was necessary, and that "from the time this was first thought of as a 
practical proposition, it was intended to house the collection in the Memorial." 1 10 
There were also foreign policy considerations: "Both in America and elsewhere the 
Australian claims will be challenged unless we can establish them by closely-
reasoned proof." 1 11 Needless to say, he was actively providing such proof in his 
Official HisiOJy, based on the Memorial's documents, and I argue that the museum's 
displays were designed to provide such proofs in a public arena, and were addressed, 
not to Americans, but to the Australian public itself. 
Significantly, the nation the Memorial's history was addressed to, and about 
whom it was constructed, was an Anglo-Austra lian, Imperially-loyal entity. The 
Mem01ial avoided reference to contemporary politics, or any event outside its wartime 
timeframe, but there was a clear indication of the institution's loyalist credentials in the 
title of Bean's guide to the museum, The Relics and Records ofAustralia 's Effort in the 
Defence of the Empire 1914-1918. This emphasised from the start the Imperial 
connection and asserted that loyalty to the Emp ire had been the primary motivation of 
the AJF. The political implications of this in the context of ongoing right-wing 
accusations of Labor disloyalty need little highlighting. The loyalty of the audience was 
assumed throughout the displays. 
The foreword of Bean's guide argued that the Mem01ial would inspire 
admiration for the Alf and reverence for the dead if "viewed in the r1ght spirit." 112 
Bean meant by " right spirit," a frame of mind receptive to tales of national heroism, 
ready to leam lessons about one's obligation to the nation, eager to be infused with "the 
national spirit, that Australians would wish to animate their country." 113 lt was this 
national spirit to which Bean had referred in J 918 when enthusing to Pearce about the 
"appeal which [the dead's] lives make to young Austral ians, through the galleries and 
109 Standing Committee on Public I·Yorks Report, p.321. For deta ils of one of the situations Bean was 
referring to, see Chapter Four. 
110 Standing Commilfee on Public Works Report, p.321 . 
11 1 Standing Comnzillee on Public Works Report, p.321. 
112 Relics and Records. September 1922, Foreword; Apri l 1928 and December \931, Introduction. 
113 Bean to Pearce, March 1918. AM W 93 12/12/1, Part I. The use of ''spi1it" here is somewhat 
confusing. considering Bean is using it for two different concepts of differi ng orders, the first refers to a 
frame of mind and the second to a belief system. 
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museums ... "
114 In Bean's vision Australians, being lovers of the truth and ready to be 
inspired, li'Ould bring the right spirit to the displays, and it was up to the museum to 
provide the cotTect inspiration, the ' 'high moral lead, " through the "true history of the 
war.'' 
Thi s loya list VISion of Austra lians was confirmed in parliament, where the 
Memorial's political connections with the right in Australia were also made clear. Sir 
Thomas Glasgow, who had commanded the l31h Infantry Brigade and the I 51 Division 
during the war, was the Cha irman of the AMWC when the Bill was passed in 1925. 
His speech contained the official Australian War Memorial Committee (A WMC) 
position, and concentrated on ''achievements" and the moral qualities these were 
thought to embody, as well as linking the qualities needed in war with the tasks of 
peace and posterity. Firstly, he argued "Australia is ... in a fortunate and unique 
position in having a memorial which was created by the men, and, may 1 add, the 
women, whose achievements it is intended to honour." 115 The nature of this memorial 
was to show the nation the virtues of its soldiers for its &rreat benefit: 
The relics, pictures and models all record incidents illustrative of 
the self-sacrifice, courage, fortitude and initiative of the men of 
the Australian Imperial Forces [sic]. These qualities count for as 
much in peace time development as they do in time of war. For 
this reason they must always be a powerfu l inspiration to 
Australians of the present and future generations. 116 
Glasgow then explored this moral equi valence between war and peace through an 
unacknowledged quote from Bean's 1919 utopian nationalist pamphlet, in Your 
114 Bean to Pearce. March 19 18. AM W 93 12/12/1, Part I. 
11 ~ CPD, Senate. vol.l l l. 26 August 1925, p. l676. Glasgow did not, it would appear, reflect upon why 
Australia was uniquely in this position. No other nation seemed as eager to embrace the traditional 
symbols of triumph, nor the victorious interpretation of the war experience, as Australia, and Austral ians 
appear to have been somewhat unable to comprehend this lack of enthusiasm. One particularly nai·ve 
example surrounded the fi rst playing of the University of Sydney's War Memorial Carillon. Organisers 
wanted to broadcast this live into Britain on the BBC. and were at first taken aback, then deeply hun. 
when the BBC declined. claiming there was no interest in that son of thing. Professor Holme reminded 
the BBC that the bells were the largest in the Empire. outside of Big Ben. Sydney Morning Herald, 25 
April 1928. p.lO. A poem, "The Bells,'' was published in the same issue of the Herald. 
116 Commonwealth of Australia, CPD, Senate, vol.lll , 26 August 1925, p.l676. Donald Cameron 
agreed. claiming that several examples of displays that he had provided illustrated "the interest and 
inspiration t he~e collections wi ll have for future generations." CPD. Senate, vol. 1 11, 16 September 1925, 
p.24X2. 
158 
Hands, Australians. In so doing he was also expressing a prevai ling conservative 
argument designed to appropriate memories of the past for contemporary political 
benefit, and the Memorial's part in the argument's legit imation: 
Those men who fell believed Australia was destined to become the 
greatest and best country in the world. They cannot make her so 
now. Those 62 000 of the very best we had are out of the struggle ... 
They can never finish the fight they began for Australia. But we 
and our children can do it for them. This memorial , containing their 
names and the relics of their greatest achievements, will be a 
constant reminder of our responsibility to their memory - our 
responsibility to make Australia the great nation they bel ieved she 
could become. 117 
Naturally it would be the Nationalist politicians, their paymasters m the National 
Union and their media supporters who would define the parameters of the new, great, 
Australia. The Memorial would offer the evidence, taken from that nation 's glorious 
past, that helped authenticate that politi cal settlement. The continuist argument went 
that the nation had been unified [under right-wing leadership] during the war, and that 
the task facing the country nov,• was the same as that faced during the war. The 
"unity" stressed was usually the disci pi ine of the soldiers, in fact, rather than any 
unity of civilians. The soldiers, both those who had died and survivors, had shown 
themselves loyal to the Empire ("steadfast unto death"), submitting themselves to 
wise leadership and unwavering (battlefield) discipline. The argument was that 
audiences should do likewise, bowing to the authority of the Nat ionalists and the 
Country Party. Bean did not necessarily condone this political usage of positive 
warfront images, but the Memorial was too large an institution for him to completely 
control its path, and Glasgow was clearly aligning the institution with the continuist 
argument, one of the principal platforms of the conservative groups. 
Realism was a vital element of the Memorial project. From the outset, Bean 
decided to follow his wartime propagandist and publicist roles in his writing and 
editing of the official history of Australia during the war, as well as in his guidance of 
and writing for the Memorial. He did all in his power to ensure that Australia and the 
117 CPD, Senate, vo1.1 11 , 26 August 1925, p. 16 77: Bean, In Your Hands. Australians. p.l3: '"They 
believed Australia would be the greatest and best country in all the world. They cannot make her so -
60,000 of the very best we had are out of the struggle .... You will see in your midst the great museum 
and gallery sacred to them. They can never finish the light which they began for Australia. But you, the 
younger generation, their survivors in the AI F. the young people of Australia. can do it for them." 
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Empire would understand the truth as he saw it, which was that the old notions of 
heroism still had value. but sometimes needed new vehicles: 
To me, the sight of a hero in a flashing uniform charging across 
the glacis is not so very impressive, but if you think of the 
ordinary old Australian just as you see him in the paddocks or 
workshop. in his battered felt, plodding across a hell of a filthy 
corner (from which he knows he is most unlikely to come back) 
just because he can see a bit of movement in the mud and grass 
which he reckons to be one of his mates in a desperately bad 
place - well , it's the same picture really but the true coloUiing 
makes a II the difference. 118 
The ''true colouting" would be provided not only by the multi-volumed written 
history, concentrating upon the actions of named individuals and small groups at the 
front line, but also by a war museum with a similar focus. Both would tell the same 
story, but the former would provide the documentation for, and the latter the physical 
links with, the actions of the AIF enshrined in the project. This multi-faceted 
commemorative project served three main motivations and objectives: to glorify the 
A IF, to construct an Australian history that connected and competed with pre-war 
European propaganda such as the Island Story, and to "educate" the character of 
young Australians through the provision of the " high, unselfish national" lead. 
In the mid-1920s several other objectives were announced in various ways by 
personnel related to the Memorial. These were the almost enti rely contradictory 
objectives of providing simultaneously a sacred space and a source of fami ly 
entertainment. The idea of the sacred had been mentioned publicly as early as April 
1918, in a memorandum circulated to the next-of-kin of each member of the AIF and 
dated 20 April 1918, the first public announcement of the intention to create a war 
museum (not yet memorial), appealing fo r objects so that the "great days and 
adventures" of the war, and the "sacred" sacrifices of Australians at home and abroad, 
vvou ld not be forgotten. 119 However, from the beginning the sacred was fused with the 
triumphal. The designation of captured weapons of war as sacred things naturally 
promoted this fusion, as did certain of Bean 's public statements. For instance, in In 
11 ~ C.E.W. Bean to Gavin Long. 30 June 1930. in C.E.W. Bean, Making the Legend: The war writings 
of C.£. W. Bean, selected by Denis Winter, (St Lucia: University of Queensland Press. 1992), p.236. 
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Your Hands, he wrote that "You wi ll put up a memoria l to them -a memorial which 
will enclose for ever the sacred relics of their fighting, and the treasured, precious 
pictures of their sacrifice. "120 
The feelings that the memory of the dead was sacred, and that remembering 
the dead publicly was a sacred task. were extremely common in many belligerent 
countries, although fusing the notion to triumph was not. Bean inclicated in many 
places that be felt the Memorial, when finally it was built in Canberra, would be a 
sacred space, and that the objects being displayed in the southem capitals in the 
meantime were sacred as well. Bean did not develop this idea in the 1919 proposal 
which oriented the Memorial's inter-war operation. It was not until 1928 that Bean 
made a major public statement about the Memorial which dwelt almost entirely on 
this notion, without the admixture of triumphal ism. 
Bean, master propagandist that he was, used the sacred strategically. For 
example, in a March 1925 letter to Alderman William Brooks of the Federal Capital 
Association, Bean attempted to show hi m why the Memorial would be a better 
memorial in Canberra than the one Brooks 's organisation had proposed, one dedicated 
to Captain James Cook. The Memorial would be, he wrote, a "still more sacred" 
memorial than the one to Cook, and offered to show the Alderman around the displays, 
soon to open in Sydney, personally: "1 think l can show you that this War Memorial is 
sacred ground for Australians."121 By contrasting the secu lar memory of Cook and the 
sacred memory of the ATF, Bean was creating a powerfu l rhetorica l dialectic. 
In the early, " triumphal," period of Australian post-war commemoration, 
display of "historically important" objects was extremely popular, and thus this was the 
main thmst ofthe 1919 programme. By 1928, while the anniversaries of victories were 
celebrated and the ADCC's Anzac Day was at its most triumphal, Bean identified a 
strong public undercurrent of unease towards mi litary subjects, runni ng contrary to the 
public respect almost universal ly given to the soldiers and the dearth of open dissent. In 
his public relat ions statements, such as his evidence to the crucial Public Works 
Committee hearing which decided the museum's fate, he dwelt at length on the sacred, 
for it had enom1ous emotional appeal without being at al l controversial. The sacred 's 
PO 
- Bean, In Your Hands, p. l 0. 
121 C. E. W. Bean to William Brooks, 24 March 1925. A WM 38 3DRL 7953, Item 60. 
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star was on the rise by 1928 as triumphalism's popu larity reached its pinnacle and 
began to fall. 
Bean did, however, refer to AlF military glory indirectly, through his discussion 
of the overtly "commemorative" elements of the Memorial's design, particularly the 
Ha ll of Memory, and in a general statement. The latter made an argument increasingly 
common in the late 1920s, which was that "whatever one might think about war, 
nothing could ever detract from the importance of Australia's part in the war." 122 The 
former blended the sacred and the triumphal carefully. The Hall of Memory would, 
Bean asserted , contain some suitable relics, "such as the signed speech of the Bishop of 
Amiens" seen in Chapter Two: "these things would be indicative, as it were, of the 
world's tribute to the men of the AIF." 123 He also stated, on several occasions, that the 
Memorial would not g lorify war, and claimed that ''we have set out with the definite 
intention , as shown in the drawings of Will Dyson, to depict, as far as possible, the 
sufferings and misery ofwar." 124 
Several comments may be made upon this public relations statement. Firstly, as 
the 1919 plan indicated beyond any doubt, this was never the institution 's original 
predominant intention. As Chapter Six demonstrates, miseries and sufferings were 
depicted as ordeals overcome. Secondly, with cet1ain exceptions the misery of war was 
subsumed by the victory won, as Chapters Four to Six explore. Thirdly, Will Dyson's 
drawings were less popular even wi th Bean than he was asserting; they were only 
mentioned in his first guide to the institution in reference to their humour, and it was 
not until the exh ibitions in Sydney that their depictions of miseries were highl ighted. 
Memorial Curator and Acting Director, A.G. Pretty, stated plainly in 1923 that he had 
had great trouble selling reproductions of Dyson 's work, because the public did not like 
it: "Dyson's impressions were too heavy and stressed the more miserable aspects of the 
soldier's li fe. That sort of thing people want to forget as rapidly as possible.'' 125 
To round out the extraordinarily complex and contradictory objectives of the 
Memorial, it was also conceived during the inter-war years to be an entertainment, as 
I" 
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well as a national educator teaching from the spoi ls of victory and a sacred space. For 
example, on 25 March 1925, just over a week before the Memorial's Sydney 
exhibition opened, Pretty, again Acting Director, authorised the release of a long 
advertising piece to newspapers in Brisbane and country New South Wales. It began: 
"Visitors to Sydney this Easter will fi nd that the Royal Show has a close rival as 
regards interest and patronage in the Austra lian War Memorial Museum which has 
been transferred from Melbourne and housed in the Exhibition Building in Prince 
Alfred Park.'' 1 ~6 The press release then continued with a definitive statement of some 
of the Memorial's fundamental principles: 
The collections wh ich comprise this national monument to those 
members of the Royal Australian Navy, and Australian Imperial 
Force, who gave their lives for their country, are regarded as the 
finest of their kind in existence. Their chann and interest is not 
due as much to the varied nature of the military equipment 
shown, as the close assoc iation of the majority of the exhibits 
with the experience of the troops. 127 
This \Vas the most solemn section of the release, pointing out that the museum was a 
national memOJi al, making the assertion of the collection's supremacy, and 
underlining the fundamental aspect of the objects, their status as physically con11ected 
with the men and their lives. 
The release then outl ined the displays, in a relentlessly upbeat list: 
Relics of lucky escapes, smal l articles closely associated with 
deeds of gallantry, exhibits wl1ich bear testimony to chivalrous 
acts on the part of the enemy, expressions of appreciation by 
leaders, and those for whom the men fought, are there and claim 
the close attention of the most casua l visitor .... Po11raits of great 
leaders and others who earned distinction look down from the 
walls.. .. By means of picture models, all highly artistic 
productions, visitors are brought face to face with incidents of 
note in the history of the AJF .... War worn flags , carried in the 
field by their respective units, hang from the pillars of this place 
of sacred memory. 128 
126 Memorandum for Chief Clerk, Australian War Memorial, fi·om Acting Di rector, Australian War 
Memorial, 25 March 1925, attachment. A WM 265 17/2/3. 
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According to this press release, the Memorial vvas a p lace for affirmation, a sacred 
space where experiences were positive, men were not maimed and destroyed by war 
but shovvn in their most heroic light, 'vvhere war was a dangerous adventure through 
wh ich the nation had come gloriously. This might have been an institution that 
remembered service, but there is no mention of sacrifice anywhere in the release, nor 
of death, nor fear, nor horTor, nor any other "anti-war" message. As we shall see in 
Chapters Four to Six, this was indeed exactly how the displays represented the war, 
albeit accompanied by considerably more considerations of the cost and futi li ty of the 
war than this list would suggest. 
Two comments may be made about this kind of advertising. Firstly, by 
emphasising adventure and escapes, it appealed to the impulse towards forgetting the 
war - at least, that is, forgett ing the most horrible aspects of it - that Pretty had 
identified in 1923. If war was an adventure which retained a sense of danger, and 
even an acknowledgement of death, but was cleansed of its fearful smells, its 
nauseating sights. and its terrible moral dilemmas, it could be popularly accepted as a 
subject of public discourse in the inter-war years. Secondly, and far more importantly, 
striving to entertain had fundamenta l impl ications for the message of the Memorial as 
the Australian National War Memorial. No other national, State or local memorial 
attempted to entertain; they promoted a solemnity that saw any levity in their sight as 
sacrilege. Witness the text of the Shrine of Remembrance in Melboume, opened in 
1934: 
LET ALL MEN KNOW THIS IS HOLY GROUND 
THIS SHRINE ESTABLISHED IN THE HEARTS OF MEN AS ON THE SOLID 
EARTH COMMEMORATES A PEOPLE'S FORTITUDE AND SACRIFICE 
YE THAT COME AFTER GIVE REMEMBRANCE. 129 
As Inglis and other authors show, war memorials in Australia were perceived as the 
most serious of public spaces. 130 Uti lity was rejected forcefully, levity much more so. 
IZ<> Quoted in Inglis. Sacred Places, p.2. 
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Many, from communists to women, were criticised fo r intruding upon spaces 
perceived as sacred, and there was strong criti cism of Anzac Day race meetings and 
hotel trade, both of which were subsequently banned. 131 Entertai nment was most 
certainly neither intended or delivered in Austra l ian State or local war memorials, or 
indeed national memorials in Britain, France or the USA. 
But the Memorial was a different kind of memorial. It was a museum, and 
took on many of the roles that such an insti tutional form implied - education, 
naturall y, but also entertai nment. Aware that the Memorial was an expensive 
publicly-funded institution, its creators felt they had to compete with other popular 
enteJtainments. for they wanted a popular (hence large) and not just a museum-going 
audience to ensure continuity of fu nding. Stri vi ng always to be popular, the Mem01ial 
promised excitement, which, as we shall see, it delivered in a number of displays. 
McKeman shows clearly that one of the objectives of Bean and Treloar was to make 
the Memorial so popular it could not be shut down by any political party without a 
huge outcry. This was one of the reasons for the desire to entertain and its attendant 
pressures on selection of content for the displays. The Memorial would appeal to the 
senses. the intellect, the emotions of awe, reverence and enjoyment. 
lt may be this objective that explai ns the Memorial's anti-Ge1man tendencies 
which, desp ite Bean's stated intentions to the contrary, ... vere a significant element of 
the overall rhetorical complex. For instance, Bean appears to use the legendary 
German "Frightfulness" to distract readers of his guide from contemplation of the 
honors of the Pozieres bombardments. In a section entitled "What England Escaped," 
Bean calls attention to the German phrase book included in showcase No.1 0. ln this 
phrasebook. which was "captured about this time [August I 916]," were "the phrases 
which German soldiers were to employ in conversing with English country people in 
the event of an invasion of England." They provided evidence of the ''frightfulness" 
of the Hun: "One phrase states ... 'We are not barbarians as people often say,' but 
another conversation-book shown elsewhere in the Museum contains the il luminating 
phrase, 'I will have you shot and destroy the vill age. '"132 Surely sacrifice to defend 
loved ones from such beasts was worthwhile? No editorial comment was made, a 
policy which Bean adopted throughout the Memorial. a technique emphasising 
13 1 D . "P . L P bl ' . 
· . amous1, nvate . oss, u 1c Moummg," pp.37 1-6. 
132 Relics and Records, September 1922, pp. l?-18; Apri l 1928, pp.20-1 ; December 1931 , p.24. 
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au thenticity. However, he used the far more subtle and powerful method of " indirect' ' 
editoriaL as Chapter Five examines. One more example shall suffice to show the level 
of antagonism that was seen in places. A I 932 label referred to "Ville-Sur-Ancre, a 
miserable little village," in which "the Huns put up an obstinate resistance and were 
responsible for at least one act of treachery- a German officer pretending to sunender 
h I . ]' ,)3' and t en s 1ootmg an Austra Ian. · 
Finally, Bean and Treloar harboured a desire to "appropriate" the Memorial's 
returned soldier audience. Bean and Treloar wanted returned soldier support, 
specifically seeking approval of the war nanative and other representations. Soldiers' 
narratives were deferred to and generally viewed with great respect, and their 
acceptance of the Memorial's messages might bring it general respect, approval and 
social status. In order to achieve this rapport with the soldier audience, the very modem 
museological practice of "appropriating the visitor through the use of the second 
person'' was used within the Memorial's representations. 134 Soldiers were addressed 
directly quite often both in the disp lays themselves and in Bean 's guides. For example, 
in his first guide Bean mentioned "a 4.7[-inch] gun - a Ladysm ith veteran - which wi ll 
be recal led by Australians who served at Anzac as a good friend on the left flank." 135 
This and other messages to veterans were sometimes very revealing, as in his 193 I 
book, in which Bean wrote that, on viewing the Somme plan model "the soldier who 
fought on these fie lds will find his memory wonderfully refreshed." 136 Considering the 
horror of the fighting on the Somme, thi s assertion is startling, but reflected Bean's 
predominantly upbeat public presentation of the war. lt also mirrored the Age's report 
1
'
11 
"Vil lc-Sur-Ancrc," label attached to letter, Curator, Australian War Memorial, Sydney (Lcs Bain) to 
Director, Australian War Memorial, Melbourne (JohnTreloar). 2X December 1932. A WM 265 21 /415, 
Part 7. 
1
" Sec Parker B. Potter, "Appropriat ing the Visitor by Addressing the Second Person," in Susan M. 
Pearce (cu.). Museums and the Appropriation o{ Culture, (London: Athlone, 1994), pp.l 03-28. This 
was but one of many rnuseological innovations introduced by the Memorial. It also saw the creation, by 
Treloar. of low-reflection cases for the Canberra Memorial and the perfection of the diorama. 
135 Relics and Records, September 1922, p.9: April 1928, p.l3; December 1931, p. 13. The 
anthropomorphising of guns was a very common practice in the Memorial, as it had been during the 
war. Sec for example Mclboume Photograph 63, "A Powerfu l Friend," whose label reiterated the 
practice: '"H ilda.' a 12-inch Howitzer on Railway Hill, in the Ypres Sector, in November. 19 17. 
'Hi lda· was 11Ccustomed to taking up different positions on the railway line, and firing on special 
targets in enemy territory." Melbourne Photograph 63: Sydney Photograph 167. Relics and Records, 
September 1922, p.73; Apri l 192S, p.94: December 1931, p.95. See also Clayton, "To the Victor," Part 
3. pp. 1 X-20. 
116 Relics wuf Records, April 1928, p.19; December 193 1, p.20. 
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on the opening of the Melbourne ex hibition in 1922, which stated that the day had seen 
veterans "fighting their battles over again ." 137 It would appear that Bean felt such 
positivity was appropriate to an audience he had an intimate knowledge of, even in the 
1930s. 
Treloar 's copy was more informa l in tone and addressed the returned sold ier 
constituency more directly. He wrote qui te a few labels in a style much more akin to 
the informal, jocular and droll tone of "internal" Alf li terature than that of official 
commemoration. us This vvas used at times to declare the supremacy of the AIF, as in 
the following labe l: 
THE RATIONS THE HUNS DID NOT RECEIVE 
A table setting forth the food to be issued on the 8 11' Aug., 
1918, to the members of a German regiment opposed to the 
Au stralians. Early in the morning of that day, however, the 
British , Canadians and Australians made a rapid advance 
into the G erman position , which it is only reasonable to 
suppose, upset the Huns' culinary arrangements. 139 
This may be compared to Bean: 
On [a small notice board] was written in chalk the menu for the 
German soldiers' meals that day - so many grammes [sic) of 
preserved meat, groats, potatoes, etc. Owing to the swiftness of 
the attack, some of these meals were certainly never eaten."140 
Together these encapsulate the extremes of emotion and of factua l statement that 
combined to create displays which claimed pure realism while purporting to display 
"the spirit of the AIF." The "dash" embodied in Treloar 's label was, the Memorial 
argued, every bit as real as the domestic item to whjch it was attached. 
To reiterate, Bean was a martial nationalist, but not a bell icose milita1ist by 
any means. ln the pre-war era he believed deeply that Australians exhibited many 
m Age, 26 April 1922, p.8. 
138 RSSILA magazine art icles, fo r example. 
139 Label A WM.854: "The Rations the Huns Did Not Receive." Attachment, Bain to Treloar 28 
December 1932. A WM 265 21/4/5, Part 7. I have chosen to use bold type for all labels, as this 
replicates the appearance of the Memorial's original labels. On the other hand. books are not rendered 
in bold. 
140 Relics and Records. September 1922, p.28. 
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mora l virtues '.Vhich he felt were characteristically .. British" and which he valued 
highly. These included love of truth, reserve and courage. He also believed Australian 
men had enormous military potential due to constant battles with men and nature. 
Bean's martial nationalism developed during his war service, along with a great love, 
awe and respect for Australian soldiers and the AI F as an organisation. 
Reactions to the Memorial from political elites were overwhelmingly positive. 
As a publicly-funded organ]sation from its inception, answerable to a Minister and 
from 1925 legislati vely established, the Memorial had principall y to convince 
parliament, rather than the Australian people generally, that it was a worthwhile 
commemorative project . This the museum did, although it is clear that two separate 
cultures existed in post-war Australia, and the contours of their conflicts could often 
be seen animating debates on the Memorial. Some observers, who subscribed to an 
"anti-monumental" view of war memories, opposed the Memorial in a matmer that 
illuminates it by refl ection. 
IV 
In 1920 the A WMC offered both Victoria and New South Wales half-shares of the 
exhibi ts. The offer brought forth a number of differing reactions in vatious quarters; 
again the ''two cultures" showed their differences and their passion. This was 
especiall y the case when the New South Wales ALP Govemment under John Storey 
politely declined the offer, on the basis that " no central accommodation" existed. 141 
The loyalist Sydney Morning Herald was not amused, and in its articles in support of 
the Memotial endorsed a perceived martial nationalis t institution. Firstly, the Herald 
announced in August 1920 that the Memorial's collection consisted of "all sorts of 
relics (too numerous to mention) which were snatched out of the very heat of some 
immortal performance of Australian so ldiers," that is, that it was evidence of great 
Australian military deeds, and should therefore be accepted. 142 The Govemment did 
not agree, however, and it was not until 1925, following the election in 1922 of the 
Fu ller Nationalist Govenunent and the opportunity in late 1924 of obtaining a lease 
on a suitable exhi bition space, that the Memorial moved to Sydney. 
1 ~ 1 Srdner Morning Herald. 20 A ugust 1920. p.8. 
~ ~~ Srdne1· Morning Herald, 20 A ugust 1920, p.8. 
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The Right were vocal in their satisfaction with the change of govemment in 
1922, and when ALP members of the Sydney City Council, which owned the 
Exhibi tion Building, again expressed reservation, they were denounced in a long and 
revea ling article. 143 The comments which the Herald found so distasteful had been 
uttered by Aldennan Richard Bramston, whose declaration of opposition was 
exemplary of the so-called "disloyalisf' group who were especially war-weary. He 
announced simply that "we do not want an exhibition of the implements of war, and it 
should be dumped over the Gap, so that we may forget all about the war." 144 War, 
Bramston felt, was horrifying, its implements all the more so. Such reminders of an 
awful confl ict were not to be publicly displayed, the alderman argued. Bramston 's 
statement represented a clear argument against the bel ief that trophies symbolised the 
''great deeds' ' of the AIF which ought to be permanently represented in public space, 
and this dialectic between remembrance and forgetting was a principal element of 
arguments sun·ounding the Memorial. 
This line of reasoning brought forth strenuous denunciation from the Herald, 
along with a definitive defence of the Memorial on martial nationalist lines. Firstly, 
the Herald invoked national pride, based fim1ly upon military actions and linked 
deliberately to the community of the dead: 
The Labour [sic] pa1iy is, with all Australians, proud, and rightl y 
so, of the present international prestige of Australia. Who made 
it? [s it not reared on the bones of 60,000 Australian dead, the 
flower of their generation, whose supreme thought during the 
. f . f h . l ? 145 exactmg years o war servtce was o t e1r 1ome country . 
143 The attitude of conservatives to the change in government was exemplified in the Anzac Day edition 
of The Sydney Mail in 1922, which fol lowed an image of tl1c Anzacs being crowned with a laurel of 
oak leaves in a classical allusion to victory with a spiteful attack on the departed ALP State 
Government: "The anniversary of Anzac Day is happily come this year with a change of government. 
The antipathy to the soldiers that characte1ised the previous Admi nistration was openly shown when it 
determined to cancel the preference law. The business community loyall y stood to it. Their 
Government did not. The retumed men now have a government that can be depended upon to do its 
best in their interests." The Sydney A·'fail, 26 April 1922, p.6. The Nationalist-RSSI LA compact had by 
1922 fim1ly established the former as the party of the Diggers, and the fact that large prop011ions of the 
business community had not "loyally stood to' ' the preference law at all was simply ignored. See Ward, 
A Nation for a Conrinent, p. l38 on the problems of enforcing the preference law in the private sector. 
144 Sydney Morning Herald, 14 August 1924, p.9. T he Gap is a clit"f on South Head, Sydney Harbour. 
14. ~Sydney 111/orning Herald, 15 August 1924, p.8. 
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Those who dared question the conduct of the war were then attacked, as were those 
"Australianists," such as the DisTributing Trades Gaze ffe writer of 1916, who had cast 
the war in strictly Australian, and therefore rebellious, terms: 
We hold it disgraceful that the service of our gallant youth in the 
years from J 914 to 1919 should be derided and maligned, as it so 
often is , here in their own homeland. It is the fas hion among 
some who prate about their Australian sentiments, not only to 
advocate the burying of the memory of that service out of sight, 
but to besmirch the high spirit in which it was offered. 146 
The Memorial was, the paper argued, a collection of evidences of great national 
service, indicative of a "high spirit" of loyalism. It would bring audiences closer to the 
dead, for it was "a priceless collection of their relics, a faint facsimile (as good as it 
could be made) of details of their story, a thing which will remind us of a debt and 
pride everlasting."147 
The Herald elaborated somewhat disingenuously on its assertion that the 
Men1orial offered a "facsimi le of details of their story," arguing that the Memorial 's 
collection ought to be accepted and displayed because it emboclied a vital element of 
Austra lia's national history, the story of the nation's life in the world, and therefore 
could not possibly be controversial: 
Strange indeed that some people in Sydney shou ld make such a 
national record a matter of party politics! Is a party political issue 
established about any treasured rei ics of Cook's landing or 
Phillip's foundation efforts; or about the mighty days of the gold 
rush: or about the heroic achievements of the inland explorers 
and the pioneers who fo llowed them? Do we remember their 
deeds now in some farcical distortion to influence a vote on some 
ephemeral issue in local politics today? 148 
Some issues were above party pol itics, the Herald was arguing, those being matters 
closely associated with the glorious history of the Australian nation. None could argue 
with these historical relics being "treasured," nor oppose dominant interpretations of 
their importance. The disingenuousness involved in claiming direct congruence 
between eighteenth-century events and those of less than a decade previous, ignoring 
146 Sydner Morning Herald, 15 August 1924, p.8. 
1~ 7 Sydney Morning Hercdd, 15 A ugust 1924, p.8. 
1 4.~ Snlney Morning Herald, 15 A ugust 1924, p.8. 
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the considerable number of political issues that still reverberated around war 
memories - repatriation and preference to name only two - which the other events 
and phenomena mentioned patently lacked, is notable, and was typical of such 
mainstream agencies as the Herald. Through its support, the article linked the 
Mem01ial to its attack on those who ''derided and maligned" war service, that is, the 
New South Wales Labour Party. 
The Herald's was a typical martial nationalist argument, predicated on the 
assumption that specifically narional issues existed, and the complementary assertion 
that in relation to these issues no division of opinion should exist. Social unity was 
urged on "national questions." Of course, what constituted a national question, and 
what the unified position on each such question ought to be were themselves 
important matters. The ability to declare a particular issue "national,'' and to an even 
greater degree the ability to define the issue's content and f01ms, conferred 
considerable social and formal poli tical power which was, as we have seen, seized by 
the RSSILA, the Nationa lists and other loyalist groups. 
In parliament in 1925 and 1928, debates lent strong approval , overall, to 
Bean 's main objectives for the Memorial, and to the assumptions about the Alf and 
Australian nationalism which underpinned them. There were several dissenters, one 
especially trenchant. although the institution certainly a lways enjoyed overwhelming 
in-ptinciple support from lawmakers. During debates on the Australian War Memorial 
Bill, differing visions of Australian nation-building were observable from either side 
of the House in speeches on the Memorial. Firstly, Donald Cameron, returned officer 
and strong suppot1er of the Memorial , strongly echoed the 1916 ideas of Bean and 
Pearce in their desire to use the Memorial for nationalist education: 
Sentiment and tradition are the soul of a nation. Without 
national sentiment there can be no national life. Symbolism of 
one kind or another has been the form in which sentiment has 
always expressed itself. These collections are symbols of the 
courage, self-sacrifice, and fortitude displayed during the war 
by the men and women of the Australian forces. They will be 
to us a constant reminder of our responsibility for completing 
the task which they began, that of making Australia the greatest 
and the happiest country in the world. 149 
149 CPD, Representatives, vol. l l L 16 September 1925, pp.2482-3. 
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Cameron. like Bean, saw the displays as fables, containing morals on which a nation 
ought to base its ideal behaviour. The final sentence, expressing a common right-wing 
argument also expressed by Glasgovv, was in accord with Bean's thinking, having 
been asserted in In Your Hands, Australians in 1919. 
In 1928. in reply to pressure that the Memorial 's Canberra home was an 
"unreproductive" public work, the Prime Minister, Stanley Melbourne Bruce, 
defended the Memorial in the clearest of nationalist te1ms, arguing that a nation 
without a national war memorial was incomplete. 150 To this, Country Party member 
Victor Thompson added that "no institution is more calculated to create the right 
national atmosphere than a great war memorial." 151 No more powerful invocation of 
the martial nationa list metanarrative could have been made. 
The display of trophies and relics was also strongly supported in the 1925 
debates. Pearce, naturally a big supporter of the practice, praised it because of the 
public acknowledgement it provided for the achievements of specifically named 
individuals and groups. Pearce argued that the practice had been the wish of the 
soldiers: 
The men gladly gave their most precious rel ics in order that the 
achievements of their units might be immortalised in a national 
institution. Many exhibits were presented in the names of fallen 
comrades, in order that the memory of these names might be 
perpetuated in the museum. 152 
Glasgow, Cameron and Sir Nevil le Howse agreed. 153 Bean's intention to remember 
the dead as triumphant heroes was popular with both leaders and the rank-and-file. 
15° CPO, Representat ives, vol. l l9, 4 September 1928. p.6323. Stanley Melbourne Bruce ( 1883-
1967). b. St Ki lda. Victoria. d. London, England. Successful businessman in the pre-war period, with 
extensive contacts in London. Joined Bri ti~h Army in 1915 and served on Gallipoli. Inval ided to 
Eng l~nd and returned to Australia. being discharged in June 19 17. Elected as Nationalist MHR for 
Flinders in 19 17, moti vated by anx ieties over possible socialistic legislat ion as well as "uneconomic" 
government expenditure. Austral ian delegate to League of Nations in 1921. Became Treasurer in 
ll ughcs Government in 1921 and Prime Minister in 1923, serving until 1929. High Commissioner to 
Britain 1933-45. ADB. vo/.7. pp.453-61. 
151 CPO, Representatives, vol. ll 9. 4 September 1928, p.631 X. 
I<' 
·- CPO. Senate. vo l. I I I, 21 August 1925. p.l643. 
153 Gla~gow. CPO. Senate, vol.ll l . 26 August 1925. p.1677; Cameron. CPD. Representatives. vol.ll l . 
16 September 1925, p.2482; Howse, CPO. Representatives, vol.1 18. 2 1 March 1928, pp.3985-6. 
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The proposed location of the Memorial at the foot of Mount Ainslie, directly 
facing the provisiona l parliament house, a lso brought forth nationalist responses. 
Senator Needham commented that he knew of "no more appropriate p lace for the 
erection of a memorial to Australia's valiant dead than the capital city of the nation 
for which they surrendered their lives.' '154 Pearce stated that "the s ite which has been 
chosen faces the front of the provisional Parliament House, and from Parliament 
House to the side of Mount Ainslie there is a prospect which wi ll be practically free 
from bui ldings for all time.' ' 155 The same point was made in 1928 by a series of 
eminent witnesses to the Public Works Committee hearings, from Bean to the 
chai1man of the Federal Capital Commission, Sir Jolm Butters. 156 
On the other hand, several ALP members had counter-proposals, predicated 
on differing visions of national identity. Percy Coleman, for example, suggested the 
creation of a national museum which would have an area "devoted to relics of the Late 
war and previous campaigns, and another portion to hi storical records and interesting 
relics associated with the discovery and development of Austra lia." 157 Coleman was 
proposing the widening of the scope of histoiical thinking in Australia. which would 
have allowed the ALP's "developmentaL" non-martial, nationalism more space in the 
public historical sphere. Notably, this idea accorded with one of Bean's original 
suggestions, expressed in early J 9 J 8, which had subsequently been quietly dropped. 
This had occurred without specific explanation, but on the evidence of the 
parliamentary debates. was most likely due to the fact that political support existed 
only for a national museum of m ilitary deeds. Coleman's idea was simply ignored by 
the Government, and the Bill passed. 
Several Labor members spoke for the Memorial. but interpreted it quite 
differently to the conservatives. For instance, party leader Matthew Charlton 
recognised that the Memorial taught history lessons, but saw no inspiration issuing 
from them: "Let us hope that it will be a lesson to them, so that in their time they will 
154 CPD, Representat ives. vol. l ll, 26 August 1925, pp. l6 75-6 
155 CPD. Representatives, vol. l l l, 21 August 1925, p. l643. 
1s6 Sydney Morning Herald, 28 April 1928, p.l8. On Butters, see ADB. ,-ol. 7. pp.512-l4. 
157 CPD, Representatives, vol.l 11, 16 September 1925, p.248l. Percy Edmund Coleman ( 1892-
1934), b. Surrey Hills, NSW, d. Concord, NSW. Worked as a union official before the war. Served in 
the AIF in 1918. Union official again after the war. ALP MHR for Reid 1922-3 1. ADB, vo/.8 , pp.65-6. 
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not have a repetition of the horrors of war. I do not advocate the establishment of this 
f l . . h . h " I ' 8 Tl . museum for the purpose o popu an smg t e war; qUite t e reverse. · 11 s was a 
rather serious expression of reservation, for as we have seen it directly contradicted 
the Memorial's stated policy of ensuring that the deeds of the Australian soldiers were 
pem1anently remembered. Edward Mann replied that ' 'the museum will not be an 
encouragement to war," which was true, but tbe reply did not rea ll y match the tenns 
of the concern, fo r encouraging and populari sing are entirely different things. 159 
Charlton's colleague Percy Colem an claimed he supported the Memorial , but 
not because it would educate "our children in the national spirit, which Australians 
would wish to animate their country," but rather because it was "a perpetual reminder 
of the horror and innate savagery of modern warfare."16° Finally, Coleman, 
supposedly a supporter of the Memorial, made a direct critici sm of its collection, and 
through this, an implied critici sm of its enti re proj ect: " I admit that it is filled with 
interesting hi storical relics, but amongst them also are devilish examples of 
mechanical ingenu ity, conta ining nothing that appeals to the Chris tian instincts of 
man kind." 161 Coleman's Christianity differed from the muscular, chivalrous 
Christianity o f the English gentleman, the Australian "public" school s, and, in Bean 's 
view, the AIF itself. 
Conservatives felt constrained to remonstrate with the ALP. Repl ying to 
Coleman 's speech, Nationalist Charles Man reiterated the right-wing interpretation of 
the Memorial's displ ays, saying "I do not share the view of the honourable member 
that the memorial may remind our people of the tragic s ide o f war only. One cannot 
view the collectio n o f reco rds and relics that has been made without being reminded 
of the great deeds o f Australians." 162 He did provide, however, examp les o f such 
15
' CPD, Representatives, vol. l l1 . 16 September 1925, p.248 1. Matthew Charlton ( 1866-1948), b. 
Ballarat. Victoria, d. Lambton. NSW. ALP MH R for Hunter, 19 10-28. Voted for W .M. Hughes's 
conscription referendum bi I I. but did not follow Hughes out of the Caucus Room and into the 
Nationalist Party. Encouraged voluntary recruit ing during the war and opposed the 1918 resolution of 
the ALP confe rence to demand conditions in return for ful l support of the war effort . ALP party leader 
1922-8. A DB. ro/. 7, pp.617 -19. 
1
'° CPD, Representatives. vol. I l l, 16 September 1925, p.248 1. 
I<>O Bean to Pearce, March 19 18. AMW 93 12/12/1, Part l: CPD, Representatives. vol. l 11, 16 September 
1925. p.24R3. 
161 CPD. Representatives, vo l. l ll, 16 September 1925, p.2483. 
16~ CPD, Representatives. vol.l 11, 16 September 1925, p.2484. Sir Charles Willia m Cia nan Marr 
( 1880-1960). b. Sydney. NSW. d. Pymble, NSW. Public servant and member of the volunteer mi li tary 
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deeds which were non-martial in characler: the flight of Ross Smith, which had 
nothing to do \vith the memorial's real collection policy parameters, and the (under-
displayed) work of nurses. He argued that the Memorial did not "cultivate in the 
minds of young Austral ians a desire fo r war." and that he would not have supported it 
if it had. Nevertheless, it was to contain things of which Austra lians could be proud. 
The dialectic between the two sides was here clearly on display. 
The political strength of martial nationalism in inter-war Australia is 
il lustrated by the parliamentary debates of 1928 and 1929. These concerned the 
question of whether the Memorial ought to remain open or have its operation 
suspended and the erection of its permanent Canbena home postponed on the grounds 
of economy. Under the pre-Keynesian economic orthodoxies of the late 1920s, 
deflat ionary policies were dictated, being manifest in large cuts to government 
expenditure. 163 As a result. many members, including some right-wing members, saw 
in the Memorial expenditure which cou ld be cut back upon during the crisis, and 
several suggested postponement. However, almost a ll , including the vast majority of 
ALP members. were very careful to preface their suggestions with avowals of support 
for the returned soldiers and respect for the dead. They went out of their way to 
declare that their calls for suspension of pub! ic works or the museum in Sydney were 
based purely on economic grounds. All were certain that appearing "anti-Digger'' was 
politically disastrous. 
A typical example of economic opposition to the Memorial came from the 
ALP member George Yates, whose argument combined a statement of respect for the 
soldiers and in-principle support for the construction of a National War Memorial 
with a strong assertion that the greater duty of the parliament was to see to the welfare 
of Jiving returned soldiers and the families of the dead. He claimed that he could not 
"be accused of want of appreciation for the efforts of the soldiers" because he himself 
was a returned sold ier. 164 He had, he declared, no in-principle objection to the 
forces before the war. Commanded AIF uni ts in Mesopotamia during the war. Nationalist MHR for 
Parkes 1919-29. 193 1-43. Held a series of senior positions in NSW anti Federal Nationalist Party. ADB. 
voi.IO, pp.418-19. 
163 On fi scal pol icy see Rodney Maddock, Australian Fiscal Policy in the Thirties: A reappraisal. 
Working Papers in Economic History. (Canberra: Australian National University Press, 1985): more 
generally see C. B. Schedvin. Australia and the Great Depression: A study of economic development 
and policy in rhe 1920s and 1930s, (Sydney: Sydney University Press, 1970). 
164 CPD. Representatives. vol.l 19, 13 June 1928, p.6079. 
175 
building of a memorial, but he was sure the large amount of money involved "could 
be better spent in the relief of distressed soldiers."165 He had a practical argument as 
well: "I would be prepared to go to the limit in assisting the soldiers and those 
dependent on them, but how many diggers will ever see a memorial at the foot of 
Mount Ainslie?" 166 Instead of such an impractical scheme, Yates suggested that the 
government "fi rst give the consumptive soldiers enough to live on for the rest of their 
lives, and see that no man who has suffered for his country was in want.'' 167 He 
reminded the House with some bitterness that "sounding the reveille will not wake a 
single dead soldier."168 Yates' s argument represents a fair summary of the views of 
those who in 1928 and 1929 opposed the allocation of monies to the Memorial on the 
authority of the then-prevai ling economic orthodoxy of deflationary, cost-cutting 
fi I 1. 169 tsca po tcy. 
It is particularly telling that Yates accused Henry Gullett, friend and colleague 
of Bean, A WRS collector and strident supporter of the Memorial, of "merely playing 
up to the war sentiment, with one eye cocked to the next election" in a speech he had 
made in favour of the institution. 170 Yates attacked Gullett often, but the nature of this 
jibe implies that Yates, at least, felt that there was a legitimate "war sentiment" in 
Australia to which one might appeal as a politician. Considering the nature of 
Australian pub lic memories, full of triumphalism as they were, it is not impossible to 
imagine that this was true - a fascinating topic for further study. 
In 1928, the distinct air of criticism in Coleman's "support" of 1925 was 
exceeded by Frank Brennan, who took aim at the Memorial on the grounds that it 
perpetuated enmities: 
165 CPD. Representatives. vol. l 19, 13 June 1928. p.6079. 
I (>(• CPD. Representatives, vol.ll 9. 13 June 1928. p.6079. 
167 CPD. Representatives, vol.l l9, 13 June 1928. p.6079. 
I <·~ CPD, Representatives, vol. ll9, 13 June 1928. p.6079. 
•r.o Other members who advocated postponement of the Memorial's construction were Edward Mann 
(Nationalist). 30 August 192R: George Bell (Nationalist). 30 August 192R and 22 November 1929; 
M<Jtthew Charlton (ALP), 31 August 1928: George Maxwell (Nationalist) , 31 August 1928; Percy 
Stewart (Country Progress Party), 31 August 1928: John Curtin (ALP), 22 November 1929: and John 
Parker Moloney (ALP), 22 August 1929. 
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What is this useless and most expensive memorial designed to do 
except to remind succeeding generations that we engaged in a 
bloody conflict, extending over four years, with our brothers and 
sisters of another nation, who, like ourselves, were members of 
the white race? Long after the fee ling of hosti lity is forgotten, 
and the absurd prejudices that gave rise to the war have been laid 
aside, and buried in obli vion, thi s memori al, if erected, will 
record that we fough t - as doubtless most men believe we did - a 
just war against a barbarous and unjust people. 171 
Brennan and Bean agreed that the Memorial materialised a spirit, but they were 
diametricall y opposed as to what that spi rit was. For Bean it was the spirit of the great 
deeds of great men. Brennan, on the other hand, felt it would materialise "the war 
spirit" of enmity. Brennan ·s racial affinity with the Germans had not been fash ionable 
in Australia for many years. Bean actually agreed with Breru1an to the extent that he 
campaigned for a more magnanimous settlement towards Germany, but the anti-
Gennan displays in the Memorial, almost impossib le to replace en masse, remained in 
place. 
Brennan's most radical suggestion was the logical complement of his assertion 
that the Memorial, through its method of remembering the war, perpetuated enmities. 
This was the simple suggestion, which Aldennan Bramston had already expressed in 
Sydney. that all reminders of the war be removed, and the memory of the war cast 
into the abyss: 
I am one of those who bel ieve that no useful purpose can be 
served by perpetuating the memory of the war as war... 
Rather than erect such memorials, let us rei ieve the distress, the 
suffering, the loss, arisi ng out of the war; let us pay the debts we 
incurred in connexion with it; let us, if possible, forget the last 
war and the tragedies and foll ies associated with it, and devote 
our energies to the building of a new world, based on a better 
understanding among nations. 1 72 
171 CPD, Representatives. vol. l 19, 31 August 1928, p.6289. Francis Brennan ( 1873-1 950), b. Upper 
Emu Creek. Victoria. Catholic lay preacher and lawyer specialisi11g in union business pre-1914. ALP 
MHR for Batman 19 11-31, 1934-49. Early opponent of Australian involvement in the war. Attorney-
general in Scullin Government 1929-3 1. Consistent and strong proponent of anti-mil itarism and 
pacifism. ADB. vol. 7, pp.400-2. 
172 CPD, Representatives, vol. 119, 31 August 1928, p.6289. 
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Bre1man deliberately separated his objections from those of the far more mainstream 
"economic objectors:" "This matter is one of fundamental importance; it is not a 
question merely of economy, and I do not on that ground, important though it be, base 
h . f I . I " 173 H' b. . f my objection to t e erect1on o t 1e war memona . IS o ~ ect10ns were ones o 
principle, and he wished this to be recorded. 
Brennan was certainly correct that the Memorial wished to "perpetuate the 
memory of the war as war," as did the RSSILA, and, at least in the first decade, the 
Nationalists. The war was not just transfom1ed into a spiritual ordeal - victories were 
publicly recalled until the end of the 1920s, and even beyond, as we have seen. For 
Brennan, the war was too terrible to remember. This was because of what he 
remembered - "the distress, the suffering, the loss, arising out of the war." He wished 
to forget these, and in this wish he was joined by a large number of Australians, as 
Bain's comment regarding his inability to sell Dyson's atiwork attests. Immediately 
after the war few wished to remember these issues, but many, as we have seen, fo und 
positive memories as well, and were happy to express them. Stridently, Brennan 
argued that the war, and all the regressive elements of human nature which it 
embodied, ought to be forgotten so as to build up a better society and intemational 
climate. He and Bean saw the same war with very different eyes, for Bean saw in the 
Memotial 's educati ve mission, using trophies and relics to carry stories of inspiration 
which would become new traditions, another path to a better nation. at least. Brennan 
represented the anti -monumental culture, as Bean represented the monumental. 
In opposing the Memorial on the grounds that it might perpetuate enmities, 
Brennan was in a min01ity: most Australians, along with the large majority of citizens 
of most other bel ligerent nations, wished to see permanent memoria ls, including a 
pem1anent national mem01ial, tmafraid of whether these might tend to promote 
enmity. Certainly, very few members shared Brennan 's fears. Only Richard Crouch 
and George Yates were wi lling to go as far as he was in criticisms of the Memorial's 
concept and form. 174 Glasgow, for example, agai n emphasised martial virtues, 
173 CPD. Represcntalivcs. vol.ll 9. 31 August 1928. p.6289. 
174 Richard Armstrong Crouch ( 1868- 1949), b. Ballarat East. Victoria, d. Port Lonsdale. Victoria. 
Member of Austral ian Natives Association in the 1890s. Dcakini te M HR for Corio 190 1-10. Served in 
the mi litia before I 019 and supported peacetime conscription. Commanded 22"d Banal ion on Gallipoli 
until September 1915, then Mudros base camp. Invalided back to Australia in March 1916 and 
ca mpaigned against conscription for overseas service. President of the Victorian branch of the 
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declaring that " it is our bounded duty to see that the names of these men and their 
great achievements are not forgotten.' ' 175 After Brennan's attack, in 1929, White 
elaborated further on the concept: "certainly those men who lost their lives in the 
service of their country will not be forgotten in thi s generation ... but will the next 
generation remember, and the next? This memorial is designed to be a perpetual 
reminder throughout the ages of the sacrifices made by those who died for their 
country.'' 176 
Despite its strenuousness, Frank Brennan 's objection to the Memorial , 
expressed in August 1928, elici ted only one truly passionate response, from Thomas 
Ley. 177 This was because in 1928 the Government had the numbers, and there was no 
danger of the Memorial being postponed, but after the Scullin Government came to 
power in 1929. when the economic situation was also much worse, more and more 
distinguished supporters of the Memorial rose to their feet in parliament. An 
announcement of the Scu llin Govenunent in November 1929. that it had "decided 
temporari ly to suspend operations in connexion wi th the War Memoria l,' ' full y stined 
the Memorial's parliamentary defenders, and their arguments are illuminating, 
concentrating on the idea that the Memorial was a "sacred" national undertaking, an 
idea which Ley's speech had already touched upon. 178 
Follmving the announcement Gullett and Glasgow invoked the sacred in their 
defences of the institution. Gullett, especiall y, was appalled, and his speeches 
defending the Memorial reveal a mind which may have been temporarily overcome 
by emotion, as some of the logic defies interpretation. 179 Before reaching the point of 
hysteria, however, Gullett laid out a passionate case for the Memoria l. Hi s key idea 
Returned Soldiers ' No-conscription League. ALP M H R for Corangamite 1929-3 I. Executive member 
of Victorian Historical Society 1925-35. A DB, vof8, pp. l60- l. 
IH CPD. Representatives, vol I I I, 26 August 1925, p.l 6 71i. 
176 CPD, Representatives, vol. 121, 22 August 1929, p.262. 
177 CPD, Representatives. vol.l l9, 4 September 1928. pp.li316-17. Thomas John Ley ( 1880- 1947). b. 
Bath, England. d. Broadmoor Criminal Lunatic Asylum, England. Nationalis t MHR for Barton 1925-ll. 
Convicted of murder I 94 7. A DB. 1·of. I 0. pp.97-8. 
17
s Arthur Blakeley, Minister for Home Affairs, CPD, Representatives, vol.l 22, 29 November 1929. 
p.50 I. Arthur Blakeley ( 1886-1 972). b. Gilberton, SA, d. Glen Iris, Victoria. ALP MHR for Darl ing 
19 1 7-34. Anti-conscriptionist. President of the Australian Workers' Union 19 19-23. A DB, 1•of. 7. p.322. 
179 For instance, in 1929 he claimed that the museum had been open on I y 1 wo or three years, and that 
"the museum does not exist." CPD, Representa ti ves, 29 November 1929, pp503. 508. 
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was that the Memorial had received donations from men who later died duri ng the 
war. and that as a consequence items donated on the understand ing that they would 
become part of a national memorial, the parliament faced "an obligation of the most 
solem n and sacred kind." 180 A promise made to the dead, he felt, could not be 
reneged upon . This sense of obligation, and the idea that the memory of the war dead 
was in some way sacred, were a lmost universa l reactions around the world to the 
trauma of the war losses. Even though the building, with its sacred elements, did not 
yet exist, its most vociferous supporters saw it as being indeed a sacred space. 
The Memorial's displays brought together the sacred nation and the sacred dead 
through the agency of the sacred martial relic, which forged the connection. The 
Memoria l had a special role in the "sacred matrix" of Australian war commemoration, 
for it held the objects, used or captured by named individuals, which provided a 
mysterious link with them and their (described) actions, as well as with the values that 
the accompanying texts asserted they embodied. In Medieval Christianity, as the 
Dictiomll} ' f?[ the Middle Ages asserts, relics were "objects associated with the saints, 
most especially with their bodies .... Relics physically linked the supernatural and the 
natural worlds in medieval mentality.''181 These Medieval connotations were mirrored in 
Bean 's vision for his museum, particularly in his desire to facilitate a connection 
between the living visitors and the members of the AIF (alive and dead) whose objects 
were presented. 
Thus, even though the building, with its sacred elements, did not yet exist. and 
even though the displays were governed, as we shall see, by a strict adherence to 
reali sm, its public supporters, at least, saw it as a sacred place. The tradition of 
consecrating temples (as Inglis says the Canberra Memori al was "a temple 
consecrated to the memory of the AIF'") had it roots in ancient practices which had 
seen a renaissance in Victorian Britain. Borg argues that "from the earliest times there 
has also been a tradition of giving memorial bui ldings a more practical meaning. The 
idea was to make the memorial part of the dai ly life of the people, and the commonest 
way of doing this was through an alliance with religion.''182 It is at this juncture of 
•xo CPO, Rcprc:.cntatives. 29 November 1929. p502. Gullclt was referring to an order issued by 
Birdwood on 14 December 1917, which mentioned both "the formation, af\cr the war, of museums." 
and that ~ uch mu~cums were desired to be "a memorial worthy of the AI F." A W M 27 623/33 . 
1~ 1 Joseph R. S1raycr ( ed.). Dictionw)" of the Middle Ages. (New York: Scribner's, 1989). p.296. 
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consideration that Ingl is has seen an alliance in Australia with a "civic" religion. 
Certai nly Bean wanted the Memorial to become part of the nation ' s daily life, and 
there is evidence that the makers of local memorials often did as well, given that 
many sited the ir monuments in prOininent public places where they would be seen 
daily by many.183 The ancient practice had been to build a temple or church in thanks 
for victories. For instance, William the Conqueror built a church, Battle Abbey, on the 
site of the Battle of Hastings, in fulfilment of a vow made before the battle to 
establish a church free from Episcopal control if God granted him victory. 184 The 
Chronicle of Bartle Abbey, 'Niitten c.l l 80, stated that the Abbey was founded as "an 
atonement" for the s in involved in the conquest.''185 Temples could also become 
"memotials by association," through the deposit inside them of captured arms. Borg 
argues that ''in this way temples which were not themselves founded in 
commemoration of victories could take on a specifically memorial aspect."186 
Religion would be directly associated with both military success and with the ru ler, in 
whose name the victory was won and the spoils deposited. 
To sum up, Bean's plan . and its rea lisation in Melbourne and Sydney, enjoyed 
widespread support in all-important elite circles. By the end of the 1920s, the project 
was firmly associated with the soldiers, and even those "economic' ' opponents who 
advocated its postponement ensured that their support for and solidarity with the 
soldiers was on the record. Few opposed it on princi ple. Those who did, though, such as 
Richard Bramston and Frank Brennan, exemplified a counter-movement in Australian 
society which could not see positive national results in the war experience. The "two 
cultures" identi-fied by Samuel Hynes in post-war Britain, the "monumental" and the 
"anti-monumental," were thus seen also in AustTalia, where their conflict was over 
whether the war should be remembered, because of what they remembered. Selection 
was always vital to public representations of the war, for the conflic t itself supplied 
1 ~2 Borg, War Memorials, p.60. 
IR' 
, Inglis, Sacred Places, pp.135-7. 
1
R
4 At the Conqueror's insistence, the altar stood above the place where King Harold had been killed. 
The Chronicle of Bailie Abbey, Eleanor Searle (ed. and trans.). (Oxford: Clarendon. [c. 11 gQ) 1980). 
p.45 ; Borg, War Memorials, p.62. 
1 ~5 The monastery at Battle Abbey was given special rights and privileges, presumably also in expiation 
for the sin. The Chronicle ofBaule Abbey, pp. 69,71 ,85. 
IR& Borg, War Memorials. p.61. 
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matc1ial for both "cultures" to present truthful memories. The war had seen honor and 
courage, success and catastrophe. As the next two chapters explore, it was perfectly 
possible to present the war as dangerous, difficult and arduous, but not honific or 
emasculating, and the Memorial did so. The key to doing so was the "national" 
interpretation of the war, wh ich underpinned all the material analysed in the remainder 
of the dissertation. The following three chapters, particularly Chapter Four, investigate 
the ways in which the Memorial spoke to its audiences, through narrative, fable, strict 
historical and teclmical realism, and deliberate strategic selection of the war's subjects. 
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Chapter 4: Australians at War in the Memorial: The 
national war history and the Australian soldier 
Figure 16: Interior, Melbourne Exhibition, main hall. 
Source: Relics and Records, September 1922. 
The Memorial made significant contributions to the maintenance and enhancement of 
the Anzac Legend throughout the inter-war period, as this and the following two 
chapters examine. The Memorial's narrative of the Australian overseas war 
experience, while concise and readily followed, was the most comprehensive 
available in any public space in the country. It made two important contributions to 
the Anzac Legend. Firstly, it offered proof that the Australians had won a large 
number of battles, thus supporting the Legend 's fundamental premise. Also, in 
standard myth-making style, it entered into interpretation as to why the Australians 
had in fact been so successful. 
The public display of proof of Australian military prowess was vital, for 
although few Australians ever pub I icly questioned the received version of the 
overseas war experience as a litany of triumph, questions nevertheless seemed to raise 
themselves. For instance, in October 1927 a scandal erupted when stories in various 
newspapers declared that proofs of the British Official History contained criticism of 
the Australian troops at the Gallipoli landing. A number of officers were outraged, 
returning fire with invective against the historian; this was then published in Britain. 
Meanwhile the Sydney Morning Herald reported that Bean ·'convened a conference of 
generals in Sydney to refute allegations [that] the Anzacs were ill-trained, badly led, 
183 
and herded together on the beach,'' and even worse. that they ·'were nothing more or 
less than a disorganised rabble." 1 The story was swiftly shown to be a shameless beat-
up. as was the story of Bean's convening the counci l of war. However, he did send 
proofs - which attached " more importance than I would have done to confusion and 
straggling," to a group of officers to be examined.2 The Minister for Defence, 
Memorial supp011er Senator Glasgow, asserted that the proofs were "subject to 
revision," and that this process of review by the generals would allow "accuracy to be 
achieved," assisting "the production of an absolutely authentic account of the 
landing."3 There was concern that the central plank of the Legend be accepted 
unreservedly, particularly in Australia and Britain, and the Memorial's narrative, 
incorporating explanat ions of military success in national terms, was an important 
element in the campaign to ensure this was the case. Through realistic presentation 
and an overt claim to be displaying nothing "except what is an exact representation of 
fact ,'' this narrative affected to prove that the Australians had won many battles and 
been highly successful warriors.4 
At the same time the Memorial sought to create national traditions based on 
the ''romance" of the "national stmies" surrounding trophies. This objective blended 
seamlessly with the primary one of proving military effecti veness. Thus, integrated 
into the narrative was further interpretation, focussing on why the men had won such 
a number of battles. The reasons offered centred on mat1ial vit1ues, such as dash, 
audacity, ferocity and endurance - the virtues already estab lished as strong planks of 
the Anzac Legend.5 The displays cons isted in part, then, of martial nationalist fables, 
in which Australian soldiers, representing the best their nation had to offer, faced and 
bested great obstacles, including tetTible conditions and strong enemies. In winning 
through they had displayed ideal moral vi rtues. The traditions created in the Memorial 
were thus based upon the men of the AIF, and incorporated an exhortation that 
visitors should strive to emulate them. 
1 S.rdm:r Morning Hemld, 8 October 1927. p.1 7; 10 October 1927, p.10. 
1 Sydne.r Morning Herald, 8 October 1927, p.17. 
·' Sl'dn£:1' Morning Herold. 8 October 1927. p. 17. 
4 AWMC Mi nutes.3 1 July 1919, Resolution2(d).AWM 170 1/1. 
'See Chapters One and Two. 
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Martial virtues vvere, however. only half of a "collective portrait" of the A IF 
which the Memorial displayed. These virtues originated in British martial tradition, 
and thus located the Austrnlian traditions presen ted in the Memorial's narrative and 
associated displays firmly within British racial and Imperial orthodoxies. 
Complementing these martial virtues were ones considered home-grown, the "bush" 
virtues celebrated by Bean, amongst many others , in the pre-war period. The strictly 
martial virtues were sourced from the Imperial tradi tion, whereas larrikinism, 
playfulness and laconic humour - virtues of a more "social" nature - as well as 
"pioneering'" virtues such as intelligence, ingenuity and marksmanship, were 
recognisably elements of a pre-war Australian self-image.6 ln the Memorial, the 
Australian was a chip otT the old British block. with all the strength of limb and 
nobility of character of Wellington as Achilles, but at the same time was animated by 
the natural intel ligence and sense of humour of the bushman. 
When describing the Memorial's narrative I seek to understand not so much 
the world of the battles themselves, but rather the world of the displays, in which the 
Memorial's very own Myth of the War Experience was in residence. This remade 
reality, but did not change the past. The question was always one of selection. As in 
Mosse's Myth in Gennany, the Memorial's Myth transfom1ed the Australian overseas 
war experience, sifting out poor discipline and poor battlefield performances, and 
putting the spotlight firrn ly on Australian mil itary achievement in tem1s of actual 
victory on the battlefield. The difference between the Myth and what the consensus of 
military historians might call "the reality" was often very small. or negligible; 
sometimes it was cons iderable. lt is certainly true, of course, that the AIF ended the 
war as a formidable fighting force, and thus that the Memorial at times amplified, but 
never invented, its claims about the Australian troops. I am less concerned with this 
fact, however, than with the marmer in which the Memorial sought to prove it in the 
public domain, and what this desire to do so tells us about a society in which the 
men's actions remained part of normal political discourse and a major part of 
commemorative ceremonies, in which retumed men were demanding preference and 
6 The Australian larrikin image was transformed during the war from a dangerous anti-social rebel to a 
national hero. The signal example of this was the hero of The Moods of Ginger Mick. Gerster, Big-
noring. pp.IS-16. 
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other social re-.vards due to outstanding service in defence of the nation, and in which 
a new national tradition, based upon those men's actions, was being created. 
The Memorial told a story of test, ordeal and fina ll y triumph. This particular structure, 
in which the test revealed the moral virtues that would, after many trials, deliver 
victory, was a structure reminiscent of saga and epic. 7 As well as being strongly 
suggestive of the Memorial's narrative structure, it was common among early post-
war Anzac Day sermons, speeches and newspaper leaders. Many commentators wrote 
of test and triumph, others of ordeal and tri umph.8 The Memorial's narrative itself 
was a combination ofthe three concepts. 
All but the first "test" of the Australians, which occurred at Gallipoli, was 
summarised, and presented to the Memorial 's visitors, through tributes to the AJF 
from three high-ranking officers who had been in positions of command over its units 
during 1918. These three messages, delivered in the full flush of victory in autumn 
1918, were exhi bited on pi llars in the Memorial's displays, sketching not only the 
contours of the narrative that surrounded them, but also those of the moral explanation 
for the successes that was such a fundamenta l part of it. In their tributes French 
Generaliss imo Marshall Ferdinand Foch, and British officers General Si r Hemy 
Rawlinson and Genera l Sir Thomas Allenby, outlined a history of ordeal and triumph, 
but went much further, and offered names of battles, a comprehensive assertion that 
moral vi1iues Jed to success, and even an assessment of the national benefits for 
7 In The Penguin Dicrion(ll:v ofLirer(l}y Terms and Urerw:1· Theo1:1·, John Cuddon states that "an epic is 
a long narrative poem. on a grand scale, about the deeds of warriors and heroes .... [Epics] are often of 
national significance in the sense that they embody the history and aspirations of a nation in a lofty or 
grandiose manner." Cuddon traces a tradit ion of epic liter ature from Gilgamesh's "search fo r glory and 
eternal life" and the trials of Odysseus to the chivalric Chanson de Roland. Spenser's nationalist poem 
The Faerie Queen. and Tennyson's Idylls o( rhe King. The MemoriaL while not using grandiose 
language, certainly offered a narrative on a grand scale. with the deeds of warrior heroes the constant 
topic, and in so-doing embodied the aspi rations of a large section of Australians. Historically, the saga 
is a less signi ficant literary mode, but it also concerned "the exploits of heroic kings and warriors." J.A. 
Cuddon. The Penguin Dictionar\' of Literal:\' Terms and Liter01:r The()l:\·. 3'" edn. (Harmondsworth: 
Penguin. 1991 ). pp.2X4-93Jl23-4. 
R Bishop Lees, for example, took the biblical text "we went through fire and water, but thou broughtest 
us out'' as the focus of a sermon on Anzac Day 1922, in which he claimed that the text was "a principle 
of history." that there "was always ... a great test, a great triumph and a great test imony.'' and that 
Anzac Day was a celebration of precisely this doctrine Argus. 26 April 1922, p.ll. In a phrase 
reminiscent of Bean. Lees also argued that "the tests of war were search! ights of character." 
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Australia flowing from that success.9 In displaying these messages, the Memorial 
allowed three famous and well-respected officers to outline its assertions about the 
soldiers. 
Rawlinson, commander during 1918 of the British Fourth A1my which included 
the Australians. provided the bas ic narrative .structure of the European section of the 
history. moving from the Somme in 1916 through the winter of 1916-17 to the final 
successes of 1918: 
I have watched with th e greatest interest, and admiration, the 
various stages through which !the Australian Corpsj have 
passed from the hard times of FLERS and POZIERES to 
their culminating victories at MONT ST Q UENTIN and the 
great Hindenburg System at BONY, BELLICOURT Tunnel 
and MONTBREHAIN. 
During the Summer of 1918 the sa fety of AMIENS has been 
principally due to their determination, tenacity and valour. 10 
9 Foch's message was seen in part in the foreword 10 Bean's guides. quoted in the dissertation 
introduction. However. only a short section was used in the foreword. and the message was displayed 
in full on a pi llar in the displays: 
The Austral ian troops have upheld the cause of the Allies with 
magnificent dash. From start to finish they distinguished themselves by 
their qualities of endurance and boldness. By their initiati ve, their 
fighting spirit, their magnificent ardour, they proved themselves shock 
troops of the first order. In the gra ve hours of 19 18, with their British, 
American and French comrades, they barred the enemy rush. They 
stopped it, broke it and, at the appointed hour, drove it far backwards. I 
am happy to express to Australia the undying memor~· which we shall 
cherish of her incomparable soldiers. 
A WM Ex Doc. 186. Sheet 23, Item 2. Ferdinand Foch ( 1851 - 1929). Generalissimo of all All ied 
fo rces in 1918 ... Foch, Ferdinand." Who's Who in 1he Tll'e/1/ielh CeniUI:J'. Ox ford Univers ity Press. 
1999. Oxford Reference Online. Oxford University Press. Queens land University. 2 1 December 2004 
<http://www .ox fordrcference.com/views/ENTR Y. him l?subview=M ain&entry==t4 7 .e583> 
10 A WM Ex Doc. 186. Sheet 23. Item I. capital isation in original. Sir Henr)' Seymour Rawlinson 
( 1864-1925), b. Dorset. England, d. Delhi. India. Conducted Blitish Exped itionary Force ·s (hereafter 
BEF's) fi rst attack on entrenched positions. at Neuve Chappelle in March 19 15, and soon realised tha t 
artillery preponderance and "bite and hold" tactics were required. although "such insights did not 
inform all his subsequent actions." ODNB, vol.46, p. l 59. Commanded main BEF attack on the Somme 
- the 4'h Army attack in front of Albert on I July 19 16. Rawlinson was agai nst Douglas Haig's 
ambitious plan for the battle. but was dependent upon Haig for his career and did not oppose the plan 
actively. After the Somme disaster Rawlinson was promoted. Commanded 4' 11 Army (including the 
AIF) duri ng the main German offensive in March 1918 and main Allied offensive on 8 August 1918 
and in operations breaching the Hindenburg Line. ODNB, 1'01.46. pp. l 57-6 I. 
187 
The Memorial's nanative was far larger, encompassing all theatres and almost every 
battle, but both the dynamic of ordeal and triumph and the relative weight given to 
victory accurately reflect its exhibitionary programme. 
Both Rawlinson and Allenby offered explanations for the success they referred 
to, and these are worth quoting extensively, for they accorded almost perfectly with 
the attitude of Bean and many other concerned martial nationalists, summarising the 
Anzac Legend to a remarkable degree. F irstly, Rawlinson launched into an 
interpretative passage that reads as if it were written by C.E.W. Bean in collaboration 
with W.M. Hughes: 
T he story of what they have accomplished as a fighting Army 
Corps, of the diligence, gallantry and skill which they have 
exhibited, and of the scientific methods which they have so 
thoroughly learned and so success fully applied, has gained 
for all Australians a place of honour amongst nations and 
amongst the E nglish speaking races in particular. 11 
Bean was particularl y taken with the abil ity and eagerness of Australi ans to learn new 
skills, to master the ' 'science" of war, while naturally both he and Hughes agreed with 
the virtues invoked and the identification of " the English speaking races." Hughes 
ended every commemo rative speech during his prime ministership with epithets such 
as "a niche in the Temple of the Immortals," which the Anzacs had apparently 
obtained for thei r nation. 
Allenby, who oversaw Australian operations in Palestine, weighed in with an 
even more striking endorsement which expanded the messages being offered about 
the men, and sharpened the analysis as well: 
I I 
When I took over command of the Egyptian Expeditionary 
Force in July, 1917, the light horse were already veterans, 
tried and proved in many a fight. Since then, they have 
shared in the campaigns which achieved the destruction of 
the T urkish army and the conquest of Palestine and Syria, 
and throu ghout they have been in the thick of the fighting. J 
have found them eager in a ttack and staunch in defence. At 
Beersheba, a mounted charge by a light horse regiment, 
armed only with rines, swept across the Turkish trenches 
and decided the day. Later, some of the regiments were 
A WM Ex Doc. 186, Shccl 23, Item 1. 
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armed with swords, which they used with great effect in the 
pursuit oflast a utumn ... 
The Australian light horseman combines with a splendid 
physique a restless activity of mind. This mental quality 
renders him somewhat impatient of rigid and formal 
disciplin e, but it confers upon him the gift of adaptability, 
and this is the secret of much of his success mounted or on 
foot. In this dual role, on every variety of country -
mountain, plain, desert, swamp or jungle - the Australian 
light horseman has proved himself equal to the best. He has 
earned the gratitude of the Empire and the admiration of the 
world. 1! 
Rawlinson again contributed, finishing his tribute with a triumvirate of themes that 
would become standard Australian commemorative rhetoric in the immediate post-
war years: the Australians playing a prominent role in the main offensive that was 
winning the war (in the white heat of the historical vortex, as it were, changing the 
world for the better), the honour that command of such men conferred upon the 
speaker, and the renown the AIF had won for thei r nation: 
It has been my privilege to lead the Australian Corps in the 
Fourth Army during the decisive battles since August 81h 
which bid fair to bring the war to a successful conclusion at 
no distant date. 
No one r ealises more than I the prominent part that they 
have played, for I have watched from day to day every detail 
of their fighting, and learned to value beyond measure the 
prowess and determination of all ranks. 
In once more congratulating the Corps on a series of 
successes unsurpassed in this great war, l feel that no mer e 
words of mine can adequately express th e renown that they 
have won for themselves and the position they have 
established for the Australian nation , not only in France but 
throughout the world. 13 
12 This message was displayed on a pillar. A WM Ex Doc. 186. The last two sentences were excerpted 
in Relics and Records. September 1922. p. 15: April 1928 p.l 6: December 1931 , p. l6. Finall y, it was 
printed in fu ll in Australian Chivah:v, Plate 24. Sir Edmund Hyn man Allenby (1861-1936). b. 
Southwell , England. d. London. England. Took over Egyptian Expeditionary Force (hereafter EEF). 
inc! uding Austral ian Light Horse uni ts, in July 19 17. l nflictcd comprehensive defeat on Turks 
September - November 191 8. ODNB, vol.l, pp.831 -4. 
IJ A WM Ex Doc. 186, Sheet 23, Item I. 
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Here then, in the messages of two British generals, was the Anzac Legend of 
the earl y post-war years . Combining the tributes provides a near complete summary 
of both Australian wartime propaganda and post-war commemorative rhetoric. It is 
notable that they should have so completel y summarised Australian commemorative 
rhetoric, but almost all its e lements were there. There was gallantry, determination 
and victory in important battles. There was an eagerness to fight and a ferocious 
abi lity to destroy the enemy. There was a great physique and a questing mind, 
underlying a military success that had made Australians famous amongst those most 
discerning of judges, "'the English speaking races." The men are the equal of any, with 
admiration and thankfulness their due. John Williams points out that these and other 
tributes were widely printed in newspapers before and during the time they were 
pub licly displayed in the Memorial. 14 
These were the stories, and these were the interpretations, that occupied much 
of the Memorial 's national war history. That all three leaders had commanded the 
Australians in victorious campaigns was of course a vital fact, giving their words 
greater authority, and the Australian war experience they presented was 
overwhelmingly positive. The Memorial fo llowed this lead, but it did include 
acknowledgement of Rawlinson's "hard times" as well. 
ln the Memorial 's narrative, the concentration was upon "diligence:' 
"gallantry," "skill" and so on, with display after display affecting to prove the 
generals' assertions. while the final judgement as to "a place of honour amongst. .. the 
English speaking races" was always left to officers and pol iticians. The Memorial 
provided a great deal of commentary on individual battles, particularly to point to 
morals perceived within stories, but used the generals' words to "naturalise" its 
editorial comment on the overall achievements of the Australians. By displaying the 
origina l texts of the tributes, the fu ll impact of the words of these famous and 
celebrated so ldiers was arrayed, and the Memorial's interpretations given the 
authority of the expert. 
1 ~ Will iam, The Quara111ined Culture. pp. J07-25. 
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II 
The test was the invasion of Gallipoli, an operation which is generally considered to 
have been poorly plaimed and badly executed. Some historians have argued that a 
great opportunity for success was lost on the first day, due to inexperience in the 
leadership and troops, and the effectiveness of Mustafa Kemal 's counterattack. 15 
Others, however, argue that this was never the case, as the numbers of men provided 
for the operation were approximately half that necessary for success. 1<' The Turks had 
been pre-warned by an attempt to force the straits by naval power earlier in the year, 
and had reinforced the peninsula. There was little secrecy and thus there was no 
chance of true tactical surprise. 17 The tows bringing the men in to shore drifted a mile 
north of their conect landing points, and landed the men under a precipitate cl iff. The 
initial attack was held up on the second ridge - day one objectives lay on the fourth -
and trench warfare swiftl y set in. Despite repeated attacks, the Anzacs (and their 
British and french allies at other points of the pen insula) were unable to break out of 
their tiny pe1imeter. In December 1915 the positions were evacuated, and the 
expedition's strategic goals - to advance on Constantinople, the Turkish capi tal , and 
force the Turks out of the war - were "as unattainable as the sources of the Amazon 
or the mountains of the South Pole.'' 18 
The Memorial's interpretations of Gallipoli exhibited the combination of 
sacrifice and triumph characteristic of Australian responses to the war, in so doing 
illustrating the "national" interpretation of the wa r addressing its first, and most 
enduring, topic. In the Memotial's van ous representati ons on Gallipoli, 
preoccupations with national characteristics, particularly those leading to mi litary 
victory, and with victory itself, were ev ident. Also ev ident in Bean's guides. but not in 
the photographic exhibition or the displays especially, •vas a deep lamentation for the 
men who died on the peninsula, and a public acknowledgement that many lives had 
1 ~ Basil Liddell Hart made this judgment. Liddell Hart, Histor:l' o.(the Firs / World War. p. 17 I. 
16 This is John Keegan's assessment. John Keegan. The First World War, (New York: Vi ntage. 2000). 
p.24 1. 
17 Keegan, The First World War, p.241. Beam Gallipoli Corresponde111. pp.46-51. covering Bean's 
diary entries for 1-10 April 1915 makes it clear that the imminent attack was common knowledge. 
1 ~ This was Bean 's description of the status of enemy trenches on the Western Front. Bean, The AIF in 
France During rhe Allied Offensive. 1918, p.336. 
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been lost. These two notions. which appear natural antagonists, were blended 
seamlessly in the Memorial's representations on Gall ipoli , setting a model for its 
treatment of other battles, and particularly its treatment of death. "A tomb most 
glorious" showed the men as victorious in death. (See Chapter Six for more details). 
The national characteristics depicted in the Memorial's representations of the 
oft-capitalised ''Landing at Anzac" were those martial virtues that were felt necessary 
to win battles: courage, determination, ruthlessness, the will to conquer- in short, the 
fu ndamentall y "British" virtues which had, it was felt, won the Empire. The 
Memorial's representations, in concord with mainstream commemoration generally, 
praised the AIF for passing a perceived test in a two-fold marmer. Firstly there was 
the si mple fact that the men stuck to their task and did not run away. Thus, the 
absolute minimum requirement for honourable martial behaviour had been satisfied; 
the troops had stood up to the "moral test" of combat. However, the men were seen to 
have performed extremely well in this first battle, not simply surviv ing their "test," 
but passing it triumphantly. In making such an argument, a somewhat arbitrary, and 
somewhat self-delusional , criterion for success was utilised - the scaling of the cliffs 
and the establishment of a defensive perimeter on that first day. This "feat," as it was 
often called. was viewed as a great success, as great as Waterloo in the Hobart 
Mercury's opinion, with the first day's actual goals - never reached - being 
completely ignored. They were never mentioned in the Memorial, either, nor in any 
commemorative rhetoric of the inter-war years. 19 A different, arbitrary sign of 
"success" was chosen, and with its adoption much greater praise could be heaped 
upon the troops than if they had been seen as simply courageously trying, but failing. 
The test depicted in the Memorial was certai nl y a s tern one, in which many 
men died. The terrain, the enemy and mistakes by unnamed non-Australians were all 
foregrounded to insist that the Australians had faced a difficult task.20 The attack was 
made more difficult by planning errors and the terrain, as a long caption for George 
11
) The Sydney Morning Herald asked the rhetorical ques tion ··was it a defeat'? on Anzac Day 1927. 
answering "a thousand times. no!" The paper also argued that 25 April 1915 was the "day of the 
Anzacs." and that "they came with the dawn; (the day's] meridian saw their triumph over fearful odds; 
its close knew them immortal." Sydney Morning Herald. 25 April 1927, p.8. The Age wrote in 1931 
that "no historical analyses could dim the glory of the Anzacs." Age, 25 Apri l 1931 , p. l 0. 
~~~ Indeed. it was routine practice for Anzac Day speakers and writers to refer to ··an almost impossible 
task" being undertaken on 25 April 1915. See for example Age, 24 April 1922. p.6, Arg us, 26 April 
1922. p. l l. Diddams. Anzac Commemomlion ! 92 I, pp. 13-23, Anzac Day. 1928, Preface. 
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Lambert's painting of the Landing 1n Treloar 's fol io book of war art Australian 
Chivalry explained : 
The task of launching the attack fell to the 3rd Australian 
Brigade. but, through an error in direction in the dark, its 
battalions were landed at points about a mi le north of those 
intended. Instead of open beach, they found themselves 
confronted in the dim morning I ight by a tangle of steep, scrub-
covered cliffs.n 
However, "undaunted by this initial misfortune and the formidable task before them , 
the troops dropped their packs, charged the magazines of their rifles, and, moving into 
the scn1b. began the precipitous ascent in the teeth of a fierce, concentrated fire, 
which quickly grew in i ntensity."~" The Austral ians were clearly in a very inferior 
position, exposed to intense fire and attempting to scale a daunting cliff. This indeed 
was a test of their mili tary manhood . 
As was made plain. however, the force came triumphantl y through this great 
test. facing the ordeal with determination and achieving a triumph: 
Clutching at the roots of stunted shrubs or digging their bayonets 
into the shallow soil, they struggled upwards, the s lope becoming 
steeper at every yard. Many who were killed outright or wounded 
by the enemy's fire, ro lled down the c liffs until stayed by some 
bush, where they could be reached only with the utmost 
difficulty. But, as the sun rose. knots of these grim, detem1ined 
men swarmed on to the summi t of the "first" ridge, the Turks 
falling back at the last minute to the inland side of the plateau, 
whence they were soon chased into Shrapnel Gully. 23 
Certainly the attack was difficult, even grim, with many men killed. However, the 
survivors were able to overcome the obstacles of planning enor, terrain and enemy to 
wrest from the latter the first ridge and chase them down into the valley beyond. This 
was a test most emphatically passed, a collective military manhood affirmed. 
To under! ine the fact that the focus of this Landing story was on success rather 
than sacrifice, the Australian Chivalry caption summa1ised its position: 
21 Australian Chivalry , Plate 7. 
2~ Australian Chiva!Jy , Plate 7. 
23 Australian Chivalry, Plate 7. 
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Figure 17: Anzac: The Landing, 1915, by George Lambert. 
Source: Australian War Memorial Collections Database. cas.awm.gov.au. 
"ANZAC'S FATEFUL DAWN" 
The daring military feat attempted and brilliantly achieved by the 
previously untried Australian troops, whose superb courage, 
resource, and unflinching determination won the admiration of the 
world, and set for all time the standard of conduct for the 
Australian soldier, is brought vividly to the imagination by this 
canvas, which portrays the scene on the slopes of Plugge's Plateau 
at dawn on the 25th of April, 1915.24 
In the entire caption there was no mention of the ultimate fate of the expedition. 
Judging from this representation it was a victory. The Turks are in full retreat, the 
Anzacs in the ascendancy. Naturally visitors knew the eventual fate of the expedition, 
but the nationalist result of concentrating on this first great rush of victory, and 
ignoring the campaign's end, was at least as strong, for many important moral virtues 
were on display. Thus the ultimate defeat of the Australian expedition did not need to 
be, and was not, mentioned. 
However, and in both contrast and complement, Bean's first guide to the 
Memorial's displays focussed significantly on another quality which he and other 
Anglo-Australians valued, the willingness to sacrifice one's life for one's nation. The 
fight at Pine Ridge on the first day gave evidence that Australians were animated by 
this quality, now the primary commemorative virtue. Bean referred to this action as "a 
tragic episode," following his practice of referring to defeats with this word, but under 
24 Australian Chivalry, Plate 7. 
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the heading "To the Last Man," emphasised the heroic elements of this first 
Austra lian fa ilure: "at the end of the long day's fierce battle, part of the Australian 
line was cut off by the Turks at dusk, and was last seen fighting on, but hopelessly 
surrounded. Not a man survived ... ' '~ 5 This "devotion to duty" was an essential part of 
the chivalric public school ethos in which Bean was steeped. and not coincidentally 
was a fundamental element of British popular military tradition. Here, on the first day 
of their test, the Australi ans were upho lding this moral code, which harked back to 
ancient Sparta, that Fitchett had summed up in the preface to his Deeds That Won the 
Empire as "heroic fortitude which dreads dishonour more than it fears death. "26 As 
much as the courage, resource and determination heralded in Australian ChivaLry, this 
fortitude was embraced as characteristically Austral ian. In Gallipol i representations, 
then, there was a blend of sacrifice and victory. The death and the g lory mentioned in 
the institut ion's motto had become one. 
That the Memorial embodied the "spirit of 1922" can be seen from the Age's 
leader of 24 Apri l 1922, whi ch made a claim similar to that of Australian Chivahy, 
but expressed it in a more ferocious, overtly propagandistic style: 
With wild cheers the troops leapt from the boats waist deep into 
the water, and with fixed bayonets charged the steep cliffs. The 
Turkish trenches on the top of the slopes were taken ; by 
daybreak the Australians were starting to dig their trenches on 
the second ridge, and by the next day the seemingly impossible 
feat of establishing a strong position had been accomplished. The 
history of war contains no more daring achievement than that of 
the landing on Gallipoli.17 
As Bean wrote to Treloar two weeks before thi s leader was published, the Memorial's 
painting of the Landing dep icted this exc iting, victorious undertaking in reali stic 
detail: "Lambert portrays the great task which our men were set exactly in its proper 
:s Relics and Records. September 1922, p. l I: April 1928. p. l4: December 1931. p. l4. 
'
6 Fitchett, Deeds Thai Won 1he Empire. Preface. Gavin Souter points out that John Monash rook a copy 
of Fitchett to the peninsula '"to stimulate the interest of his men in British mili tary traditions. he said.' ' 
Souter, Lion and Kangaroo, p.222. Souter argued that ''the Gallipoli campaign lacked only one of the 
quali ties that went to make such deeds, though admittedly rather a vital one: the quality of success. But in 
all other aspects - courage, suffering and persistence - Gallipoli was as much the stuff of legend as Albuera 
on another peninsula, or the Heights of Abraham at Quebec." However, as we have seen, the landing, the 
key moment, was represented as a success in many quarters. 
27 Age, 24 Apri I 1922, p.6. 
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proportion and light - the cl imbing of an almost precipitous hill , in the uncertain light 
of dawn. in the face ofan unseen enemy." 2K Bean was sure that much could be learned 
by visitors from the men depicted, telling Treloar that ·'every face and attitude is 
J? 
worth study." -
In the Memorial m the 1922-35 period, as in Australian mainstream 
commemoration more generally, it was always the landing itself which was the key 
event in the entire story of the Australian overseas war experience. The stom1i ng of 
the cliffs, such a dramatic "test" of military manhood, was more than sufficient to 
answer the question as to whether Australians were truly "of the Bulldog breed." The 
fact that the campaign itself was lost was almost entirely irrelevant in 1922 as it had 
been in 1916. The popular 2004 interpretation that failure was important or necessary 
to the myths created at Anzac is, I think, largely anachronistic. "Sacrifice" never 
equated with "failure," for instance. Indeed, through the Memorial, as in the wider 
commemorati ve networks, sacrifice was very often organically fused with triumph in 
the 1920s. 
III 
After their ''test" at Gallipoli, the A IF's infantry retired to Egypt, expanded from two 
to four divisions, and moved to France to fight the Germans, arriving at the line in 
April 1916:'° For the next year, the A JF fought a series of battles in which inadequate 
resources and planning, poor communication between headquarters and front line, and 
inferior execution of the weak plans (particularly ineffecti ve coordination between 
arti llery and infantry) combined with stout German resistance to produce a string of 
disasters and pyrrhic victories at Fromelles, Pozieres, Mouquet Farm and Flers.31 
These battles were launched in the expectation of achieving a decisive breakthrough, 
but when they foundered the justi fication offered for them was that they would wear 
down the Germans more quickly than the Allies. This, at least, was the justification of 
~' C. E. W. Bean to John Treloar, 15 April 1922. A W M 93 2011 II A. 
,,, 
" Bean to Treloar, 15 April 1922. A WM 93 201111 A. 
30 The Light Horse went to Palestine. 
'
1 Fought respectively on 19 July, from 23 July to 5 August, from 8 August to 3 September, and 
November 19 16. For details sec Coulthard-Clark, Encyclopedia , pp.1 J 6-22. 
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Douglas Haig, British G.O.C.~2 Scanti ly-prepared attacks against formidable 
defences, with the element of surprise forfeited from up to two weeks in advance 
through registration of targets and slow preparatory barrages, were repeated 
throughout the second half of 1916 in an attempt to find a breakthrough that was 
clearly not possible with the tactics and resources availab le.u 
These were battles which vvere difficu lt to cast as heroic victories; although 
some ground was taken they were clearly not deci sive and few believed they were 
worth the lives lost (this few did incl ude Haig). Therefore , in the Memorial a different 
method of glorificat ion was used, casting this period as an "ordeal." The endurance of 
the men in surviving the appalling bombardments that the AIF experienced during 
1916 was brought to the foreground. This theme. once established in the narrative at 
Pozieres. remained and was utilised often in descriptions of 1917 as well. At the same 
time, the moral qualities establ ished by the test at Gall ipoli- courage, determination , 
an ability to win trench battles in hand-to-hand combat - were reiterated, with the 
reasons for defeats being of a ··material" nature: lack of arti llery support negated an 
overabundance of ''dash." Victory was still emphasised whenever it cou ld be 
perceived, however. 
Pozieres provides an excellent example of the way in which the Memorial 
"redeemed" a generally unsuccessful , costly battle, mixing together victory, 
endurance and cost to highlight the fom1er two notions and acknowledge, yet 
depoliticise, the latter. Pozieres was the most pyrrhic of victories, and is now usually 
seen in terms of its horror, and the endurance of the men who withstood the 
bombardment there. In the Memorial in 1922, though, it was a battle in which the 
Australians had been successful, carrying the town with superior soldierly qualities, 
onl y to have a bitter enemy retaliate by a resort to the material in the fom1 of a 
monstrous artillery barrage. Whilst the cost of the battle was clearly acknowledged, 
there was a strong emphasis on success in the plan model label which outl ined the 
campaign. Firstly, there was success: 
3~ Sir Douglas Haig ( 1861-1928), b. Edinburgh, Scotland, d. London, England. Commanded BEF 
December 1915 until the end of the war. A cavalry officer. Haig sought a decisive breakthrough to be 
fo llowed by cavalry exploitat ion, throughout the war. His abi li ty remains a point of great contention. 
ODNB. vo/.24, pp.456-64. 
H Sec " Haig, Douglas," ODNB. vo/.24, p.459 and ''Rawlinson. Henry," ODNB. vo/.46, p.l 59: Prior and 
Wilson, Rawlinson, pp.l54-70; Liddell Hart, Hist01y o/lhe First World War, pp.23 1-53. 
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At 12.30 a.m. on the 23rd July, 1916, the 1st Division attacked 
Pozieres, which had already deJ1ed several attacks. T he 
operation was a complete success, but the casualties were 
heavy. The 2"d Division relieved the 1 s• and captured the O.G. 
(Old Gem1an) lines on the eastern side of the town. Jn turn 
the 4111 Division entered the line and ex tended the 
Australians' gains.34 
The fact that casualties were heavy did not in any way detract from the complete 
success; this was war after all , and in war men unfortunately died. The visitor was 
urged to dwell upon the success of the Australians, which Bean stated in his 1929 
volume of the History was "at las t. . . a victory of importance on the Western Front," 
and in fact , the only one on the British front in the third stage of the Battle of the 
Somme. -'5 The Australians had clearly outdone the British; the sou them branch of the 
race was superior, it seemed to some. 
The enemy reta liated against the victorious AIF, res011ing to the material, 
having been shown wanting in martial virtues by their eviction from the town: 
For six weeks they .. . suffcred under an artillery fire of 
unprecedented intensity, t he fury of which may be 
appreciated from the fact that under it the village of Pozieres 
completely disappea red. The Australians faced it 
unflinchingly.36 
Here the men showed that, in addition to courage, determination and devotion to duty, 
they had the strength to endure anything the enemy could fling at them. 1t was this 
bombardment, concentrated on a very smal l area at Pozieres, which led to the battle 
being referred to as an "ordeal by fire" in the photographic exhibition.37 It was an 
ordeal, though, that was also a " complete success," proving that even during the 
Battle of the Somme, that most iconic of disasters, the Australians had moved ahead. 
3~ A WM Ex Doc. 186, Sheet 5. ltem 1. 
>
5 Bean. The AIF i n France. 1916. pp.530, 524-6. 
3
'' A WM Ex Doc. 186. Sheet 5. Item I . 
. n See Mclboumc Photograph 34; Sydney Photograph 107. Relics and Records, September 1922, p.68; 
April 192R. p.80; December 193 1, p.81. 
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Finally, there came the sad truth: "At a cost of 25,000 casualties they seized 
the summit of the Pozieres Ridge- an area of a square mile." .\S The numbers were 
stark, and the cost of the "complete success" at Pozieres therefore hit the reader with 
considerable impact. A square mile won for 25,000 casualties was, objecti vely, a 
shockingly pynhic victory, but it was still to this victory that the narrative cl ung. 
The ordeal reached its cl imax at the end of 1916, as a savage winter closed 
over the Western Front. Two aborti ve attacks were made, both disasters. The 1922 
Somme plan model asserted that the fai lure of the attacks was not the fault of the 
troops, but of the mud: 
The terrible bombardments of the summer and autumn, and 
the .-ain, had reduced the forward areas to muddy wastes, 
which were spann ed here and there by narrow duckboard 
track. Here, in the wrecked trenches, the Australians held a 
section of the line during the severest winter experienced in 
France for several decades. In November they attempted two 
attacks. The ground was practically impassable and the 
'<) attacks were not success ful : 
The two attacks were in fact conducted in conditions that were so bad that a strictly 
factual institution might have made angry accusations against those who sent their 
nationals to fight in them.40 That no such c1iticism came from the Imperially-loyal 
Memorial was not a surprise, but did underline the museum's commitment to those 
who had conducted the war. 
In the Memoria l's narrative, the winter was represented explicitl y, as befitted 
an "ordeal." lt showed the AJF as having been tri ed to their utmost by the weather, 
and bowing under the strain: many were ill , morale at its lowest ever ebb. It is notable 
that the enemy were never presented as being able to sap the morale of the Austra lians 
to anywhere near the extent that the weather did . The narrative never had a depressed 
tone, however, and it stressed that the Australians, though "sorely tried" did not break, 
and fought back against nature as agai nst the enemy, using that natural intelligence so 
often commented upon by Bean. The severity of the winter and the Australian 
recovery were explored in the caption for the photograph "Somme Mud," which 
Jx A WM Ex Doc. 186, Sheet 5, Item 1. 
39 A WM Ex Doc. 186, Sheet 5, Item I. 
4
° For a discussion of truth and its ''national" limits in the Memorial, see Chapter Six. 
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showed Bean struggling along a trench. The difficulty of the conditions were first 
foregrounded: "the freezing cold was preferable to the milder weather, which filled 
the trenched with liquid mud, as in the case of Gird Trench here photographed."41 As 
Bean said in In Your Hands, though, AIF minds were sharp and could overcome any 
problem by applying their minds "to it straight."42 The caption elaborated: "At first 
the terrible conditions were responsible for a heavy sick wastage, but the problem was 
faced , and after a short time the Australian wastage figures were among the lowest."43 
Again, here was triumph over a terrible ordeal, and the Australian recovery from the 
winter was symbolic of a change in the course of the war as the Memorial told it. It 
consisted thereafter of a long string of "successes," some larger than others, almost 
uninterrupted except by the intervention, once again, of the weather at the end of 
1917. 
By the summer of 1917 the Australians' military performance was improving. 
They were learning new methods of warfare, particularly co-ordination of infantry 
and arti llery and better gunnery. Their planning abilities had increased through 
experience and assimilation of in fonnation from their allies. They also had available 
hugely increased numbers of guns, especially heavy guns, as well as machine guns, 
mo1tars and other forms of firepower, although not yet reliable tanks.44 These matetial 
factors , which are now acknowledged by historians as decisive, were played down 
throughout the Memorial's displays, although they were acknowledged obliquely at 
times. This had the effect of giving the troops even more credit for the victories that 
occurred both in this year and 1918 than modern historiography suggests is due, 
considerable as that is. 
The AIF experienced a real success in June 191 7, at the well-planned Battle of 
Messines.45 Here was a legitimately positive development, and the tone of the 
Memorial's nanative takes a decisive turn in that direction at Messines and continues 
in this fashion almost without break thereafter. In the Memorial's narrative Messines 
J l Melbourne Photograph 41: Sydney Photograph 112. Relics and Records, September 1922, p.69; 
April 192/.l, p.81: December 1931. p.82. 
J ' 
- Bean, In Your Hands, p.91. 
43 Relics and Records, September 1922. p.69; April 1928, p.81; December 1931 , p.82. 
JJ Prior anc..l Wi lson, Rawlinson. pp.225-49. 
J< 
· See Coultharc..I-Ciark. Enc:vclopedia , pp.l 29-30. 
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saw the Australians reaping the reward for complementing their moral qualities with 
the intelligent creation and application of new methods of planning, wh ile the material 
elements of the victory, mines and a massive bombardment, were relegated to the 
sidelines of the action. To illustrate the idea, the Memorial exhibited a photograph of 
Australian soldiers researching the terrain over which they would fight: 
F igure 18: "Studying the Battlefi eld." 
Source: Australian War Memorial Collections Database. 
cas.awm.gov.au. Photograph E00532. 
STUDYING THE BATTLEFIELD 
Australians of the 13th Brigade, on 6 th June, 1917, studying 
the lar ge contour map of the Messines ba ttlefield made nea r 
Petit Pont, Belgium, to enable the troops to acquire a 
thorough knowledge of the ground. This was one of the 
means adopted to make victor y certain. Indeed, the battle of 
Messines was a masterpi ece of car eful pla nning a nd 
or ganisation, and th e thorough sta ff work was largely 
responsible for the complete success with which the oper ation 
was attendcd.46 
Here the men were absorbing some of those scientific methods that Allenby would 
later praise so roundly. The men in the photograph are foc ussed on the model; this is 
serious business. Yet the tone of the caption is upbeat, and there is an air of 
excitement in the cro\.vd. War was not a terrible thing, perhaps, if one was brave and 
ready to plan, ready "to make victory certain." This was the kind of message Bean 
46 Relics and Records. September 1922. p. 70; April 1928, p.85: December 1931, p.86. 
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had used during the war to keep up public morale, that ts, it was propaganda, 
exhibited for the whole 1922-35 period. 
Messines was successful in part because it had limited objectives, and the third 
quarter of 1917 saw a continuation of such battles. The Australians met with success 
in late September and early October at Menin Road, Polygon Wood and Broodseinde 
Ridge, all in Belgium, but as rain turned the low-lying Flanders battlefield into a giant 
bog that made movement almost impossible, the s low "bite-and-hold" offensive, 
known as the Third Battle of Ypres, ground to a halt near Passchendaele.47 Haig, who 
had not personally inspected the terrain, ordered the attacks to continue in impassable 
mud, with the result that enormous casualties - even the successful attacks had had 
these - multiplied without progress of any kind being made. In the Memorial's 
nan·ative, ordeal began to give way to triumph more strongly, but this segue was cut 
shott by the Passchendacle mud. It is si&rnificant, though, that the narrative showed the 
enemy as no longer being able to withstand the AI F by September 1917; only the 
weather could defeat them now that their martial virtues were being matched by their 
preparation for combat. the visitor learned.48 
The winter descended, and in the spring of 1918, with the Australians at rest, 
the Gem1ans attacked in their last great effort to win the war in the West as they had 
in the East. The Soviets having sought an annisticc, concluded in December 1917, the 
Germans were able to bri ng large forces to the West. These were unleashed in March 
1918 in a final attempt to destroy the French and British before an American force of 
over a million fresh troops arrived. The Gennans at first had spectacular success. 
breaking through British army forma tions and advancing at unheard-of rates. As the 
Memotial 's narrative told it, the situation was critical and urgent action was needed. 
The AIF were sent to stop the advance, and this they did at Yillers-Bretonneux and 
Hazebrouck, redeeming the failures of British troops. The Gennan offensive marked 
the end of the AJF's ordeal, and the beginning of their triumph. 
n The 1922 Flanders Plan model label declared that "'between September 20'h and October I t'" there 
were launched five attacks .... All were successful until the final assault by the 3'd and 4'" Australian 
Divisions on October 12'11." John Treloar to C. E. W. Bean, 15 May 1922. A 7702 566 003/005. See 
Coulthard-C1ark, Enc_•·c/opedia, pp.130, 131, 132-3 . 
• , The 1911 Flanders Plan model label stated succinctly that it was '"the fine weather that permitted the 
rapid progress of Augu~t and September.'' Treloar to Bean. 15 May 1922. A 7702 566 003/005. Th1s 
interpretation. in no way '"untrue," was not the entire "truth.'' either. This essentially museo1ogical issue 
·~ discussed in the next chapter. 
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At Hazebrouck the enemy were first halted: 
THEDEFENCEOFHAZEBROUC K 
The honour fell to the I 51 Australian Division which upon 
joining th e other divisions in the Amiens sector about the 9111 
April was immediately hurried back to reinforce the British 
line near Hazebrouck, at the time reeling under a new and 
heavy German offensive. 
Taking up a position near Strazeele, between the 131\ and 
17'1\ April they succeeded in holding up the German 
advance. In these operations, the 12''\ Army Brigade AFA 
and some Australian Light Horsemen with the XXII Corps 
Mounted Regiment also played a prominent and gallant 
part.49 
The Australians were now in the middle of clearly vital military operations, equal to 
Waterloo and Trafalgar from a martial nationalist perspective, and thus worthy of 
considerable elaboration. 
After this initial and important success, further gams were made. The 
Australians, building on their 1917 ac hievements, were establishing dominance over 
their enemies: 
From th en on to the end of July th e Di vision constantly 
harried the Huns in this area . Patrols, raids, or battalion 
attacks were a daily occurrence, and yielded a generous 
return in the destruction or capture of enemy personnel and 
material, and the gain of ground. 
Altogether 1923 prisoners from twelve German Divisions 
were taken, 25 guns and trench mortars, 130 machin e §un s 
and one tlammenwerfer (flame-thrower) were captured.5 
With supremacy thus established, the A lf then went over to the offensive, and after a 
triumphant dress rehearsal at the Battle of Hamel in July ''decisively defeated" the 
49 
'The Defence of Hazebrouck." Attachment, Bain to Treloar, 28 December 1932. A WM 265 21 /4/5, 
Part 7. 
50 
'The Defence of Hazebrouck." This label - for the Somme 19 18 plan model - was slightly longer 
and more elaborate than the original one installed in December 1928, which stated simply that '·wi th 
this anack [Villers-Bretonneux] the tide in this sector turned. During the following three months the 
Austra lians carried out a series of minor operations by which they establ ished a marked ascendancy 
over the enemy." Bain to Treloar, 15 May 1929. A WM 265 2114/5, Part 2. It is also interesting to note 
that in 1922 Bean labelled the fla me-throwers "flame projectors:" the evolution of military 
nomenclature can be seen in the change of designation. 
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enemy on 8 August.5 1 In the Memorial's story the Australians continued their 
domination throughout the third quarter of 1918, demolishing one Gennan defence 
line after another. until they finally smashed through the valmted Hindenburg Line 
shortt y before the Armistice. In describing the last few months of the war, Bean's 
guide featured the headings "Smashing Through," "Breaking the Hindenburg Line," 
"Fighting Spirit Extolled'' [Foch] , ·'An Audacious Advance," "Magnificent Feat of 
Anns," and "Beginning of the End."52 The temper of these pages is exemplified by 
the passage following the latter headline, which made clear the historic triumph of the 
Australians: 
It was intended by the Germans that the high ground across the 
Somme at Peronne should be held, although the rest of their line 
was being withdrawn behind the river. When, however, on the 
29th August, 1918, the enemy carried out this withdrawal , the 2"d 
and 5th Australian Divisions advanced with such dash that 
Germans left to defend their important corner were rushed from 
their positions and driven back with the rest. This occurrence had 
consequences of the greatest importance in making possible the 
subsequent attack by the Australians upon Mont St Quentin and 
Peronne.53 
Figure 19: Breaking the Hindenburg Line, by Will Longstaff. 
Source: www.awm.gov.au/ l918/battles/art03023.htm. Painting ART03023.54 
51 The Somme 1918 plan model used precisely the words "decisively defeated." Bain to Treloar, 15 
May 1929. 
52 Rehcs and Records, September 1922, pp.3l-2 ; ApriJ 1928, pp35-4l ; December !931 , pp.35-41. 
>J Rehcs and Records, September 1922, p.32; April 1928, p.39; December 1931 . pp.37-8. 
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Whilst Mont St Quentin remained the most famous action, the breaching of 
the Hindenburg L ine - with its name associated with the most famous German 
general of the war - gave the tale of the AIF a glorious ending. It was made clear that 
this was the last, and greatest of all the German defensive lines, "the famous 
Hindenburg Line, which. with its concrete field works, belts of wire, and undeq,,'TOttnd 
shelters, was a most formidable obstacle which had already defied the British army."55 
This would not be obstacle enough to defy the Australians, however: "within a month 
the Hun had been driven from this, his last stronghold in France." 56 A step-by-step 
description was furnished, which foregrounded prisoners and trophies captured: ''80 
guns and 4243 prisoners" on 18111 September, for example. "The war furnished no 
similar record of such important tactical and material gain at such slight loss," the 
label declared. 57 
The Australians then worked with their inexperienced allies , the Americans, 
and overcame both American mistakes and the enemy to achieve a historic success, as 
a plan model label explained: 
The American Divisions succeeded in getting through the 
German defences but inexperience caused them to neglect 
thorough " mopping-up." The Germans reappeared from 
underground shelters behind th em and were able to oppose 
the 5th and 3rd Australian Divisions advancing to exploit the 
American successes.... The fact that many American 
wounded were lying in front of th em caused th e Australians 
to refrain from using adequate artillery support. This made 
their task much harder. By the evening of the 1st October the 
famous Hindenburg Line had been forced. Over 3000 
prisoners and 35 guns wer e captured.58 
54 See Relics and Records, April 1928, p.38. 
55 
"The Hindenburg Line," p.1. Attachment, Bain to Treloar, 28 December 1932. A WM 265 2 1/4/5. 
Part 7. 
~6 ''The Hindenburg Line," p.l 
57 
"The Hindenburg Line," p.l. See also the Somme 19 18 plan model originally installed in December 
1928: "Many prisoners were taken and the fact that little heavy fighting occurred was primari ly due to 
the dash of the infantry and the accuracy of the barrage. The whole of the objective was gained and 
consolidated. The victory was the swiftest and most complete ever won by the Austral ian infantry." 
Bain to Treloar, 15 May 1929. A WM 265 21/4/5, Part 2. 
SR "The Hindenburg Line," p. l. 
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Then, in one last push, the Australians become not only conquerors, but also the 
de liverers of french civilians: 
On the 3rd October the 2"d Division, on a front of 6000 yards, 
attacked the Beaurevoir Line, captured it before midday, and 
pushed on to the ascent of Beaurcvoir Hill. It improved its 
position on the 4111 and on the 5111 captured Montbrehain. 
Here for the first time the Australians released French 
civilians who had been under enemy domination since the 
autumn of 1914. In these operations the 2"d Division captured 
2400 prisoners and many guns, machine guns, etc. 59 
The breaching of the Hindenburg Line was a symbolic destruction of German 
militarism in the eyes of some Australians, and it was often used as a climax to the 
brief narratives of commemorative rhetoric, just as in Rawlinson's tribute, generally 
accompanied by a note of distinct satisfaction. The Memorial's narrative itself ended 
contentedly, noting the completion of"a memorable and decisive campaign."60 It also 
remarked that "before the Australians entered the line again the Germans signed the 
Arm istice," suggesting, perhaps, that it was the threat of facing the Australians again 
that final ly made the Huns see the futility of continuing the struggle.61 
Thus was a nan·ative of ordeal and triumph created around the Australians 
who served in Europe. The story of the Australians in Palestine was also one of ordeal 
fo llowed by a great triumph, but the figh ting was very successful almost from the 
beginning, and the narrative is one of near-constant victory, beginning with the 
defensive Battle of Romani, through to the pursuit east of the Jordan River in 1918. 
This time the ordeal consists of the terrible desert conditions in which the fighting 
occurred; the bombardments of the Western Front, the major element of the ordeal 
there, were absent. In general, the narrative in Palestine was even more triumphal, 
with the label of the "Semakh" plan model ending on a note of ferocious 
triumphalism: 
The Light Horsemen would not be denied. Rushing from 
their cover they battered in th e doors of the main station 
5q "The Hintlenburg Line," p. l . 
60 
"Tl H. tl b L" " 2 1e 111 en urg me, p . . 
''
1 
"The Hindcnburg Line," p.2. 
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building and, entering one by one, foll owed the Germans a nd 
Turks in the darkness from lloor to floor and room to room, 
not pa using in the struggle until the whole of the enemy force 
6' 
was d estroyed or captured . -
This small example of the Jess layered Palestine section is sufficient to ill ustrate its 
content. 
The Memorial's narrative materialised a v1s1on of the Australian war 
experience that was almost perfectly in accord with that of dominant commemorative 
agencies such as the RSSlLA, soldier-writers and politicians. Right the way through 
the narrative, victory •vas yoked to the moral qualities of the troops, whi le the moral-
material dialectic was also maintained throughout. The structure of test, ordeal and 
triumph meant that difficulties and setbacks were quite frankly acknowledged, but 
sublimated by the ultimate victory. The "national" interpretation, with its moral 
emphasis, ensured that the men could be praised at all times, for courage in a lost 
cause as much as for skill in a successful one. 
IV 
With its position as a powerful and triumphant military force strongly asserted in the 
narrative of its deeds, the AIF was further exalted by a large number of 
representations which praised the moral qualities of its members. There were two 
strands of such praise. The first set of representations, which explained victory, were 
the more numerous and important. lt was these that elevated ordinary Australian men 
to the stature of national heroes. The second strand consisted of ''social" virtues, such 
as humour and playfulness, which humanised the troops, and ''pioneering" virtues, 
such as ingenuity and physical prowess. 
Victories and defensive successes - those events claimed to be great events in 
Australian history, fonning the basis of Australia's "most important traditions"- were 
ascribed to dash, audacity, ferocity, initiative (or decision as it was known in the First 
World War and is still known in the Memorial's Hall of Memory), detem1ination, and 
a willingness to sacrifice oneself for the victory of one's comrades and one's cause. 
All of these virtues were recognisable components of pre-war British Imperial 
military propaganda, and a cOJmection between Australian soldiers and their Imperial 
forefathers was asserted repeatedly. It was these virtues which, in martial nationalist 
62 AWM 93 13/ 111 4; Relics and Records, December 1931, pp. 16-17. 
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ideology. proved the strength, and therefore the worth, of a nation, as the British 
nation had proved its worth over many centuries. As Pearce had said, Australia was 
now ··making history of her own," and not least in th.is process was the perceived 
exhi bition of these virtues by Australian soldiers.63 History was seen in part as a series 
of moral revelations, realised by physical actions. Martial virtues were national 
virtues, so the Memorial displayed such qualities. This was the principal content of 
the ''praise that never ages ... 
Dash and audacity- traditionally the province of the glamorous cavalry arm-
were virtues ascribed principally to the Light Horse in their campaigns in Palestine, 
and also to some of the final infantry attacks on the Western Front. They were 
embodied in the swift seizure of the enemy position by a frontal charge. Ironically, 
this was the same type of attack wruch, in its 1916-17 Western Front form , was a 
major element of anti-war rhetoric. This was because until I 918, frontal assaults over 
open ground resulted in enormous casualties without discernible gain. In Palestine 
though, such attacks faced vastly weaker defences, particularly in relation to artillery, 
and some were stunning successes. This was a return to the type of warfare that had 
spawned pre-war martial nationalist literature, in which rapid movement was possible 
during battles that were generally small in scope and duration. Thus the 
representations that embodied dash and audacity tended to resemble pre-war mi litary 
art in thei r treatments and themes. 
The finest example of this resemblance consisted of the representations 
depicting the charge of the 4111 Light Horse Brigade at Beersheba in Palestine on 31 
October 1917. Often claimed to be the final successful cavalry charge in history, it 
resulted in a strategic defeat of the Turks, and was thus the ki nd of subject matter 
much used in much pre-war mm1ial nationalist propaganda.64 The Memorial's 
treatment was twofold. Firstly it was "traditional ," emphasising victory and glorifying 
dash and audacity. The charge was shown in two different yet strongly-drawn 
representations. The first surrounded George Lambert's painting The Charge of the 
Australian Light Horse ar Beersheba, 1917, which hung in the exhibitions throughout 
the period. Bean 's guides proudly declared that "the fearless horsemen, in capturing 
63 Cablegram, Secretary of Defence to Administrative Headquarters AI F London, including text of 
message to Colonial Secretary. No. WT 18, 3 March 1918. A WM 38 3 DRL 6673, Item 62 1. 
(,4 Fitchet-t 's Deeds Thai Won the Empire had offered a catalogue of such victories from the Seven 
Years· War and the Napoleonic Wars. 
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this strongly entrenched position by sheer audacity, turned the flank of the whole 
Turkish line, and made possible the advance to Jerusalem. ·'65 
Figure 20: The Charge of the Australian Light Horse at 
Beersheba, 19/7, by George Lambert. 
Source: Australian War Memorial Collections Database. 
cas.awm.gov.au. 
The kinetic energy of the painting suggests the men's dash and audacity, 
sweeping over the hapless Turks and winning the day. fn using such a style the artist 
was placing his work within the tradition of Victorian battle painting which had been 
a major element of traditional pre-war nationalist propaganda. Compare Lambert's 
painting with, for example, Lady Butler's Scotland For Ever' (The Charge of the 
Scots Greys at Waterloo), painted in 1881 in a deliberate attempt, the artist stated, to 
repudiate anti-militarist influences from the Aesthetic Movement: 
65 Relics and Record~, September 1922, pp.l7-18. 
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Figure 2 1: Scotland For Ever!, by Elizabeth Butler. 
Source: Paul Usherwood and Jenny Spencer-Smith, Lady Butler, 
Battle Artist. 1846-1933. 
Both paintings have the same kinetic elements, the same sense of excitement, but 
most importantly, the same reckless courage and (at least in the initial stages of the 
Grey's charge) the same successful outcome. 
The second representation related to Beersheba was typ ical of the Memorial 's 
desire to prove its claims, although it was as emphatic as Bean 's guide entries in its 
boast of victory won through superior moral qualities. This was a photograph 
displayed in Sydney, ti tled ·'After the Victory" and said to show "squadrons of the 4111 
Australian Light Horse (ALH) Brigade among the ruins of Gaza. By their dashing 
charge, mounted over the Turkish trenches at Beersheba, these troops played an 
important part in driving the Turkish force from the Gaza-Beersheba line."66 This 
second representation also provides visual evidence that the men had triumphed in the 
battte, for they can be seen in Gaza, which other representations made clear had 
withstood two previous attacks by British troops. 
Such reckless verve had long been the stu tf of pre-war nationalist military 
propaganda, had occupied wartime propagandists, and was most especially the 
content of much Austral ian war literature. Thus was the action of the Australian Light 
Horse connected to a long line of similar actions performed by past British heroes, 
such as the Scots Greys at Waterloo. These connections were doubtless deliberate, 
and in hanging the painting the Memorial could not have been operating less as an 
60 Sydney Photograph 51 . Relics and Records, April 1928, p. 70; December 1931 , p. 71 . 
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anti-war institution and more as a martial nationalist propaganda agency. The fact that 
Bean and Treloar believed what they were saying does not make the representations 
less ideologically charged. 
The attack of the Light Horse showed the Australians eager to get to grips with 
the enemy, to kill his soldiers and vanquish him on the field. This ferocity was a 
primal impulse which was much praised by wart ime propagandi sts, for it was 
intimately li nked with military success. With the Memorial 's commitment to 
representing victory, ferocity was commonly depicted. The most dramatic of such 
images was also one of the most symbol ically important in the Memorial, gracing as it 
did the cover of Bean's first guide. It was the fi rst of a series of images of the Digger 
which, in their contradiction, offered in miniature the complexities of the Memorial 
project. For the ferocious Digger was accompanied by a gentle and a tender Digger, 
although it must be kept in mind that the ferocious Digger came first, and was never 
superseded by the less bellicose images, simply given another face.<' 7 
The cover of Bean's fi rst guidebook was a definitive statement of the 
MemOJial's ''tradi tional" commemorative intent and heroic vision of the AIF . Jt 
showed a soldier in full battle dress with rifle and bayonet in hand, looking grimly 
downwards as if to the fallen opponent he is about to dispatch with his cold steel. 
67 Fiona Nicoll discusses a different set of arguments over the typical Digger's face in From Diggers to 
Drag Queens, pp.97 -1 22. 
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Figure 22: Cover, Australian War Memorial Guidebook, 
1922. 
Source: Relics and Records, September 1922. 
This was an image of overt military strength, reminiscent of wartime propaganda and 
even of the "war-god" images of Norman Lindsay's wartime anti-German 
propaganda.68 It was, in short, a militarist image, glorying in the virility of the warrior 
doing "bloody work." It announced that the Memorial would show the Australian 
soldier as a formidable fighter - strong, merciless and determined - single-mindedly 
seeking out his enemy with the cold steel. It also announced the depth of the 
Memorial's commitment to traditional understandings of war and the glorification of 
the warrior. This was a Memorial, it said, which saw the destruction of the enemy as 
an act to eulogise, ferocity a character virtue to emulate. The cover image was, in fact, 
the man on the front of the Anzac Book, transformed from a battered, bloody yet 
determined stoic into a rampaging berserker, looking only for a German Eagle to 
finish off with the bayonet. 
68 Nonnan Lindsay, Norman Lindsay War Cartoons /9l.J-1918, Peter Fullerton (ed.), (Melbourne: 
Melbourne University Press, 1983 ). 
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Figure 23: Cover, The Anzac Book, 1916. 
Source: www.retrieverbooks.com.au/ warl .html 
The rugged, enduring hero on the Anzac Book cover, tattered Union Jack behind him, 
was the very image of the detennined Briton - the Bulldog breed at its most 
pugnacious. The Digger on Bean's guide cover was the triumphal Australian- the 
Briton reborn as Achilles. 
A brief examination of two representations - one photographic, the other an 
object display- helps illustrate the manner in which ferocity, the desire to attack and 
harm the enemy, was linked to victory. Firstly, a photograph displayed in Melbourne 
depicted Australians shooting at the enemy from a position they had ejected them 
from: 
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Figure 24: "Dealing With Running Huns." 
Source: Australi an War Memorial Collections Database. 
cas.awm.gov.au. Photograph E03259. 
DEALING WITH RUNNING HUNS 
The 451h Australian Battalion, at the final objective of 18th 
September, 1918, overlooking Ascension Farm, near La 
Verguier, in France. The fourth soldier from the right is 
sniping at Germans, who are running up the hillside opposite, 
but are hidden from view in the photograph by the smoke. On 
this day the l s1 and 2"d Divisions captured the Hindenburg 
Outpost Line. Their casualties were, comparatively, 
rema rkably few, especially when the importance of the position 
and their capture of personnel and material are considered.69 
The caption foregrounded the men 's ruthlessness in their pursuit of victory and the 
destruction of the Hun, while also providing vivid evidence of the common wartime 
story of Australians driving the enemy from their trenches and harrying him as he 
fled. The claim of victory is unmistakable, as the Australians stand in complete 
command of the "final objective," and when the element of ''keeping score" - the 
comparison of Australian to enemy casualties- is added, the representation provides a 
comprehensive message of AlF military supremacy. 
·'Dealing With Running Huns" was used only in Melbourne, but its 
withdrawal ought not to be taken as ev idence that such representations were no longer 
119 Melbourne PhotO!',ITaph 128. l?eh~:s and Records, September 1922, p.85. 
2 14 
desired in the Memoria l. Another label, on disp lay in Sydney in 1932, went much 
fu rther, adopting the devil-may-care ferocity of the most bellicose soldier-writers: 
A RAID BY THE SIXTH 
At midnight on the 12111/13111 July [1 9 181, B Coy. raided the 
Huns near Meteren. At first the Germans showed light, but 
when the raiders got close to them they turned and ran. The 
Lewis gunners with the raiders, firing from the hip, gave the 
fl eeing Huns a warm time. Among the captures were 2 
prisoners, 2 machine guns and this spade.70 
This jocular ferocity in the story-tell ing tone, in which the flee ing Huns were given a 
warm time, expressed a desire to extem1inate the enemy, and a joy in his destruction, 
that "Dealing With Running Huns" did not even approach. It was in accord with the 
cover image of 1922, though, and its existence in 1932 indicates that anti-war ideas 
had gained little purchase. The expression "a warm time" was characteristic of 
wartime propaganda and " big-noting" war literature, but had a ferocity and an 
antipathy seldom used in war memorials. The style was also used in a display of 
trench raiding clubs, presented by Bean under the carefree heading "When Clubs 
Were Trumps," and described as "effective weapons, especially for stunning 
recalcitrant prisoners who refused to 'come quietly. '' '71 
Although it may labour the point, one final example illustrates the exuberance 
with which destruction of the enemy was presented: 
OFF TO HARRY THE HUNS 
An armoured car, moving up the main Amiens Road from 
Warfusee-Abancourt, on 811' August, 1918, during the 
advance of the 151h Australian Infantry Brigade, nea r 
Harbonnieres, encounter s an obstacle in the form of a fallen 
tree. On this day the armoured cars appeared as a bolt from 
the blue, in the German billets, well behind the line. They 
sped through villages, firing through the windows of the 
houses at German soldiers at breakfast, threw transport 
columns into wild confusion, chased staff officers, and 
10 Label A WM.82 J: "A Raid by the Sixth." Attachment, Bain 10 Treloar, 28 December 1932. A WM 
265 21/4/5, Part 7. 
71 Refics and Records, 1922, p.48. 
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incidentally carried out a valuable reconn aissance of the 
enemy's te~ritory.72 
These annoured cars caused absolute chaos amongst the enemy, the label claimed, 
creating what Briti sh military writers liked to call " merry hell ." It was exciting and 
enjoyable, the label argued , to wreak such havoc on the enemy, and the visitor is 
invited (and expected) to agree. 
That reviews of the Memorial never mentioned the cover picture, never took 
exception to its obvious mi litarist connotations, nor said anything negative about these 
displays of ferocity, suggests that such images were accepted in the public arena. 
indeed, Rider Haggard-style ferocity had been a widespread theme of both private and 
pub lic writing since the war. Certainly it was widely expressed by soldiers during the 
war. 7.1 For example, after a trench raid Signaller G.H. Molesworth gleefully recounted 
the ag!,rressiveness of his unit's attack in a letter of March 1918: 
Our artillery opened into the Germans and Belted Hell & Blazes 
Into them - we sneaked up under the Barrage & It was lovely 
shells Bursting & Lights shooting al l over the sky ... all of a 
Sudden It lifted back a couple of Hundred yards & away we 
charged yel ling like devils right Into His Trenches Fritzey Bolted 
& we after Him 1 was directly after my officer & a couple 
Dodged Into a Dugout. We Fed Them on Bombs etc & on To the 
74 
next. .. 
Thus, the Memorial was using language which was actually more reserved than that 
which soldiers had used to their correspondents during the war. This put the Memorial 
on the less extreme end of a continuum of usage ofthe theme. 
Dash and ferocity were c learly useful in battle, but also high on the register of 
traditional military virtues was decision. The AIF were routinely claimed to be 
superior in initiative to other troops, both allied and enemy, in the Memorial and 
elsewhere . In most cases an explicit link with AIF victories was asserted. The 
Memorial followed a similar course. Two actions suffice to illustrate this. Firstly, 
72 M elboume Photograph I 16. Relics and Records, September 1922, p.83. 
7
' Robin Gerster suggests that accounts of the destruction of the enemy may have been a way of 
soldiers reassuring themselves and their loved ones that they were in control of the battle situation. 
Gerster. Big-n1Hing, p.4. 
1~ Ga mmage. The Broken Years, p. l55. Capital isation in original. See also pp. 22 1-5, 257-9. Gammage 
goes so far as to declare that "many [Australians] ki lled their opponents bruta ll y, savagely, and 
unnecessaril y.'' The Broken Years, p.259. 
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there was the action at Broodseinde Ridge dming the Third Battle of Ypres. This was a 
heroic tale of quick-thinking Australi ans defeating their German enemies man-to-man 
despite their being seriously depleted in numbers before the action began: 
Here is the actua l tape from which the great attack started upon the 
4th October, 19 17, when the I st 2nd and 3rd Austra lian Divisions, 
together with the 7th British Division, the New Zealand Division, 
and other troops finally captured the commanding Broodseinde 
Ridge [sunounding Ypres]. As they lay upon the tape, just before 
dawn, the I st and 2nd Divisions were subjected to a murderous 
bombardment, which killed or wounded no less than 20 per cent. of 
the men in some of the units. 
When the moment of the attack came, and the men rose. they had 
advanced some 30 yards only when they discemed, in the dim light 
ahead, a line of Gem1ans rising to their feet not 50 yards away. The 
Australians realised in an instant that an enemy attack must have 
been planned for the same hour, neither side knowing the 
intentions of the other. The Australian Lewis gunners dropped on 
the h'TOund and began to fi re; the German line broke, and the 
Australians rolled over it and seized the ridge. One of the helmets 
of the Germans who were killed in this incident can be seen, 
covered with sandbag cloth 75 
The Australians' superior martial ability once again secured an important victory: this 
time the AJF succeeded (albeit with some outside help) in capturing a height which for 
three years the Gennans had held, making the British trenches "precmious."76 The 
"individual genius of the Australian soldier" was here displayed in a pure fonn, and 
there was a trophy taken from the enemy dead to prove it. The fact that the Australian 
attack had superior numbers to the Gem1an was discreetly left unsaid, so as to better 
highlight the quick-thinking of the Australians, and to amplify the quality of the 
victory.77 This was a "national" tnrth - selective, yet based firmly on verifiable fact. 
The Broodseinde story exemplified quick-thinking, which was one 
manifestation of the claimed superior in itiative of the Austral ians. A story 
accompanying a German megaphone provided proof of another, the ability of 
Australian Other-Rankers to act without expl icit direction and press an attack home 
successfull y: 
75 Relics and Records. September 1922, p.22: April 1928. pp.24-5: December 1931. p.26. 
76 Relics and Records, September 1922, p.22: April 1928. pp.24-5: December 1931. p.26. 
77 Coulthard-Clark, Enc:vclopedia, pp.l32-3. 
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This German megaphone, which is made of paper, was found 
in Haut Allaines by the 1st Div. Salvage Coy. This village & 
Allaines, which is immediately adjacent to it, were captured 
on the 2"d September 119181 by the 2i" Battalion. In the 
attack the battalion encountered heavy M.G. fire directed 
from the village, and all officers except 2 became casualties. 
The men pressed on however & drove the Huns from the 
villages, about 600 of them rapidly withdrawing to a trench 
in the rear of the villages. The battalion captured 102 
prisoners and 15 machine guns.78 
This label was on display in 1932, by which time the innate initiative and inte ll igent 
quick-thinking of the ordinary Australian soldier, and his ability to act without orders, 
were well-establi shed elements of mainstream Australian war commemoration, pillars 
of the Anzac Legend. The element of ferocity within the claim of victory, with "the 
Huns driven from the vi llages," is c lear, and illustrates the close connection which 
existed between dec ision, ferocity and victory within the Memorial 's rhetoric. 
In a war of attrition such as the First World War, endurance was a maJor 
mi litary virtue, and used to redeem military fai lures and pyrrhic victories. Whilst not 
leading directly to victory, endurance allowed the AIF to survive the worst of the 
wa(s attritiO!ial battles in 1916 and 1917, and was thus a fundamental component of 
the Memorial's glorification of the men. The longest example is also one of the 
richest. This is a catalogue of the hardships of the Jorda n Valley in Palestine 
excerpted m Bean's Sydney guide of 1931 from Gullett's volume of the Hi~tory 
publ ished m I 923. It has an assortment of Biblical allusions, thereby utilising a 
treatment that was popular for war stories in general, but espec ially for stories set in 
the Middle East. The title of this part of the book, firstly, was "Armageddon," a 
reference to the battle of Megiddo, in the Christian Bible the battlefield at which will 
be fought the final battle between good and evil , according to prophecy. 79 There 
followed a long description of the terrible conditions of the Jordan Valley, a place of 
great heat and humidity, where the troops suffered from plagues of Biblical 
proportions: 
IR Label A WM.990: "AIIaincs and Haut Allaines." Attachment. Bain ro Treloar, 28 December 1932. 
A WM 265 2 1/4/5. Part 7 
79 It is mentioned in Revelation 16: 16 and Judges 5: 19. 
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Blinded and choked by the dus t, with rifles and tools almost too 
hot to touch, harassed by fli es and mosquitoes and a s trange 
plague of sti nging scorpions, great black spiders, snakes and 
other venomo·us creatures, insect or reptile, which seemed in 
keeping with that inferna l region, the troops were weighed down 
w ith a sense of physica l oppress ion due to the abnormal weight 
of the atmosphere and its excessive mois ture. Rations reached 
the lines in regular supply, but in a condition which would have 
revolted any men but soldiers on active service. The bread was 
dry and unpalatable as chaff; the beef, heated and reheated in its 
tins, came out like so much string and oil. The men 's 'bivvy' 
sheets gave little shelter from the fierce sun by day, and the heat 
and insects made s leep almost impossible at night. And upon this 
threshold of hell the men were ca lled upon not on ly to hold their 
line against an aggressive enemy, elated with his recent 
successes, but had for many weeks to engage in severe physical 
labour. "80 
As a means of impressing upon the audience what the Li ght Horse had endured in 
Palestine, thi s passage was extremely vivid. It was also desi&,rned to inspire admiration 
and awe in a measure equal to the tale, whi le prais ing the men and enhancing their 
reputation for toughness and stoicism. The notion that the First World War was the 
final battle between good and evi l had been widely expressed in Australia during the 
war, and would have been very well known to the Memorial 's audience.81 The title 
"Armageddon" was thus a symbolic shorthand for the complex of myths surrounding 
tltis notion, which was compounded of clergy's anti-German sermons and the works 
of other propagandist writers and speakers . 
The Palestine example implied that the Australians had overcome the 
conditions they had encountered, for their fi nal triumph in Palestine was shown 
elsewhere in the Memorial, and in true romantic style was well known. Another 
il lustration of the men 's endurance, an archetypal one from the Western Front, made 
this even more exp licit, arguing that the men had transcended the conditions: 
RO Relics and Records, December 193 1, pp.l ?-18. The quote ca me from H.S. Gullett, The Aus1ralian 
Imperial Force in Sinai and Palestine 19/4-1 918, Official History of Australia in the War of 1914-
1918. vo1.7, (Sydney: Angus and Robertson, 1923), pp.64 1-2. 
~ 1 John A Moses, ''The First World War as Holy War in German and Australian Perspective," 
Colloquium, 26,1 (May 1994), pp.44-55. 
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Figure 25: " In Di fficulties." 
Source: Australian War Memorial Collections Database. 
cas.awm.gov.au. Photo&rraph EO I 076. 
IN DIFFICULTIES 
Member s of an Australian battery hauling their gun forward 
through heavy mud , after th e ad vance, near Hannebeek, in 
th e Ypres Sector, on 4'h O ctober , 1917. The Third Battle of 
Ypres was the most searching test to which Australian 
a rtiller ymen were subjected during th e war. The terrible 
sta te of the ground made it indescribably difficult for them to 
get their gun s into position, and to keep them supplied with 
the enor mous amounts of ammunition which they expended . 
The frequ ent attacks, and ceaseless G erman counter-attacks, 
kept th em in action almost continuously. The infantry did 
their .iob, and wer e relieved. The gunners stayed on to help 
the newcomers. But through it all the Australian artiller y 
maint a ined , and even enhanced , its r eputation.82 
The caption's focus on the performance and reputation of the Australians is a key 
example of Memorial rhetoric. The men endured a "searching test," with terrible 
conditions and a formidable enemy, yet they did not let these adversities best them. 
They persevered. doing their duty conscientiously as the photograph depicted. In fact 
the image chosen is noteworthy. for while the mud is bad it is not impassable, and the 
men look as if they wi ll successfully pull the gun out of it hart ly. In a simi lar 
manner. the caption argued, the Australians had overcome all obstacles to emerge 
~" Me l bourne Photograph l\7. Relics and Records. September 1922. p.78. 
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with greater glory than they had entered the battle. Whilst it suggests terrible 
conditions, the representation presents a war in which men's dign ity remains. 
Praise for the Austral ian soldier in traditional terms reached its zenith in 1933 
m the preface to Australian Chivuby. This contained almost all the elements of 
traditional nationalist military propaganda - powerful warriors fighting nobly and 
with great effect in the defence of the weak - and none of those common to anti-war 
literature - terrified, emascu lated creatures sent to slaughter by fools in the service of 
knaves. Treloar, in fact, announced that he was publishing the volume as a rejoinder 
to anti-war propaganda. Thus, the volume was a pure il lustration of the traditional 
approach taken by the Memorial . 
The title page asserted a direct c01mection between two figures , an Anzac on 
the right and a knight on the left. The knight wears chain mail and a smock with a St 
Andrew's cross on the chest, and carries an enormous sword. The Anzac, in frontline 
rig of steel helmet, puttees and rifle, greatly resembles Charles Wheeler's figure of 
The Digger in his painting ofthe same name, included in the collecti on. Both warriors 
have calm, assured expressions on their faces, the knight looking across to the Anzac, 
who stands, smoking, gazing out at the viewer. The two men stand on ground which 
begins on the left of the picture with a tree and a farm, representing the agrarian idyll 
so common in propaganda posters, and ends on the right in the devastated landscape 
of the Western Front, with the stump of a tree, tangles of barbed wire, and the 
ubiquitous duckboards, on which the Anzac stands.83 The landscape and the gaze of 
the knight, especially, promote the idea that the Anzac is heir to the knight, and to the 
ideals of chivalry which he represents, and this message is continued in the preface 
thus: 
The slouched hat replaced the crested heaume, the sombre khak i 
tunic the mail hauberk, and the magazine rifle the sword and 
lance. But, with enthusiasm as lofty as that of any kni ght of old, 
these young men swore fea lty to the oppressed against the 
despoi ler, and from that pledge, volu ntarily given, they were not 
to be diverted by pain, peri l or privation.84 
~3 On propaganda posters see Peter Stanley, What Did You Do in rhe War, Daddy?: A visual hisTOIJ' of 
propaganda posters, (Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 1983). 
IW Treloar (ed.), Aus1ralian Chivalry, Preface. 
221 
This classic example of the nationalist claim of connection between the present and an 
idealised, mythologised past conti nued in the same vein, arguing that "knights" had a 
strong impact on the fortunes of the Allies in the war, for although "their banners, 
their Jances, and their armour have decayed centuries since ... their spirit, sent down 
through the generations, proved on countless occasions the most potent weapon in the 
am1.oury of Great Britain and her allies."85 A more perfect example of martial 
nationalist ideology could not be envisioned. 
Readers were left in no doubt as to the noble vision of Australians at war that 
they ought to have: 
Australians who served in the War, in whatever capacity, were 
inspired by "the high sense of honour, d isdain of danger and 
death, love of adventure, compassion for the weak and 
oppressed, self-sacrifice, and altruism" - which, as a leamed 
dean has written, were the embodiment of chivalry.86 
Here was the clearest possible embrace of martial nationalism. Chivalry was the very 
stuff of traditional war commemoration and literature, the epitome of the glorious 
warrior. To ensure that this message was received, it was underlined several times. 
There was reference to "the inauguration of this new Order of Chivalry," which saw 
the coming "from all grades of society [ ofJ Paladins to champion the cause of peace-
loving peoples whom they believed to have been wantonly assailed."87 This was the 
Memoria l' s clearest ever refutation of the idea that the First World War had destroyed 
the concept of personal heroism on the battlefield.88 
"
5 Treloar (ed.). Australian Chil'(llrr. Preface. For a striking and somewhat polemical discussion of the 
tradit ional connection of generations of warriors to perceived lineages of great antiquity, and the 
connections bet ween this idea and the national ist notion of the immemorial past, see Ehrenreich, Blood 
Rites. pp.l50-203. 
Kll Treloar (ed.), Australian Chivalry, Preface. 
R
7 Treloar (ed.). Australian Cl!ii'(J/i:r. Preface. 
~~ The idea that Australian soldiers were paladins had been popular directly after the war. ln 1919 the 
yellow-press paper Smith 's Weekly, the self-styled " Digger's Advocate." declared the assertion in a 
dramatic manner: 
Out of the mists of b<t ttle-dawn they broke, 
Flashing their virgin steel. untried yet strong. 
Laughing. they died to right a nation 's wrong. 
Died. and the soul of nationhood awoke. 
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The preface continued with another, and even greater, invocation of traditional 
heroic notions. It asserted that ''among Australia 's knights were to be found Bayards 
'without fear and without reproach,"' in a reference both to the original Bayard, Pierre 
Terrail (c.l472-1524), who was called le chevalier sans peur et sans reproche, and 
perhaps to certain popular biographies of military officers published in the pre-war 
years.89 A quick examination of the saga of Bayard indicates the nobi lity being 
asserted. When still very young ("Your beard is not of three years growth") he 
challenged a famous knight at a tourney, for his love of single combat was 
insatiable.90 He then became a hero and general in the Italian Wars (1494-1559). 
Richard Barber asserts that his virtues were "in the traditional mould: comtesy, 
generosity ... and above all, courage: at Milan he was so intent on the pursuit of his 
enemies that he was captured right inside the town, though the skinnish had begun 
some miles outside."9 1 Such was Bayard's prestige and nobility that Francis I, King of 
France 1515-47, in a dramatic step, actually accepted a knighthood from Bayard, 
"wherein he did wisely," Bayard' s chronicler declared, "for by one more worthy it 
could not have been conferred on [Francis]."92 Although few of its readers may have 
known the story in detail , these were the virtues invoked. 
These were our men. who, answering the brazen clangour of the War-God's 
gong, forsook the plough, the mine, the pasture. the workshop and the pen. 
Hurling themselves across a watching world. they were gay as the sunshine of 
their far-off southern home. Splendid in the thew bestowed by their deep-
bosomed mothers, reckless and gallant in the spirit of their pioneer forebears, 
they came on that immortal Apri l morning up out of the sea which for ages 
was furrowed by the keels of the soldier adventurers of the heroic past. An 
army of warriors, these Anzacs, of. perhaps. the grealcs1 physical perfection 
that the world has seen. Trained at the highest athletic pitch, briefly. but 
effectively, instructed in the use of unfamiliar weapons, untested in battle. 
these laughing paladins of the South, leaping on to the now famous beach of 
Anzac, blooded their maiden steel in one irresistible rush upon an astonished 
but stubborn enemy. 
Smith 's Weekly. 26 April 1919, p.9. 
K
9 See for example Lionel James Trotter, A Bayard of India: The life of General Sir James Outram, 
(London: Dent. 1909); Treloar (ed.), Australian Chivaby, Preface. 
90 Jacques de Mailles, The Right Joyous and Pleasant HisiOtJ' of the Fea ts, Gests, and Prowesses of the 
Chevalier Bay arr, Sara Coleridge (trans.). (London, 1906), p.20, quoted in Richard Barber. The Knight 
and ChivahJ', (London: Cardinal, 1974 ), p. l51. 
91 Barber, The Knight. p. l52. 
92 Mai lles, Bayart, p.301. quoted in Barber, The Knight, p. l 52. 
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The Australi an Bayards were dangerous men, with a "terrible aspect," but 
beneath this "they were gentle and chivalrous with a clean, brave outlook, and an 
unfailing respect for all that was good and just in life.'m These were clearly the same 
Australians Bean wrote of in 1907. Here again was Bean's assertion of the cleanliness 
of mind and character of the AIF, while the assertion of respect for the good and just 
had become a standard element of mainstream commemorative rhetoric by 1933, 
common not just in Australia but in Britain as well. The preface to Australian 
ChivahJ', then, represented the AIF as great men- strong, courageous, and noble. The 
Memorial's displays had been quietly making the same c laim for over a decade by 
1933. 
The argument that Australians were latter-day knights was summarised in the 
notion of "the Glory of Anzac." Compounded of all the martial vi1tues perceived to 
have been displayed at the Landing, it was deeply ' 'traditional," as illustrated in the 
several representations that included the notion. According to Bean's guide, 
Lambert's painting Anzac: The Landing. 1915 was powerfully revelatory, being "an 
al most exact representation of the actual scene on that fateful April morning, when the 
Glory of Anzac was revealed."94 The notion was also used in summary of the whole 
Dardanelles campaign, which he said was the "first, most tragic, and in some ways, 
most glorious, of the Australian campaigns." Finally, he invoked the "glory" 
popularly attached to one of the most famous failures of British arms through a quote 
from Tennyson, ''While All the World Wondered,'' putting the visitor in mind of the 
Victorian Poet Laureate's famous "Charge of the Light Brigade:" 
Flash ' d all the.ir sabres bare, 
Flash'd as they turn'd in air, 
Sabring the gunners there, 
Charging an army, while 
Al l the world wonder'd: 
Plunged in the battery-smoke 
Right thro ' the line they broke; 
Cossack and Russian 
Reel' d from the sabre stroke 
Shatter 'd and sunder'd. 
9) Treloar (cd.). Australian Chil'ali:r. Preface. 
··~ Relics and Re,·ords, September 1922, p.1 4; April 1928, p.15; December 193 1, p. 14. Australian 
Chh·alry. Plate 7. 
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Then they rode back, but not 
Not the six hundred. 
When can their glory fade? 
0 the wild charge they made! 
All the world wondered. 
Honour the charge they made, 
Honour the Light Brigade, 
Noble six hundred.95 
Whether the campaign was a success in military terms was ultimately not the question 
to contemplate when reflecting on Gall ipoli, Bean was suggesting. There were greater 
issues at stake: the upholding of ideals of manliness and military conduct which a 
popular Imperial mi litary tradition of the pre-war period had espoused, which were 
proved by the perceived successes at the landing. 
That the sniper of the 45111 Battalion depicted in the photograph "Dealing with 
Running Huns" had "dealt" with the "running Huns" in a fa tal manner was suggested 
by other displays, those concentrating on ma rksmanship. lt was here that locally-
sourced ideas of Austra lian identity entered the Memorial's explanatory rhetoric. 
Whilst not strictly a virtue. marksmanship was perceived as an important part of the 
military ideal of manhood p romoted in Australia from 1900 and reflected in such 
statements as that of Hughes in which he argued that Australians wanted "an am1ed 
people who can shoot straight. .. "96 Certain] y marksmanship was praised in the 
Memorial with all the gusto that giving Huns a warm time was, and implied a number of 
virtues- coolness, control of oneself, ruthlessness. 
Taken fi·om the "bush myth" of the pre-war period, and echoing tributes that 
had been paid to Boer War troops, Australian marksmanship was praised in two 
clearl y-drawn representations. The simpler was a label, a small part of which was 
included in a Jetter fi·om Treloar to the curator Les Bain dated 14 December 1932: "It (the 
object, although unnamed, was probably a rifle] bears evidence of the accurate shooting of 
the Australians in the dark as it will be noticed an Australian bullet struck and lodged in 
the barrel. It can be seen just in front of the second band.'m Another, much more resonant, 
95 Christopher Ricks (ed.), The Poems a_( Tennyson, (Harlow: Longman, 1987), pp.l 034-6. 
96 W.M. Hughes, Bulletin, 13 February 1901, in McKinlay, Documentmy Histo1 y of the Ausrralian 
Labour Movement, p.22. 
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claim was the contrast between an Austral ian and a Bedouin marksman which appeared in 
Bean 's guides throughout the petiod: 
The case also contains some relics of. .. the Bedouin tribes who 
hung round the armies in search of loot. Worthy of mention among 
[these] is a 1ifle, on the breach of which is engraved a text from the 
Koran: "Nothing can be accomplished unless God is willing" - a 
consoling clause for a poor marksman! 
In the right-hand comer of the case is a Turkish entrenching tool, 
neatly d1illed by a bullet. A Turk held thjs up in a trench near Rafa. 
A Light Horseman fired at it, and found it when the position was 
captured a little later. It is ample proof of the accuracy of his aim.98 
Claims of Australian marksmanship were summatised in the photographic exhibition. In 
a clear line of progression from Boer War praise through the Sydney Morning Herald's 
argument in 1914 that "as in South Africa, so in Europe, the Australian horseman will 
be able to do a service to the allied armies which they can expect from no other 
reinforcements," one caption argued that "in making the most of natural cover, and in 
sniping, the Light Horseman was without peer."99 While summatising the argument 
about marksmanship1 this label also reinforced prevailing ideas that the bushman was a 
better shot than the city-slicker. 
Displays concentrating on leisure activities were also used to prove Allenby's 
claims of the superior physique and physical qualities of the AIF. There was, for 
example, an entire showcase devoted to sporting trophies won in the field by the AIF, 
and this was supplemented by the display, on a pillar, of paper certificates for horse 
riding. 100 
97 Director. Austra lian War Memorial. Melbourne, (John Treloar) to Curator, Australian War 
Memorial. Sydney (Les Bain). 14 December 1932. A WM 265 21/4/5, Part 7. Treloar's attention to 
detail is ex hibited in the lerter also, where the Director points out a small amendment that had been 
made, in which the word "seen" had been substituted for '"noticed.'' 
9~ Relics and Records, September 1922. p.l5; April 1928. p.l7; December 193 1. p.l 9. The Bedouins had 
a poor reputation amongst the main powers of the war, being considered scavengers without al legiance. 
There is striking evidence of this in the Canberra Memorial's displays themselves. in an incident in which 
General Ryrie allowed a group ofTurks to keep their ri lles so as to protect themselves and the Austral ians 
from Bedouins; he disarmed them when the danger had passed. Australian War Memorial, Guide to 
Aus1ralian War Memorial. (Sydney: Halstead, 1942). pp.32-3. 
QQ S.Fdney Morning Herald, I 0 September 19 14, quoted in Will iams, Anzacs. the Media, p.5 1; 
Melbourne Photograph 140; Sydney Photograph 41. Relics and Records, September 1922, p.86; Apri l 
1928, p.68: December I 931. p.69. 
100 These certi fica tes are at Ex Doc. 186. Sheet I 0 Item I. 
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Figure 26: Showcase 3 7: Sporting T rophies, Australian War Memorial, 1922. 
Source: Relics and Records, September 1922, p.26. 101 
The physica l strength asserted by such a display was given artistic form in the 
second of the symbolic images of the Digger, the sculpture "Anzac Undress" which 
was prominentl y displayed in the entry of the Melbourne exhibition. 
Figure 27: Anzac "Undress. " by William Anderson. 
Source: Relics and Records, September 1922, p.15. 102 
101 See also Relics and Records, Apri l 1928, p.1 4. 
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The lean physica l strength and pleasi ng proportions of the figure embody the beauty of 
the Australian soldier, a vital element of wartime propaganda and of post-war 
commemorati ve rhetoric. lt had been widely commented upon, especially by British 
observers, with poet Jolm Masefield's reactions perhaps the most well-known: "For 
physical beauty and nobility of bearing they surpassed any man I had ever seen." 103 The 
Memorial' s leaders were happy to display the men 's perceived beauty, but it was never 
more than an occasional theme. 
An adjunct to the military virtues of dash, ferocity and endurance was 
ingenuity, the practical application of intelligent comprehension of one's 
surroundings. Also known as ''resource," it was usually represented as associated with 
victory rather than contributing directly to it. This was in accord with Bean's view, 
and one widely held in Australia, that brains were useful but character was decisive. 
Battles were perceived to be more often won by dash or ferocity than by creating and 
using an ingenious new device, not entirely consonant with the experience of the AIF 
on the Western Front. Nevertheless, being resourceful was felt praiseworthy, and was 
praised accordingly. Part of the pre-war Australian "bush myth" which was 
transferred readily to the Alf, ingenuity was widely acclaimed by wartime and post-
war propagandists and the Memorial alike. 
One of the symbols of Australian ingenuity was the "jam-tin bomb," an 
improvised grenade produced and used at Gallipoli. A photograph showed men at 
work producing the bombs, proving such ingenuity while educating the public as to 
what these looked like and how they functioned. Victory is not specifically 
mentioned, but the possibility had surely been increased by the men's ingenuity: 
10~ See also Relics and Records. April 1928, p.8. 
1113 Masefield, Callipoli , p. l9. This quote was extremely popular. being seen as late as 1939 on Anzac 
Day. See Age. 25 April 1939, p.8. 
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Figure 28: "A Bomb Factory." 
Source: Australian War Memorial Collections Database. 
cas.awm.gov.au. Photograph G00267. 
A BOMB FACTORY 
Within a few days of the Landing at Anzac, the Turks were 
using bombs. Quickly appreciating their value, the Australians, 
having none supplied to them, set out to make their own, 
introducing the famous "jam-tin" pattern. The container, as the 
name implies, was an iss ue jam-tin. Jn the centre was placed a 
cylinder containing high explosive, in which was inserted a fuse 
and detonator. The space between the explosive and the side of 
the jam-tin was filled with scraps of metal - pieces of iron, 
cartridge cases, nails, punchings, barbed wire, etc. The fuse was 
lit before the grenade was thrown. Towards the end of the 
Gallipoli campaign more elaborately designed grenades became 
available. 104 
In this representation, clever Australians, thinking with characteristic swiftness, had 
"fearlessly and independently" faced the problem, applying " their mind to it straight," 
as Bean stated was their custom. 105 They had solved it with the kind of practical 
simplicity Ashmead-Bartlett bad referred to in his first dispatch. 
104 Melbourne Photograph 20; Sydney Photograph 29. Relics and Records, September 1922, p.65; April 
1928, p.65; December 1931, p.66. 
105 Bean, In Your Hands, p.91. 
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In addition to ingenuity, the Memorial provided evidence of Australian 
superiority in the more intellectual endeavour of invention. A display of gas-masks, 
which at first sight appear to have been arranged in a completely traditional 
typological manner, with examples from different countries and different years 
shown, carried the message. 
Figure 29: Showcase 58: Anti-gas Equipment, Australian War Memorial, 1922. 
Source: Relics and Records, September 1922, p.50. 106 
Bean 's guide argued that one ofthe masks, invented at Melbourne university, was "so 
far as is known ... the first British box respirator." 107 Here, the ingenious colonials 
were contributing to the Empire and its greatness, and as a nice bonus, surpassing the 
metropolitans in achievement. All of this surely proved that, as Bean had written in 
1919, given a group of young Australian minds set upon the task of determining how 
best to improve their country, great things were inevitable. 108 
The preface to Australian Chivalry argued that as well as having a "terrible 
aspect," the Australians were also "gentle and chivalrous." Part of this chivalry was 
exhibiting "compassion for the weak." This included humane treatment of vanquished 
enemies. During the war the Australians actually had a fearsome reputation for not 
taking prisoners, but this was never addressed in the Memorial except through the 
106 See also Relics and Records, April 1928, p.44. 
107 Relics and Records, September 1922, p.44 ; April I 928, p.46. 
lOR Bean,/n Your Hands, Australians, p.33. 
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display of contrary images. 109 For example, the diorama label for the battle at Semakh 
in Palestine, as triumphal and ferocious as any in the museum, finished with the Light 
Horsemen, having "destroyed" the enemy garrison, respectfully laying out the bodies 
of enemy dead side by side with their own.110 The 1917 section of the Sydney 
photographic exhibition carried a more dramatic example, a shot entitled "Helping 
His Wounded Enemy" which provided a visual representation of the argument. This 
was ··a scene during the Battle of Messines, showing an Australian stretcher-bearer 
assisting a wounded German prisoner towards a field dressing station on the St 
Quentin Road, on 7'h June, 1917 ."111 
Figure 30: "Helping His Wounded Enemy." 
Source: Australian War Memorial Collections Database. 
cas.awm.gov.au. Photograph E00481. 
Once the enemy had surrendered, the implication was, the fight was over and the 
Australians solicitous. This was an idea much cherished by Bean; he contrasted the 
Australians' forgiving nature with their grudge-bearing Scots allies. 112 
109 Indeed, Bean explicitly infonned Treloar that such images were not to be included in the Memorial. 
C.E.W. Bean to John Treloar, 18 May 1922. A7702 566/003/005. 
110 A WM 93 1311/4. 
111 Melbourne Photograph 51; Sydney Photograph 123. Relics and Records, September 1922, p.70; April 
1928, p.84; December 1931 , p.85. 
112 C. E. W. Bean, Lettersfrom France, (London: Cassell, 1917), p.153. 
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The kinder side of the Australian soldier was also depicted through examples of 
his humour. Such representations tempered the Memorial's generally serious tone, 
injecting a little hannless fun. 113 For example, under the heading "Dodging Discipline," an 
exhibit presented the lighter side of war, in which a unit (the 2"d Divisional Train) 
"acquired" the timber for a billiards table from dubious sources, then attempted to have its 
officers use it often, to avoid them insisting "on us cleaning harness and grooming the 
horses." 1 14 The AlF dislike of parade ground fonnality was legendary, and a fme subject 
for appropriation of the retumed soldier constituency. The Memorial did not neglect to 
examine the playfulness of the Anzacs, either, with this virtue contrasted to German 
turgidity in an exhibit of street signs. The Australians named street "Roo de Kanga," and 
"Dingbat Alley," in happy contrast to the Gem1ans' "Hohenzollern," "Tirpitz" and 
Moltke" streets. ln reviews of the Memorial, this was popular, and usually received a 
mention. 1 15 
Bean liked to emphas ise that when the men played, they played in wholesome 
ways. ln his guide, he reported gambling, sport, devising souvenirs for his friends , 
needlework (when convalescing in hospital), badge collecting and autograph hunting" 
as being the typical leisure activities of the typical Digger. 1 16 Unpleasant topics such 
as the high rate of venereal disease were ignored, of course, as was the Australian 
tendency, mentioned by many observers, to drink to excess as often as possible. 117 
Bean wrote constantly of "clean, straight" young men in his numerous public 
references to the troops. Therefore, the AIF's leisure, as depicted in the Memorial , was 
generally wholesome, although gambling was freely mentioned. However, gambling 
was by a distance the least of the unholy ttinity of drinking, wenching and gambling 
that wowsers railed against. Gambling was relatively acceptable, considered by many 
a harmless pastime, and even a game which one could be skilled at and victorious in. 
113 Levity was also present in Treloar's use of the rhetorical devices, common to returned men's literature, 
of a devi l-may-care feroc ity and an ironic understatement. 
114 Relics and Records, Apri l 192R. p.30; December 193 1, p.47. 
115 Relics and Records , September 1922. p.32; April 1928, p.41 ; December 1931 , p.39. 
116 Relics and Records . September 1922, pp.39-40. 
117 According to E1ic Andrews, the rate o f disease was one in seven in France in 19 17. Andrews, Anzac 
Illusion. p.184. 
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The creation of trench sculpture was a completely wholesome leisure activity, 
and was displayed in several places. One Sydney exhibit carried a label combining the 
claim of AIF morality with the droll humour so characteristic of the AIF of legend: 
TRENCH " SCULPTURE" 
The pieces of chalk dug out of the ground when constructing 
tenches, provided first rate material for carving. Many a 
soldier in the trenches whiled away the time in this way. 
Boyd Cable tells a story of a man who carved an elephant. A 
bullet struck it while it was in his pocket and drove a piece of 
it into his body. Upon his arrival in hospital he considerably 
startled a nurse by telling her he had been wounded by an 
elephant! 118 
Finally, the following photograph was displayed, illustrating the men m a 
domestic situation, which Bean had often done in his war correspondent work. The 
caption combined the themes of seriousness in battle and levity out of it which became 
pillars of the Anzac Legend, while providing evidence that such images of safe, happy 
soldiers appealed to the Australian public: 
Figure 31: "Telling the Latest ." 
Source: Australian War Memorial Collections Database. 
cas.awm.gov.au. Photograph EO I223. 
11
R Label A WM 743-6: "Trench 'Sculpture."' Attachment, Bain to Treloar, 28 December 1932. A WM 
265 21 /4/5, Part 7. Cable wrote children's stories on First World War subjects. 
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TELLING THE LA TEST 
Members of the 1st Austra li an Division a round a fire in a 
billet at Ypres in October, 1917, listening to "the latest" of 
one of their comrades just back from Paris leave. It is a 
typical scene, for billet life with the Australian was as 
cheerful as his fighting was terribly earnest. The War 
Museum has exhibited this photograph in a number of cities 
and towns in Australia, and judging by the copies sold, it had 
everywhere been the most popular photograph in the 
ex hibitions.119 
The Digger presented by the Memorial was, then, a composite of the martial 
virtues originating in British martial nationalist propaganda and the Australian virtues 
promoted by local commentators. The emphasis was on the former, due to the 
emphasis on military victory within the Memorial , and as a consequence the image of 
the typical Australian soldier - and thus by analogy the typical Australian - which 
emerged was more "Bri tish" than "Australian" This was because the virtues seen as 
most vital to the establishment of a healthy nation were the martial ones, with the 
more social virtues sourced from Australia s imply providing a happy bonus, a useful, 
yet optional, set of human characteristics that put the local icing on an Imperial 
cake. 120 
In sum, the narrative and the collecti ve portrait of the AlF presented in the 
Memorial addressed core issues of the Anzac Legend, military effectiveness and the 
moral explanation of it. Both sought acceptance as incontestable truth. Such 
acceptance would gain the Memorial authority on matters concerned with the war. 
This in tum would influence commemoration, supporting those who spoke of AIF 
successes. The narrative and the collective portrait outlined the broad contours, and 
many ofthe details, of the Memorial 's Anzac Legend. The following chapter looks in 
more detail at the ways in which the principal assertion of the Legend, Australian 
military supremacy, was addressed. 
119 Melbourne Photograph 70: Sydney Photograph 163 Relics and Records, September 1922, p.74; 
April 1928, p.94: December 1931 . p.95. 
l lO The "pioneering" vi11ues such as resource were, as indicated, useful adjuncts to the moral core of 
the nation-building project. 
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Chapter 5: Australian Military Supremacy and National 
History 
Figure 32: Interior, Sydney Exhibition. 
Source: Australian War Memorial Collections Database. 
cas.awm.gov.au. Photograph 102198 
"Historians in time will say, ' What was there, after all, in 
this fighting reputation of the AIF?"'1 
- C.E.W. Bean, Public Works Committee Hearing, 1928. 
The fighting reputation of the AIF was, in the first post-war years, the foundation of 
the Anzac Legend. Bean was determined to prevent any such questioning if he could. 
The Memorial was a principal outcome of this determination, with the History being 
the other. The twin elements of Bean's larger project performed complementary 
functions. The History would make a sustained and well-documented case for 
Australian military superiority over almost all other groups. The Memorial offered 
physical evidence of the fact, publicly displaying material purporting to be proof of 
Australian military supremacy in the public domain. 
This "proof' had two elements. The first was embodied in the most triumphal 
battle displays of the national war history, which used a variety of museum 
presentation methods to ·'prove" that Australians had been successful in important 
battles and campaigns. The climax of the national war history saw the Australians 
1 Slanding Committee on Public Works Report, p.32l . 
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triumphant over their enemies. Thus, this series of battles - beginning with Messines, 
but mainly from Villers-Bretonneux onwards - was one of the main subjects in the 
campaign to establish unquestionable proof of the fighting reputation of the AIF. The 
battl es considered here - Menin Road, Villers-Bretonneux, Amiens and Mont St 
Quentin- were al l integral to the Memorial's national history, and the last three were 
the most famous of all Australian victories in mainstream commemoration in the 
1920s. 
Thus, the issue was how to ensure that the displays themselves had authority. 
As a museum, the Memorial's claims to legitimacy were different from those of 
speakers at Anzac Day gatherings or Bean as the Official Historian. Nor was the 
Memoria l a nonnal museum. Therefore, the important museological issues 
surrounding the displays require examination by way of introduction. The most 
impo1iant of these is the process by which ordinary-seeming objects were transformed 
into proof of mil itary supremacy based on superior moral virtues. The primary 
method was "naturalisation," a presentation system under which both military fact and 
moral assertion were to be considered equally '·true" by visitors. The role of both 
object and label were vital. This in tum highlights the importance of labelling to the 
Memorial project and confirms its ljterariness. 
The representations of the four victorious battles are then considered. The 
recapture of Villers-Bretonneux was portrayed through several related displays that 
took the method of "naturalisation,' ' typified by the generals' tributes, to its limit; the 
attacks at Amiens and Mont St Quentin in 1918 were depicted as both exciting 
adventures and historica lly-important victories, combining entertainment and 
nationalist education; and the Battle of Menin Road, fought in 1917, placed these 
Austra lian mi litary traditions in the British Imperial context. All were fundamental to 
the Memorial's programme of creating "the most prominent trad it ions," each being 
potentia ll y the kind of impotiant event referred to in Bean's 1919 plan. 
The second element of the "proof' of the fundamental basis of the Anzac 
Legend displayed Australian military supremacy as an abstract notion , concentrating 
on the representation of the enemy and of enemy material. Display of their words of 
praise for Australian soldiers, a common propaganda tool during the war, helped 
assert it. Tales of their fear of the Austral ians and desire to flee were also useful in 
this regard. More dramatic and telling, though, was the evidence provided by the 
possessions of the enemy, and ultimately, by their bodies. Images of vanquished 
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enemtes, both captured and killed, and items taken from them on the battlefield. 
offered the ultimate tribute to the strength of Australian arrns, although it was at times 
a bloody testimony. 
I 
The imaginative power of the museum form was an imp01tant element in the 
Memorial's messages, differentiating them from those of all other memorials through 
the provision of a unique immediacy. For example, the rhetorical leap from ordinary 
spade to exciting deed of domination over the enemy in the label ti tled "A Raid by the 
Sixth," considered in the previous chapter, is an operation that is characteristic of a 
museum setting and could not be replicated elsewhere. The "romance" of the 
"national story'' attached to it performed a kind of alchemical operation on the base 
spade, transfonning it into a symbol of triumph within a tale of dening-do. The spade 
itself, though, was vitally important to the chain of s ignification, for its physicality 
made the battle at Meteren palpable for audiences and gave the label's interpretation 
an added sense of reality. Museological theoris t Susan Pearce argues that objects in 
museums connect viewers with the past because of thei r "etemal relationship with [that] 
" past, and it is this we experience as the power of the ·actual object. '"- The Memorial was 
able to mobilise this power on a large scale during a period in Australia when there was 
still widespread ignorance about the simplest realities of war.3 Its museum form made it 
a unique war memorial, one that could combine the physicality of objects with copious 
intetpretation, appealing s imultaneously to the senses, the intellect and the emotions 
while forging a direct link between its audiences and the past deeds of the Anzacs. 
However, the Memorial was also a unique museum due to its pmticular treatment 
of its objects. Pearce argues that most museum objects are indexes, a semiotic tenn that 
refers to the object's relationship to an event being evoked in a display. An index is a 
sign-vehicle (a "signifier") which has an intrinsic relationship to its message 
("signified").4 A m useum object was "there at the time," was part of the event and thus 
' · Susan M. Pearce, Museums. Objects and Collections.· A cufwraf still~\ ', (Leicester: Leicester University 
Press, 1992), p.28. 
3 Bean re flected on this ignorance when he wrote, in 1922. that "I know of nothing which has enabled 
my own friends to grasp the meaning of a ' trench ' in the same way as the Mont St Quentin model has 
done.'' C.E.W. Bean to George Pearce, 12 June 1922. A WM 38 3DRL 6673, Item gQ3. 
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operates through synecdoche, that is, the pmt stands for the whole event.5 The Meteren 
spade was, therefore, an index of the battle that occurred that day, making that battle 
present for visitors. However, the Memorial had an added level of complexity, for Bean 
indicated that the objects in the Memorial were "emblems ... of qualities," or in semiotic 
terms, s)'mbols. Such sign-vehicles have an arbitrary relationship to their message; 
decoding is necessary to understand their significance.6 So in the Memorial the spade, 
which operated as a symbol of Australian military supremacy, as did ''the greater part of 
the exhibits," only did so due to the labelling that confirmed the fact.7 The labelling, in 
tum, had to resonate with the audience to achieve its propagandist aims. It had to 
convmce. 
Two factors affected this question of influence most strongly. Firstly, the 
authority of the museum institution was important. ln early-twentieth-century Australia 
museums operated primarily as sources of knowledge, controlled spaces where the world 
was systematically ordered and displayed. "Repositories of the already known," they 
were the physical expression of that knowledge.8 In short, museums of the early 
twentieth century displayed the truth, the world "as it really was." This was partly 
because most of such museums were devoted to natural history, but a British tradition of 
industrial display, also anchored on a fundamental truth-claim, had existed since at least 
4 The typology of the sign was originally expounded by Ferdinand de Saussure and Charles Peirce. See 
Ferdinand de Saussure. Course in General Linguisrics. (Glasgow: Fontana, 1974), pp.64-78, 120-2; 
Charles Peirce. Co/leered Papers o.l Charles Sanders Peirce. vol. 2: Elements of logic, Charles Hartshorne 
and Paul Weiss (eds). (Camb1idge: Harvard University Press, 1932), in particular pp.l56-73. More 
explication of the concept can be found in Roland Ba11hes, £1emenrs of Semiology, Annette Levers and 
Colin Smith (trans.). (London: Cape. 1967), especially pp.35-57. For comment on this theory, see for 
example John Fiske, lnrroduuionto Communicarion Srudies, (London: Routledge, 1982), pp.47-8; Wendy 
Leeds-Hurwitz, Semiotics and Communication: Signs, codes. cultures, (Hillsdale: Erlbaum, 1993 ), p.23. 
~ On synecdoche sec Cuddon, The Penguin Dicrioncu~r of LirerarJ' Terms and Lirerm:v The01y, p.945. 
Fiona Nicoll discusses synecdoche in relation to the Memorial's displays, distinguishing between ''the 
digger as subject of the national history or war,' ' a synecdochical image. and the digger as subject of 
the traumat ic ·experience' of the war," which, Nicoll argues. was a sentiment that Hynes might label 
"anti-monumental." From Diggers ro Drag Queens, pp.42-3. This is an interesting, if not wholly 
developed, distinction. On object semiotics, see Roland Barthes, "Semantics of the Object," in The 
Semioric Challenge. Richard Howard (trans.). (London: Blackwell, 198R), pp.179-90: and Leeds-Hurwitz, 
Semiotics and Communication. On the semiotics of objects within museums, see Susan M. Pearce, 
"Objects as Meaning: or Narrating the Past," in Susan M. Pearce (ed.), Objecrs o.f'Knowledge, (London: 
Athlonc. 1990), pp.l 25-40. 
6 Peirce. Elemenrs o,(Logic. pp. J56-73 . 
7 Relics und Records. September 1922. Foreword: Aprill928 and December 1931. Introduction. 
x Bennett, Birth ()(rhe Museum , p. J47. 
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the middle of the nineteenth century and the Great Exhibition at the Crystal Palace.9 The 
Memorial appropriated the formal authority of both fom1s by utilising their display 
techniques and organisational principles. The Memorial's leaders sought legitimacy, 
with a press release of November 1929 claiming it was "the Austral ian authority on 
matters associated with the war." 10 Importantly, evidence suggests that influential 
groups such as the RSSILA indeed afforded the Memorial this position to make 
pronouncements on the war. Secondly, the naturalisation typified by the generals' 
tributes was an important source of legitimacy for the Memorial. The voices of 
experts vvere arrayed to authenticate its messages, and this extended to the reprinting, 
as extensive labels. of various literary sources, especially the History. Naturalisation 
was the vitaJ element. for it promoted the notion that the Memorial's proof of 
Australian military success, such as the spade, was also proof of the spiritual and 
moral virtues perceived by Bean and Treloar to have caused it, as well as being proof 
of the national historical lessons which were inserted into stories surrounding the 
objects. The "truth-effect" was to flow from "the actual objects" to all the surrounding 
assertions made about them, iJ1Sisting that all of them were entirely natural, in no way 
ideological or constructed. 
A definitive example of this authentication project surrounded the ''Glory of 
Anzac," fi rst mentioned in Bean's original guide of 1922 in reference to George 
Lambert's painting of the Landing: "Unl ike most battle pictures, this painting is an 
aJmost exact representation of the actual scene on that fateful April morning, when the 
Glory of Anzac was revealed. " 11 This claim of the painting's fidelity to the truth was 
reinforced by a footnote referring to a small controversy that had arisen: '"some visitors 
to the Museum have claimed that this picture is incorrect in two minor details:- ( 1) 
That men at the Landing wore caps, not hats, and (2) that the scrub was then higher 
and thicker than is shown.'' 12 This suggested of course that all the other details had 
been agreed on by those visitors. who were quite obviously former soldiers and who 
therefore could pass judgement upon the war's incidents. The implication was that 
9 Paul Greenhalgh. The £xposilions Unil·erse/les. Creal £xhibi1ions and World's Fairs. /85/- /939. 
(Manchester: Manchester University Press. 1988). 
10 Press Release, November 1929. AWM 93 20/ 1/ IA . 
11 Relics and Records, September 1922. p. 14; Apri l 1928. p. l5: December 1931, p.14. 
12 Relics and Records, September 1922, p. l4: April 1928, p. 15; December 1931 , p.14. 
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these expert visitors, while unhappy about the height of the scrub, agreed that the 
Glory of Anzac was indeed on display in the picture. This of course meant that the 
Glory of Anzac was something completely natural , part of the constitution of the men 
themselves and in no way ''created" by writers such as Masefield, Ashmead-Ba1tlett, or 
Bean himself. 
Two displays concerning the defence of Yillers-Bretonneux in April 1918 
serve to illustrate the Memorial's naturalisation project in its purest form. The 
treatment of Villers-Bretonneux utilised a mixture of factual and overtly 
propagandistic content, all presented through the words first of the soldiers 
themselves and their British commander, used to prove that the Australians had been 
successfu l, and of another British officer to make a nationalist claim replete with pre-
war martial nationalist ideology. The role of the museum as interpreter of the 
representations was thus removed entirely, with the proof of the victory and the 
nationalist moral provided by experts. The result was a powerful example of the 
prevailing Australian "national" interpretation ofthe war. 
The battle ofYillers-Bretonneux was of considerable importance to the overall 
fo11unes of the Allies. The village was near Amiens and, if lost, would have given the 
attacking Germans, then several weeks into their final great offensive and threatening 
to win the war, access to Amiens, itself considered '"the key to Paris."13 In the 
Memorial , five official military telegrams associated with its loss and recapture were 
displayed on pi llars. They established, in terse military language, the facts of the 
action, which was well-known by 1922, havi ng been the subject of considerable 
propaganda during the war. 14 If any visitor was unsure as to whether the stories they 
had read in the papers during the war were correct, these telegrams offered proof 
direct from the soldiers. The telegrams, although utilising military language 
throughout, still totalled over 200 words, and thus constituted a very long label by the 
standards of modem museum practice. They told the story in considerable detail. 
The telegrams began with one of 22 April, an intelligence message from 51h 
Division headqua11ers to its brigade and other headquarters, warning of information 
13 Coulthard-Ciark, Encyclopedia, pp. l39-41 . 
14 John Wi ll iams reports that as early as 9 April 19 18 The Times of London published "a dispatch by 
' official Australian war correspondents' (F.M . Cutlack and C.E.W. Bean] which fim1ly associated 
Austra lia with Villcrs-Bretonneux." Will iams, Anzacs. the Media, p.215. 
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from two prisoners which independently suggested an attack was imminent. 1:; This 
duly arrived early in the morning of 24 Apri l, with considerable severity: 
[Telegra m 2[: Morning r eport AAA At 3.45 a.m. enemy 
opened heavy barrage on right sector right Bn support and 
r eserve line with H.E. and gas AAA Battery positions shelled 
with H.E. and gas AAA At 4.20 a.m. POUILLOY shelled 
with gas AAA ... signed, L. Merkel, Capt. 6.45 a.m. 16 
The town was temporarily lost to the Gem1ans. The Australians and some 
Imperial troops quickly reorgan ised themselves, however, and a full -scale attempt to 
recapture the who le town was then made, which was successful. To indicate just how 
successful, the final te legram came from the AIF's British General Officer 
Commanding (GOC), Rawlinson: 
[Telegram 5): Following from Army Commander begins 
AAA Please convey to the 151h and 13111 Aust. Bdes my 
congratulations and warm thanks for their brilliantly 
executed counter attack against VILLERS BRETONNEU X 
last night AAA It was a difficu lt operation and was carried 
out with a dash and determination which does them the 
greatest credit AAA General Rawlinson. 17 
With such evidence offered, there was to be no doubt that the AIF had perfom1ed 
brilliantly in the recapture of Villers-Bretonneux. Rawlinson, in his overall tribute, 
had asserted dash and determination; here was the proof. To set the nationalist seal on 
the story, the plan model of Villers-Bretonneux used yet another quote: "A prominent 
British staff officer has written: ' even if the Australians had accompl ished nothing but 
the recapture of Vil lers-Bretonneux, they would have won the right to be considered 
among the greatest fighting races of the world."' 18 Here was the complete message: 
the Memorial first "proved" that the Australians had conducted the recapture of the 
vital village, then that this was an extraordinary feat. This proved Australian military 
supremacy on this occasion. The proud social Darwinist boast of Australians as a 
"fighting race" took the matter further, directing the visitor' s mind to Allenby's 
1
; Ex Doc. 186, Sheet 17, Item I. 
16 Ex Doc. 186, Sheet 17, Item 2. 
17 Ex Doc. 186, Sheet 17, Item 5. 
18 Relics and Records, April 192!), p.32 . 
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tribute, with its assertion that Austra lia had earned a "place of honour" amongst the 
"Eng! ish speaking races," as well as unambiguously invoking pre-war martial 
nationalist ideology and wartime propaganda. Together the representations on Yi llers-
Bretormeux asserted the doctrine of victory as history, of triumph as act of national 
establi shment, in its purest, most pseudo-scientific form, packaged so as to appear the 
natura l corollary of a well-documented mil itary action. 
Most of the Memorial's displays did not take naturalisation to such a degree, 
however, and the important battles of Amiens and Mont St Quentin in 1918 were 
dealt with in a more standard museological manner. The museum, using its authority, 
interpreted the objects, the events for which they were indexes and the qualities for 
which they were symbols. However, in both cases the Memorial appealed to 
(unacknowledged) sources to summarise the position. Just as in the case of the 
nanative, in which the generals offered summaries of the Australian performance, the 
key interpretative elements were naturalised, if not the whole displays as in the 
Villers-Bretonneux representations. 
The Battle of Amiens, fought on 8 August 1918, was the great breakthrough 
that began the final campaign of the Western Front, known after the war as the 
"Hundred Days." The Memorial presented the battle in the most triumphal of terms, 
as a great Australian victory that had ensured German defeat in the war. This placed 
the museum in agreement with other loyalist nation-builders such as Hughes, who 
saw the battle as one of the great events of Australian history. It was presented 
through a combination of a serious historical assertion of its importance, with 
naturalisation to the fore, and an excited, triumphal series of photographs of the troops 
in action. 
In Bean's guide, the reader was left in no doubt as to the historical importance 
of the battle. He labelled it "Gennany's Day of Doom," and to prove that it had been 
he quoted the German Quartermaster General (and effective commander-in-chief), 
Erich Ludendorff, to the effect that "after the severe defeat of August 81h, I gave up 
the last vestige of hope."19 This defeat was inflicted by ''the British Fourth Army, 
I') Relics und Records, September 1922, p.27: April 1928, p.35: December 1931, p.36. The Somme 
1918 plan model inst<J lled in Sydney in 1928 used the same quote, and added triumphantly that the 
capture of Lihons on 11 September "under the conditions of open warfare, was no ordinary feat of 
arms." Bain to Treloar, 15 May 1929. AWM 265 21 /4/5, Part 3. Erich von Ludendorff ( l 865-1937). 
Quartermaster-general, and effective supreme commander, of German forces on the Western Front 
from August 1916 until the end of the war. Participated in Adolf Hitler's abortive coup attempt in 
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attacking mainly with Australian and Canadian troops, and with the French First 
Army on its right," who "broke through the Gennan line at Villers-Bretonneux, near 
Amiens, and began the great forward movement that ended the war."20 Here were 
Australians "in the thick of it" where the fighting was at its most important, when the 
war was finally won, as the enemy's commander-in-chief confirmed. 
A series of photographs supported this judgement, offering proof, and 
meanwhile presenting Australians with an almost arrogantly triumphal vision of their 
soldiers, who the enemy could not withstand. Both the nationalist education and 
entertainment objectives of the Memorial were furthered in the process. The first 
showed the mighty Australian warriors relaxing during a lull in the fighting: 
Figure 33: "Final Instructions." 
Source: Australian War Memorial Collections Database. 
cas.awm.gov.au. Photograph E02790. 
FINAL INSTRUCTIONS 
Lieutenant Downes (291h Battalion) giving the men of this 
platoon final instructions, near Warfusee-Abancourt, before 
the advance on the second objective commenced on 81h 
Munich in 1923. Sat as a Nazi Member of the Weimar parliament 1924-8. "Lude.ndorff, Erich von." 
Who's Who in the Twentieth Centwy . Oxford University Press, 1999. Oxford Reference Online. Oxford 
University Press. Queensland University. 21 December 2004. 
<http://www.oxfordreference.com/views/ENTRY .html?subview=Main&entry=t4 7 .e I 035> 
20 Relics and Records, September 1922, p.28; April 1928, p.35. In December 1931 the passage read 
"the great forward movement which assisted materially to end the war." Relics and Records, December 
1931 , p.36. 
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August. The photograph, which shows the men in a variety of 
poses, with their helmets at various rakish angles, suggests 
the insouciance of the Australian soldier in battle. The 
background is obscured by the smoke of heavy shell-fire.21 
Here the Australian warriors, having taken the first objective, wait self-assuredly on 
the smoke-filled battlefield, now their natural home, for the order to continue their 
destruction of the enemy. Naturally the second objective will be taken as the first has 
been; the Australians are irresistible. 
The next image offered solid proof of the claim of Australian triumph: 
prisoners taken in the advance. 
Figure 34: "Anxious Moments." 
Source: Australian War Memorial Collections Database. 
cas.awm.gov.au. Photograph E030 17. 
ANXIOUS MOJ\IIENTS 
German prisoners, taken during the Australian advance 
along the Somme on 8tb August, 1918, proceeding up a hill 
near Morcourt, in France, in charge of a single Australian. 
The prisoners are looking anxiously over their shoulders to 
the hills in the background, over which the German guns are 
shooting at any movement in the Australian area noticed 
from an observation balloon.22 
21 Melbourne Photograph 113; Sydney Photograph 196. Relics and Records, September 1922, p.81; 
April 1928, p.lOO; December 193\, p. \0 I. 
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This representation added proof of supremacy in two ways. The first was its vital 
visual confirmation of the capture of prisoners; the image of a long line of Germans 
controlled by a single Australian strongly enhanced the claim of supremacy. 
Secondly, the caption emphasised the danger the Australians were in as they made 
their historic push. and by pointing this out suggested that it was not the enemy that 
had become weaker (a lthough this was the case), but the Australians who had 
improved and mastered them (a lso true). Emphasis was the key to the representation. 
The nonchalant wan1ors of the first photograph had their counterparts in the 
final one in the series. Here the conquerors sit metres away from their dead foes, 
enjoying the fruits of victory: 
Figure 35: "The New Front Line." 
Source: Australian War Memorial Collections Database. 
cas.awm.gov.au. Photograph E02887. 
THE NEW FRONT LINE 
Troops of th e 11 th and 1 i " Australian Battalions, near Bois 
de Crepy, in France, about midday on 1 01h Aug ust, 1918, 
smoking cigars salved from captured enemy dug-outs . . . . Half 
an hour before the 1 i h Battalion had passed through the 11 ' 11 
2> 
- Melbourne Photograph l iS: Sydney Photograph 192. Relics and Records, September 1922. p.83; 
April 1928, 99; December 1931, p. l 00. 
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at this point, to press the attack towards Lihons, which was 
captured after a desperate struggle.23 
The cigars are certainly not ''looted" from the bodies of dead Germans, they are 
salved." The word implies that the cigars were in danger in the hands of "the 
destructive Hun,' ' and have been removed from them for their own good.24 The 
amused tone of the caption clearly served the Memorial's entertainment objective as 
well as bolstering the primary claim of supremacy. 
The Battle of Amiens was a great victory, as significant as any in the First 
World War. lt was a substantial historical success, and accordingly was celebrated as 
one of the great deeds done by Australians, both by the Memorial and in mainstream 
commemorative rhetoric. However, from the point of view of martial national ism, it 
lacked a little, for it was won mainly tlu·ough the application of iJTesistible force, 
especially artillery counter-battery fire which silenced German guns. 25 This was the 
marerialschlact, the ''war of material" the Gem1ans had written of so often and so 
bitterly. Even Remarque mentioned it.26 Further, the defences at Amiens had been 
very weak. Enemy weakness and materialschlact did not make the best martial 
nationalist propaganda, no matter how successful the attack was. The greatest such 
propaganda arose from battles won against strong enemies and in which one's own 
side had no significant material advantage. Such battles, seen as having been won 
through moral virtues, were the very epi tome of martial nationalism. Therefore, the 
seizure of Mont St Quentin was perfect material for nationa list propaganda. 
The victory at Mont St Quentin had all the elements to become a martial 
nationalist trad ition: it allowed the entire Allied advance in that sector to continue 
after it had been held up, and was thus histOJica ll y important. The material element 
was minimised, with no nom1al barrage provided to assist the troops. Further, the hi ll 
was strongly defended . Nevertheless, the victory was total, with the enemy's best 
units t1eeing the field. In te1ms both of its importance to the war effort, and the 
~; Melbourne Photograph 118: Sydney Photograph 20 I. Relics and Records. September 1922, p.83; 
Apri l 1928, p.l 0 I: December 1931. p.l 02. 
2
" A display of firebrands had the tit le "The Destructive Hun." Label A WM. I 021 /2. Attachment, Bain 
to Treloar. 28 December 1932. A WM265 21 /4/5. Part 7. 
2
' Prior ami Wilson, Rml'linson, pp.320-3. 
~6 Remarque, A II Quiet , p. 186. 
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traditional heroic element of its achievement, this was the AIF 's crowning triumph. 
Accordingly it was a major focus of the early exhibitions, used as the main climax of 
the Memorial 's narrative. The visitor's attention was called to the story through a 
larger number of representations than almost any other combat These were vivid and 
very visual, including a set of action photographs, a painting and the first large picture 
model. 
Bean saved the most triumphal passage in his 1922 guide for Mont St Quentin. 
The mighty Australians, martial virtues to the fore, were unstoppable: 
Figure 36: Capture of Mont St Quentin, by Frederick Leist 
Source: Australian War Memorial Collections Database. 
cas.awm.gov.au. Painting ART 02929. 
AN AUDACIOUS ADVANCE 
Above the central case is a picture by Fred. Leist, showing the 
leading men of the 5th Australian Infantry Brigade passing a 
German trench during their audacious advance in which the 
summit of the hill was captured. The shell fire did not go before 
them in the form of a barrage, as was usual, but was 
concentrated on the summit nearly a mile ahead. The thin force 
of Australians had to rush every trench between, but such was 
their dash that, before they had gone two-thirds of the way, the 
whole hillside in front of them was dotted with the figures of 
fleeing Germans.27 
This was an uncommonly excited and incomplete description from Bean, for other 
displays confirmed that this was only the beginning of this action. The France plan 
model, under the title "The Single Finest Feat of the War," described not just "the first 
wonderful assault" by the 5th Brigade, but also "their magnificent defence when 
27 Relics and Records, September 1922, pp.31-2. 
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beaten back" by a counter-attack. The Australians held the counter-attack, then sent 
the reinforcing 61h Brigade in to finish off the enemy: "the Huns fought to the last and 
the bodies of their dead littered the hillside. "28 
The image of triumphant Australians was greatly sharpened in the photograph 
series, which focussed tightly on small groups of men at the moment of their making 
history. These were no "artist's renderings," but "true" representations of the battle 
(and the reputation photographs enjoyed at this time as representations of the truth, of 
the real world "as it was," was a significant factor in the series' power). The visitor 
could see the real faces of the heroes, and these were, as Bean had always said, the 
faces of ordinary Australian men, of people who the visitor could know. The first 
photograph, for example, showed the men waiting to get to grips with the enemy: 
WAITING FOR THE BARRAGE TO LIFT 
Members of the 24111 Battalion, awaiting the lifting of the 
artillery barrage on Mont St Quentin, on 1st September, 1918, 
photographed a few minutes before moving out of the trench in 
the renewed attack at 1:30 pm. It was this attack, following a 
28 
""Single Finest Feat of the War:' Mont St. Quentin, Peronne, Bouchavesnes." Attachment, Bain to 
Treloar, 28 December 1932. A WM 265 21/4/5, Part 7. 
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30-minute intense bombardment, that finally won the 
position.29 
The captions all included the claim that this was the charge that took the hill; the 
visitor was not to be under any illusions as to the historic nature of the series. The 
second caption went further, referring to "the final capture of this highly-important 
position" by the 6111 Brigade. ~ 0 
The final in this series shows the 6111 Brigade advancing to their date with 
destiny, in a scene which became the basis for the picture model of the action, the first 
such model instal led into the museum in Melbourne in 1922.31 The caption for the 
photograph made c lear the difficulties of the attack, so better to impress upon viewers 
the spectacular nature of its successful prosecution: 
~ 
figure 38: "The Final Rush." 
Source: Australian War Memorial Collections Database. 
cas.awm.gov.au. Photograph E03104. 
THE FINAL RUSH 
The first wave of '•A" Company, of the 21 51 Australian 
Battalion, advancing in extended order towards Mont St 
Quentin, in France, on 151 September , 1918, after leaving their 
19 Melbourne Photograph 120: Sydney Photograph 197. Relics and Records, September 1922: p.83, 
April 1928, p.l 00: December 193], p.l 0 I. 
30 Relics and Records, September 1922; p.83, Apri I 1928, p. I 00: December 193 1. p. I 0 I. 
31 Relics and Records, September 1922, Attached Plan of Exhibition. 
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trenches to join the renewed assault by the 23rd and 24'h 
Battalions, at 1:30 pm. This magnificent assault of the 61h 
Brigade resulted in the capture of the strongly-defended enemy 
position. The German garrison consisted of Prussian G uard 
regiments; machine-guns were more numerous than usual; and 
the old wire of 1916, in thick belts on the hill slopes, was a 
serious obstacle to the attacking troops:12 
This caption places Bean's statement in his guide in stark relief. The troops "fleeing 
down the hillside" were Prussian Guard regiments, the best of the enemy's units. 
They had been protected by thick belts of wire and numerous machine guns, while the 
attackers were unable to use their usual barrage. Nevertheless, the Australians ' dash 
and audacity brought them a stunning victory, dramatically "proved" in the 
photographic series. 
These were descriptions that could match Fitchett for excitement and ferocity. 
The enemy, though courageous and tough fighters , are destroyed by the superior 
Austra li ans in a man-to-man fight. The latter's supremacy is clear. This is the 
crowning moment of the Australian nationalist war history: the military virtues 
revealed at Gallipoli and tempered through the terrible ordeal of 1916-17 have 
brought them victoriously through. The flag was a most dramatic symbol of 
Australian supremacy over the Hun, and of Australian victory in a historically-
important battle. lt was thus worthy of becoming "the focus of a major national 
trCldition." 
Amiens and Mont St Quentin were offered as new traditions for Australia, as 
events to inspire Australians by their historic importance and the mighty national 
martial virtues they embodied. However, displays relating to a battle of 19 17 had 
reminded visitors that the history "made" by the Australians in these 1918 battles 
remained within the traditional Imperial framework. Thus, as well as using the images 
of British martial tradition, the Memorial placed Australians within this tradition -
Austra lian national identity remained within the larger Imperial identity, albeit 
enjoying a special position within it. The Battle of Menin Road took place on 20 
September 19 1 7, and was a model of the step-by-step method. Following an intense 
barrage, the infantry advanced and were able to occupy their final objective 1500 
metres away from their jumping-off trenches. A standing barrage placed around the 
-'~ Melbourne Photograph 122: Sydney Photograph 199. Relics and Records, September 1922; p.84, 
April 1928, p. 100: December 193 1, p. 101. 
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point attacked meant the infantry were able to operate with minimal resi stance. Even 
this opposition, though, was enough to inflict serious casualties, with pillboxes and 
other strongpoi nts, as well as enemy artillery, responsible for most of the 5,103 
casualties the Australians suffered in securing their 1500-metre gain.31 The battle was 
a local success, but nothing more. 
The Memorial, however, felt that the battle had a wider s ignificance, arguing 
that on that day, "the Australian troops of the I s l and 2nd Divisions, by their attacks in 
the vicinity of Glencorse Wood and Nonne Bosschen, 'wove a fresh and brilliant 
strand into the traditions of the Imperial Annies. '"34 Again the editorial comment was 
naturalised through a quotation, although its provenance remains unclear. The 
assertion of Anglo-Australian identity, on the other hand, is very clear, as is the 
deliberate invocation of British popular mi litary propaganda and the assertion of 
Australian contribution to an ongoing British military tradition. In 1893 Hemy Parkes 
had stated that ·'the glory, the incomparable beauty of her traditions are all ours."35 Now 
Australia was giving back to those traditions, adding "a fresh and brilliant" strand to the 
most important one, that of military glory. of ongoing British ttiumph on the field of 
honour. There were now Australian pages in the book of British racial history. As Henry 
Lawson had prophesied, the Australians had signed their Stonny Histories in the Book 
of Eternal Fate. 
This sense of being "in all respects . . . one and the same people," in Parkes's 
phraseology, was promoted by another photograph related to the Menin Road battle, 
showing Australians under the famous ramparts ofYpres.36 This was accompanied by 
a short history of the town, including a reference to a famous problem faced by other 
British soldiers in the past: " Historians record that the English soldiers of a century 
ago [in the campaign against Napoleon] had as much difficulty in, and as many 
variations of, the pronunciation of its name as those who served in Flanders during the 
recent war."37 The association of the Australians of 1917 with the oft-praised heroes 
H Coulthard-Ciark. Encyclopedia , p.l30. 
34 Sydney Photograph 162. Relics and Records, April 1928, p.93: December 193 1. p.94. 
35 Quoted in Cole, "The Crimson Thread of Kinship," p.S21. 
36 Quoted in Cole, ''The Crimson Thread of Kinship," p.521. 
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of the fight against another perceived tyranny allowed them to appropriate a measure 
of that earlier glory. As had Wellington and the heroes of Waterloo, so too had the 
AlF fo ught the good fight against the forces of darkness. This association was, of 
course, an ent irely typical martial nationalist manoeuvre; the evocation of a long line 
of triumphal and noble waniors was at the core of the Island Story. 
II 
As well as the national war history, supremacy was asserted in a more abstract sense 
through the display of the enemy' s words, possessions and bodies. The propaganda 
technique of using the enemy's own words as testimony to hjs inferiority to A ustralian 
troops, w idely utilised during the war and in "big-noting" post-war literature, was also 
used in the Memorial. Two variants were displayed in the 1918 courts from 1 922 to at 
least 1929. On a pillar in the Sydney display were the following two Gem1an newspaper 
items, with the accompanying label text: 
~7 Melbourne Photograph 64: Sydney Photograph I 50, Relics and Records, September 1922, p.73: 
April 1928, p. 9 I; December 193 I, p.92. Such difficult ies spawned. for example, the ironic title of The 
/-Vipers Times. a British trench newspaper. See The Wipers Times: A jc1csimile reprint of rhe trench 
magazines: The Wipers Times - The New Church Times - The Kemme/ Times - The Somme Times -
The B. E. F. Times, (l ondon: Jenkins, 191 S). 
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Figure 39: "Australia Through Gem1an Eyes." 
Source: Relics and Records, September 1922, p.42. 
The first purports to show how scared of the Austral ians the Germans were in 1918. 
According to the label, this was "a page from the German paper Jugend taken from a 
Hun captured in the attack on the Hindenburg Outpost Line on 181h Sept. 19 18." 38 The 
two figures are Hughes and the President of the United States of America, Woodrow 
Wilson, who have, ironically given their real feelings for each other, agreed to act 
together: "In the cartoon Mr Hughes is represented as saying, 'We Australians will 
slaughter one half of the Gennan people and Mr Wilson has kindly undertaken to 
slaughter the other half. "'39 Other displays in the museum suggested that the promise 
had been kept. The second representation indicated the danger of insulting the mighty 
Allied forces , for it was, the label declared, "a cartoon to which the British, Canadian 
Js Label AWM.453617: "Australia Through German Eyes." Attachment, Bain to Treloar, I 0 January 
1929. AWM 265 21 /4/5, Part?. 
39 
"A ustralia Through German Eyes." On the relat ionship between Hughes and Wilson, see for example 
Clark, The Young Tree Green, pp.l l l-13. 
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and Austra lian troops gave a convincing reply on the 8'11 August when they achieved a 
striking victory over the Gennans."40 Both concepts, which appealed directly to the 
nation's collective vanity, had received a wide airing dming the war, and continued to do 
so in retumed-soldier writing after it. 
Perceived enemy fear of the Australians was underscored in stories that had all 
the verve and mockery of wartime propaganda. One such story was attached to a 
German machine gun taken from a captured aeroplm1e. Despite Bean's assertion that 
"we do not believe the banal war-time jokes about our enemy always running away," the 
gun's label and caption made it clear that the plane 's occupants had not been able to 
match it with their Australian counterparts:4 1 
''THE BOCHE WHO WOULDN'T FIGHT" 
''The !Germani machine was flying east at about 2,000 feet, 
and was apparently trying to make for the front line. T he 
!Australian! R.E.8 immediately intercepted it to prevent its 
escape, and commenced driving it towards the 3rd 
Squadron's aerodrome. When the Halberstadt tried to break 
away, as it did several times, the R.E.8 headed it off. The Hun 
officers made no attempt to fight and allowed themselves to 
be forced to land their machine intact upon the 3rd 
Squadron 's aerodrome, where they were taken prisoners. 
From papers and maps found in the machine much valuable 
information was gained. This parabellum machine gun was 
carried on the Halberstadt machine."42 
Then there was the tale of the Gennan 1841h Infantry Regiment who, one label 
remarked, opposed an Australian attack in France. According to the label , "The 
regiment apparently felt keenly the ceaseless harrying of Australian patrols and raids, 
and their morale was poor. One N.C.O. prisoner said that, a few nights before, the 
whole of his machine gun crew ran away when they heard some Australians 
approaching."43 Other enemy troops took another option. Images such as that titled 
~0 .. Australia Through German Eyes." 
4 I (' 
.E. W. Bean to John Treloar. 4 December 1929. AWM 38 3DRl6673, Item 747. 
4 ' . 
· Bam to Treloar, 28 December 1932. A W M265 21/4/5, Part 7. 
41 Label A WM.g29: ·'The Huns Who Opposed the Australians at Yille-Sur-Ancre." Attachment, Bain 
to Treloar. 28 December 1932. AWM 265 21/4/5, Part 7. This contrasted with the message of the 
Demancourt picture model installed in December 1928: "German machine-gunners. with characteristic 
bravery, fought to the last, but the enemy infantry broke in the face of a detennined advance." A WM93 
[49). 
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"Kamarad" offered proof of the myriad claims that the enemy had thrown up his 
hands in surrender at the approach of Australian troops: 
Figure 40: "Kamarad!" 
Source: Australian War Memorial Collections Database. 
cas.awm.gov.au. Photograph EC03274. 
"KAl\llA RAD !" 
A photograph showing a party of German soldiers in the act 
of surrendering to troops of the 451h Australian Battalion 
who were advancing beyo nd Ascension Fa rm, nea r Le 
Verguier , on 181b September, 1918.44 
This photograph was taken after "Dealing with Running Huns," and shows the 
irresistible Australians catching up to some of those very runners. 
Prisoners were a consistent theme in the photograph ic exhibitions, covering 
Gallipoli, the Western Front and Palestine. Many of the images of German prisoners 
accompanied references in the Memorial's narrative to battles fought in 19 L 7 and 
1918, and offered evidence that Australians had really won those widely-praised 
victories. The German Army, as many Australians liked to say, retained an awesome 
reputation, and to humble its troops was significant evidence that Australians were a 
44 Melbourne Photograph 129; Sydney Photograph 205. Relics and Uecord~. September 1922; p.85; 
April 1928, p.l 02; December 1931 , p.l 03 
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"fighting race.' ' However, it was Palestine that provided the most spectacular success: 
Figure 41: "A Great Haul.'' 
Source: Australian War Memorial Collections Database. 
cas.awm.gov.au. Photograph B00090. 
A GREAT HAUL 
General view of 4,500 prisoners captured by the Anzac 
Mounted Division in their third expedition to the plateau of 
Moab and the heights of Gilead. The previous expeditions had 
been raids, but this time the Divisions came to stay. Altogether, 
it captured 11,000 Turks, of whom these are some, at a cost of 
a few score casualties.45 
This was a signal example of triumphalism. The all-conquering Australians, after a 
few raids, "came to stay." There is no mention of fighting - only a few score 
casualties were sustained. The Australians simply came with the determination to 
stay, and the Turks capitulated. The unwritten assumption was that the Australians 
were far superior soldiers, perhaps to the extent that the casualty discrepancy implied. 
As Allenby had written in his tribute, the Australians had "achieved the destruction of 
the Turkish army."46 Here was proof, presented in a particularly Australian style, in 
45 Melbourne Photograph 159; Sydney Photograph 68. Relics and Records, September 1922; p.89; 
April 1928, p.72; December 1931, p.73. 
46 Ex Doc. 186; Australian Chivalry, Plate 24. 
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which the Light Horsemen, predominantly bushmen, "mustered" the Turkish 
prisoners like a herd of cattle in the Gulf Country. 
This very story was told, in fact, in Auslralian Chivalry. This depicts a world 
in which battlefield dominance has moved beyond the excitement of "Kamarad!" and 
"A Great Haul," and become simply a part of the job of being an Austral ian soldier: 
Figure 42: The Drover, by George Benson. 
Source: Australian War Memorial Collections Database. 
cas.awm.gov.au. Painting ART00142. 
THE CLING OF CUSTOM 
Before joining the AIF, a large proportion of the men of the light 
horse regiments had lived on stations and farms, where driving 
sheep or cattle is a regular occurrence, and the habit of trailing on 
horseback behind a flock or a herd was far too deeply ingrained to 
be shed even under the changed circumstances of active service. 
When detailed to take a party of prisoners to the rear, the Light 
Horseman instinctively "drove" them. It was a common sight to 
see him lazily bringing up the rear, whistling cheerily, on his slow-
paced mount, with his sauntering charges strung out ahead. 47 
There is a pastoral air about the image, a relaxed, assured sense that all is well. A 
captured foe could, after all, present no more danger. 
47 Australian Chivalry, Plate 35. 
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Those who did not surrender were also put on di splay. There were a small 
number of photographs of dead Germans with captions calling attention to the fact 
that they had been killed by Australians. The bodies of these enemies were the last 
word in proof o f Australian military supremacy. Although few in number, their 
display visuall y confirmed the considerable number of displays that gave prominence 
to the killing of the enemy. More importantly, one of these photographs showed the 
logical conclusion of that chain of signification which took the battered hero on the 
cover of The Anzac Book and transfonned him into the rampaging warrior of Bean 's 
guide, indicating what he did when he came to grips with his enemy. The label 
affirmed that the photograph depicted " the fiercely contested ground won from the 
enemy in the Austra lian attack of 4111 July, 1918," and, quite matter-of-factly, " the 
bodies of two dead German machine gunners bayoneted during the fighting.'.48 
Figure 43: "Between Pear Trench and Hamel." 
Source: Australian War Memorial Collections Database. 
cas.awm.gov.au. Photograph E02704. 
This was how the rampant Achilles of Bean's guide cover used his bayonet. As the 
body of the great Hector had proved the Homeric hero's mettle beyond doubt, so too 
did the corpse of this German machine gmmer - the strongest foe in a mighty army-
prove beyond doubt the mettle of the conquering Australians.49 Just as Australian 
JK Melbourne Photograph I I 0: Sydney Photograph 189. Relics and ReC'ords, September 1922, p.81 : 
April 1928, p.99; December 193 1. p. l 00. 
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blood sealed the sacrificial e lement of the national story, German blood confirmed the 
triumphal one. No greater or more ruthless testament to Australi an strength of arms 
could be offered. It is worth noting that no reviewer obj ected to this image; indeed, no 
reviewer ever mentioned it. 
To complete its evidence of Australian martial ability, the Memorial displayed 
a large number of trophies taken from vanquished enemies, and certain relics -
machine guns, fo r example- used by Australians in valorous acts. For example, no 
trophy symbolised Australian military supremacy more than the colours of the Turkish 
46'11 Regiment, referred to in Bean's guides in tenns of their historic importance and the 
casual military superiority that their appearance in the displays embodied: 
Regimental colours are most coveted trophies, and are generally 
captured only after desperate fighting. In the war of 1914-18, 
however, few regiments took their colours into the field , and the 
capture of such a trophy was a unique event. As far as the AIF is 
concerned, the colours of the 461h Turkish Regiment were the only 
ones captured. They were secured by the 91h Light Horse Regiment, 
which encountered and completely disposed of this Turkish 
regiment near Khan Kusseir, near Damascus, on the I sc October, 
1918.50 
This "disposing of' the enemy was also asserted in the description of captured German 
shoulder-straps, "displayed,' ' Bean stated, "under the brief but apt title, 'Huns we have 
met. ,.,s r 
~9 The quote used by Bean in With the Flagship of the South to introduce the "fascinating dream" of an 
Australian China Squadron began: "In front a good man fled, but one far better pursued him." Homer, 
The Iliad, p.465. 
50 Relics and Records, September 1922, p.l7; April 1928, p.l8; December 193 1, p.20. 
51 Relics and Records, September 1922, p.36. 
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Figure 44: Showcase 28: "Huns We Have Met," Australian War 
Memorial, 1922. 
Source: Relics and Records, September 1922, p.37.52 
That "meeting" the Australians had been fata l for the "Huns" was implied by other 
displays, such as that for a cigar case, whose label stated that it had been "Taken From 
a Fritz Killed at Chipill y on the 91h AugliSt.''53 Supporting this display was one of several 
cups. taken during what its label refeJTed to as "A Fine Little Stunt." 54 This was 
successful, the label elaborated, because it had seen the "killing [of] a number of Huns" 
and the capture of machine guns and prisoners.55 A final example, incorporating clear 
triumphalism, showed "conquerors" taking a t,rreat trophy, the enemy leader's personal 
banner: 
VON FALKENHAYN'S FLAG 
During the latter portion of his ser vice with the Turco-German 
army in Palestine, General von Falkenhayn established his 
headquarters at the Fash Hotel in Jerusalem. U pon entering 
the city towards the end of August , 1918, the conquerors saw 
5 ~ See also Relics and Rl!cords, April 1928. p.29. 
53 
.. Cigar Case Taken From a Fritz Ki lled at Chipilly on the 9'h August." Bain to Treloar, 23 August 
1928. AWM 265 21/4/5. Part I. 
'• Label A WM. 776: "A Fine Little Stunt." A ttachmcnt. Bain to Treloar, 28 December 1932. A W M 265 
21/4/5, Part 7. 
<< F. . 
· · "A 1 nc Little Stunt.'. 
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this flag flying over the Hotel. It was removed at the instigation 
of Corporal Coles of the AAMC, who later presented it to 
,.,1 . W R C M . . 56 t l' aJor . . . amwanng. 
The standard of the enemy commander was an even more valuable trophy than 
regimenta l colours, and certainly proof that Australians had been "conquerors. "57 
Finally, the Memorial also depicted the actions of those who had done the 
kil ling and the capturing. The vanquished enemy provided physical proof of 
supremacy: so too did the offic ial citation of a Victoria Cross, attached to a weapon 
used by the medal's winner and stil l on display in Sydney in 1932: 
HOW SERGEANT S.R. McDOUGALL WON THE V.C. 
The Lewis gun used by Sergeant McDougall, 47'h Battalion , 
when he won the V.C. on the 28111 March, 1918. The official 
record of the deed is as follows:- "At Dernancourt on the 
morning of the 28111 Ma rch, 19 J 8, the enemy attacked our 
line, and his first wave succeeded in gaining an entry. 
Ser geant McDougall, who was at a post in a fla nk compa ny, 
r ealised the situation and at once charged the enemy's second 
wave single handed with rifle and bayonet, killing seven and 
capturing a machine gun which they held. T his he turned on 
to them, firing from the hip, ca using many casualties and 
routing that wave. H e then turned his attention to th ose who 
had en tered the t r ench, until his ammunition had run out, all 
the time firing at close quat·ters, when he seized a bayonet 
and charged again , killing three men and a German officer 
who was just abo ut to kill one of our own officers. He then 
used a L ewis gun on the enemy, killing many and enabling us 
to capture 33 priso ners. His prompt action saved the line and 
enabled us to stop the enemy advance. ''58 
The ferocity of Sergeant McDougall's attack, " routing" waves of the enemy's attack 
and killing a large number, was presented with excitement and hearty approval. Here 
56 Bain to Treloar, 23 July 1928. A WM 265 21/4/5, Part I. 
51 However, in a letter of 23 July 1928 from Curator Les Bain to Treloar the former mentioned that 
furt her investigation, based on the information of returned officers, had proved that the flag displayed 
could not, in fact, have been found in the hotel, for Falkenhayn had never used it as a headquarters. The 
display was removed from the Memorial as a consequence. Bain to Treloar. 23 July I 928. A WM 265 
21/4/5, Part I; Relics and Records. April I 928, p.18 stated that "the German flag was found flying over 
Fash 's Hotel, Jerusalem, the headquarters of General von Falkenhayn. the senior German officer with 
the Turkish Army." The reference had been excised by the time the December 1931 guide was printed. 
~~ Labe l AWM. 152: "How Sergeant S.R McDougal l won the V.C." Attachment, Bain to Treloar, 28 
December I 932. A W M 265 2 I /4/5, Part 7. 
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\\·as a warrior who had displayed all those martial vi11ues that the museum praised -
courage. determination, feroc ity, the will to conquer. The "magnificent dash" of Foch, 
the "gallantry" of Rawlinson, the "staunclmess in defence" of Allenby - all can be 
seen in this modern-day chanson de geste relating what was, by any standard, an 
astoni shing military accomplishment. Here was an example of Australian manhood, 
the Memorial suggested, a warrior who defended his nation by destroying the foe. 
Men like McDougal l were offered to visitors as heroes of the nation, exemplars of an 
Australian "spirit" that could conquer any obstacle. By striving to be like him, visitors 
would improve themselves and their nation. 
Between them, the most triumphal battle displays in the Memorial's narrative, 
which formed its cli max, along with displays dedicated to the fundamental task of 
proving Australian military supremacy had considerable success. There is little doubt, 
viewing these displays, that the Australians achieved a marked superiority over the 
Germans in 1918. In objects from the Meteren spade to the colours of the 46111 Turk ish 
Regiment, documents wri tten by Germans or Frenchmen, and the guns used by 
Austra lians, the displays prove the point. These displays offered crucial support to the 
entire Anzac Legend. By proving in a popular public space that the Australians had 
been superior warriors, they ensured that, throughout most of the inter-war years, the 
main discussion on the AIF would be about why they were great soldiers, not {[they 
were. Further, the naturalisation used in some of the displays also contributed 
powerfully to the debate as to why, w ith the enti re collective portrait of the AIF 
presented as spiritual truth manifest in physical evidence. 
The displays dedicated to Australian military supremacy also allow a test of 
accusations The Ausrralian Worker made in 1925 that the Memorial glorified killing: 
' 'The present war museum serves no purpose whatever. Behind the whole of its 
display is the noisy claim of victory and a glorification of kill ing."59 There can be no 
doubt that. in a limited number of representations, the Memorial did, indeed, glorify 
the extermination of the enemy. The concentration on military supremacy, and the 
insistence on demonstrating its validity beyond doubt, were at the heart of this 
phenomenon. To carry out these ends, the Memorial did not bau lk at depicting the 
death of the enemy at the hands of Austral ians, nor at underlining the fact that booty 
had been taken from dead enemies. Representations of the dead enemy accompanied 
;ry The Austra/icm Worker. 8 April 1925, p.9. This a1 icle was the only real ly savage attack on the 
Memorial. 
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by de liberate descriptions of killing, or of trophies take "from a Fritz killed at 
Chipi lly," or labe ls revelling in "killing a number of Huns." were all an·ayed to prove 
the fundamental assertion of Bean's Anzac Legend, that Austra lians were superior 
warriors. There were, it must be emphasised, only a relatively small number of 
displays that glorified the kill ing of the enemy, yet the displays which went short of 
this extreme, while still offering proof of supremacy or delineating a triumphant 
national history, were a significant proportion. 
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Chapter 6: Truth in the Service of Nationalism: Defeat, 
death and the wounded 
Figure 45: Interior. Melbourne Exhibition, photograph hall. 
Source: Australian War Memorial Collections Database. 
cas.awm.gov.au. Photograph J02198. 
The Memorial covered a great many issues related to the Australian overseas war 
experience, going well beyond those which fonned the bellicose core of the early 
Anzac Legend. These included such vital subjects as defeat in battle, death and the 
wounded. Adding to the "social" elements of the collective portrait of the AIF, these 
representations added much to the Memorial's overall vision of the Australian 
overseas war experience. The Memorial's treatment of these once again fearured the 
"national" interpretation of the war. "Modern memory" and the anti-war position had 
a degree of influence through the display of emotions such as sadness and 
compassion, but each was ultimately appropriated by the Memorial's "traditional" 
outlook, with the fundamental elements of shocking realism and strong criticism 
absent. This is made particularly clear through a comparison of the Memorial' s 
treatment of these issues with those of certain anti-war writers who loom large in the 
"modem memory" interpretation of the culrural legacy of the First World War, 
particularly the German Erich Maria Remarque. 
The "national" interpretation continued in the Memorial's representations of 
defeat, death and the wounded, and its effect meant that certain similarities existed 
between these and more bellicose displays. For instance, a cult of victory remained, 
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with both moral and military victories found within defeats. However, failures were 
scrupulously acknowledged, and some were criticised. The "national" interpretation 
extended to displays critical of Imperial commanders, in whi ch the Memorial did not 
so much ctiticise the war's conduct as map out an Australian identity within the 
Empire. Within its references to the Imperial am1ies and the defence of the Empire, 
the Memorial envisioned Australia as now hav ing a real history of its own - the 
history that was revealed in the museum's own displays. In references to the dead and 
wounded, the influence of the norms developed by late-nineteenth-century British war 
corespondents was again discernible. Roger Stearn argues that "correspondents' 
descriptions of [the dead and wounded] were usually not specific or detai led, and 
omi tted or minimised agony. They wrote of wounds, mutilation and death in 
expurgated, distanced and sometimes symbolic terms." 1 The Memorial did not use 
symbolism, but most certainly offered a distanced and expurgated vision of defeat, 
death and the wounded. Overall, in spite of a number of moderate influences from the 
"modem memory" interpretation of the war, the Memorial appropriated these, 
incorporating them into a modified "tradition," which predominated in the Memorial.2 
Both issues require an investigation of the Memorial's commitment to the truth, and 
how this was reconciled with its deeper commitment to nationalist education, a 
somewhat contradictory notion. 
1 Steam, "War (OITCSpondents,'' p. 151. 
2 The "modern memory" interpretation can be traced back 10 the I S50s and the reportage of the 
Crimean War. Wi ll iam Howard Russell aml others reported the war in a highly realistic fashion, and 
advances in printing techniques allowed for great verisimil itude in newspaper illustrations. a 
development that was seized upon to show the British public some of the horrible truths of an 
unpopular war. The 1870s saw Elizabeth Butler. anu others. depict exhaustion. emotional breakuown 
and death to great acclaim. but the 1880s and beyond saw the rise of High Imperial ism and the return 
of a traditional heroic sentiment to battle painting, includ ing that of Butler. The depiction of the 
hardships faced by ordinary soldiers remained, and it became a major element of the democratisation of 
glory. Kipl ing's arch-I mperial ist poems focussed on the ordinary soldier. whose image was 
transformed from that of a lowlife, criminal and oppressive thug to a pure and noble rough diamond 
through the magical agency of the Empire. The question in relation to realities, in the nineteenth 
century as in the twentieth, was one of criticism. Russell denounced the conduct of the war in stringent 
tenns, while Kipling's dead were martyrs because of the glory of their national cause. See Matthew 
Lalumia, Realism and Politics in Viclorian Arl ojlhe Crimean War. (Ann Arbor, Mich.: UMI Research 
Press, 1984 ); McKenzie, Popular Imperialism and the Militw:v: H ichbcrger, Images of the Army: 
Ehrenreich, Blood Rites; W.J. Reader, AI Dury's Call: a study in obsolete patriotism. (Manchester: 
Manchester University Press, 1988); MacDonald, The Language o.f Empire. 
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1 
The entire discussion of the Memorial's treatment of defeat and realities brings into 
focus the institution' s commitment to the truth, illustrating the "national" limitations 
which were placed upon it. The decision to display images of the wounded, for 
instance, was a function of Bean's commitment to truth-telling in the Memorial. 
However, their consistent portrayal as whole and safe reflected the deeper 
commitment to the unity of the nation, which in Bean encompassed a humanitarian 
compassion to spare the bereaved's feelings. Thus "truth" did not include "modem 
memory" elements such as graphic depictions of mutilated Australians, and no image 
similar to that of the dead Gennan machine gunners at Peach Trench existed. One 
photograph showed what may have been the bodies of two Australians, but the label 
makes no reference to them, referring rather to a successful advance. In relation to 
military defeats, the "national" limits on truth concerned the choice of subject. It was 
quite possible to display facts without displaying all of them, and thus displays were 
"the truth," but perhaps not "the whole truth." 
The display of a selected truth was a conscious decision on the part of Bean, as 
indicated in his first guide. Responding to the criticisms that Lambert 's painting The 
Landing a! Anzac showed too few men wearing British-style caps rather than 
Australian slouch hats, Bean made a clear policy statement: 
An officer of the 91h Battalion, who was one of the first ashore, 
and who climbed the slope shown in Lambert's picture, after 
consulting brother officers, stated, "the consensus of opinion is 
that the men wore hats, though a percentage wore caps." Having 
this foundation in fact , the artist decided to paint the men with 
hats, to secure a distinctive Australian feature. 3 
The objective was "to secure a distinct Australian feature," taking careful cognisance 
of the facts of the situation as agreed by contemporary military authorities. The 
Memorial was to give the visitor a distinct Australian vision having its foundation in 
fact. It would not represent the truth of the war strictly, though , if this was to the 
detJiment of the "Australian feature." It was, after all, the Australian national war 
memorial. The note admitted that, contrary to Bean's stated intentions, the Memorial 
did actually include displays which were not an "exact representation of fact," and 
3 Relics and Records. September I 922. p. I 4, footnote. The note appears on page 15 of the April I 928 
edition. 
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that historical accuracy could at times be sacrificed to nation-building.4 This example 
of inaccuracy is a trifling one, but the "national" principle established by it governed 
the Mem01ial's representations. Peter Cochrane points out a more famous and serious 
example when he notes that Treloar was happy to have a photograph which he knew did 
not actually depict John Simpson Kirkpatrick, the now famous and revered "man with 
the donkey," acknowledged as an image of the real man throughout the I 930s and 
beyond because, Cochrane argues, "a legend, undisputed, was more important than the 
facts. lt concerned a higher kind of truth."~ This "higher truth," of course, was the 
"national" truth. Slouch hats were one of the great symbols of the A IF, and the famous 
Landing painting helped make this so. The Memorial's leaders were happy to stretch the 
tmth a little to achieve their nationalist gaols. No outright misrepresentation was 
involved, just a small change of emphasis. 
The Memorial's "national" truth contrasted to the "anti-war" truths of soldier 
writers such as Siegfried Sassoon, Erich Maria Remarque and Ernest Hemingway. 
These writers claimed reality as their province, having seen the conflict at close 
quarters. They rejected the vision of war promulgated by "stay-at-home" patriots, 
whose pronouncements they argued had no legitimacy as they were not infonned by 
actual inspection of the conditions of the war. Bean, however, had seen the war in 
person, and he, too, claimed that he spoke the truth. 
The ''anti-war" position was expressed succinctly by the radical journalist 
H.W. Massingham in 1917 in a review of the newly-published poetry of Siegfried 
Sassoon: 
Mr Sassoon has rea ll y no excuse for not wntmg what was 
expected of him, except one, and that is the excuse of the truth. 
And by truth we do not mean realism. Realism is not 
objectionable; on the contrary, it is fashionable. But truth, and 
truth about the actual conditions of the war, is objectionable, 
because of the deadly criticism that, like the dagger under the 
cloak, underlies it.6 
4 AWMC Minutes, 31 July 1919, Resolution 2 (d). AWM 170 1/ 1. 
s However, he does point out also that Treloar "got back on to the Simpson trail,' ' as Cochrane puts it, for, 
in Treloar's own words, "the sake of historical accuracy," in 1950. Peter Cochrane, Simpson and the 
Donkey : The making of a legend, (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 1992), pp.191 , 193. 
6 H.W. Massingham, " Indignation," Notion, 16 June 1917, p.278, in Dominic Hibberd (ed.), Poet1y of 
!he First World War: A Casebook, (London: Macmi llan, 1981 ), pp.43-4, p.44. Hibberd points out that 
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Massingham was the editor of the Nation, and used it to campaign for a negotiated 
peace. 7 He was sympathetic to Sassoon and his attempt to use "truth about the actual 
conditions of the war" to criticise the manner in which it was being conducted. 8 The 
anti-war position adopted by soldier-writers such as Sassoon could in fact be defined 
as "truth in the service of criti cism." This '"truth" involved the most gruesome realism 
- mutilation, horror, appalling conditions and other "actual conditions of the war" -
and the criticism might be summed up in Sassoon 's own line: "But he did for them 
both with his plan of attack." The leaders who sent the young men to die were 
indicted by anti-war writers. The whole political and social system, even the entire 
civilisation that produced the war, was called into question because of the searing 
power of the truth about the "realities" of war. 
The Memorial 's attitude differed. Its truth was not, as Sassoon's, in the service 
of criticism. Nor was it a graphic truth. Although publicly pledged to the depiction of 
"nothing that is not an actual representation of fact," the Memorial was an instrument 
of the State dedicated to martial nationalist education, and many of the cultural tools 
of martial nationalism - notions of noble sacrifice, glory and heroism, especially -
were fundamentally incompatible with the critical anti-war position. The Memorial 
was seeking to enhance "emotional" nation-building, the formation of an imagined 
community, whereas the anti-war position questioned all such constructions. 
However, realism itscl f was perfectly compatible with martial nationalism, having 
been part of the "democratisation of glory" from the 1850s. Thus, the Memorial 
adopted a position of "truth in the service of the nation," with the "national" 
interpretation of the Australian overseas war experience shaping the story. The 
difference between these two visions arose mainly in tenns of the choice of facts, the 
treatment of them. and the question of critici sm, the "dagger under the cloak." Thus 
the inter-war period saw the construction of two ·'truths" - one bitter, angry and 
disi llusioned, the other sombre at times but ultimately triumphal. Both had va lidity, 
the article was published anonymously and that he derived the authorship from an unpublished lcuer of 
Sassoon's. 
7 On Massingham in the war, ~cc Alfred F. Havighurst. Radical Joumalist: H.W. Massingham (1860-
1914). (London: Cambridge University Press, 1974), pp.226-6il. 
~ In February 19 I 8 1he Na1ion argued for dissent: "Let poets and writers and anists and all other 
soldier!> of our time be allowed freely to describe the actual truth of war as they have seen it." Quoted 
111 Havtghurst. Mas.,inglwm, p.261. Sassoon knew Massingham personally. and in 1964 declared that 
he met him "often at the Reform Club and liked him very much." I lavighurst, Massingham, p.261. 
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and both had political affil iations and connotations, embodying the "monumental" or 
the ''anti-monumental" culture. 
There was much more to Bean's, and the Memorial's, "national" work than 
manipulation or s leight-of-hand, though. Bean saw truth through the lens of his 
emotional nationa list commitment, and his presentation of verities reflected this fact. 
He understood the realities of death and maiming, and was deeply affected by what he 
saw, but put most of this information into his diaries rather than his war 
correspondence, the History or the Memorial. Jn private Bean was often a Wilfred 
Owen, but in pub lic he was usually a Rupert Brooke, and this was a deliberate 
response, taking into consideration what he saw as the nation's needs. He was in 
favour of the disclosure of as much carefully-selected information to the nation as 
possible as soon as it was discreet to do so. There was a hint of the rebel in him, in 
that he did want some of the terrible real ities to be revealed9 He had been very angry 
during the war about attacks which he thought threw away men's lives for little gain , 
and was sympathetic to the notion that telling the plain truth would ultimately help 
stop wars. He •vas also a sens itive man , though, and a thoroughgoi ng nationalist. 
Therefore, he did not wish to show the war's true horror in the public domain in the 
inter-war years, for memories of bereavement and trauma were stil l very fresh, and at 
that time their display was politically dangerous . As a result, the worst of the terrible 
truths about bombardments, mutilation and horror remained hidden unti l 1942, when 
the diaries became available for public inspection, but eventually became well known. 
The more graphic and shocking of Bean 's observations of the war thus came publicly 
to li ght only after a long period of time had elapsed, and many of the generation who 
had suffered so much grief, especially the parents, had passed on, unable to be inj ured 
by its disclosure to their descendants. Simi larly, in relation to Australian defeat in 
battle Bean was adamant that indi viduals' reputations be protected while they lived, 
and the Memorial followed this policy of protection throughout the 1922-35 period. 10 
Examining the Memorial' s choice and treatment of "realities" and defeats 
illustrates several elements of the Memorial 's "national" work - its earnest, sincere 
9 Bean had also declared. when particularly frustrated during the war, that England would benefit from 
a revolution, and was willing to write positively of socialism. referri ng to the AIF as a "one big 
Socialistic state." His loyalty to Anglo-Australian idea ls of the chivalrous gentleman never wavered, 
however. Bean Diary, 4 Apri l 1918, quoted n Williams, Anzacs. 1he Media, p.214. 
10 W'II' ' rams, Anzacs, the Media, p.l68. 
269 
and someti mes subtle attempts to help and improve its nation 's citizens. Firstly, these 
displays provided a continuation of the national war history's praise for the soldiers, 
argu ing that even in the worst situations the Australians acted with honour and 
courage. Equating the nation with the Alf as it did, defending the soldiers' reputation 
helped Australia. 11 The "national" work also included concem for group emotional 
wellbe ing and social cohesion. ln transcending realities and thus depicting the soldiers 
as generally in control of their environment the Memorial addressed an important 
psychological aspect of the war experience, helplessness. Many Australian civilians 
had endured a deep and debilitating powerlessness in being so far from the fa te of 
their loved ones, while soldiers under prolonged bombardment had experienced a far 
more terrifying sense of being unable to protect themselves or control their 
enviromnent. For those who had been there, and those who had waited for them, 
helplessness had been a significant and painful part of their war experience, and the 
Memorial sought to provide a kind of retrospective reassurance that the men had not 
reall y been helpless. This response was every bit as "national" as defending the Alf. 
Helping the nation and educating it were both parts of the Memotial 's brief. Also 
under the " national" rubric was the manipulation, in displays of defeats, of public 
opinion towards wartime commanders, both to save embanassment and to forestall 
social conflict. 
II 
In the Memorial's treatment of defeats on the field of battle, "traditional" martial 
nationalism retained primacy and the fighting reputation of the AIF was protected. 
Victories were discemed within defeats, and the result of this focus was to p lay down 
the extent of some military failures, especially those on Gal lipoli. As in the triumphal 
displays, traditional forms and ideas were utilised, and once more martial virtues were 
perceived within battles. ln tem1s of the A IF's fighting reputation , military defeat did 
not necessari ly negate a soldier' s martial qualities, for sacrifice, devotion to duty and 
the ability to face death with honour - all celebrated in the Memorial's displays -
were considered great virtues in traditional military discourse. 12 For many centuries 
11 See Bennett, Birrh of!he Museum, p.l40 
11 It was necessary for a nation to be able to accept defeat gracefully- but not to sustain too many, lest 
it go under in the competitive world of social Darwinism and martial nationalism. 
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they had been honoured as hi ghly as victory itself, and with the advent of social 
Darwinism, wh ich equated fai lure with weakness, they quickly came to be seen as 
victori es in and of themselves. Thus all fo ur of the battles considered in this chapter -
two at Gallipoli, two in France - were at least partly redeemed through the perception 
within them of victories. both moral and military. Battles now considered to have 
been abj ect fai lures were presented in a more favourable light, much in the manner 
that Pozieres was branded a "complete success." Small tactical victories were 
repeatedly foc ussed upon, and larger strategic fai lures general ly ignored. Casualties 
were often acknow ledged, but the objectives of many battles were never mentioned, 
the fai lure to reach them not offered as a matter for consideration . The Gallipoli 
displays levelled no questions at generals but the most tacit, rather claiming that some 
defeats were glorious and those who had been defeated remained great warriors 
because of their loyalty and devotion to duty. ln so protecting the reputation of the 
men, and the officers of the State, the Memorial was do ing its "nati onal" work, 
stri ving to create that deep union of people and State under the aegis of the fallen-yet-
tJiumphal Digger which was one of its fundamental objecti ves. 
When criticism was seen, it was primari ly for the purposes of extending this 
protection of the men 's reputations, but an anger to,~·ards Imperial commanders was 
also observable. Th is was more in the order of an assertion of national identity, 
however, rather than a denunciation of the war. The Memorial criticised the conduct 
of the disastrous battles of Fromelles and Second Bulleco urt, fo ught respectively in 
July 1916 and May 1917, the first for fau lty preparations, the second for apparent 
pointlessness (with a position won at great cost by Australians being subsequently 
ignored and left unexploited by the British). However, only these very worst blunders 
were criticised, and some of the accusat ions were almost meek, others were only 
implied rather than made directly, while at no time was anyone named , nor was the 
value of the 1918 victory nor the Imperial cause called into question. 
The Gallipoli campaign was treated in full nationalist mode. For example, the 
fai lure of an Anzac attack at the t ip of the peninsula was transformed from a potential 
shame on Austral ian anns into a tale of reckless dis regard for safety in the national 
cause. It was also one of the most dramatic images of the men's pat1iotism, and it was 
a decidedly traditional, Imperially-loyal patrioti sm. In early May 19 15 the 2"d 
Australian Brigade was sent to assist in an attack against the vi llage of Krithia bei ng 
undertaken by British infantry. The attack was a poorly-planned, costly fa ilure. The 
271 
Australians were forced to advance to the forward trenches in the open, rather than 
moving up communication trenches, as would later occur on the Western Front. The 
result was the loss of one third of the Brigade's strength in an advance which could 
have been done almost without cost under cover of darkness. 
A painting of a dramatic incident from the attack hung among the displays 
from December 1928. The Australian Chivalry caption for this painting, while faintly 
hinting at a criticism of the whole operation and its Imperia) controllers, focussed 
most strongly on the heroic and patriotic elements of the fight. 
Figure 46: "Come on, Australians!" by Charles Wheeler. 
Source: Australian War Memorial Collections Database. cas.awm.gov.au. 
Painting ART 09558. 
Despite .. . short notice, the battalions succeeded in reaching their 
assembly positions almost on time. Moving in steady lines across 
the open, they immediately came under a heavy fire which 
quickly grew in volume. After advancing 500 yards, they reached 
a trench occupied by British soldiers, which, from that moment, 
became known to the Australians ac; the "Tommies' Trench." 
When the leading waves had rested for a few minutes, the 
Brigade Commander (General M'Cay) scrambled on the parapet, 
periscope in hand, shouting "Now then, Australians! Come on, 
A ustraJi ans!" 
By now the fire was intense, but as the order, "Come on, 
Australians!," flashed along the trench, the men hitched up their 
packs and again flung themselves forward into a storm of lead 
such as Australians seldom again encountered during the war. 
They succeeded in advancing another 500 yards, but at 6.30, the 
line, with its flanks in the air and its numbers sadly thinned, was 
brought to a standstill, with the Turkish trenches still several 
hundred yards distant. Here they dug in, and the advance ended. 
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ln thi s attack, the Australian Brigade suffered I ,056 casualties, 
more than one-third of its strength. 13 
·· come on, Ausrralians!" is a traditional military painting which dramatises 
Australian courage whi le linking that valour expl ic itly with the conventional Briti sh 
signifying modes of coolness under fire and defiance of the enemy. The Imperial link 
is also explicitly depicted. The urging brigadier is waving his baton, symbol of 
a1istocratic warfare in the early twentieth century. 14 He stands at his ease, unworried 
by the fall of shot around him, thinking only of his duty, and that ofhis command. His 
words echo Newbolt's Vita Lampada: "Play up! Play up! And play the game!" 15 The 
men respond to his encouragement, pressing on the attack with courage. They, too, 
are unaffected by the enemy fire , with one soldier reaching down to help his mate up 
out of the trench, oblivious to his own danger. Some of the Imperial troops in the 
trench also react to the brigadier's rallying-cry, and join the Australians. The pair of 
soldiers on the right, the Tommy in the cap and the Digger in the slouch hat, advance 
doggedly together, the former shaking his fist defiantly at the Turks. The unity of the 
Empire at arms is thus materialised and dramatised, with the colonials prov iding the 
lead in a thoroughly ' 'British" manner. The viewer is encouraged to ask, "What IS 
danger to these men?" 
The whole vision of the battle, with courage and determination in the nation 's 
cause to the fore , contrasts strikingly with the terror and pity of Bean's own account 
of the battle in his diary. Two men have been hit, one killed, but the fonner might be 
merely resting, and the latter stoicall y accepting of the fac t that he is "out of action" 
for the immediate future. Their main task in the composition is to symbol ise the 
danger which the force was facing rather than providing a focus for anti-war-style 
criticism. Thi s was academic battle painting of the most traditional kind. steeped in 
the popular military culture of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. 
I.J Australian Chivalty , Plate 9. Sir James Whiteside M 'Cay (also spelt McCay) ( 1864-1930}. b. 
Ballynure. Ireland. Commanded 2"d Brigade, AI F. at Gall ipoli, being blamed for the disaster at Krithia. 
Commanded 5'h Division at Fromelles. again being blamed for the catastrophe. He was relieved of is 
command in January 1917, ostensibly on the grounds of ill-health. after his staff refused to work with 
him and his relationship with GOCAIF, Lieutenant-General Will iam Birdwood, deteriorated. ADB. 
vol. J 0, pp.224-7. 
14 MacDonald, The Language of Empire, p.24. 
,. ) Newbolt, Poems New and Old, pp.78-9. 
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Focussing on courage and devotion to the cause (even when it was perhaps a 
poorly-directed cause) allowed a note of positivity to come out of the failure of the 
Krithia attack. The objecti ve, and the failure to significantly threaten it, could be 
placed to one side to allow concentration upon moral elements, which were praised. 
One should admire the actions, and the "clean, high ideals" of patriotism which 
motivated them, the suggestion was, and draw one 's cloak over the question of 
whether those in command were fit to hold it. 16 In this way, what was in reality a 
poorly-planned disaster could be transfonned into a potential embodiment of bravery 
and devotion to the nation. 
The attack at Krithia was a fail ure, but most of the men survived it. This was 
not the case with the more famous attack of the 3'd Light Horse B1igade at the Nek on 
7 August 1915, in which more than half the force was killed or wounded. In the 
Memorial 's "national" interpretation, the battle was transfonned from a poorly-
organised, overly-ambitious disaster into a great event in Australian history, and in 
this transfonnation the traditional martial virtues of self-sacrifice and courage in the 
face of death were to the fore. 
The Nek was a feint attack designed to draw Turkish reinforcements away 
from a fresh troop landing at Suvla Bay. 17 The plan was for a Brigade of dismounted 
Light Horsemen to attack across the narrow, bare apex of the triangular Anzac 
positions. Due to a synchronisation problem, there was a seven-minute gap between 
the end of a naval bombardment of the Turkish positions and the start of the attack, 
leaving ample time for the defenders to man the many machine guns that commanded 
the smal l Nek battlefield. Four waves of men were sent out; all were annihilated, and 
the wounded could not be reached . The attack forms the climax of Peter Weir's I 981 
fi lm Gallipoli, which presents the slaughter as being the result of British indifference 
and inflexibility: the bastard "Poms" had done for the Aussies with their plan of 
16 In his guide Bean called the allack a "famous charge," and used a poetic al lusion to the burgeoning 
symbol of sacrifice to dignify the bloodshed. pointing out that display case No.5 contained "one of the 
poppies that bravely flowered there that day" (the Brit ish Legion had begun to sell poppies for display 
on Armistice Day only several months before Bean wrote his first guide, in November 192 1 ). Relics 
and Records, September 1922, p.l2; April 1928, p. l2; December 193 1, p. l2. Bean, of course, 
recognised the blood-letting of that day in his diary, so there was considerable difference between what 
he knew to have been the terrible truth of a hurriedly-organised. poorly-executed attack, and what was 
depicted in public in the Memorial. On the symbolism of poppies and other flowers, sec Fussell, Great 
War. pp.243-54. 
17 Coulthard-Clark. Encyclopedia , pp.l 08-9. 
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attack. The viewer's honor and pity fuels rage at the foolishness and callousness of 
the Imperial officers. 
The 1920s treatment of the battle in the Memoria l was of a completely 
different order. Criticism, firstly, was entirely absent. Rather, the visitor was invited 
to embrace the debacle. A physical connection with the attack existed, and Bean's 
guide transfonned it into a sacred object. This was ''the haversack, shot through and 
through, of one of the brave men who fell in the most famous and deadly charge 
Australians ever made.''18 The haversack was precious, Bean asserted, for it was 
"almost the on ly relic which remains of that wonderful episode in our history." 19 
A military disaster, a total defeat caused by ambitious yet poor planning and 
haphazard execution, had been transfonned into a potential cornerstone of national 
pride. This transformation occurred under the influence of the prevailing ideology of 
martial nationalism, and, like the Krithia representation, illustrated its accepted codes 
of conduct. The ability to remain cool in the face of imminent death was, by 1914, 
one of the most important of all the virtues of a chivalrous gentleman. Novelist and 
English gentleman A. E. W. Mason wrote in 190 I that "it was a simple creed .... It 
amounted to no more than this: that to die decently was worth a good many years of 
life.''20 During the war Bean argued that the men had actively embraced the idea: 
The long list of casualties must daily include the names of men 
of peculiarly valuable attainments who have gladly laid down 
their lives for their country and the Allied cause, and a 
correspondent doubts whether it is wise to pem1it those whose 
loss is admittedly i1Teparable to perish in leading infantry attacks. 
[To) the men concerned [the] magnitude of the cause 
immeasurably exceeds the possible value of any further 
contribution they might have made, had they been spared, to the 
sum of human knowledge. They knew the wo1th of a single life 
lies, not in its length, but in its quality. 21 
Martial nationalist propaganda suggested that all the "important" nations had 
one or two "glorious debacles," narratives in which a small group, doomed through no 
IR Relics and Records. September 1922. p. l 3; April 1928, p.l4: December 1931, p. l3. 
19 Relics and Records. September 1922, p. l 3: April 1928, p. 14: December 193 L p. 13. 
10 MacDonald, The Language of Empire, p.24. 
21 The Times, 26 July 19 16. Quoted in Wil liams, Anzacs. rhe Media. p. l47. 
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fault of their own, heroically embrace their fate. This romance was powerfully 
influential in Australia in the inter-war years, and the sense of Australians carrying on 
the tradition was an integral part of the nationalist response to the war. Gallipoli was 
"our Thermopylae" to Bean and others, invoking the glorious deaths of Leonidas and 
his Spartans.22 British martial nationalist propaganda of the Victorian era had revived 
such Classical heroic visions as part of the greater Victorian embrace of Ancient 
Greek culture.23 In the Memorial, it was again to the Victorian Imperial stalwart 
Tennyson that an appeal was made for an image with which to sublimate the tragedy 
of the Nek. Following Bean in his guide's summary of Gallipoli, Australian Chivalry 
invoked the ·'Charge of the Light Brigade," with its "glory that would never fade," 
thus romanticising the disaster to a startling degree: 
Figure 47: The charge of the 3rd Light Horse Brigade at the Nek, 7 
August 1915, by George Lambert. 
Source: Australian War Memorial Collections Database. 
cas.awm.gov.au. Painting ART07965. 
·'AUSTRALIA 'S GALLANT SIX HUNDRED" 
The famous episode in the Crimean War - the charge of six 
hundred British cavalry against the Russian guns at Balaclava -
which was immortalised in Tennyson's stirring poem "The 
Charge of the Light Brigade," had its counterpart at the Anzac 
"Nek" when Australian light horsemen, then serving without 
22 For example, arch-apologist for the Australian war effort, Henry Tardent, invoked Leonidas, 
claiming that ' 'human actions are not judged solely on their material results" when judging the value of 
the Gallipoli campaign. The important issue for Tardent was that Leonidas and his countrymen had 
''for ever immortalised the patriotism and courage of ancient Greece." Tardent, In Freedom 's Cause, 
p.26. 
23 Richard Jenkyns, The Victorians and Ancient Greece, (Cambridge, Mass. : Harvard University Press, 
1980). 
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their horses, were called upon to make a charge in the face of 
terrib le odds.24 
This connection with past British military "matiyrs·· having been asserted, the caption 
then described the action itself as a heroic tragedy: '·As it leapt over the parapet, the 
first wave met fire so heavy that the report of rifle or machine gun could not be 
distinguished in the din, and in half-a-minute the men were swept away. Two minutes 
later the second wave courageously followed, to meet a similar fate."25 Again, the 
ideals of the men, the courage to sacrifice themselves for the cause, was the issue to 
focus upon. One should admire the self-sacrifice and devotion to duty of the troops, and 
this was further emphasised by the decision to send two more waves over: 
Shortly afterwards, however, the appearance in the Turkish front 
line of a flag which was waved feebly for a short time suggested 
that some of the light horsemen had managed to reach their 
objective. This led to the decision to continue the attack, and the 
third and fourth waves unhesitatingly went on to almost certain 
death." 26 
This sacrifice for others, similar to that urged by the Round Table journalist, was the 
overall moral offered by Australian Chivalry. The men, it summarised, "gal lantly went 
forward rather than risk letting down their comrades engaged in other parts of the 
line."27 Thus the battle was redeemed, for in it the Australians had shown the virtues of 
chivalrous gentlemen, thereby winning a great moral victory. They had exemplified the 
ideals of manly behaviour Bean later outlined to Gavin Long in 1930, giving their lives 
just as his ideal Australian did, "because he can see a bit of movement in the mud and 
grass which he reckons to be one of his mates in a desperately bad place."28 
This devotion to duty, especiall y the assertion that the Light Horsemen had 
sacrificed themselves "rather than risk letting down their comrades engaged in other 
parts of the line," encapsulated a loyalty to the cause that did not criticise the conduct of 
~·Australian Chivalry, Plate 14. 
l:. Auslralian Chivalry, Plate 14. 
26 Australian Chiva/Jy, Plate 14. 
21 Australian Chivalty, Plate 14. 
28 Bean to Long, 30 June 1930, in Bean, Making the Legend, p.236. 
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the battle or the war."9 Indeed, it did not question that conduct in the least. Bean wrote 
often of the troops surrendering themselves to the anny, tn1sting that others knew better 
than they what had to done. This offered the sentiment of another stanza of "The 
Charge of the Light Brigade:" 
Their' s not to make reply, 
Their's not to reason why, 
Their's but to do and die: 
Into the valley of Death 
Rode the six hundred. 30 
The Australian Chivalry caption, which as always can be taken as the Memorial ' s last 
word in the 1922-35 period, provided a truly heroic mediation of an already heroic 
image. The painting dramatically shows the men on the left advancing to certain 
death, eyes steady, tread detem1ined. Many men have already been hit; those falling in 
the distance have a ghostly quality. There is not a drop of blood on the whole canvas. 
It is tragic, without question, but it is also '' traditionally" heroic, and the caption adds 
greatly to thi s sense of valour, as well as placing the battle and the A TF's actions 
firmly within an Imperial framework. Death was mentioned, most definitely, but there 
was no criticism of the timing fiasco. Nor was there an examination of the issue of the 
flag, as there was in the History, in which Bean scrutinised the point in detail , 
eventually questioning the wisdom of sending out the final two waves into certain 
death regardless of the story of the appearance of a flag.31 The Memorial did not enter 
such complications, however, for its space was limited. Furthennore, it had been 
constructed for a popu lar audience and was detennined to educate that audience 1n 
"the national spirit," keeping its messages simpler. 
The Alf's move to the Western Front was marked with a spectacular disaster. 
Just two days after the 5111 Division, freshl y formed from half of the I st, reached the 
line in July 1916, it was hurled into one the worst-planned attacks of that year, against 
a German position near Fromelles. It might have gone in on the very day it arrived, if 
requests for a twenty-four hour postponement had not been acceded to. The plan, such 
as it was, was for three brigades of the 5111 Division to capture a section of the enemy 
]Q Ausrralian Chimll:l'. Plate 14 . 
.1o Ricks (ed. ), The Poems o(Tennyson, p.l 036. 
' ' Bean. The St01:1' o.lAnza,·!l, pp.616-33. 
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trench opposite, tn concert with the 61 sl British Divi sion. The British general 
commanding, Sir Hubert Gough, was a caval ry officer, a man with an aggressive 
spirit that Haig appreciated, but with little grasp of the requirements of success in 
trench warfare. ~2 Surprise was non-existent, artillery insufficient to cut the German 
wire, destroy strong defences or suppress a11il lery, and disaster ensued. As they 
advanced across o-Man's Land, the Australians were caught by machine gun fire 
from undamaged Gennan positions as they emerged from the remnants of an orchard, 
and killed in enonnous numbers; in a single night the 5111 Division sustained 5,553 
casualties. The survivors were devastated by "numbing grief, bitterness and ... deep 
disi llusionment,'' as were their senior officers.33 Bean wrote that the Brigadier, H.E. 
"Pompey'' Elliot, " looked like a man who had lost his wife."34 He was utterly 
distraught. lo doubt he bitterly regretted telling his men before the battle that they 
would not meet a single German when they went over the top. 35 
It was difficult to present such a disaster in terms of the ' ·Light Brigade 
Romance,'' in terms of glorious death. Sustai ning 5,553 casualties in a magnificent 
and lasti ng victory was one thi ng. but to do so in an ignominious defeat was quite 
another matter.36 This was not, by any measure. a ' 'wonderful episode in our history." 
Bean, however, had no intention of equating Fromelles with the Nek. He had been 
greatly angered during the war by the offi cial British communique, which cla imed 
that the attack had been "an important series of trench raids," crowned by the capture 
of " 140 prisoners." 37 Bean saw this communique - suggesting as it did that the attack 
was successful - as deliberate lying, and felt i.t served no good purpose. He believed 
that the best propaganda was that which told the population as much of the truth as 
was consistent with military security. During the war he interpreted this to mean less 
than fu ll disclosure, making "the result something of an honourable draw" in his 
Jl Sir Hubert de Ia Poer Gough ( 1870-1963). b. Gurteen. Ireland. Commanded Reserve (later 5'11 ) 
Am1y on the West em Front. ODNB. vo/.23. pp.42-5. On Gough's shortcomings as a tactician sec 
Liddell Hart, Histo1y of the First World War, p.250 anti Andrews, Anzac !!!usion, pp.96-9. 
n Andrews, Anzac !!!usion, p.96. 
34 Bean Diary. 20 July 19 16, quoted in Williams, Anzacs. the lv/edia, p. l l8. 
J\ w·11· 
• 1 tams, Anzacs. the Media, p. l 11 . 
36 At the Nek there were 3 72 casualt ies. 
31 Bean Diary 20 July 1916. quoted in Anzacs. the Media, p.ll8. 
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corrcspondence .1R After the war, though, in the Memorial, the true result of the action 
was acknowledged, and blame was assigned, even though this was only implicitly 
done and was not criticism of an "anti -war" variety, in which commanders were 
indicted for "murdering" young men. At the same time, the reputation of the AIF 
soldiers was protected through the insistence that their courage and detetmination 
were equal to that displayed during the great victories. The men had been let down 
through clearly negligent organisation, hence the failure, but they sti ll possessed the 
requisite virtues for success - if given the assistance they needed (as the narrative 
assured visitors did later occur). 
Still, the various representations on Frome!les illustrate the upper limit of the 
anti-war influence in the Memorial's national war history, including confronting, even 
shocking descriptions of the manner in which the disaster developed and the desperate 
situation the Australians found themselves in when surrounded by the enemy. The 
troops were shown clearly as victims, and while they were ''heroic" victims this was 
their lowest ebb in terms of the power to control their surroundings. The ability to do 
so was a key factor in war literature, as Fussell has shown, and this "ironic" mode was 
characteristic of "modern" literature. These representations also displayed the most 
intense sadness of any displays, utilising that fundamental anti-war theme. However, 
the key focussing agent of anti-war literature, the indictment of the war and its 
conduct which, as Massingham affirms, backed up the description of shocking truths, 
was absent. The result was that the Memotial was able, by surrounding these 
examples of the "modern memory" sensibility with strong traditional heroism, to 
appropriate emotionally powerful realism, the other main plank of the anti-war stance. 
In Bean's guides there was a sad, but not critical, tone. Bean's interpretation of 
Fromelles was more complex, and utilised the anti-war technique of graphic realism 
to a greater extent than anything else in the gu ides, yet still found positive elements, 
even in this appalling disaster, particularly the heroism and determination of the 
Austral ian troops: 
Ofthe tragic Battle offromelles, in which the 51h Australian and 
a British Division were cut up in a most gallant feint attack, 
intended to distract the attention of the Germans from the 
3~ For cx<J mplc. he wrote that the troops were "enabled to retire with a loss that was sl ight when the 
extraordinary difficulty of the operation is considered.'" Argus. 24 July 1916, quoted in Williams, 
Anzacs. 1he Media, p.l2 1. 
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Somme battle, few relics can ever be obtained.... A few 
mementoes were collected, as shown (in Case No. l2); the hat of 
an Australian killed in the fight: the boot of a Victorian soldier of 
the 15111 Brigade, shot through the heel: and an Australian water-
bottle carrier, found several hundred yards behind the German 
line, along the flooded ditch in which the advance ended, and 
where the 14111 Brigade held out for a night against the enemy, 
reti1ing only when ordered to do so in the morning:w 
This is a rich passage, for there was sadness, anger and pride intermixed within it. The 
former can be seen in the re ference to the water-bottle canier, and the reflection 
thereby on the likely lonely, sad death of the carrier's owner in a muddy ditch in 
France. The boot, shot through the heel , \Vas a powerful symbol of defeat, and the 
failure itself was carefu ll y acknowledged, but the proud avowal of the heroism of the 
l41h Brigade provided a "positive exclamation," a sudden insertion of some kind of 
success, or of a moral virtue displayed , that acted to soften the bleakness of a disaster 
like Fromelles.40 
The description of the action in 1933's Auslralian Chivally, from which the 
following account derives, was more forthright carrying open criticism of the lack of 
secrecy and a vivid description of the manner in which, from this ominous beginning, 
the disaster developed. Allowing their enemy to comprehend their plan had 
lamentable results for the Austral ians from the very moment the attack began: 
The Germans, by ordinary observation, anticipated the operation, 
and besides stocking their front line with bombs, brought up a 
reserve battalion to a position close behind the front. During the 
afternoon of the 19111 the Germans shelled heavily the 
communication trenches and reserve and support lines of both 
divisions, causing serious loss.4 1 
Despite these problems the troops attacked, and disaster, not surprisingly, resulted: 
"The 151h Australian Brigade, attacking the northem face of the Sugarloaf [salient, the 
principal German position], was met by a murderous fire, which caused the 
successive waves to wither half-way across No-Man 's Land. The dead lay thick." The 
situation faced by the s•h and 141h Brigades, which did enter the German lines, was 
39 Relics and Records, September 1922, p. l9; April 1928, p.22: December 193 L p.25. 
40Thc "positive exclamation" was used throughout the Memorial. 
41 Australian Chivalry, Plate 25. 
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also bleak, for they soon found the Ge1mans behind them, in trenches which, 
according to standard practice of that period of the conflict, they had left unoccupied 
while advancing. In desperation, ''the survivors of the 141h on the right flank at last 
turned round and attempted to charge the Germans, but they were met by heavy fire 
vvhich broke up the attacking line." The 8111 Brigade "found themselves in similar 
straits, and at 3.45 a.m., with machine-guns fi ring at them from front, flank, and rear, 
some 150 made a dash across the German front trench to their own lines. By 5.30 the 
whole of the 81h Brigade had been forced to retire."42The bloody disaster was thus 
described blow-by-blow, and there was clear, albeit indirect, criticism of the lack of 
secrecy and the practice of leaving trenches empty. The caption leaves the reader in 
no doubt as to the scale of the failure , and some ofthe bitterness, shock and grief that 
the Australians, including Bean, had felt when it had happened was reprised there. 
However, this is the point: only some of these emotions were alluded to, and in a 
greatly diluted form. The heroism of the l41h Brigade was still emphasised, as it was 
in Bean 's guide, and that of the 81h added. The description is tragic, and angry, but its 
praise for the men's heroism is as great as any seen in descriptions of the victories of 
1918. The critici sm was clear but did not mention any particular person, so the 
reputations of generals such as Gough were protected, but those who knew the truth-
the soldiers, for example - would understand who was indicted by the Australian 
Chivaby caption. So this was criticism, certainly, but it was unsustained criticism, 
and it did not include an open attack on those whose lack of even the most 
rudimentary understanding of tactics led to "casualties [of] between five and six 
thousand.''43 Truth was not in the service of criticism here, but rather in the service of 
the nati on. 
The failure at Bullecourt in April 1917 and the pyrrhic victory there in a 
second attack in May also led to criticism in the Memorial 's presentations, although 
again th is was neither sustained nor focussed upon any individttal. In fact, it was a 
sign of the Memorial's national ist focus upon Australia and the limits of its Imperial 
loyalty. Casua lties in these battles were again hi gh. In April , the failure of tanks led to 
3,000 casualties in another sing le night attack, including the largest number of 
Australians captured during the whole war. The Somme plan model label described a 
~~ Ausmt!ian Chivalrr. Plate 25. 
~3 Aus/ralian Chimli')·. Plate 25. 
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heroic yet unsuccessful first battle, in which the tanks, being used with the 
Australians for the first time, broke down and fai led to breach the German wire, 
leading to the infantry, who had "'with the greatest gallantry, set out unaided on their 
hazardous task" and actually "succeeded in reaching the second line of trenches," 
being cut off from reinforcements unable to get through the wire: "some posts, cut 
off, fought to the death.'-44 
The second battle's description, following directly on from this story of 
detennined and bloody heroism, ca rried the criti cism. Firstly, the Australian 2nd 
Division "succeeded in capturing its objective,'' but due to the fai lure of "a British 
Division entrusted with the capture of Bul lecourt" they had no flank support. 
Regardless, ' 'they held on despite numerous heavy counter-attacks.''45 Finally the 
position was won, but a bitter taste remained, for "the Australian casualties in this 
fighting ... amounted to some 15,000 [and) the position won at such great cost was not 
furt her exploited.'A6 The fina l resentful accusation gave voice to one of the Alf's 
most pass ionately-held gtievances. Many fel t that their efforts and sacrifices were 
cast away by an Imperial general staff that had no understanding of what the 
Austral ians had done. Certainly Bean felt this had occurred at times, and that many 
Australians had lost their lives in attacks that were without point.47 By levelling the 
finger vaguely at the Imperial leadership, the Memorial defended the men and 
separated the AIF commanders from poor decisions. The Memorial was 
differentiating the Australian war effort from the Imperial one, asserting a distinctive 
Australian identity within the Empire as a whole. ln success, the two were 
inseparable, but in failu re a distinct difference was observed . Australian leaders, 
selected for their moral qualities as they were, would not have done th is, the 
implication went. This was an in-house quarrel , though, for the limits and the 
vagueness of the criticism meant that only those cognisant with all the facts (soldiers) 
would understand who was being attacked. These elements were also yet more marks 
44 A WM Ex Doc. 186, Sheet 5, Item l. 
45 A WM Ex Doc. 186, Sheet 5, Item l. 
46 AWM Ex Doc. 186, Sheet 5, Item l. 
47 Bean discussed Haig's "wearing down" phase at length in The AIF in France 1916. He accepted 
battles of attrition in theory, but would not defend poorly planned disasters that would lead only to 
casualties hugely greater for his own side than his opponent's, anti ultimately fell that the whole 
Somme battle fell into this category. Bean, The A IF in Fran,·e 1916, pp.945-7. 
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of the Memorial ' s conunitment to the "traditional" notions of heroism, used to exalt 
48 the dead and protect the State. 
These defeats complete the national war history. Victory, both military and 
moral, as well as martial virtues, were the prime focal points. The men's collective 
portrait fanned a catalogue of martial nationalism and a celebration of home-grown 
virtues. The latter blended with and enhanced the former, sourced from the AfF's 
solid British stock. The Memorial was a ce lebration of Australian moral virtues, key 
strands of the Anzac Legend, and these virtues were those of a noble wanior people-
courage, determination, devotion to duty, the willingness to sacrifice and the will to 
conquer, and so on. The depiction of defeat, death and the wounded showed that this 
noble people had been through a tremendous, testing ordeal, making their triumph all 
the more glorious, and all the more historic. It was a powerful popular historical 
cocktail. 
HI 
Defeat. death, the wounded and other "real ities" of war also had a "national" 
interpretation. The tension between the contradictory impulses of truth-telling and 
nationalism drove the Memorial 's display policy, affecting the choice of realities for 
display as well as the treatment of them. Thus danger was represented , for it enhanced 
the A IF's reputation for courage, whi le the killing of prisoners, more likely to affim1 
French anti-war soldier-writer Henri Barbusse 's ant i-war argument that "the soldier's 
calling ... changes men by tums into stupid victims or ignoble brutes" was excluded.49 
4
x Bruce Kapferer and Ken Inglis had a public disagreement over the symbolic position of the Canberra 
Memorial in Australian society. Kapfercr argued that the Memorial represented ''the People" and stood 
in a symbol icall y opposit ional position to the old parliament house. representing "the State." Inglis 
demurred, arguing that the Memorial was an instrument of the State throughout its existence. I feel 
lngli, 's argument is more in keeping with Bean's objectives and the realities of the Memorial's 
development. Alt hough the critical stance occasionally taken by the Memorial would appear to confirm 
Kapfercr's contention about the existence of an anti-State element within the museum, it is important to 
recognise that critical displays comprised an exceptional set of representations. In the normal run of 
thi ngs. Inglis was right, and the Memorial served the State. The disagreement is found in K.S. Inglis, 
"Kapferer on Anzac and Australia," Social Analysis. 29 (December 1990), pp.67-73 and Bruce 
Kapfcrcr. "Nationalist History and the Poverty of Positivism." Social Ana~\ ·sis, 29 (December 1990), 
pp. 74-85. Inglis's article is a review of Kapferer's Legends o_{ People. My1hs of Slate, first published in 
1988. 
~·~ Henri Barbussc. Under Fire. p.257. quoted in Gerster. Big-noting, p.7. The Memorial utterly rejected 
a Barbussia n vision of the A IF. and thus rejected the display of these realit ies which might have had a 
deleterious effect on the reputation of the AIF. Self-inflicted wounds, cowardice, drunkenness and 
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The Australian medica l system was defended in representations re ferring to the 
wounded that coupled realism to careful selection. The conditions of battle were part 
of the ordeal overcome by the Australians, and were shown in considerable detail. In a 
manner similar to the insistence that the enemy conquered at Mont St Quentin were 
formidable Prussian Guard units, the Memorial showed the danger and difficulty of 
the front lines to have been fom1idable. All were then transcended, with the exception 
of the wounded, over whom the cloak of the discreet propagandist fe ll. 5° First danger, 
then the guns, and finally death were transfom1ed into positive national forces. 
Danger was transcended through stories of lucky escapes, the guns through both 
social Darwinism and a kitsch trivialisation of shells, and death through several 
definitive representations wedding sacrifice to either national martyrdom or triumph. 
In fact, the most fundamental symbolic disp lay in the 1922-35 Memorial - which 
incorporated a painting of the death of Lieutenant John Tumour in 1917- organically 
fused triumph and sacrifice. 
Before they could be transcended, the dangers of the battlefields had to be 
depicted. Thus civilians might understand what the A IF had faced , and better 
appreciate the scale of their victory in mastering such a dangerous battlefield. 
Depicted they were, then, and in no uncertain terms. Several photographic displays 
left the viewer in litt le doubt that the AJF had been in hazardous parts of the line, and 
that their lives had been in jeopardy even when undertaking the most routine of tasks. 
The sombreness of their mood is evident from the fact that the image of the 
Australians ignoring shellfire, commonly seen m Bean's war coiTespondence and 
diary during the war, was absent from the Memorial.51 This was a significant 
omission , for it meant that the Memorial depicted a grave public recognition of the 
dangers faced by the men. Instead there were photographs in \ovhich the troops were 
shown wisely seeking to minimise their exposure to a danger which is all too evident: 
dese11ion, as well as the kil ling of prisoners - all of which could attract the label of brutish or ignoble 
behaviour - were given no place in the Memorial. 
50 James Wieland points out that the analogous mixed image/text medium of wartime postcards also 
negotiated "that fi ne li ne between providing access to the excitement, even the agony, of combat 
without revealing the grim reality of torn. dismembered bodies." Wieland. '"What do you think of this 
card'J," p.143. 
51 During the war Bean had, for instance, written about men walking 1hrough barrages "exactly as if 
they were going home to tea," and "as you would go through a summer shower." Sun 27 July 1916, 
quoted in Williams, Anzacs. the Media, p.l48; Bean. Lerters From France, p. l 08. 
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Figure 48: "No Place to Linger." 
Source: Australian War Memorial Collections Database. 
cas.awm.gov.au. Photograph E00649. 
NO PLACE TO LINGER 
An Australian motor lorry speeding along the road toward Hill 
63, on 5'11 June, 1917, during the shelling of the Anzac batteries 
concentrated in the sector to take part in the battle of Messines 
two days later. A shell can be seen bursting over the battery 
position in the wood.52 
Figure 49: "Death's Messenger." 
~~ Mclboumc Photograph 48; Sydney Photograph 125. Relics and Records, September 1922, p.70; 
April 1928. p.85: December 193 1, p.86. 
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Source: Australian War Memorial Col lections Database. 
cas.awm.gov.au. Photograph E00737. 
DEATH'S MESSENGER 
Taking shelter from a heavy shell-burst at Glencorse Wood, 
in the Ypres Sali ent, on 20111 September, 1917. Some diggers 
are dropping into shell holes, and others r·unning to shelter 
ahead, not to avoid the shell which is shown bursting (it was 
too late then!) but the furth er shells they knew would follow, 
or perhaps co uld hear on their way.53 
It was not fear so much as good sense that drove the men to cover, the second caption 
assured civilian visitors, who at least in the early years in Melbourne still had little 
real understanding of the situation at the front. These photographs brought them close 
up against the face of battle. The realities of the danger endured daily by the AIF were 
graphically illustrated without pushing audiences over the edge into direct 
contemplation of the war's true horror- the result of a direct hit by the artillery, for 
example. Much could be inferred, though, and little imagination was needed to bring 
powerful feelings away from the contemplation that one's own people had been 
subjected to such indiscriminate menace. Bean was hoping to provoke awe, and the 
first image, especially, in which the men speed towards the shelling, provokes that 
emotion. This was truth-telling in the name of the nation: no criticism of the war was 
implied in these captions, so the emotions which remain are awe and admiration for 
the bravery of anyone who could withstand, and then conquer, such an environment. 
Other displays assured visitors that the men had indeed done these things (compare 
the insouciant 29'11 Battalion), and thus the representation of such menace helped 
authenticate the Memorial's narratives wh ile leaving the cloak over the image of those 
who had not run quickly enough. 
Danger could also be exciting, though, and true to the pre-opening advertising 
in Sydney, stories of narrow escapes existed in the Memorial. Two examples suffice 
to illustrate the theme. Firstly there was the story, told by Bean in his first guide, 
entitled "A Marvellous Escape." This recounted the tale of "Lieut. C.E. Steadman, 
51 51 Battalion, who was blown up by a shell on the 22"d August [1918]. His revolvers 
were smashed to pieces, and his equipment peppered with holes, but he himself 
53 Melbourne Photograph 72; Sydney Photograph 152. Relics and Records, September 1922, p. 75; 
April 1928, p.92; December 1931, p.93. 
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escaped with nothing worse than concussion. ,.:;4 For people who had spent years 
hoping their man would be so lucky. here was a story to warm the heart a little: a man 
surviving the terrible guns to fight another day. Secondly, there was an adventure 
story that could have come straight out of the Boy's Own Paper or Chums. 55 This was 
the tale of two pilots in the desert, who escape from the Turks in death-defying 
fashion. As Australian Chivalry put it: 
Figure 50: Incident for which Lt. McNamara Won the VC, by H. 
Septimus Power. 
Source: Australian War Memorial Collections Database. 
cas.awm.gov.au. Painting ART08007. 
COURAGEOUS AIRMAN'S FEAT 
The margin between freedom and capture for two Australian 
airmen was literally a matter of seconds. The two concerned were 
Lieutenant F.H. McNamara and Captain O.W. Rutherford, ofNo. l 
Squadron, AFC. 
On the 20th of [March 1917], while returned from [a] raid, heavy 
anti-aircraft fire was encountered. Rutherford's machine was hit, 
and he was forced to land in enemy territory, at no great distance 
from some Turkish cavalry, which immediately bore down on him 
at full gallop. McNamara, though himself seriously wounded in the 
54 Relics and Records, September 1922. p.29; April 1928, p.36; December 1931 , p.37. 
;s See Robert H. MacDonald, " Reproducing the Middle-class Boy: From purity to patriotism in the 
Boy's Magazines, 1892-1914," Journal ~[Contemporary History, 24,3 (1989), pp.519-39. On Chums, 
see MacDonald, The Language of Empire, pp.99-104. 
288 
thigh , without hesitation dropped to the rescue of hi s comrade, 
landing about 200 yards fi·om the damaged 'p lane. Rutherford 
promptly climbed into the machine, but McNamara now found 
himself handicapped by his damaged leg, and in attempting to take 
off again he crashed his 'plane badly. Meanwhile the enemy 
horsemen were rapidly drawing nearer. The two Australians, 
however, were full of resource and pluck, and determined to make 
a strong bid for liberty. Hurriedly extricating themselves they set 
fire to tl1e machine, and made the best pace they could to 
Rutherford's. Luckily they succeeded in starting the engine, and, in 
spite of some damage to the struts and fuselage, McNamara flew 
the machine back to the Australian aerodrome, a distance of 
seventy miles, with Rutherford as passenger. For this courageous 
action McNamara was awarded the V.C?' 
This was a truly remarkable escape, with more than a touch of romance about it, 
reminiscent of nineteenth-century mi litary tales of dening-do.57 The display itself was 
one of the most "traditional " of all representations in the Memorial, telling audiences 
of the continuing excitement and friendship seen in war, thus transcending its danger. 
The largest part of the danger of the battlefie ld was caused by a11illery, and 
th is pre-eminent fact of the Western Front was treated in several ways, all designed to 
acknowledge yet sublimate and transcend its shattering truth, with the prevail ing 
social Darwinist ideology to the fore. 58 In his diary Bean had written of an "insatiable 
factory of ghastly wounds," where each shell brought "a promise to each man, 
instantaneous: I wi ll tear you into ghastly wounds, 1 wi ll rend your flesh and pulp an 
arm or a leg, fling you half a gaping quivering man (like these that you see smashed 
around you one by one) to lie there rotting and blackening like all the things you saw 
by the awful roadside, or 1n that sickening dusty crater. "59 Bean was in awe of anyone 
who could simply abide in the hell of bombardments, but reali ties such as these were 
not for the Memorial. Sti ll, this overriding fact of AIF existence had to be 
acknowledged, not least so that the public would better appreciate the magnitude of 
56 Australian Chivalry, Plate 19. 
57 This display speaks to the entertainment role oft he Memorial, having neither the tone nor the content 
of an architectural war memorial of any kind, anywhere. 
SR f 0 all the dangers and horrors of the war, the bombardments had had the greatest and most long-
lasting impact on the sensibilities of the men who had fought in the trenches. See Gammage. The 
Broken Years, pp.l58, 161,168, 186; Thomson, Anzac ,\!Jemories, pp.95-6: Andrews. Anzac Illusion , 
p.98. 
59 Bean Diary 4 August 19 16, in Bean. Making !he Legend, pp. 1 00-1. 
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the Anzac achievement as he saw it. His answer for public consumption during the 
war and into the inter-war period was to describe the effects of the guns on the earth, 
first and foremost, and on inanimate objects such as buildings or other guns. 
The destruction of the earth was shown through image, word and object. 
Throughout the period, the following stark pictorial example hung in Memorial 
displays: 
Figure 51: "Once a Beautiful Wood." 
Source: Australian War Memorial Collections Database. 
cas.awm.gov.au. Photograph E01220. 
The caption stated simply that the picture showed "Australians passmg along a 
duck board track through the devastated Chateau Wood during the fighting for 
Passchendaele."60 This image added to the Memorial's object display, which, Bean 
informed visitors in his guide, contained physical evidence of the destructiveness of 
the guns: 
Near the comer of the case are fragments shovelled at random 
from the site of the village of Pozieres, showing the condition to 
which the whole area was reduced -literally a desert of hummocks 
and hollows. Portions of a house, tree and tile can be seen in the 
heap. It is doubtful if any village was more completely destroyed 
than this one, it being almost the only hamlet in which there were 
no bricks left even to mend the roads with when the battle ended. 
60 Sydney Photograph 187. Relics and Records, April J 928, p.88; December 1931 , p.89. 
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Portion of the rai lway hne taken from near Pozieres Copse bears 
evidence of the fury of the same bombardment.6 1 
The display was more than a mere verbal description; it contai ned physical evidence 
of the bombardments, and thus intensified their reality for visitors. They were once 
more brought close to the "truth of the war," but spared the trul y gruesome realities. 
The bombardments were sublimated through the sale in Sydney of "Souvenirs 
from the Battlefields" - Gennan shell cases which had been made into various 
decorati ve items, such as vases.h1 This continued the Memorial's ''national" work, for 
in transfonning these objects associated with death and maiming into decorative home 
ornaments, the Mem01ial was allowing people to symbolically conquer them , and 
brisk sales suggest that many Australians appreciated being able to s tti ke a blow -
however post factum and purely symbolic - against the Teutonic barbarians .63 The 
women's magazine Society gave the practice its approva l in May 1925 in an article 
entitled "The War Museum From a Woman 's Perspective," which noted that "German 
howitzer shells that hurled death at the British Annies have been converted into 
handsome and durable j ardinieres."64 The sale of these items was another turn away 
from the political elements of truth-te lling, yet retained the strong sense of national 
service that pervaded the Memorial project. These objects might help Australians deal 
with their loss and grief, and the nation wou ld be stronger as a result.65 This was one 
of the main reasons for the Memorial's wide popular support - it served people's 
61 Relics and Records, April 1928. p.2 1, December 193 1, p.24. Bean was following a practice he had 
developed as a correspondenl. concentrating on the suffering of the earth. with not a man to be seen: 
"Imagine a gigantic ash heap, a place where dust and rubbish have been cast for years outside some 
dry, derel ict, God-forsaken up-country township. Imagine some broken-down creek bed in the dliest of 
our dry central Austral ian distlicts, abandoned for a genera1ion to the goats. in which the hens have 
been scratching as long as men can remember. Then take away the hens and the goats and all traces of 
any living or moving thing. You must not even leave a spider. Put there. in evidence of some old 
tumbled roof. a few roof beams and ti les sticking edgeways from the ground. and the low faded ochre 
stump of the wi ndmill peeping over the top of the hil l, and there you have Poziercs." Bean. Letters 
from France. pp.l 13-14. 
61 See the advertisements in Relics and Records, Apri l 1928, pp.53 -4: December 1931, p.54. 
6
' Mark Clayton points out that the large number of trophies displayed in public spaces in Australia in 
the early post-war years served the same purpose. Clayton. "To the Victor,'' Part 3. pp.3-26. 
64 A WM 265 17/2/3. 
65 This "war kitsch," and the "process of tri vialisation" has been examined in relation to Germany by 
George Mosse in Fallen Soldiers, pp. l26-56. See also the pictorial evidence in Barbara Jones and Bill 
Howell , Popular Arts of the First World War, (New York: McGraw-Hill. 1972) 
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needs. as Mc Kernan has pointed out in re lation to the provision of infom1ation to the 
bereaved about the action in which their loved one was killed. 
Other displays asserted that the bombardments had in fac t had a positive side, 
111 that they had tested the "race" and not found it wanting. For example, Bean's 
commentary for Frank Crozier's painting Sausage Valley (an area on the Somme 
battlefield), which hung in the 1916-17 court, put the idea succinctly: "Before the war, 
flower-decked fields surrounded the peaceful village [Poz ieres] where Australia 's 
sons proved their worth under the searching test of war."66 Bean believed in the 
notion of war as test of character in the early 1920s, and he had many like-minded 
compatriots. The apocalyptic tum of mind observable in Australians in the early years 
of the century, manifest in fears of Asian invasion and the inevitability of race war, 
had not disappeared, and here Bean appealed to it. Bean's ultimate question for the 
Hist01y, which demonstrably pervaded the Memorial as well, was "How did the 
Australian people - and the Australian character, if there is one - come through the 
uni versally recogn ised test of this, their first great war?" As Joan Beaumont points 
out, " his answer predictably was that they excelled themselves," and such excellence 
was never more evident than when they were under fire.67 The idea that war was the 
greatest test of national character was an efficient way to find positives in negatives, 
and thus could be used to justify huge loss oflife.68 The influence of the idea, though, 
was predicated on an acceptance of the notion that the cause in whose name the test 
was undergone was sufficiently just and righteous. This was one of the strongest 
connections between commemorative institutions such as the Memorial and fonnal 
politics in Australia, for as the peace won in 1918 became more perilous the "test" 
was called into question. 
As images in public discourse, those of wounded men were much more hazardous 
from a political point of view than those simply showing men in danger. Those who 
had been wounded had often suffered in appalling ways, and the Memorial's visitors 
could see permanently disabled returned servicemen in the streets every day. To 
~,~, Relics all(/ Records, September 1922. p. 18. 
<•J Beaumont, "The Anzac Legend." p. l52. 
6x Bean's question itself. of course. had a denial of the anti-war position built deeply into it. for if war 
constituted a test. it could not be pointless or dehumanising, but rather affi rming of the virility of the 
··race." 
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depict the wounded was to invite the chain of logic put together by Erich Maria 
Remarque, which begins with a catalogue of the horrors of a hospital and becomes a 
bitter indictment of the war and the civilisation that produced it: 
Two fellows die of tetanus. Their skin turns pale, their limbs 
stiffen, at last only their eyes live - stubbornly. Many of the 
wounded have their shattered limbs hanging free in the air from a 
gallows: underneath the wound a basin is placed into which d1ips 
the pus. Every two or three hours the vessel is emptied. Other 
men lie in stretching bandages with heavy weights hanging from 
the end of the bed. I see intestine wounds that are constantly fu ll 
of excreta. The surgeon's clerk shows me X-ray photographs of 
completely smashed up hip-bones, knees and shoulders. 
A man cannot realise that above such shattered bodies there are 
still human faces in which life goes its daily round. And this is 
only one hospital, one single station; there are hundreds of 
thousands in Gem1any, hundreds of thousands in France, 
hundreds of thousands in Russia. How senseless is everything 
that can ever be written, done, or thought, when such things are 
possible. It must all be lies and of no account when the culture of 
a thousand years cou ld not prevent this stream of blood being 
poured o ut, these torture-chambers in their hundreds of 
thousands.69 
When local leftist newspaper the Australian Worker attacked the Memorial, it was on 
similar grounds. The paper sardonically insisted that "en larged pictures of all war 
diseases" and '"surgical instruments, as used, should fill a number of cases - all shown 
with fresh blood and fragments of bone to give a vivid idea of their part in the general 
glory."70 The political currency of this opposition to the Memorial was made clear by 
the jeer that "a few live specimens of more seriously crippled veterans could pose in 
the centre of the room, and hold out their military hats for coppers."71 The returned 
men had been left to fend for themselves after the war, the Worker claimed, as they 
had been mutilated by uncaring quacks during it. Displaying images of the treatment 
of the wounded during the war would remind audiences of the poignant circumstances 
of some returned men, bringing the Memorial onto the Worker's rhetorical ground. It 
was a dangerous practice from the point of view of "emotional'' nation-building. 
69 Remarque, All Quiet on the Wes1ern Front, pp.l72-3. 
70 The Australian Worker, 8 Apri l 1925, p.9. 
71 The Australian Worker, 8 April 1925, p.9. 
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Neverthe less. Bean and Treloar had the comage and integrity to display the wounded 
. 'fi d l' to a s1gm tcant egree. -
Unsurprisingly. the Memorial rejected the Worker 's vision of the wounded, 
arguing that dUJing the war the men had not been abandoned nor butchered, but taken 
care of with tender professionalism within the national medical system. One caption 
reminded visitors that victory had been the reward for the sacrifices, a fair 
demonstration of the feelings of Bean, Treloar, Pearce and Gullett, who all rejected 
Remarque 's logic outright as well. While far from unmoved by the slaughter, they 
felt, at least in 1922, that the victory had been worth the cost. The nation had secured 
immediate physical security within the Empire, and it had revealed the character of its 
men, which augured wel l for the future , turbulent as that looked?) Further, Neville 
Howse, the AIF' s Chief Medical Officer, was also a significant member of the 
A WMC. being one of the main advocates for the museum at the Public Works 
Committee, as he was Chaim1an at the time. 74 It seems inconceivable that an 
institution governed by such an officer would attack his system of medical assistance. 
In addition, the British handling - or more accurately, mishandling - of medical 
arrangements at the Gallipoli landing had been a major scandal within the Australian 
officer corps and political leadership. This had led to one of the first assertions of 
Australian identity within the British Anny system and Empire, and the resu ltant 
Australian system was a source of pride. 75 Lastly, the Memorial was committed to the 
Australian State and the Imperially-loyal, right-wing nationalist ideology that was 
consolidating its grip upon that State in 1922, and thus never sought to impatt 
Remarque's dangerous understanding of the past to its audience, but rather to fend off 
any such suggestion. 
?J For example. ten out of 174 photographic prints in Melbourne were of the wounded. 
n It is a measure of the depth of the nationalist response to the war that nationalism was able to 
override the deaths of 60.000 men in the hearts of sensitive men who had seen the slaughter at close 
range. 
74 Howse summed up his own attitude to the war when in 1926 he told an Anzac Day gatheri ng that the 
AIF had won " li fe . liberty and justice. and without those blessings their lives would be worse than 
death." Quoted in Inglis, Sacred Places. p.217. 
75 Howse told the Dardanelles Commission in January 1916 that "I personally will recommend my 
Government when this war is over, that under no conceivable circumstances ought they ever to trust to 
the medical arrangements that may be made by Imperial authorities. for the care of their sick and 
wounded." Quoted in Andrews. Anzac 111usion, p.54. 
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The Memorial's treatment of the wounded corresponded with that of the 
Histmy. Ken Inglis points out that in The Story ofAnzac /, "the reader is given no 
help ... to imagine what bullets, shrapnel and bayonets do to flesh and b lood and bone; 
and the only photograph of wounded men shows them in need of a helping hand , but 
whole."76 The Memorial followed a si milar strategy. No Austral ians were shown, 
either in picture or word. as other than out of harm 's way, calm and relaxed , taken 
care of by their mates and the army, in whom they have placed their trust. 
Images of the wounded in the photographic exhibition followed the evacuation 
of soldiers from the battlefield through several medical posts. There was also a 
diorama, installed in 1924, showing the evacuation of wounded. 77 The joumey 
depicted was one of increasing safety and control within a system of professional 
care. Although some of the images included confronting locations, they never showed 
men in need of more than a helping hand, and indeed, the helping hand was always 
there. The dedication, courage and professionalism of the medical personnel were 
consistently praised. All the Aid Posts and other medical facilities were shown as 
calm, healing places, in which caring staff tenderly and professionally ministered to 
the wounded. This contrasted sharply with Remarque, whose narrator tel ls of his 
determination not to put his trust in his doctors when he is wounded: 
In the evening we are hauled on to the chopping-block. 1 am 
frightened and think quickly what I ought to do: for everyone 
knows that the surgeons in the dressing stations amputate on the 
slightest provocation. Under the weat business that is much 
simpler than compl icated patching. I think of Kemmerich. 
Whatever happens I will not let them chloroform me, even if I 
have to crack a couple of their sku lis. 78 
76 Inglis, Introduction to University of Queensland Press edition of C. E. W. Bean, The Sto,;~ · o( Anzac I, 
p.xxxv. 
77 Press Release. December 1924. A WM 93 20/ 1/1 A. 
7~ Remarque. All Quiet on the Western FronT, p.159. Kemmerich. a soldier from Baumer's platoon, dies 
in the fi rst scene of the book, described in searing detail : ··we look at his bed covering. His leg lies 
under a wire basket. The bed covering arches over it. I kick Muller on the shin, for he is just about to 
te ll Kemmerich what the orderlies told us outside: that Kemmerich has lost his foot. The leg is 
amputated. He looks ghastly, ye llow and wan. In his face there are already strained lines that we know 
so well , we have seen them now hundreds of times. They arc not so much li nes as marks. Under the 
skin the life no longer pulses, it has already pressed out the boundaries of the body. Death is working 
through from within. It already has command in the eyes. Here lies our comrade, Kemmerich, who a 
little while ago was roasting horse flesh with us and squatting in the shell-holes. He it is still and yet it 
is not he any longer. Hi s features have become uncertai n and faint, like a photographic plate from 
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Refuting this vision of the medical realities of the war, the Memorial presented the 
medical organisation of the AIF as well-staffed, clean and efficient. Nothing 
exemplified this more than the following photograph of a casualty clearing station: 
Figure 52: "A Field Operating Theatre." 
Source: Australian War Memorial Collections Database. 
cas.awm.gov.au. Photograph EO 1304.79 
Even an image which was visually confronting, showing men lying in stretchers in a 
desolate landscape on the Western Front, had its impact softened by its caption: 
which two pictures have been taken. Even his voice sounds like ashes." Remarque, All Quiet on the 
Western Front, p.l5. 
79 Melbourne Photograph 84; Sydney Photograph 170. Relics and Records, September 1922, p. 76; 
April1928, 95: December 1931 , p.96. 
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Figure 53: "An R.A.P." 
Source: Australian War Memorial Collections Database. 
cas.awm.gov .au. Photograph EO 1202 _ 2. 
AN R.A.P. 
An advanced aid post in a pill-box, near Zonnebeke Station, 
to which the wounded were carried from the Battle of 
Passchendaele on l21h October, 1917. The captured pill-boxes 
made admirable shelters for the wounded.80 
The first stage of the medical chain, the evacuation of the wounded from the 
battlefield, was depicted through a very confronting display showing conditions so 
bad as to leave no doubt in the viewer's mind that the war had been a terrible ordeal. 
However, the caption defended the Australian troops, if not the powers-that-were, for 
they had done their duty as ordered: 
80 Melbourne Photograph 59; Sydney Photograph 175. Relics and Records, September I 922, p. 73: 
April 1928, p.96; December 1931, p.97. The photograph was title "The R.A.P." in Sydney. 
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Figure 54 "A Flanders Battlefield." 
Source: Australian War Memorial Collections Database. 
cas.awm.gov.au. Photograph E0I l23P. 
A .FLANDERS BATTLEFIELD 
Stretcher-bearers coming back with wounded, and troops 
moving up to the front line over a duckboard track running 
across Anzac Ridge, near Garter Point, in the Ypres Sector, 
on the lOth October, 1917, when the attack upon the enemy's 
position was being pressed, in spite of adverse weather 
conditions prevailing and stubborn resistance by the 
enemy.81 
This is the clearest criticism in the Memorial of the widespread practice of continuing 
attacks in impossible conditions, something which Bean especially detested, and 
criticised in the History. This representation was a sharp rebuke to those unnamed 
officers who had ordered an attack in these conditions; the result could be seen starkly 
here. This was no mere Wine of Victory, no mere work of imagination.82 Rather, it 
was something much more damning - a true representation of the wounded 
themselves. 83 At the same time, it was a passionate and proud avowal of the 
determination and courage of the troops in attacking regard1ess of the conditions, and 
above all an affirmation of the work of the stretcher-bearers. The viewer was invited 
st Melbourne Photograph 53; Sydney Photograph 144. Relics and Records, September 1922, p.72; 
April l 928, p.90; December 1931, p.91. 
R2 The Wine of Vict01y is the title of a famous drawing by Will Dyson showing Gennan prisoners, 
wounded and defeated, staggering to the rear. It has a great deal of sympathy for its subjects. 
~ ! Bean stated that the dioramas had to represent actua I situations so that visitors would feel that the 
"War Memorial is giving him the truth from which he can form his own impressions." C.E.W. Bean to 
John Treloar, 10 November 1937. AWM 93 13/1/37. As powerful as Dyson's painting The Wine of 
Vic!OIJI was, its status as art meant that it might simply depict the front as the artist would like people to 
think it was, as Bean had warned Treloar in the same letter. This photograph had no such defects. 
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to applaud the devotion and courage of these medics in going out in such conditions 
to fetch in men from the muddy. waterlogged hollows. It is clear from the conditions 
that any badly wounded man left on his own would likely drown. and thus the life-
saving work of the stretcher-bearers, as well as the dangers which they had faced. 
were clearly perceptible. These ideas were developed more fully in Australian 
Chivalry: 
Figure 55: Stretcher Bearers, by H. Septimus Power. 
Source: Australian War Memorial Collections Database. 
cas.awm.gov.au. Painting ART03645. 
SONS OFCHLYALRY 
During the long course of the war, from the day of the Landing until 
the Armistice, the Australian stretcher-bearers pursued with superb 
heroism their errands of mercy, and their utter disregard for personal 
safety won for them the confidence and unstinted admiration of the 
fighting services .... The honest fire could not stop them, and on 
more than one occasion (as Mr Power has shown in his painting) 
they were known to have rested the stretcher on the ground while 
with their own bodies they sheltered the stricken soldier lying on it.R* 
In thus utilising an Imperial motif, the medic as hero, the Memorial was 
simultaneously eulogising the stretcher-bearers and defending Howse's medical 
system. 
34 Ausrra/ian Chivalry, Plate 37. The painting was first hung in Melbourne in March 1924. See Press 
Release 2 April 1924. AWM 93 20/ 1/ IA. 
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Other images of casualties had captions seeking to redeem the situations 
through positive exclamations. In one example, the redemption surrounded the power 
to act. This was a shot of men lying on the side of the Men in Road, having made it off 
the battlefield. The sense of desolation and helplessness of the photograph is very 
striking, but there are no really badly injured men depicted, and some retained the 
abi lity to take action: 
Figure 56: "On the Menin Road, ear Hooge.'' 
Source: Australian War Memorial Collections Database. 
cas.awm.gov.au. Photograph E00711. 
ON THE MENIN ROAD, NEAR HOOGE 
A scene on th e Menin Road , near Hooge, lookin g towards 
Birr C r oss Roads, durin g the battle on 20'" September , 19 17. 
T he wound ed on the stretchers ar e waiting to be taken to the 
clea rin g station; oth ers able to walk are ma kin g th eir way 
a long the road as far as possible.85 
In fac t, the caption suggested, some of these men are not rea lly victims: they walk as 
far as they can, they do not need help. At the same time, the stoicism and endurance 
of the wounded was affirmed, as those in the stretchers wait patiently to be taken care 
of by their mates. The mediation of the image by the label is considerable, for this 
image has since become an icon of anti-war literature, seen as symbolic of the 
~· Melbourne Photograph 61: Sydney Photograph 133. Relics and Record.1·, September 1922, p.73; 
April 1928, p.87: December 1931 , p.88. 
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disorganisation endemic on the Western Front. Here Bean was res isting irony (which 
many historians and literary critics insist was the natural response to the war). He 
disliked modernist art, and thus held the line against it. 
Even in depictions of Australian casualties the message of Australian military 
supremacy could be promoted. The photograph of Kandahar Farm Dressing Station 
near Messines combined reassurance about the wounded with an attack on the 
Germans, who, the caption asserted, had petulantly resorted to the material when 
beaten in the trenches man-to-man: "The Australian casualties for the battle [of 
Messines] and the remainder of the month were 8,999, but the majority occuned after 
the capture of the position when the Gennans deluged the whole area with high 
explosive and shrapne l shells.''86 Audiences who might feel angry at the sight of so 
many of their men lying low knew who to blame - the unsporting "Hun" who had 
resorted to artillery to punish those who had beaten him. 
Another display took the invocation of success further, offering the sma ll 
advance at the Battle of Menin Road as compensation for its casualties, for "on this 
day [201h September, 1917] the I 51 and 2"d Australian and some British divisions made 
a notable advance, in the course of which were wounded the men receiving treatment 
in this dressing station."87 According to this display, casua lties were a stem necessity 
of such an advance, but were taken care of as well as they could possibly be. The 
national medical system dealt efficiently with the inevitable casualties of the 
successful advance. Wounds were thus depicted, and depoliticised, but the argument 
was predicated largely on the notion that the cause of the war had been just. The 
national medical system was defended, and social unity promoted through the 
reassurance that the powers-that-were had the people's best interests at heart. 
The guns killed many, but according to the Memorial did not always conq uer 
them. Death, of course, was the key image of the whole Memorial , for the Institution 
was publicly dedicated to the memory of the dead. There were a range of 
representations directly dealing with death, and they help illustrate the parameters of 
the Memorial' s commemorative scheme. A small number of displays were pervaded 
~6 Melbourne Photograph 52: Sydney Photograph 127. Relics and Records, September 1922. p.72; 
April I 928. p.85; December I 93 I , p.86. The Flanders plan model label agreed. Sec Treloar to Bean 15 
May I 922. A 7702 566 0031005. 
87 Melbourne Photograph 71; Sydney Photograph 160. Relics and Records, September 1922, p.74; 
April I 928, p.93; December 193 1, p.94. 
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with sadness and 1rony, indicating that the anti-war position did have a measure of 
mflucnce on the Memorial. sma ll and deeply subordinated as it was. More prominent 
displays showed the Australian dead in terms of sacrifice for the good of others, or 
sacrifice for victory. The former was a subset of the latter, for both were subsumed 
within the Memorial 's narrative and its logic of test, ordeal and triumph. Of course, 
large numbers of deaths were part of the ordeal the A IF had endured, and the structure 
of these displays reflected that idea. Sacrifice for the good of others showed the ordeal 
as it was being undergone, while the more triumphal sacrifice for victory offered the 
sweetness of triumph in a terrible struggle, rather than simply respected martial 
virtues, as recompense. 
Discussions of death were also pervaded by sadness. There were a small 
number of displays of an intense and poignant melancholy in the Memorial , and 
reviews suggest these resonated with visitors. One of the most poignant displays was 
a message from a Gallipoli signaller, cut off in mid-sentence by the death of the 
author. Another message, written by Major Qui 1m at the then unnamed Quinn's Post 
"where he afterwards lost his life," brought visitors in direct contact with a famous 
national martyr.H8 This sadness, seldom seen in the triumphal displays examined in 
Chapters Four and Five, connected the museum emotionally wi th the large number of 
its visitors who were bereaved. Again here the museum did "national" work: this was, 
perhaps. "national" sadness. Sadness was not the main emotion offered, however, for 
the Memorial was dedicated to "a praise that never ages:' and it was reverence, not 
sorrow, which the Memorial was attempting to elicit. 
Irony, the fundamental ''modernist" rhetorical mode, was rare in the 
Memorial, and thus striking when it was observable. Bean recounted a story in his 
gu ides of two unlucky Australian airmen who died when a bullet "passed through the 
lungs of one and lodged in the other's heart.''8<) The two airmen were killed, yet their 
plane continued to fly straight and level until its fuel ran out, whereupon it landed 
quite safely. It was only then that the death of the men was discovered.90 As with 
other negative stories, this was told in a matter-of-fact manner, left undeveloped. 
" Relic·s unci Records. September 1922. p.l4. 
'Q Relic~ and Record!>. September 1922. p.23: April 192S, p.25; December 1931, p.27 . 
. ,., . 
Relics and Records. September 1922. p.23: April 1921<. p.25; December 193 I, p.27. 
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The Light Horsemen at the Nek were the archetypal example of soldiers 
sacrificing themselves for their comrades and their nation. Austrulian Chivalry 
declared that the men ··gallantly went forward rather than risk letting down their 
comrades engaged in other parts of the linc.''91 They were transfonned under this 
logic into national martyrs. embodying the greatest idea ls of martial nationalism. 
They were shown, not as "half a gaping quivering man." but as heroic waJTiors, fallen 
on the field of honour. It is notabl e, and somewhat ominous, that the unquestioning 
discipline of the third and fou11h waves in going into certain death was yoked to this 
nationalist message. 
Sacrifice for victory was the key image of the whole Memorial , summaris ing 
its method of commemoration and underlining once more its "traditional" nature. 
Alan Borg points out that depictions of the death of heroes were a relatively late 
development in Western commemorative discourse, begitming only in the eighteenth 
century, but confinns that the emphasis was on victory: 
It was of course essential, if the hero was to remain (or become) 
a hero, that he should die in triumph, the battle won. The moral 
of history must remain and the hero's li fe could not be seen to 
have been pointless or wasted. Thus, in those cases where the 
hero does stand alone, the battle lost, the viewer knows from 
subsequent history that defeat was to turn into victory.92 
This is precisely the manner in which the Memorial operated. 
The fus ion of death and victory was explicitly made 111 representations 
surrounding the painting of an incident at Polygon Wood in 1917, in which Lieutenant 
John Tumour risked and sacrificed his life so that his section might overcome an 
obstacle that threatened to hold up the Australian advance. The painting itself does not 
depict any clear success. Jn fact, it would be a si mple matter to read the image as 
depicting sacrifice alone, or even futility and foolishness, as the officer's comrade 
appears to be attempting to prevent his suicidal advance across the open. However, 
the men on each flank advance with deliberate intent, raisi ng the ma11ial element of 
the image. Further, in his guide of April 1928 Bean made it plain that this was an 
image of victory, and highlighted the role ofTumour in securing it: 
91 Aus/ra/ian Chivalry, Plate 14. 
92 Borg. War Memorials. p.47. 
303 
Figure 57: Australian Infantry Attack in Polygon Wood, by 
Frederick Leist. 
Source: Australian War Memorial Collections Database. 
cas.awm.gov.au. Painting ART02927.93 
F. Leist's "Attacking a Pill-box'' depicts an incident which took 
place during the fighting at Polygon Wood, when a platoon of the 
57th Battalion commanded by Lieut. Tumour was held up by a 
machine gun in a pill-box. Tumour divided his men in two parties, 
and sent them round either flank while he drew the machine 
gunner's fi re upon himself. He was killed, but his men were able 
by his sacrifice to capture the pill-box.94 
Tumour is depicted as victorious in death, and his behaviour provides the most public 
of examples to future generations of how an Australian man should act. The image of 
him risking his life, choosing to carry out the most dangerous aspect of the attack 
himself so that the attack m ight succeed, and thus putting the cause above his own 
safety, was in fact an archetypal materialisation of the ideal of leadership which Bean 
had cherished from his school days.95 Here was true remembrance in the Bean style: 
although Tumour had been killed, he was remembered as a victor and a role model in 
the national war memorial. In this way, he lived on, or at least, as the motto promised, 
his fame did. Future generations would know his name and his deeds, boys yet unborn 
would look upon the painting with awe. If they then decided, as Bean put it in In Your 
93 The names of many paintings given in Bean's guides are different to those now listed in the 
Australian War Memorial Collections Database. I have used the latter for figure identifi cation. 
94 Relics and Records, April 1928, p.27. This action was also made into a technical diorama, without 
the death of Lieutenant Tumour, the label text of which, re-written in February 1932, is at A WM 93 
13/ 1/37. 
95 The Memorial "s attitude to Australian officers was exemplified by a press release of 18 December 
1923: "Probably the Company officers were more responsible than any other section of the AIF for its 
splendid record of achievement." A WM 93 201111 A. 
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Hands, to dedicate their lives to their country in the spirit that Tumour had given his, 
Australia would be the better for it. Thus the officer, honoured in the telli ng of his 
tale, would continue to give to his nation. It was in such ways that the Memorial 
fulfilled Bean's promises to honour the men while insp iring future generations to 
unselfish dedication to the nation. Again '"nationa l" work was being undertaken. In 
fact, by providing such close-up images of named individuals sacrificing themselves 
for their cause, personalising and dramatising these notions, the Memorial performed 
several nationalist services. It flattered the national ego, for, as Archbishop Weddy 
stated in a dramatic Anzac Day sennon in 1922, the nation had created such men; it 
provided role models of ideal citizenship for later generations to follow, and it 
promoted the integrity of the nation-state by buttressing the cause and the State in 
whose name the war wa.s fought and such sacrifices made96 
The image of a named so ldier laying down his life so that victory might be 
obtained had both cultural and political connections. The trope had enjoyed wide 
popularity in British martial nationalist tradition. In so dying victoriously, Tumour 
upheld what Robert MacDonald calls an Imperial "Deed of Glory,'' specifically, The 
Sacri/icial Death , the type specimen of which he gives as an action from the Indian 
Mutiny.97 The most famous example, though, was Admiral Nelson, who was 
consistently depicted as a dying conqueror. In terms of Australian inter-war politics, 
victory had been the stated goal of the Nationalists and other loyalist groups, and 
when it came it was claimed as the justification for all the pain and loss of the war. 
The conflict was still conceived in the 1920s by loyalists as having been a vi tal 
national struggle for existence, or at least for the ex istence of the British Empire, 
which amounted to the same thing. Death which brought victory in such a struggle 
closer was therefore the most glorious possible death. The Memoria l strongly 
endorsed this position. All of the leaders of the Memorial had been conscriptionists, 
and many adhered to a victory-at-any-cost position. 
96 The Archbishop had declared: "[The war] was the first great test of these young nations [Australia 
and New Zealand], and showed that they were not afraid. and were not going to run away from the 
tasks set before them. It gave them confidence to look forwa rd to the future . They were ready to face 
the future because they proudly felt that the countries that bred the men who faced the test of Gallipoli 
would be able to breed men to face any test God put before them." Argus, 27 April 1922, p 7. 
97 MacDonald, The Language of Empire, p.90: "Lieutenants Sal keld and Home lead the powder-party 
to blow up the Cashmere Gate at Delhi: they die in the attempt, but the gate is breached; 1857." 
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Crosses served two important symbolic purposes in the MemoriaL Firstly, 
there was the Will Dyson drawing adopted in 1928 as the new cover image for Bean's 
guides. Superficially at least, the difference with its predecessor could hardly have 
been greater: 
Figure 58: The mate (In memory of W .. , Machine Gun Company, 
Messines Ridge}, by Will Dyson. 
Source: Australian War Memorial Collections Database. 
cas.awm.gov.au. Painting ART02231. 
Dyson's The Mate indicated a change in direction for the Memorial's "introductory" 
message, from asserting the Digger's prowess to symbolising the nation's reverence 
for the dead. As we have seen, though, this was not accompanied by a change in the 
triumphalism seen in many displays.98 The drawing symbolised reverence, and was 
entirely compatible with triumphalism, and indeed the Memorial did more for its 
"mates" than Dyson's - it recorded their names, yes, but it also recounted their deeds, 
showing them as triumphant in life and, like Tumour, as victorious in death. 
Secondly, and simultaneously, the fusion of triumph and death could be seen in the 
use of crosses as symbols of victory rather than of death or remembrance alone: 
98 Although Bean's favourite artist, Dyson did not play a prominent role in the Melbowne exhibitions. 
Bean only mentioned Dyson in 1922 in relation to the amusing drawing The Barber: ''Who's cutting 
this hair, me or you?" asks the distinctly amateur barber of his unhappy customer. The drawing was 
part of the Memorial's display of"Humour of the AlF." Relics and Records, September 1922, p.34. 
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ERECTED TO T HE MEMORY OF SOME OF THE MEN 
OF THE TWENTY FIRST KILLED I N THE CAPTURE OF 
MONT ST QUENTIN 
At 1:30 p.m on the I sr September after half an hour's 
hurricane bombardment of the hill top, the 21 st Battalion re-
inforced the fighting line, and with the 23rd and 24111 
Battalions completed the capture of the position. The 21 st 
Battalion a lone captured 58 machine guns. This will suggest 
the number of guns the Huns employed in the defence of the 
hill. Between the 31st August and the 41h September the 
battalion lost 23 killed and 79 wounded. This cross was 
erected to some of the fallen and later was replaced by one of 
a more permanent nature?> 
Once again victory was the ultimate justification for casualties. 
There was only one representation that appeared to represent a dead 
Australian, and this very fact demands its being examined. It was a strange 
representation, being both a searing illustration of the cost of war and one of the 
strongest examples of the substitution of success for son ow or criticism in the 
representation of death. The photograph itself is extremely confronting and disturbing, 
clearly showing two dead men, and had a caption insisting that A ustralians had passed 
through the area depicted just before the image was taken. They are thus probably 
Australians, and if so are the only two dead Australians in the photographic 
exhibi tion. If one simply looks at the photograph, the loss, sadness, and futil ity of war 
are immediately apparent. 
99 
"Erected to the Memory of Some of the Men of the Twenty First Killed in the Capture of Mont St 
Quentin." Attachment, Bain to Treloar 28 December 1932. A WM 265 2 1/4/5, Part 7. 
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Figure 59: "The Gap in the Wire." 
Source : Australian War Memorial Collections Database. 
cas.awm.gov.au. Photograph E03 149. 
However, the caption does not even men6on the men, and instead speaks of 
advancing, albeit under fire, and then turns its attention elsewhere: 
A photograph, taken a t Anvil Wood, near Peronne, in 
France, on September 2, 191 8, showing the gap in the tan gled 
wire through which some of the 53rd Battalion advanced the 
day before, in the face of heavy machine-gun fire. In the 
background a shell is bursting over an old casualty clearing 
station, near Quinconce, between Peronne and Mont St 
Q uen tin .100 
As confron ti ng as the photograph is, there is no mention of the bodies of the men. The 
elements of sadness and loss, so clear in the image, were all but ignored in the 
caption. The facts are blandly stated but left to speak for themselves, while an 
advance is mentioned: the Austral ians forged ahead once more on 2 September 19 18. 
The very display of such an image indicates that the "modem memory" dedication to 
showing the cost of war in fl uenced the Memorial, as Peter Stanley argues it did.101 
However, the entire representation, caption and all, indicates the severe limitations, 
particularly of selection, which the martial nationa list desire to perceive success 
100 Melbourne Photograph 124: Sydney Photograph 200. Relics and Records, September 1922, p.84: 
April 1928. p. l 0 I; December 193 1, p.l 02. 
101 Slanlcy. ··Gall ipoli and Pozieres." ' 
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placed upon the Memorial's use ofthat realism. Sti ll , it remains an odd representation, 
taking an overtly anti-war image and entirely ignoring its most significant feature, the 
dead Australians. This was not a justification, but an acknowledgement of realities 
utterly undeveloped, and thus depoliticised. 
All the "realities of war'' examined in this chapter were subl imated to a 
considerable degree by their placement within the national war history and its 
triumphal narrative. Further, the depiction of many of the realities, especiall y the 
appalling conditions on the Westem front, enhanced rather than detracted from the 
national story, for it enabled the Memorial to emphasise endurance and other martial 
virtues. Overall, the Memorial's treatment of its selected realities of war gave the 
impression whenever possible that, despite the dangers of the battlefield, the 
Australians were generally in control of what was happening on it. With the 
Memorial's national war history s imultaneously asse11ing that the Alf had overcome 
all obstacles, the overall suggestion was that the experience of the war for Australian 
soldiers was generally positive, despite considerable dangers and discomforts. 
In many representations of defeat, death and other realities, war was shown as 
a stem necessity, in which men were killed and wounded, but which sti ll retained 
honour and nobility. Endurance, stoicism, sacrifice to one' s duty - these were the 
vi1iues of traditional military heroes. Ultimately, the ability to "die well'' was 
considered the very essence of gentlemanly behaviour. These issues could be and 
were dealt with in traditional terms, using traditional motifs, as the displays related to 
the Nek illustrate. Beyond this - the sacrifice for one's country - was the sacrifice for 
the victory of one's country. The image of Lieutenant Tumour giving his life so his 
platoon might capture a pill-box was the epitome of the sacrifice for victory, and of 
the Memorial's commemoration. Men had died in the war, the Memorial argued, and 
that was a horrible truth, but those men would be remembered, whenever they could 
be, as great warriors, as triumphal Bayards who protected the weak from tyrants. 
Often, even in their death they would be seen so. Their lives would be depicted as 
F.M. Cutlack had said: "before all but death they were invincible." 
Tt was in these displays on defeats and realities that the Memorial incorporated 
anti-war ideas and sentiments, appropriating them in the process. These included 
sadness and a great compassion for those who had been in the trenches, enduring 
danger and the conditions of the front lines. These ideas, treated so as to depoliticise 
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them, then served the nation, and moreover, allowed the museum to appropriate some 
of the anti-war literature 's realist authenticity. The Memorial was able to depict death 
and the wounded in a relatively realistic manner, yet remain firmly within the 
mainstream of Austral ian commemoration, war literature and nationalist propaganda, 
which had taken a "realist" tum in the 1850s. It was the graphic depiction of 
mutilation, madness, and horror, and the criticism, that tntly marked off the anti-war. 
Thus, the Memorial's approach to realities should still be called "traditional,'' despite 
the inclusion of a significant amount of '·modem" imagery and interpretation. The 
Memorial's overall approach could never be considered anti-war or "modern," 
because the notions of glory, honour and sacrifice rang as stridently and as proudly 
within it as they had within the pages of Tennyson, Fitchett and Kipling. These words 
had not lost their meaning, according to the Memmial. The tone remained as upbeat 
as possible, with little of the "numbing grief, bitterness and ... deep disillusionment" 
that many of the soldiers had felt when the battles had actually been fought. 102 
These representations do, however, also illustrate the broader commemorative 
shift from triumph to sacrifice that was taking place during the inter-war years, which 
influenced the Memorial to a degree in the late 1920s. This led, among other 
developments, to a greater prominence being given to the artwork of Will Dyson in 
Sydney than had been the case in Melbourne, culminating in the adoption of a Dyson 
draw ing for a symbolic change of the cover of Bean's guides in 1928. This was not as 
radical a development as it might appear. The display of realities, even sublimated by 
the victorious narrative, was a turn away from triumphalism, but it was not an 
embrace of the anti -war position. 1t was st ill powerfully national , for the new image 
was intimate and reassuring, showing a Digger carving his mate 's name onto a cross, 
symbolised the nation honouring its dead through the operation of the Memorial 
itself. 103 It was a melancholy image, a romantic image. Further, crosses were symbols 
of victory as much as death in the Memorial. Lastly, and intriguingly, by the time of 
the switch it was less important to emphasise prowess in any case, since the idea was 
widely accepted as fact in Australia by 1928, something the issue of the ADCC's 
Anzac Dav from that year illustrates. 
l u~ Andrews, The Anzac Illusion, p.96. 
101 Pacifi sm, by contrast, was international. See Ramussen, The Lesser Evil?, pp.6-18. 
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Finally, the Memorial's attempt to spare and salve the feelings of its visitors 
illustrates a fundamental fact about the institution, the depth and integrity of its 
identification with its nation. The manipulation of memory inherent in much of the 
tri umphal display material was for the nat ion's own good, designed to create goodwill 
between Australians based on a united acknowledgement of the achievements of the 
AIF and the sacrifices made for those achievements. The imagined community served 
by the Memorial was one for which the institution had a great deal of affection, for 
this was the affection of its creator, Charles Edwin Woodrow Bean. 
311 
Conclusion 
Figure 60: The Digger by Charles Wheeler. 
Source: Australian War Memorial Collections 
Database. cas.awm.gov.au. Painting 09327 
I 
The Memorial contributed strongly to the Anzac Legend, providing a public narrative 
and other displays which affected to prove - and were taken by many Australians as 
having proved - the most important assertion of the Legend - that Australian soldiers 
were superior. The Memorial's displays, governed by a strict and overt realism, were 
unique contributors to the Legend. No other agency could muster such a potent 
combination of physical objects and authoritative text, appealing simultaneously to 
the senses, the intellect and the emotions of vis itors. The realistic presentation 
supported two vital assertions: firstly that the Australians had, indeed, won the battles 
they were said to have won, and secondly that the moral virtues which were used 
throughout the Memorial 's displays to explain such success were not interpretations, 
but statements of fact The symbolic meanings which the Memorial held were backed 
up by this realist logic and took on the stature of natural truth . The Al F, the Memorial 
argued. had been an army of great men who had done great military deeds. 
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The Memorial offered its audiences a complex array of displays, but one 
overarching idea united them. This was the "national" interpretation of the war, the 
interpretation offered by those, such as Bean, who were dedicated to educating the 
Australian nation about what, in their opinion, that nation had experienced and done 
during the war. "National" interpreters sought out national lessons from the incidents 
of the war, locating Australian excellence and displaying it to a national audience in 
the hope of inspi ring future generations. In the Memorial during the inter-war years, 
as I have demonstrated, excellence was expressed principal ly in tenns of military 
success and supe1ior martial virtues. 
The Memorial was dedicated to the protection of the fighting reputation of the 
AIF as the basis for a new national tradition. The major ways in which this was done 
consisted of a narrative of the Australian overseas war experience, a collective pOiirait 
of the AIF, and disp lays offering direct evidence, such as trophies. The greater part of 
the dissertation is concerned with these issues; Chapters Four and Five explore them 
directly, wh ile Chapters One to Three provide background and context. 
The Memorial's narrative of the war showed a "test" at Gall ipoli, an "ordeal" 
especially in France in 1916 and 1917, and a ''triumph" in both France and Palestine 
in 1918. The test, as presented by the Memorial , was to successfully storm the cliffs 
and establish strong trench lines there, a test which, the museum argued, the AIF had 
passed with fl ying colours. This proved Austra lian military manhood. Bean argued 
that Australian men exhibited most of the traits of the EngLish gentleman, which he 
sa'v as the model for correct behaviour. These traits included courage, nobility (often 
described in terms such as ''clean" and '·straight"), and a will to conquer and rule. At 
the same time, part of being a gentleman (and therefore a good citizen, and a good 
nation by extension) was the ability to lose well, which redeemed failure with moral 
victory. The "ordeal'' phase of the war narrative, in which the A IF suffered terrible 
casualties in defeats at Fromelles and First Bullecourt, and in pyrrhic victories at 
Pozieres and Second Bullecolllt, proved that Australians could do so. The gentleman 
- and the plebeian gentlemen which Bean felt the Australians were- also had to be 
able to win, though. Gentlemen ntled, and they had to find a way to enforce that rule 
if necessary. The triumphal phase of the war naJTative proved that they could do this, 
showing in the process the Australians weaving "a fresh and b1illiant strand into the 
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tradit ions of the Imperial Am1ies.''1 Here the Australians showed that they could 
match any nat ion for strength of arms , and thus proved their martial nationalist mettle 
beyond doubt. 
The collective portrait of the AIF, which interpreted the primary assertion of 
mi li tary supremacy, depicted a group of men who were mighty, ruthless warriors, yet 
noble in victory and kind to the defeated. The moral virtues of the gentleman -
ferocity in battle, kindness in v ictory, endurance, nobility of heart, loyalty - were 
ascribed to the men, and, importantly, both linked to their military victories and to the 
future of the Australian nation. These were the virtues which the Memorial argued 
ought to be permanently remembered and made the basis of national traditions. These 
.. British"' virtues were supplemented, to the improvement of all, as the Memorial 
argued, by home-grown "Australian" traits such as initiative and free thinking, the 
abi lity to make decisions, ingenuity, humour and light-heartedness. This collective 
portrait was the model for future generations of Australian men. 
To ensure that the national mettle was truly proved, the Memorial mixed into 
the narrative a number of displays which offered physical, incontestable evidence of 
Australian military supremacy. These included photographs of dead enemy sold iers~ 
trophies labelled so as to focus on the killing of "Fritzes" and the seizing of their 
property, and a number of other somewhat dubious displays. The brutality of a terrible 
war was never more evident than in these displays, as the Memorial' s anti-German 
displays reflected ongoing bitterness towards the fanner enemy in the early 1920s. 
The Memorial went well beyond triumphal ism, however, as Chapter Six 
explores. The manner in which issues such as Australian defeat, death and wounding 
were treated is extremely instructive, for these were not hidden from the public or 
ignored by what was in other ways a triumphal institution. Indeed, the "national" 
interpretation of the war which governed the d isplays argued that such ordeal s made 
the Australians' final victory all the more praiseworthy. Truth was the key issue here, 
and as I demonstrate, the Memorial 's truth was not that of anti-war writers. Two 
"cultures'' existed, one "monumental ," the other "anti-monumental," and each had a 
different " truth." The war experience had seen horror, victory, compassion and 
heroism. along with numerous other emotions and aspects of human nature, and it was 
1 Sydney Photograph 162. Relics and Records. Apri l 1928, p .93; Dece mber 193 1, p.94. 
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possible for activists to select and treat incidents and anecdotes in such a way that the 
public memories so constructed were whol ly or almost wholly made up of verifiable 
facts. The question was one of interpretation and selection rather than one version 
being true and the other false. The monumenta l culture expressed itself through 
cultural fo1ms which have been labelled "traditional'' and others labelled "high 
diction," while the anti-monumental did so through "modem memory" cultural fonns. 
The "tradition" thesis, promoted by Jay Winter and other scholars, asserts that 
memories of the war included images and ideas which had prevai led in the pre-war 
era, used primarily in mourning rituals for the relief of bereavement. Tradition, 
Winter argues. while being reworked by post-war citizens, prov ided a great deal of 
solace and comfort, and was thus widespread. The ''high diction" thesis concentrates 
on the creation and usage of propaganda. George Mosse was a leading scholar in this 
school, and Samuel Hynes has written on the topic also. In contrast to these two 
interpretations of the war, "modern memory" emphasised the memory of horror, 
pointlessness and death on an enonnous scale. Disjunction was the key notion, with a 
decisive break identified between the pre-war period and the post-war era. 
The question of where the Memorial fits into these wider theories of cultural 
legacy of the First World War has concerned scholars. The Memorial has been placed 
in the "modem memory'' interpretation by writers such as Michael McKernan and 
Peter Stanley. I dem ur, seeing the Memoria l's inter-war displays as offering a 
combination of tradit ion and high diction, based on the former but going further than 
offering simply solace and using certain triumphal elements of European traditions 
which were being used Jess in post-war Europe itself. The Memorial offered 
propaganda at times, while at other times it sought to salve the grief of the bereaved. 
At al l times, however, it sought to praise the dead, and to glorify the AIF in terms of 
its military performance. Whilst the "real ities" of the war were, as Chapter Six 
explores, depicted in realistic ways, the "national" interp retation of the war ensured 
that the criticism of the conduct of the war, which was a vital characteristic of 
''modern memory" agenc ies, was absent from the Memorial, with the exception of 
extremely mild criticism of B1itish authorities which cannot be considered sufficient 
to label the Memorial "anti-monumental" or "modem memory," rather being in the 
nature of an assertion of independence within the British Empi re. 
Chapter S ix demonstrates conclusively that, so far from being an anti -
monumental " modem memory" institution recalling the horror of the war, the 
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vtemorial was a monumental "traditional" agency, being very little, if at all , 
influenced by the anti-war position. The Memorial dealt sensitively and carefully with 
the "realities" of war, such as wounding, but always added important national caveats. 
In the example of wounded men, the Memorial defended the national military system, 
and when depicting death. promoted the heroic notion of sacrifice for victory as a 
means of symbolically conquering death on behalf of the Australian war dead. This 
was the Memorial 's most important gift to the AI F, to whom it was ultimate! y 
dedicated - the fallen would not be remembered publicly as " fallen," but as heroic 
warriors who had done !:,'Teat th ings in life. They would be remembered forever, the 
Memorial promised, through ''a praise that never ages." 
A further thesis, re lated to Winter's "traditional" thesis, is Ken Inglis's 
"sacred" thesis. He sees commemoration as a "civi l" religion, and argues his case 
persuasively. As examined in the introduction, l feel that his interpretation is more 
appropriate to the later, Canberra-based, Memorial, than to the interim exhibitions 
which are the topic of this dissertation. The truly "sacred" elements of the Memorial -
the Hall of Memory, the Pool of Reflection, the Cloisters, the Tomb of the Unknown 
Soldier, whose very names are redolent of religiosity - did not yet exist. Certa inly 
there were sacred elements within the displays, emanating from the objects 
themselves. and, as Chapter Three explores, accepted as sacred by some of the 
Memorial's most prominent supporters. However, as indicated, the historical, rather 
rhan the sacred, aspects of the objects were predominant. 
Inter-war Australian public memories were equa lly or even more triumphal 
than the Memoria l's displays. This was particularly true of soldier-writers' literature 
concerning the war, which was replete with "big- noting," as Robin Gerster has 
demonstrated. The principal influence on Australian commemoration which led to this 
triumphalism was martial nationalism. ln addition, the ferocity and exultation in the 
destruction of the enemy that were inherent in many triumphal displays inside the 
Memorial were products of wartime and survived long into the peace. 
Maltial nationalism was the more fundamenta l influence, however. The fact 
that Austra lians were concerned with constructing a new national tradition, based 
upon their troops ' war experiences, was vital. Searching as they were for a national 
past which might compete wi th British history, martial nationalism - in which 
military success proved a nation 's mettle - served them admirably, offering a path to 
parity with the ancient cultures of the Old World. Austra lia was unable to compete in 
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terms of artistic, literary or intellectua l achievements, but it could claim to have 
outdone Britain - Australians' main yardstick for a successful nation - militarily 
during the war. Martial nationalism claimed that mili tary actions were far more 
important, ultimately, than artistic or intellectual endea vour in any case, so its 
adoption gave Australians reason for confidence in themselves. 
The Memorial thus tells us much about nationalism in Australia in the inter-
war period. It was focussed upon memories of the war to a great degree; indeed, 
within the realm of war commemoration, nationalism throve in inter-war Australia. 
There was a significant level of what was "true" Australian national sentiment 
involved, according to contemporary definitions of the expression. It may not have 
been of the " independent," pre-1900 variety, but it was nonetheless very strong, and 
not purely Imperial as some have argued. Many nationalists, such as Bean, had an 
independent idea of Australia which, while incorporating the Empire, did not do so in 
a manner which was purely, or even mainl y, deferential. A national sentiment 
definitely existed in many areas, although beyond the focuss ing intensity of war 
commemoration this national feeling was not so strong. Australians were proud of 
their soldiers, though, and the Memorial was the ultjmate embodiment of the fact , its 
popularity testament to it. 
The whole Memorial was oriented toward the futu re of its nation. Jt assured 
Australians that they had the virtues to face anything. Jt was a strong affirmation of 
Australia and its future, an optimistic statement. It is interesting to speculate that part 
of this message for the nation concemed the perceived danger of the so-called Yellow 
Peri l, particularly Japan. After the First World War many Australians began to see 
Japan as a likely antagonist, and part of the message of the Memorial and the Anzac 
Legend generally may have served to reassure the country that any attack would be 
met by a military force which had destroyed the Gem1ans, previously the greatest 
army in the world, and which would therefore surel y defeat the lowly Japanese. The 
country was safe. 
II 
r have attempted to provide a new interpretation of the Memorial through the use of a 
new perspective, one which brings the Memorial's displays to the foreground, as 
befits Australia's first truly national museum. The sources I have used in the 
dissertation, including display and diorama labels, guidebooks, photographs and their 
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labels and architectural plans, have allowed insight into the Memorial which cannot 
be gained in any other way. This has been the main point of difference between my 
approach and that of previous scholars, and has led to conclusions considerably 
different from. yet also in places complementary to, earlier studies. 
The conclusions that may be drawn from the Memorial's significant number 
of ferocious and triumphal displays have led me to part ways with most previous 
scholars of the Memorial on a number of fundamental points conceming the 
institution 's objectives and their realisation. The latter, realisation of objectives, is a 
particular point of difference between my work and that of other writers: I have 
sought to understand the Memorial's messages to its audience before answering the 
question as to what the institution's nature was; C.E.W. Bean's public relations 
statements must not be accepted as complete and accurate enunciations of what his 
Memorial did. This they were not - they were carefully tailored statements 
concentrating on such elements of the Memoria l as appeared most useful from time to 
time in promoting Bean 's mission of getting an expensive and complex project 
completed. They thus need to be treated with care and interrogated in light of other 
evidence, a practice I have endeavoured to follow. 
The appeal to the displays has assisted my pursuit of the key insights into the 
Memorial which scholars such as Michael McKeman. Tony Bennett, Kimberley 
Webber. Jenny Bell and Ken Inglis have made. Webber, for instance, raises the issue 
of symbolic meanings, begging the detailed examination of them which I have 
undertaken. Bell and others have pointed out that the Memorial was dedicated to 
nation -building, yet have had insufficient space in short a1iicles to explore its nature. 
To examine this nation-building in detail requ ires extensive investigation of 
Austra lian "emotional" nation-building in the pre-war era, all the war through to the 
late 1930s, which I have done in Chapters One and Two. The final three chapters, 
examining the displays. outline the manner in which martial nation-building 
imperati ves were implemented. 
I agree with Michael McKeman that the Memorial 's miSSIOn included 
commemoration of service and sacrifice, but argue that this was neither the first nor 
the strongest of the Memorial's objectives, as Chapter Three demonstrates. This does 
not make his insight inva lid, however, for certainly service and sacrifice were 
commemorated in the Memorial. However, such an interpretation must remain partial, 
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needing the complementary triumphal understanding which J have added to our vision 
of the Memoria l in the inter-war period. 
The question of militarism in the Memorial again benefits from examination 
of the displays. There has been a tendency in Australian historical scholarship to 
argue, although not nonnally in the same breath, that the Anzac Legend was militarist 
but the Memorial was not, and thus a temptation might exist to separate the two. This 
likel ihood is scotched by recourse to what the Memorial sa id, for this was clearly and 
unambiguously militarist, as I have demonstrated. The argument that Australian 
commemoration was militarist, which scholars have add ressed but which requires 
more examination, receives support from my reading ofthe Memorial's displays and, 
in Chapter Two, of Armistice Day and Anzac Day rhetoric. As 1 have reiterated, tllis 
militarism was a home-grovvn Australian brand, not to be confused with Prussian 
militarism, in which certain additional civic and social rights were gained by those 
who had served. In addition, members of the Digger-Nationalist commemorative 
complex enjoyed control of vital platfOJms at which national identity was enunciated 
and defined, and the ideal Australian which many fonner officers, as well as the 
Memorial, defined, was based very strongly on moral virtues which had origins in 
British and European military traditions. 
Ill 
The ways in which nationaJ identities are presented in public spaces is important, for 
public control is affective control, and can be politically co-opted. Tn the political 
climate of 2004, where "values" are the political coin of choice, public memories are 
more important than ever. Many of the elements of the ideal Australian which the 
Memorial of 1922-35 embodied retain their relevance today. Certainly the control of 
public history has never been a more hotl y contested issue, with conservatives 
showing a strong desire to present a national history that embodies their economic and 
political sensibilities. Never has interrogation of our national institutions been more 
necessary, as political correctness is drummed out and replaced with "affirmative 
orthodoxy."2 lt is all the more important to subject public institutions and public 
representations to a searching test, seeking to illuminate their messages - in their 
roots, objectives, composition, and political and social affiliations, so that we might 
2 Macintyre, The HisiOI)' Wars, p.198. 
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better understand what we are saying about ourselves and our ancestors - who we are, 
what they have done. By coming to grips with the details of public stories, we come to 
a better appreciation of what it is that national institutions are telling us about 
ourselves, what meanings of the past they have produced in public spaces. 
Finally, one major objective of my elaboration of "Australian militarism" is to 
illuminate the extraordinary degree to which our Australian nationalism is based on 
war and the military. Our nationalism, as is common to many modem nations, is at its 
most strident, its most passionately-felt, when focussed by war or its memory. Jt is a 
commonplace to say that the First World War made Australia a nation, but it is less 
common to infer from this that some of the values and virtues of the warrior, such as 
ferocity, detennination and ruthlessness, have become infused into the very fibre of 
our collective identity, at least in its dominant forms. Certainly many Australians exist 
who wholly reject Bean's Anzac legacy and all it stands for, but I feel it is reasonable 
to argue that such people stand outside the mainstream of Australian social life. To be 
Australian normally involves an acceptance, however tacit, of the Legend. 
This said, the manner in which we commemorate the First World War has 
changed considerably in Aush·alia, and few would deny that it has been for the better. 
Sacrifice of life is now the primary message, and the conquest of Palestine in 191 7-1 8 
or the rout of the German army in 1918 are remembered only by military historians 
and some enthusiasts. The nature of our understanding of Gall ipoli has also changed 
radically, with the actual storming of the cliffs less important than the lives lost. 
The change from triumph to sacrifice has been gradual , and it is still possible 
to observe many echoes of past commemorative forms. In particular, the pride in 
Australian military ability has remained undiminished, although the method of its 
expression has changed. As war has followed war, Australians have come to accept 
that their soldiers in each one "fol lowed in the footsteps" of the Anzacs, "upholding 
the tradition. " Thus today pride in military ability is often unstated, except in 
situations such as that surrounding the InterFET intervention in East Timor in 1999, in 
which Australian soldiers' professional ism and detennination saved many lives and 
established the security needed for a new State to emerge on the island. That we did 
not feel the need to display the bodies of West Timorese militiamen killed by the 
Australians or trophies taken from them indicates both a national moral growth and, 
perhaps, the internalisation of pride in Australian martial abilities, fo r the satisfaction 
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in some quarters that our men had defeated these dangerous and unlawful groups was 
as strong as that embodied in the Memorial 's inter-war displays. 
Triumph, then, remains observable in modem Australia, transfonned and 
largely subl imated to service and sacrifice, but nonetheless alive and influentia l. The 
many developments in commemoration. the media. literature, the arts and politics, to 
name but a few factors, since the mid-1930s, have altered triumphalism, but not 
destroyed it. Placing the creation of meaning in the inter-war Memorial under scrutiny 
also reminds us that such production is occurring today, and to a much greater degree. 
It reminds us to seek out the details in what official myths tell us we are, or should do, 
or should believe. Thus. in a spirit of sel f-improvement which Bean might have 
argued for, it may be time to examine this e lement of our collective psyche more 
closely. in an endeavour to leam more about who we are as a group, and where we 
wish to go. 
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Appendix 1: Statistical Evidence 
In the Memoria l in the inter-war period, not only were representations of victory 
common, but that military success was the dominant theme. The survivi ng display 
material certainl y suggests this. The photographic exhibitions and the guides, which 
are extant, gave the same relative amount of space to images of success, victory and 
supremacy, compared to those of fa ilure, defeat and inferiority, as did the surviving 
labels. For instance, in the 1922 gui de, military success in some form was referred to 
on 45 of its 92 pages. Having references to military success on 49% of pages 
compares with death, 23%, defeat, 1 l %, and irony, 2%. Of these figures, 4% 
combined death and defeat. The photographic exhibition had less concentration on 
victory, with much greater element of technical instruction, but it was still very 
significant as a theme. Of the 174 prints , twenty-nine (16. 7%) specifi cally depicted 
victory. Thi s compares with twe lve images of defeat, ten of wounded men, six of 
danger and three speci fically mentioning death (although two of these were the deaths 
of British troops. not Australians) - respectively 6.8%, 5.7%, 3.5% and 1.7%. In the 
Palestine section, wi th 3 7 images, the proportion of images of victory and supremacy 
increased to 30%, whi le defeat fe ll to 8. 1%, death and the wounded to 2.7% (one 
image each), and danger was not shown at all. France merited I 04 pictures, with I 6 
specifically related to victory (almost all of these in the 19 18 section) or 15.4%. This 
compares with seven for defeat (6.7%), one of British death ( I%), six of danger 
(5. 7%) and nine of wounded men (8. 7%). Victory was, therefore, at least twice as 
prevalent as defeat. 
Further, the amount of display space that was allocated to the vanous 
campaigns suggests emphasis. In Melbourne in 1922, nine of the twenty-one 
campaign display cases were devoted to the successes of 1918. Thus, 43% of these 
display cases were devoted to a period of 7 months out of the 43 months the 
Australians were in the field ( 16%), its seven most successful months. The space 
allocated to the July 1916 to June 1917 period, full of fa ilure as it was, was the same -
one full "court" of three cases - as that given to August 1918, the month which came 
to symbolise the Allied victory. This trend continued in Sydney, but not to the sa me 
extent as in Melbourne. ln Sydney, France 1916 and 19 17 were allocated seven 
display cases, with an add itional two plan models, both of which had extensive labels, 
and the Gueudecourt diorama, which showed the terrible conditions endured by the 
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troops. At the same time, France March-October 1918 also had seven full cases, 
supplemented by two plan models and the Mont St Quentin picture model. Thus, 
while this layout was more balanced, it retained an emphasis on successful actions 
and campaigns. 
A furthe r suggestion of emphasis comes from a tem1inological distinction 
made between locations which had seen victory and those which had seen defeat. In 
Bean's 1928 and 1931 guides Broodseinde in Flanders is called a place of "heroic 
memory." In contrast, in the script for a plan model the Somme battlefield is deemed 
a locality of "evil memory;" a photograph caption read "Flers - Of Evil Memory." 
Both places saw huge loss of Australian life, but Broodseinde was the site of a tactical 
victory, whereas Flers was a failure and the Somme the site of the most pyrrhic of 
victories - Pozieres:~ "Heroic memory,' ' it would thus seem, issued from victory or 
success, and "evil memory" from defeat or failure. Such a distinction again points to 
the high value placed on military victory in the 1920s. Although the endurance of the 
men at Pozieres became legend, and is now widely rehearsed, in the early inter-war 
years the sea rch was always for victories as the primary basis on which to construct a 
military tradition. 
3 Pozieres was attacked in July and August, and Flers in November 1916; Broodseindc was taken in 
October 1917. See Couhhard-Ciark, Encyclopedia , pp.l 17-8, 120-2, 132-3. 
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